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This thesis is concerned with ways in which equality may be materialised through 
politics. It engages with various strands of literature that have had a profound impact on 
theoretical considerations of egalitarian politics. The thesis begins by mapping various 
branches of liberal egalitarianism that all set equality as a political objective. In attempting to 
substantiate equality through the liberal democratic nexus, these thinkers often construct 
their egalitarian models alongside liberal values such as individual liberty, autonomy, human 
rights, and market exchange. These approaches fall short of reconciling their egalitarian 
ambitions with the inegalitarian tendencies of market exchange, reducing equality to a 
question of inequalities in the process. Whereas contemporary neoliberal subjects embody 
the complete marketisation and individualisation of the liberal ideal of autonomy, hence 
foreclosing its egalitarian potential into purely heteronomous conducts, Jacques Rancière and 
Alain Badiou provide a way out of the impasse of liberal (in)equality. They do so by 
reconceptualising equality as a starting point rather than an objective of politics. Framed as 
such, egalitarian politics becomes a fully emancipatory project depending on the work of a 
subject for its realisation. Although Rancière’s egalitarianism is boundless, his account of 
subjectivation is politically limiting. Conversely, Badiou offers a methodical account of the 
process of ‘becoming subject’ rooted in his notions of ‘event’, ‘truth’, and ‘fidelity’. Focusing 
specifically on the latter, the last part of this thesis will theorise the notion of faith as a process 
for the materialisation of egalitarian politics. Against Badiou, political fidelity will be 
conceptualised as a subjective as well as an objective procedure. The object of political fidelity 
is the actual constitution of a collective. To the extent that theoretical subjects and truths play 
a crucial role in enacting egalitarian politics, existing bodies also actively participate in its 
material elaboration through a distinctive perspective provided by the horizontality of the 
existing ground, and their capacity to relate as equal through economic production, 
distribution, and exchange.  
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Can equality be realised by politics? This question has captured the imagination of 
political thinkers for centuries. Unsurprisingly, their answers greatly vary in scope. Even when 
this question is articulated within contemporary debates, it remains difficult to identify 
theorists who might agree on a set definition of either equality or politics, let alone the 
process by which egalitarian politics may effectively be realised. Amongst the multitude of 
egalitarian frameworks populating political theory, equality may appear as a goal, a starting 
point, or an obstacle to politics. Suggestions concerning the best way to politically apply 
equality are even more abundant. Within the conceptual mist generated by the question of 
egalitarian politics, this thesis aims to provide a thorough theoretical engagement with some 
of the most stimulating accounts of equality in contemporary political theory. Two theoretical 
approaches appear especially well suited to discussing the political potential of equality. One 
may be labelled as liberal egalitarianism and sets equality as a political goal to be achieved in 
a liberal democratic context. The other encompasses the work of Jacques Rancière and Alain 
Badiou, establishing equality as a starting point of politics understood, in part, as a process of 
emancipation from the liberal state. Based on the impossibility for liberal egalitarians to 
decisively resolves paradoxes inherent to the liberal democratic nexus, this thesis follows 
Rancière and Badiou in recognising the importance of setting equality as a pre-requisite of 
politics. The confrontation of these two highly contrasted propositions, alongside discussions 
of neoliberalism and the notion of faith will foreground the possibility to consider the 
materialisation of egalitarian politics through the figure of a faithful political collective.   
This thesis will begin with a discussion of liberal approaches to equality. Liberalism has 
been and continues to be one of the most influential approaches to egalitarianism. Setting 
the stage for these models is the liberal democratic nexus. At the core of this modern union 
lays a desire to uphold individual autonomy without sacrificing the goal of collectively 
realising the promise of democratic equality. The work of thinkers concerned with the political 
implications of the historical encounter between democracy and liberalism will be discussed 
to contextualise contemporary approaches to liberal equality. Through the work of Claude 
Lefort, Marcel Gauchet, Norberto Bobbio, or Pierre Rosanvallon, one gains a fuller 





autonomy, and market exchange underpinning the liberal democratic nexus.1 From the 
philosophical tension between liberty and equality, to the difficulty of reconciling collective 
and individual goals, these readings reveal contradictions and paradoxes embedded within 
the liberal democratic framework still affecting the work of contemporary liberal egalitarians. 
The first chapter of this thesis will discuss liberal egalitarianism through two main 
approaches: redistribution and recognition. Redistributive considerations of equality and 
justice encompass the work of thinkers like John Rawls and Ronald Dworkin, for whom 
equality results from redistributing goods, resources, or rights.2 Although Rawls and Dworkin 
differ in their approaches, they both construct highly idealised frameworks through which 
substantive equality may be achieved in a context defined by individual choice and market 
exchange. On the other hand, proponents of recognition like Nancy Fraser, Iris Marion Young, 
and Seyla Benhabib consider equality through the prism of inclusion and identity.3 In their 
view, achieving equality depends on further integrating marginalised groups who have been 
historically excluded from the demos. Such inclusion largely takes place through the 
expansion of rights and rests on the state’s capacity to recognise the claims of identity-based 
groups. Another significant endeavour is Amartya Sen and Philip Pettit’s effort to 
conceptualise equality as equal freedom, revitalising the notion of individual autonomy 
through capabilities and republicanism respectively.4 One thread running throughout all 
these theories is the difficulty of reconciling market exchange and individual autonomy with 
the pursuit of substantive equality, an issue these thinkers only provide partial answers to. 
Despite the great range of egalitarian propositions offered by liberal theorists, their accounts 
are eventually let down by an unwillingness to question the egalitarian potential of market 
exchange. Although proponents of recognition like Nancy Fraser and Iris Marion Young 
 
1 See Pierre Rosanvallon, The Society of Equals (Cambridge: Harvard University Press), 2013; Claude Lefort, 
Essais sur le politique XIX-XXe siècles (Paris: Editions de Seuil), 1986; Norberto Bobbio, Liberalism & Democracy 
(London: Verso), 1990; Marcel Gauchet, La Révolution Moderne, L’avènement de la Démocratie I (Paris : 
Gallimard), 2013. 
2 See John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge: Harvard University Press), 1999; Ronald Dworkin, “What is 
Equality? Part 1: Equality of Welfare,” Philosophy & Public Affairs; and Ronald Dworkin, “What is Equality? Part 
2: Equality of Resources,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 10 (1981). 
3 See See Iris Marion Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference (New Jersey: Princeton University Press), 
2011; Nancy Fraser and Axel Honneth, Redistribution or Recognition? (London: Verso), 2003; and Seyla 
Benhabib, The Claims of Culture, Equality and Diversity in the Global Era (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press), 2002. 
4 See See Philip Pettit, On the People’s terms (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 2012; and Amartya Sen, 





attempt to exceed the egalitarian limits of markets, they too tend to consider equality 
negatively as a result of undermining inequalities.  
Liberal conceptions of equality also include those who dismiss equality as a 
fundamental limit on individual liberty and autonomy such as neoliberalism.5 Chapter two 
will discuss neoliberal politics through a conceptual portrait of the contemporary neoliberal 
subject. By denying the political potential of equality, neoliberal thought is often presented 
as antithetical to politics. Against this interpretation, neoliberalism will be interpreted as a 
branch of political economy that rests on a complete marketisation of politics. Addressing the 
current hegemony of the neoliberal ethos is needed, not only to critique its complete 
dismissal of collective politics, but also because it sheds lights on the egalitarian shortcomings 
of liberalism. Neoliberal subjects’ openly individualistic and desire-driven conducts signal the 
complete marketisation of the liberal ideal of individual autonomy, surrendering its early 
collective and egalitarian objectives in the process.  
In the second part of this thesis, Jacques Rancière and Alain Badiou will be recognised 
for offering a way out of the impasse of liberal (in)equality. By establishing equality as the 
starting point of politics rather than its goal, both thinkers re-substantiate egalitarian politics 
as a process towards collective emancipation as opposed to a strategy towards undermining 
inequalities.6 Whereas Rancière arguably radicalises the egalitarian content of democracy 
further than any other contemporary thinker, the making of a political subject or 
‘subjectivation’ appears as a full stop in his otherwise ground-breaking political thought. 
Alternatively, Badiou axiomatizes equality within his mathematical ontology, allowing for a 
methodical account of political subjectivation as a result of which political materiality may be 
envisaged. Through the deployment of concepts such as ‘the event’, ‘truth procedure’, and 
‘fidelity’, Badiou reignites the political potential of subjectivation left dormant by Rancière.  
The third and final part of this thesis comprises of two chapters. Each expands on the 
notions of faith and fidelity as a process through which egalitarian politics may be thought in 
the concrete forms of its appearance. Chapter five is dedicated to the egalitarian potential of 
the notion of faith. Building on Pauline theology and the work of Søren Kierkegaard, Giorgio 
 
5 See See Friedrich Hayek, The Road to Serfdom (London: Routledge), 2001; and Milton Friedman, Capitalism 
and Freedom (Chicago: University of Chicago Press), 1962. 
6 See Alain Badiou, Being and Event (London: Continuum), 2007; Badiou, Logics of Worlds Being and Event 2 
(London: Continuum 2009; and Jacques Rancière, Disagreement: Politics and Philosophy (Minneapolis: 





Agamben, and Simon Critchley, the argument will be made that a secularised form of faith 
has the potential to serve as a process for the materialisation of egalitarian politics.7 Yet, away 
from Agamben, Badiou, and Kierkegaard, political faith will not be theorised as a purely 
subjective commitment. Rather, faith redefined as fidelity must also have an objective 
component if it is to play a part in materialising egalitarian politics. The final chapter of this 
thesis will be fully dedicated to deciphering the objective facet of political fidelity. Against 
Badiou’s rebuttal of existing bodies in favour of a theoretical political subject, the political 
potential of existing bodies will be reasserted alongside the subject. Both subject and bodies 
must be fully integrated within the figure of a collective subject-body when it comes down to 
conceptualising political materiality. Objectively, the materialisation of egalitarian politics 
depends on the fidelity of a collective subject-body grounded within a determinate space and 
set in a specific temporality. This thesis will conclude on the claim that materialising 
egalitarian politics is contingent on the basal space of the ground, providing a shared 
perspective to bodies on their possible subjectivation as a collective subject-body, as well as 













7 See Giorgio Agamben, The Time that Remains (Stanford: Stanford University Press), 2005; Simon Critchley, 
Faith of the Faithless Experiments in Political Theology (London: Verso), 2012; Søren Kierkegaard, Concluding 
Unscientific Practice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 2009; and Alain Badiou, St Paul The Foundation 





Part I | Equality through the Liberal Democratic Veil: 
Individual Autonomy and Markets as a Limit 
 
Chapter 1 
Aiming for Equality Within the Liberal Democratic Nexus 
 
Introduction 
In contemporary political theory, the concept of equality is overwhelmingly discussed 
through the prism of liberal democracy. Determining the political processes by which equality 
may materialise demands that the historical and intellectual encounter between democratic 
thought and liberalism be discussed. In order to thoroughly engage with contemporary 
egalitarian literature, one must first assess the intricacies of the modern association between 
these two different philosophical traditions which became conflated to the point of being 
hardly distinguishable.8 The complex union of democracy, conveying notions of equality and 
popular sovereignty, with liberalism emphasising individual liberty, human rights, and 
economic exchange must not be dismissed as a mere step of democratic history. The 
emergence of liberal democracy is an unprecedented event signalling the convergence of two 
distinct political visions. Many thinkers have outlined the philosophical antagonism by which 
the pursuit of equality inevitably entails a limit on liberty.9 This fundamental tension emerges 
as a useful tool to apprehend various strand of egalitarianism within the liberal democratic 
nexus. Whereas some minimise the philosophical divergence between liberty and equality, 
others over-emphasise it. Yet, most scholars on both sides of the theoretical spectrum frame 
 
8 Chantal Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox (London: Verso, 2000), 2-3.  
9 Modern thinkers such as Benjamin Constant and Alexis de Tocqueville were aware of this antagonism in their 
discussions of liberal democracy. As a liberal, Constant outlined the incompatibility of liberty and equality by 
arguing that the pursuit of equality engenders a subordination of individual liberty to the interest of the 
totality. [Benjamin Constant, « De la Liberté des Anciens comparée a celle des modernes » in Collection 
Complete des Ouvrages (Paris : Brechet Librairie 1820), 253.]  
De Tocqueville also pointed to this contradiction writng that “We encounter in the hearts of men a degenerate 
taste for equality which inspires the weak to bring the strong down to their own level and reduce men to 
prefer equality in a state of slavery to inequality in a state of freedom.” [Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in 
America and Two Essays on America (London: Penguin Books, 2003), 67.]  





their accounts of democratic equality alongside liberal ideals of individual liberty, autonomy, 
and market exchange. 
The first section of this chapter will focus on the work of authors whose thought rests 
on a historical account of the convergence of democracy and liberalism. Beginning the 
chapter with this literature allows for the possibility to introduce crucial resemblances and 
divergences between the two intellectual traditions. The political philosophy of Pierre 
Rosanvallon, Claude Lefort, Norberto Bobbio, and Marcel Gauchet will be discussed. From 
Rosanvallon’s historical retracing of equality, to Lefort’s conception of democracy as an empty 
place, Bobbio’s consideration of liberalism and democracy as individualistic traditions, and 
Gauchet’s emphasis on individual autonomy and human rights, the egalitarian ideal of a ruling 
demos always appears mediated and sometimes overwhelmed by liberal notions of individual 
liberty, autonomy, and market distribution. In the face of economic and political liberalism, 
equality is often reformulated as a question of individual rights.10 The value of these historical 
interpretations of the relationship between democracy and political liberalism is undeniable. 
Nonetheless, they will be challenged based on their relative omission of economic liberalism, 
and on their deterministic consideration of liberal democracy as a historical necessity. In 
response, it will be argued that economic liberalism is crucial in making sense of equality’s 
role within the liberal democratic nexus, while liberal democracy is not an inescapable 
historical necessity.11 Providing an account of the historical convergence of democracy and 
liberalism sets the stage for engaging with contemporary thinkers for whom democratic 
equality cannot be thought outside the bounds of liberal democracy. Amongst the latter, 
many political scholars including John Rawls, Ronald Dworkin, Iris Marion Young, Nancy 
Fraser, Seyla Benhabib, Amartya Sen or Elizabeth Anderson have been concerned with ways 
to interpret and reinvigorate the notion of equality within a liberal democratic framework. 
With the exception of Fraser and Young, they may be labelled liberals to the extent that their 
work displays a deep attachment to individual liberty and an unwillingness to fundamentally 
question the institution of the market. For most of these thinkers, achieving equality is a 
political goal essentially compatible with the liberal ethos.  
 
10 Norberto Bobbio, Liberalism & Democracy (London: Verso 1990), 31-32. 
11 Marcel Gauchet, Que Faire ? Dialogue sur le Communisme, le Capitalisme et l’Avenir de la Démocratie (Paris : 
Philo Editions 2014), 90; Claude Lefort, Essais sur le politique XIX-XXe siècles (Paris: Editions de Seuil, 1986), 28; 





The first set of liberal egalitarians to be discussed includes the work of John Rawls and 
Ronald Dworkin who both conceptualise equality through the prism of distributive justice. In 
their view, justice requires that certain benefits (such as rights, resources, or welfare) be 
distributed equally.12 Distributive conceptions of justice and equality are not primarily 
focused on political equality in its current parliamentary and representative form. In fact, 
distributivists tend to exceed formal discussions of equality to directly address disparities in 
individual socio-economic conditions. It is the nature of the goods to be distributed which 
defines each strand of distributive equality. Resource egalitarians such as Dworkin defend the 
idea that “people have equal chances to achieve whatever they might seek in life when each 
person commands equal resources.”13 This approach raises complex issues tied to individual 
talent, luck, and market distribution. On the other hand, the egalitarian content of Rawls’ 
broad theory of justice is best characterised by the difference principle, according to which 
socio-economic inequalities should be re-arranged “to the greatest expected benefit of the 
least advantaged”.14 For Rawls, such distribution takes place in the ideal context of an ‘original 
position’ preceding birth when individuals are fully unaware of their future social position in 
the world.  From this standpoint, rational individuals placed behind a ‘veil of ignorance’ will 
be led to adopt a collectivist and egalitarian outlook for every possible future outcome can be 
envisaged.15 Dworkin’s and Rawls’ distributive approaches to equality are best understood in 
contrast to welfarist and realist considerations of equality. Unlike utilitarians who discuss 
equality in consequentialist terms as ‘the greatest happiness of the greatest number’, both 
Dworkin and Rawls construct an ideal redistributive model with the potential to actively 
undermine inequalities through a complex re-articulation of state and market mechanisms.16 
The second strand of egalitarian literature to be discussed in this chapter concerns 
proponents of recognition such as Nancy Fraser, Seyla Benhabib, and Iris Marion Young. These 
thinkers all point to the necessity of conceiving equality through the active recognition of 
 
12 Stuart White, Equality (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2007), 18. 
13 Richard J. Arneson in A companion to Contemporary Political Philosophy 2nd ed. Ed. Robert. E Goodin, Philip 
Pettit and Thomas Pogge (Malden: Blackwell Publishing 2007), 595. 
14 Rawls, 72. 
15 Stuart White, Equality, 41; and Rawls, 121. 
16 See Jeremy Bentham, A Fragment on Government, 2nd ed. Enlarged. (London: Royal Exchange and Lincoln-
Inn Fields), 1823; John Stuart Mill, “Utilitarianism” in Utilitarianism and On Liberty, ed. Mary Warnock (Malden: 
Blackwell Publishing), 2003; Robert A. Dahl, On Political Equality (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006); and 





marginalised groups.17 These groups reflect minority cultural, ethnic, religious, or sexual 
identities that have historically been ignored and excluded from formal political processes. 
For supporters of recognition, equality is to be understood less as the result of fair 
redistribution than as a process of integration and inclusion working towards curbing 
inequalities and injustices. Whereas many distributivists assume a universalist and idealised 
standpoint that usually remains blind to individual differences, proponents of recognition 
argue that individual and group particularities must not be flattened. Instead, they uphold 
marginalised identities by calling for their active recognition by the state and integration 
within liberal democratic processes. Inasmuch as recognitive scholars usually acknowledge 
the egalitarian capacity of states and markets, they demand that the latter be opened to all 
against any types of exclusion.  
The final section of this chapter will be dedicated to thinkers who conceptualise 
equality as an objective to be achieved through individual autonomy and capabilities. This 
concerns supporters of equality of capabilities such as Amartya Sen and Elizabeth Anderson 
as much as republican theorists like Philip Pettit.18 Although most authors mentioned thus far 
recognise the political virtues of individual autonomy, these thinkers take autonomy as the 
primary force towards overcoming the limits set by inequalities upon individuals. Viewed 
through the lens of capabilities, equality works alongside individual autonomy rather than 
resulting from an ideal position or a process of integration.19 The egalitarian task of states and 
markets is not to restrain certain behaviours or integrate certain groups, but to make sure 
that individuals are provided with sufficient capabilities, freedom, and opportunities for 
political participation to achieve their full potential.  
Although rich and varied, many of these approaches to equality suffer from a tendency 
to naturalise market mechanisms. This is done by either overlooking or working around the 
inegalitarian potential of markets that are indexed on individual liberty and autonomy rather 
than equality. To the extent that inequalities are legion in a market environment, taking 
 
17 See Nancy Fraser and Axel Honneth, Redistribution or Recognition? (London: Verso), 2003; and 
Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition, ed. Amy Gutmann (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press), 1995. 
18 See Amartya Sen, Inequality re-examined (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 1995; Sen, “Justice and Identity” 
Economics and Philosophy Volume 30, Issue 1 1-1-10; Elizabeth S. Anderson, “What Is the Point of Equality?” 
Ethics 109 (January 1999); Anderson “How Should Egalitarians Cope with Market Risks?” Theoretical Inquiries 
in Law, Vol 9 number 1, 2008; and Philip Pettit, On the People’s terms (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2012). 





markets for granted while promoting egalitarianism inevitably reduces the question of 
equality to the task of undermining naturalised inequalities. The spectre of the market 
prevents most of these authors from approaching equality as a positive political category. 
Instead of presenting themselves as bearers of equality, states and individuals are assigned 
with the task of ‘correcting inequalities’ that are inherent to the market context in which they 
evolve. Despite the sophistication of some of the models deployed by liberal egalitarians, 
failing to question the desirability of markets forbids the possibility to think equality as a 
positive category detached from the ‘problem’ of inequality. This paradox reveals the weight 
of economic liberalism within the liberal democratic nexus, demanding that the question of 
equality always be mediated by that of individual liberty and autonomy in a market context. 
 
On the Union of Democracy and Liberalism: The Individual as Mediator 
Despite standing as a pillar of western political thought for more than 2000 years, the 
concept of democracy remains largely interpretative. Generally conceived as a system of 
government, contemporary thinkers have referred to democracy as a regime, a technique of 
governing, a power for those who have no legitimacy to govern, or even an ambient milieu.20 
These contrasted interpretations bear witness to the polemical character of the democratic 
ideal. To gain access to the undisputed meaning of democracy one must return to its 
etymological roots. Democracy is made up of two ancient Greek words: demos meaning the 
people or the commons, and kratos signifying rule, sway, or authority.21 As Wendy Brown 
concisely puts it, “The term democracy contains nothing beyond the principle that the demos 
rules.”22 Any interpretation of democracy the exceeds the equal and sovereign capacity of 
the people must be confronted to this open, yet irrefutable signification. Apprehended in this 
 
20 Giorgio Agambden in Democracy in what State?, ed. Amy Allen (New York: Columbia University Press 2011), 
1; Jacques Rancière, La Haine de la Democratie (Paris : La Fabrique Editions 2005), 54. Own translation; and 
Jodi Dean, Democracy and other Neoliberal Fantasies (Durham: Duke University Press, 2009), 80.  
21 “Democracy,” in The Oxford Concise Dictionary of English Etymology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 
118.  
About the meaning of the word democracy, Bobbio explains that “Democracy figures in the famous typology 
of modes of government bequeathed to us by Greek political thought, by which it is defined as government by 
the many or by most or by the majority or by the poor (but where the poor have obtained the upper hand, this 
indicates that power belongs to the pkilhos, to the masses). In short, democracy, as its etymology tells us, is 
government by the people, as opposed to government by one or by a few.” [Bobbio, 25.] 





way, democracy stands in sharp contrast to liberalism and its emphasis on human rights, 
private property, and market exchange.23 However distinct, the democratic promise of a 
ruling demos and the liberal ideals of individual liberty and autonomy have become 
increasingly conflated through the historical development of liberal democracy. Grasping the 
uncertain status of equality within the liberal democratic nexus demands that complex 
historical interactions between the two intellectual traditions be clarified. 
 When investigating the union of democracy and liberalism, few publications are more 
valuable than Norberto Bobbio’s Liberalism & Democracy. In this important book, Bobbio 
retraces the history of liberal democracy, exposing his distinctive vision of the conceptual 
couple. The Italian thinker is quick to remark  that the relationship between the two traditions 
is extremely complex and far from linear.24 He clearly differentiates between classical 
democracy and its modern counterpart on the grounds that ancient Greeks had a more 
totalising vision of the state.25 In his view, modern democracy may be regarded as liberalism’s 
‘natural extension.’26 In The Society of Equals, Rosanvallon casts historical light on this claim 
by outlining the egalitarian sentiment that infused newly formed liberal democracies 
following the American and French Revolutions:  
Independence is equality as autonomy […] a society of autonomous individuals, and a 
community of citizens. Equality was thus conceived in terms of the relative position of 
individuals, the rules governing their interactions, and the principles on which their 
lives in common were based, and these concepts in turn corresponded to three 
possible representations of the social bond. The rights of man, the market, and 
universal suffrage were the underlying institutions.27 
 In the context of late 18th century revolutions, equality was associated with the 
possibility of gaining independence and autonomy from an oppressive state. Alexis de 
Tocqueville, a key witness of the emancipatory potential of emerging liberal democracies in 
 
23 Chantal Mouffe makes this point very clear in the Democratic Paradox when writing that ideas central to 
liberalism “do not have their origin in the democratic discourse but come from elsewhere”, adding later that 
with liberal democracy “we are dealing with a new political form of society whose specificity comes from the 
articulation between two different traditions.” [Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox, 4.] 
24 Bobbio, Liberalism & Democracy, 1. 
25 Ibid, 31. 
26 Ibid. 





France and the United States, depicted the ‘democratic revolution’ as “an irresistible fact 
against which it would be neither desirable nor wise to struggle.”28 Equality was contained 
within the emancipatory promise of a new society of equal individuals founded on human 
rights, market exchange, and equal political participation.29 The subject of liberal democracy 
must be understood “at once individual and people”, “both a subject, bearing specific rights, 
and as a member of a community.”30 In a liberal democratic environment, individual subjects 
are no longer subjected to the authority of the crown. Instead, they are expected to act as 
free and autonomous individuals as well as citizens committed to collective life.31 As 
Rosanvallon remarks, belonging collectively must be complemented by the capacity to act 
autonomously “to invent one’s life, to exist as a subject responsible for oneself.”32 This 
tension between collective civic duties and individual autonomy reflects the deeper struggle 
operating between equality and liberty sustaining the liberal democratic nexus in its entirety. 
Unlike many liberal thinkers, Bobbio does not treat democracy and liberalism as 
fundamentally antithetical categories.33 However, he admits that their articulation demands 
that equality be mediated by individual liberty, autonomy, and the law.34 
The political novelty of the liberal democratic proposition is best understood through 
the concept of autonomy expressed twofold as collectively breaking away from an oppressive 
state, and individually acting on one’s own freedom.35 This shift towards autonomy is most 
 
28 De Tocqueville, Democracy in America, 490. 
29 About the conflation of autonomy and equality in the context of the American revolution, Rosanvallon 
explains that “individual autonomy was seen as essential to the regeneration of the social bond, which would 
be healthy again only when individuals ceased to be separated by barriers of any kind.” [Rosanvallon, 26.] 
30 Ibid, 34. 
31 This double facet of the liberal democratic subject was depicted by de Tocqueville in Democracy in America: 
“In civil life, every man can, if needs be, fancy that he is self-sufficient. In politics, he can imagine no such thing. 
So when a nation has a public life, the idea of associations and the desire to form them are daily in the 
forefront of all citizens’ minds.” [De Tocqueville, Democracy in America, 604.] 
32 Rosanvallon, 22. 
33 About this, Bobbio explains that “liberalism and democracy have never been radically antithetical, even 
though it proved difficult and contentious to graft democratic ideals on to the original stock of liberal 
aspirations, and even though where liberalism and democracy have come together the process has been slow, 
painful and uneven.” [Bobbio, 73.] 
For neoliberal accounts of the antagonism between liberty and equality see Friedrich A. Hayek, The Road to 
Serfdom (Abingdon: Routledge), 2001; and Milton Friedman Capitalism and Freedom (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press), 2002; For a libertarian account see Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1974.) 
34 Bobbio, 33. 
35 The modern consideration of autonomy, tied to self-determination, is usually associated with Kantian 
philosophy. A belief in the capacity for self-rule is the prerequisite for an individualistic apprehension of 
politics.  The notion of autonomy projected onto the figure of the individual is arguably the clearest evidence 





legible through the work of Claude Lefort whose account of the emergence of liberal 
democracy is constructed in contrast to totalitarianism.36 Lefort’s political philosophy is 
commonly associated with the statement that ‘democracy is an emptying of the place of 
power.’37 His distinctive outlook on democracy as an empty place is clearly laid out in Essais 
sur le Politique XIX-XXe siècles: 
In contrast with totalitarianism, democracy reveals itself as a society which formally 
welcomes and contains indeterminacy. […] democratic society institutes itself as a 
society without a body which annuls the idea of representation of an organic totality. 
[…] the unprecedented and revolutionary trait of democracy is designated by the place 
of power becoming an empty place.38 
Following Lefort, the novelty of modern democracy resides in the de-incarnation of 
the body politic previously personified by the figure of the monarch. The locus of politics shifts 
from the totalitarian fusing of the state with civil society to the potential of newly gained 
individual autonomy in an empty and indeterminate place of power.39 Through his 
dismemberment, the body of the monarch discharges power onto the demos in all its 
multiplicity. Whereas the notion of empty place serves as an “image of popular sovereignty”, 
the actual legitimacy of power lays on the autonomous people itself.40 For Lefort, liberal 
democracy does not merely inaugurate the process by which power is emptied, but also the 
phenomenon by which it is dissolved and shared amongst the multiplicity of the demos.41 
 
in its classical form implicitly depends on the idea of autonomy for its theoretical recognition of the political 
legitimacy of a sovereign demos. On the other hand, liberals uncompromisingly elevate the autonomy of 
individual subjects as one of its central political purpose. [See Immanuel Kant, Ethical philosophy (Indianapolis: 
Hackett, 1999); and Immanuel Kant, What is Enlightenment?, Columbia University, 
http://www.columbia.edu/acis/ets/CCREAD/etscc/kant.html.] 
36 Nestor Capdevila explains that Lefort perceives the object of totalitarianism as “the fantasy of ‘the One’ as 
opposed to the reality of totalitarianism that is always divided and conflictual.” [Nestor Capdevila, 
«Totalitarisme, idéologie et démocratie,» Actuel Marx 33 (2003): 171.] 
37 Oliver Marchart points out that this phrase has unfortunately become sloganized by many contemporary 
scholars who limit their discussion of Lefort’s thought to a superficial analysis of this statement. [Oliver 
Marchart, Post-Foundational Political Thought: Political Difference in Nancy, Lefort, Badiou and Laclau 
(Edinburgh: Edinburgh University press, 2007), 85.] 
38 Claude Lefort, Essais sur le Politique XIX-XXe siècles (Paris : Editions du Seuil, 1986), 25,27,28. Own 
Translation. 
39 Claude Lefort, The Political Forms of Modern Society Bureaucracy, Democracy, Totalitarianism (Cambridge: 
The MIT Press, 1986), 224. 
40 Ibid, 279. 
41 The recurrence of the binary opposition between democracy and totalitarianism in Lefort’s work is 
problematic. It exhibits a central theme in his political thought by which the emergence of liberal democracy is 





 In this context, equality is identified with the emancipatory and autonomous potential of 
“proud individuals living as equals [and] not set apart by humiliating differences.”42 
Lefort’s account of modern democracy reveals the cruciality of individuality for 
understanding the political implications of the union between liberalism and democracy. 
Bobbio clarifies this point by treating individualism as a common theoretical ground between 
the two traditions in contrast to organicist visions of politics: 
[The] reciprocal relation between liberalism and democracy is possible because they 
share a common starting-point: the individual. Both are grounded in an individualistic 
conception of society. The entire history of political thought is riven by the great 
dichotomy between organicism (holism) and individualism (atomism). […] For 
organicism, the state is a body, an overall corporate structure made up of pans, each 
of which has its own destiny, […] Individualism sees the state as a collection of 
individuals, and as acquiring its form only through their actions and the relations they 
establish with one another.43 
As implied in Lefort’s argument and clearly stated by Bobbio, individualism appears as 
a cornerstone of the liberal democratic nexus.44 Yet, Bobbio emphasises the difference 
between democratic and liberal brands of individualism, writing that whereas “liberalism 
defends and proclaims individual liberty as against the state, in both the spiritual and the 
economic sphere; democracy reconciles individual and society by making society the product 
of a common agreement between individuals.”45 For Bobbio, the liberal limit imposed on the 
state is “grounded in the prior liberty of the individual relative to the power of the 
sovereign.”46 Inasmuch as liberals (both political and economic) tend to designate the state 
as an impediment to individual liberty and autonomy, democracy on a large scale almost 
certainly depends on the state in order to realise its egalitarian promise. By conceiving 
 
Gauchet also appears to support the historical necessity of liberal democracy based on his assessment that the 
current difficulties faced by contemporary liberal democracies are the result of a crisis of ‘growth’. [Marcel 
Gauchet, La Révolution Moderne, L’avènement de la Démocratie I (Paris : Gallimard, 2013), 27.] 
42 Rosanvallon, 258. 
43 Bobbio, 41; also see Gauchet, L’avenement de la Democratie I, 74. 
44 Lefort’s consideration of emptiness as a virtue is only explainable in view of the process of atomisation of 
power embodied by autonomous self-governing subjects. [Lefort, Essais sur le Politique XIX-XXe siècles, 55.] 
45 Bobbio, 43. 
46 Ibid, 18. Also see Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1996); 
Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations Book I-III (London: Penguin Books, 1999); and Wilhelm Von Humboldt, The 





individual liberty as existing prior to the state, liberal thinkers elevate the project of individual 
autonomy above all else. Liberalism carries the idea of liberty within its very name. It 
ambitions to be experienced and realised at an individual level. On the other hand, 
democratic thought prioritises equality through the collective figure of a ruling demos.47 
Democracy is a fundamentally political project whose survival depends on some form of 
‘coming together’. Demanding that individuals collectively organise (whether in the form of a 
state or smaller entities) reveals democracy’s conditional attachment to the project of 
individual autonomy. Democrats must join hands in order to share power equally, hence 
limiting the scope of isolated individual pursuits.  
The liberal democratic nexus rests on several theoretical compromises that aim to 
overcome the antagonism between individual liberty and the collective expression of 
equality. Since a restrictive vision of the state may be considered as one of liberalism’s most 
unalterable facets, space for concession must be found elsewhere. For Bobbio, liberalism is 
compatible with democracy only if the latter is understood in its formal “juridical-institutional 
sense rather than its ethical sense.”48 Democracy’s strong egalitarian promise must be 
formalised in order to avoid antagonising liberal ideals of individual liberty and autonomy. 
The contradiction existing between democratic equality and individual liberty may only 
surpassed through an egalitarian emptying of democracy. Such formalisation of equality takes 
shape most distinctively within the idea of individual human rights. Rights must not be 
confused with democratic egalitarianism “whose scope extends to [the] pursuit of the ideal 
of some degree of economic equalization, an ideal foreign to liberal thought.”49 Away from 
strong egalitarian promises of a ruling demos and material equality, equality of rights and 
equality before the law are directly tied to the development of the liberal state.50 More than 
any other liberal institutions, human rights embody the modern rapprochement of 
democracy and liberalism around individual autonomy and the subsequent formalisation of 
democratic equality. 
 
47 For the German sociologist Georg Simmel, the individualist tendencies of the liberal democratic nexus were 
not fundamentally incompatible with equality to the extent that the individualist perspective assumes that 
“individuals freed of social and historical fetters would turn out to be essentially similar to one another.” 
[Georg Simmel, Sociologie: Études sur les formes de socialisation (Paris: PUF, 1999 (1908)), 702; Also see 
Rosanvallon, 223.] 
48 Bobbio, 31. 
49 Ibid, 37. 





Lefort maintains an unconditional belief in the political potential of individual human 
rights. In his view, “human rights signal the emergence of a new type of legitimacy and a 
public space of which individuals are both the products and the instigators.”51 Contributing 
to the dissolution of  the totalitarian myth of a ‘people as One’, individual rights have the 
capacity “to exploit the resources of freedom and creativity which are drawn upon by an 
experience that accommodates the effects of division .”52 Following the “dissolution of the 
markers of certainty”, rights offer an opportunity to institutionalise individual autonomy in a 
way that does not compromise individual liberty.53 Lefort’s confidence in rights rests on their 
dynamic dimension, constituting a generative principle of democracy.54 For Gauchet, a former 
student of Lefort, human rights have facilitated the emergence of individual subjects and 
continue to support the process by which they grow.55 Although Gauchet recognises the role 
of rights in autonomising subjects as individuals, he does not share his elder’s enthusiasm for 
their political effectivity.56 Expressing some restraint towards the capacity of rights to 
successfully bring about the potential of liberal democracy, Gauchet writes that “whereas the 
hegemony of human rights, tied to our world’s full accession to autonomy enables democracy 
to justify its status, these rights do not provide democracy with means to effectively handle 
its destiny in a way that would satisfy its theoretical promises.”57 Inasmuch as the liberal 
proliferation of rights symbolises individuals’ accession to a relatively  autonomous state, it 
 
51 Lefort, Essais sur le Politique XIX-XXe siècles, 42. 
52 Ibid, 304 ; and Lefort, The Political Forms of Modern Society, 272. 
53 Lefort, Essais sur le Politique XIX-XXe siècles, 29 
54 Lefort, The Political Forms of Modern Society, 259-260. 
55 Marcel Gauchet, La Révolution Moderne, L’avènement de la Démocratie I (Paris : Gallimard, 2007), 100. 
Despite clear theoretical divergences, Gauchet shares Lefort’s vision of modern democracy as a unique 
historical event. In The Modern Revolution I, he expresses the need for his contemporaries to retake into their 
own hands the project of historical auto-determination inaugurated two hundred years ago by “the pathway 
to history”. [Gauchet, La Révolution Moderne, L’avènement de la Démocratie I, 64, own translation.]  
The linear historical outlook of both Lefort and Gauchet on democracy clearly sets their work as a continuation 
of great political thinkers of the 19th century such as de Tocqueville and Michelet. [John B. Thompson in The 
Political Forms of Modern Society, 20.] 
56 This shift on the question of rights between the two thinkers may be partly explained by the time period 
coinciding with Lefort’s publication of Essais sur le Politique (1986) and The Political Forms of Modern Society 
(1986). These pieces were written in the late 1970s and early 1980s, at the beginning of a historical process 
which would eventually end with the dismantlement of the Soviet state and the subsequent triumph of liberal 
democracy. On the other hand, Gauchet wrote his series La Révolution Moderne (2007) after having 
experienced years of unchallenged liberal democracy, witnessing the deployment of neoliberal policies, and at 
the dawn of the 2008 global financial crisis. Despite an apparent withholding towards the political effectivity of 
human rights in their current form, Gauchet paradoxically reasserts his belief in liberal democracy by claiming 
that political advancement must be equated with the development of the liberal democratic project through 
the language of rights. [Gauchet, La Révolution Moderne, L’avènement de la Démocratie I, 52, 54.] 





does not suffice in effectively realising the democratic promise of a ruling demos. If rights 
consolidate the place of power left vacant by the totalising ‘myth of the One’, they also 
elevate the individual as the only embodiment of politics, hence challenging democracy’s 
collectivist ambitions.58  
As an institutional enactment of the liberal ideal of autonomy, rights do not in 
themselves undermine the democratic promise of a ruling demos. In fact, the self-
determination of an emancipated demos demands a certain level of collective autonomy. 
However, liberal rights begin to impede on the materialisation of democratic equality when 
liberty and autonomy are upfolded as political guiding lights. In this context, the democratic 
impulse towards a collective ‘coming together’ is irremediably subordinated to unrestrained 
individual choices that do not necessarily converge towards the egalitarian ideal of a ruling 
demos. Substantiating democratic equality would require that collective self-determination 
somehow interrupts the pursuit of individual autonomy. Instead, the liberal prioritisation of 
liberty leads to the formalisation of democratic equality in order to prevent it from getting in 
the way of individual autonomy. For Gauchet, this is the paradox of the liberal democratic 
nexus by which the divisive effects of unrestrained individualism ultimately affect liberal 
democracy from within.59 It also points to another characteristic of liberal thought by which 
individual liberty and autonomy typically take precedence over equality. This tendency will 
be illustrated in the discussions lay forth in the following three sections of this chapter. 
To the extent that the emergence of liberal democracy represents an autonomisation 
of subjects through the enactment of individual rights, how is autonomy expressed beyond 
the language of rights? A decisive way in which liberalism manages to fully appropriate the 
notion of individual autonomy is through its multidimensionality. The potentiality of 
autonomous individuals is reflected within the ubiquitous character of liberalism. Aiming to 
expand the horizon of individual possibilities, the modern project of autonomy cannot limit 
individuals to a purely political existence. Inasmuch as the democratic ideal of a ruling demos 
is essentially political, liberal autonomy is reflected in the political sphere as much as in the 
realm of market exchange. The capacity of liberalism to encompass both political and 
economic realms tends to be overlooked by contemporary political thinkers who often 
 
58 Ibid, 100. 
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choose to differentiate between its economic and political components.60 Liberalism must be 
considered in both its political and economic dimensions to effectively assess its capacity to 
support the materialisation of democratic equality. Whereas human rights act as the symbolic 
expression of the liberal project of individual autonomy, the market is arguably the terrain on 
which this project is meant to be effectively enacted. 
What justifies the claim that markets embody the modern project of individual 
autonomy more convincingly than human rights or democratic politics? The answer lays in 
the intricacies of production, market exchange, and consumption. The concept of a ‘free’ 
market in which goods can be exchanged with minimal state interference is undoubtedly the 
most archetypal dimension of economic liberalism.61 However abstract, the idea of market 
freedom provides a material face to the notion of individual autonomy. In contrast to the 
symbolic autonomy contained in human rights, the market rests on a set of concrete relations 
facilitated by the palpability of goods, the immediacy of economic exchange, and the ability 
to easily quantify individual benefits through the accumulation of capital and wealth. 
Following Gauchet, the market establishes itself as the concrete twin of abstract 
individualism, autonomy becoming quantifiable as a measure of market behaviours.62 
Rosanvallon reminds his readers that early conceptions of the market were formulated as an 
expression of liberty as well as a vector of equality.63 Through market exchange, 18th century 
liberals theorised economic liberalism both as a vehicle of autonomy and a purveyor of 
reciprocity.64 Only following the emergence and consolidation of the capitalist mode of 
production did the market become associated with sprawling inequalities, exclusions, and 
divisions.65 The logic of capital, now inseparable from that of the market, has fully eliminated 
the ideal of reciprocal exchange present in the work of early economic liberals.66  
 
60 Notable examples include Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox, 18; Jürgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms 
(Cambridge: The MIT Press), 1998; and John Rawls, a Theory of Justice (Cambridge: Harvard University Press), 
1999. 
61 For classical accounts of the free market see Adam Smith, An Inquiry Into the Nature and Causes of the 
Wealth of Nations (Amsterdam: Metalibri), 2007; and David Ricardo, Principles of Political Economy and 
Taxation (London: J.M Dent & Sons), 1911.  
62 Gauchet, La Révolution Moderne I, L’avènement de la Démocratie, 231. 
63 Rosanvallon, 27. 
64 Ibid, 27. 
65 Ibid, 75. The inegalitarian and divisive effects of capitalism whose full force was most clearly felt throughout 
the 19th century led to the emergence a new branch of egalitarian thought through the development of 
communism and socialism.  
66 See Adam Ferguson, Essay on the History of Civil Society (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992 





Theoretically compatible with democratic equality, the ideal of market reciprocity has given 
way to an interpretation of the market monopolised by individualism through the prism of 
utility, private property, and self-interest.67 It will be shown in the remaining sections of this 
chapter that market relations ultimately fall short of realising the liberal ideal of individual 
autonomy, reducing the question of equality to a ‘problem’ of inequality in the process. 
Where liberal ideals of human rights and minimal state have come to symbolise the 
political aspirations of the liberal democratic project, the spread of economic liberalism has 
fixed the emancipatory horizon of individual autonomy on the market and away from 
egalitarian concerns. One could see within the liberal democratic nexus a type of democratic 
deference by which democracy does not only theoretically cohabit with liberalism but also 
allows for a substantial surrendering of its egalitarian project. In a liberal setting where 
individual liberty takes priority over all else, equality does not fully disappear. Instead it 
becomes an objective that may be realised as a result of autonomous conduct. If equality is 
to exceed its formal representation as equality of rights, it requires that autonomous 
individuals collectively assemble around a ‘common good’.68 An early witness of the crucial 
role of collective association for liberal democracy was Alexis de Tocqueville.69 The vibrancy 
of American associative life inspired the Frenchman to provide a detailed account of the role 
of associations for realising equality. About this early American specificity, he wrote, “I have 
frequently admired the endless skill with which the inhabitants of the United States manage 
to set a common aim to the efforts of a great number of men and to persuade them to pursue 
it voluntarily.”70 For de Tocqueville,  individuals’ active drive towards collective assembly 
directly contributed to strengthening liberal democracies. Conversely, he warned against the 
danger of disassociation for democratic civic life: 
 
Meyssonnier, La Balance et l’Horloge: La genèse de la pensée libérale en France au xviiie siècle (Paris: Les 
Éditions de la Passion, 1989.) 
67 Gauchet, La Révolution Moderne I, L’avènement de la Démocratie, 234. 
68 Joseph Schumpeter provides a concise explanation of the notion of ‘common good’ for early liberal thinkers: 
“The eighteenth-century philosophy of democracy may be couched in the following definition: the democratic 
method is that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions which realizes the common good by 
making the people itself decide issues through the election of individuals who are to assemble in order to carry 
out its will. It is held, then, that there exists a Common Good, the obvious beacon light of policy.” [Joseph A. 
Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism & Democracy (London: Routledge), 2003, 250.] 
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[Men] all sink into a state of impotence if they do not learn to help each other 
voluntarily. If men living in democratic countries had neither the right nor the 
inclination to join together in their political ambitions, their independence would run 
great risks. […] If they failed to acquire the practice of association in their day-to-day 
lives, civilization itself would be in danger. A nation in which individuals lost the 
capacity to achieve great things single-handed without acquiring the means of doing 
them in a shared enterprise would quickly revert to barbarism.71 
Although purely speculative, this dystopian picture disturbingly resembles the 
inanimate state of formal parliamentary representation at work in today’s democracies. It 
also illustrates how in a liberal society regimented by the ideal of individual autonomy, the 
possibility for substantive democratic exchange depends on people’s spontaneous capacity 
to assemble as a collective. Notwithstanding of its status as a common theoretical 
denominator between liberalism and democracy, individualism in its deepened form cannot 
but engender a rejection of the democratic ideal. Through the fragile balancing between 
autonomous individuality and collective political life, democratic equality becomes at best an 
elusive possibility.  
The liberal democratic nexus works primarily towards materialising, not equality, but 
individual autonomy. This is done symbolically through the proliferation of human rights and 
materially through market relations. In this context, realising the egalitarian promise of a 
ruling demos as well as the possibility of achieving a certain level of material equality tends 
to be reduced to a question of individual choices. If individuals decide against assembling in 
order to collectively rule over themselves, then democratic equality will remain in a purely 
formal capacity for individual liberty and autonomy systematically take precedence over 
equality in a liberal democratic context. The next sections of this chapter will focus on the 
work of thinkers who are dedicated to conceptualising equality beyond its formal iteration 
through human rights and political representation. They remain committed to the liberal 
democratic project of individual autonomy, maintaining that substantive equality can be 
achieved under specific conditions that aim to curb inequalities through the reworking of 
state and market mechanisms. 
 
 





Redistributing Equality: Rawls and Dworkin 
The egalitarian content of the democratic project embodied by the promise of a ruling 
demos has been an inexhaustible source of debate for classical and modern political thinkers 
alike. These discussions tend to be dominated by scholars who aim to reconcile liberal ideals 
of individual liberty, autonomy, and market exchange with substantive expressions of 
equality. In the context of this literature, substantive equality denotes a willingness to 
conceptualise equality beyond rights and parliamentary representation as the pursuit of a 
certain level of material equality, active inclusion, and/or enhanced political participation. 
This section will focus on the work of theorists for whom achieving equality rests on a process 
of redistribution. The distributive paradigm is identified with influential theories of egalitarian 
liberalism that have emerged in the second half of the 20th century. John Rawls and Ronald 
Dworkin have had an especially strong impact on the development of this theoretical trend. 
Whereas Rawls constructs an ideal theory aiming at distributing justice equally according to 
the ‘difference principle’ and the ‘efficiency principle’, Dworkin’s resource egalitarianism 
reframes redistribution around issues tied to individual luck, choices, and tastes.72 Both 
approaches may be read as responses to utilitarianism’s consequentialist ethics according to 
which “the greatest happiness of the greatest number should serve as a guiding normative 
principle.”73 Not content with reducing justice to an aggregation of individual interests, Rawls 
and Dworkin argue that a fair distribution of socio-economic goods must precede purely 
individual pursuits in order the limit their inegalitarian outcomes.74 Deploying sophisticated 
redistributive frameworks, both Rawls and Dworkin ultimately refuse to question the market 
as an inegalitarian mode of resource allocation. By naturalising market relations, they are 
constrained to reduce equality to a set of choices geared towards correcting inequalities 
rather than actively aiming to materialise equality. 
 
72 For Rawls, justice begins with an ideal theory which informs the non-ideal world. He explains that “the ideal 
conception shows the ranking of the principles of justice in ideal theory reflects back and guides the 
application of these principles to nonideal situations. [Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 267.] 
73 Jeremy Bentham, A Fragment on Government 2nd ed. (London: Royal Exchange and Lincoln-Inn Fields), 
1823. 
74 On the conflation of equality and justice within models of redistribution, Arneson explains that “the ideal of 
democratic equality is an ideal of justice as sufficiency: we owe each and every member of society a provision 
of liberties, opportunities, resources, and aid so that everyone has enough to be continuously enabled to be a 
full functioning member of democratic society.” [Richard J. Arneson, “Democratic Equality and Relating as 





Prior to discussing Rawls and Dworkin’s egalitarian models, it is crucial to mention 
utilitarian ethics for both thinkers appear to frame their work against this tradition.   
Utilitarianism has been one of the most influential branch of liberalism for the last two 
hundred years.75 John Stuart Mill arguably produced the most concise exposition of utilitarian 
ethics in Utilitarianism published in 1861.76 Within this work, Mill was able to clarify and 
defend the consequentialist essence of the utilitarian position, the claim that an action is right 
merely by virtue of its consequences.77 According to utilitarians, the end justifies the means 
so long as it brings about some form of pleasure or happiness. Early in Utilitarianism, Mill 
introduces the primacy of consequences not only as an ethical rule but also as a natural 
(observable) ordering of human action:   
All action is for the sake of some end, and rules of action, it seems natural to suppose, 
must take their whole character and colour from the end to which they are 
subservient. […] A test of right and wrong must be the means, one would think, of 
ascertaining what is right or wrong, and not a consequence of having already 
ascertained it.78 
Here, Mill plainly exposes the naturalist ambitions and consequentialist core of 
utilitarianism; the idea that utility-driven behaviour reflects reality as much as it constitutes 
an ethical good.79 Whereas the impact of Mill upon the development of utilitarianism is 
undeniable, the consequentialist roots of utilitarianism emerged from the work of Jeremy 
 
75 Alex Callinicos, Equality (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2000), 42; Bobbio, 58; and Rawls, xvii. 
76 Following the lead of Jeremy Bentham and James Mill, his own father, John Stuart Mill eventually outranked 
his predecessors to become one of the most authoritative political thinkers of the 19th century. [Cambridge 
Companion to Utilitarianism, ed. Ben Eggleston and Dale Miller (Cambridge: Cambridge University press, 
2014), 4, 62.]  
Mill was also one of the few philosophers to have been actively involved in parliamentary politics and a vocal 
proponent of equality between sexes. [See Mill, The Subjection of Women (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing 
Company), 1988.] 
77 This consequentialist approach to ethics has been fiercely criticised by Max Horkeimer in Eclipse of Reason: 
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our expectations are fulfilled and our actions successful.” [Max Horkeimer, Eclipse of Reason Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1947), 42.] 
78 Mill, “Utilitarianism” in Utilitarianism, Liberty & Representative Government (London: J.M Dent & Sons Ltd, 
1954), 182. 
79 Philip Schofield outlines the naturalist character of utilitarianism when he writes in Utility and Democracy 
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Bentham. With a more frontal approach than Mill, Bentham was able to uncompromisingly 
convey the individualistic and hedonistic spirit of utilitarianism. His distinctive style is most 
clear in his discussion of ‘private ethics’ in Principles of Morals and Legislation in which he 
writes that “ethics at large may be defined, the art of directing men’s actions to the 
production of the greatest possible quantity of happiness, on the part of those whose interest 
is in view.”80 This definition simultaneously illustrates utilitarianism’s individualistic approach 
to ethics, while introducing its aggregative consideration of happiness and justice. Whereas 
Bentham places the pursuit of individual interests above all else, his concerns also laid with 
the ethical implications of utilitarianism for collective life.  
The collective facet of utilitarianism is embodied in Bentham’s ‘greatest happiness 
principle’ or the idea that if happiness is a good, “each person’s happiness is a good to that 
person, and the general happiness, therefore, a good to the aggregate of all persons.”81 From 
a utilitarian perspective, the ‘common good’ is constituted by an aggregation of fragmented 
individual pleasures. Through this rule, achieving individual ends is elevated as the organising 
principle of society. The greatest happiness principle shows the strength of Bentham and Mill’ 
belief in the emancipatory potential of individual autonomy. But it also demonstrates their 
commitment to a form of arithmetic equality by which “everybody counts for one, nobody 
for more than one.”82 In other words, the egalitarian content of the greatest happiness 
principle lays in the proposition that one man’s happiness is equal to any other when 
aggregated into a common good. This proposition outlines the supreme role played by 
individual happiness in this framework. Happiness is considered as the only purely desirable 
end while all other things “are only desirable as means to that end.”83 Here, desire becomes 
the primary drive behind autonomy, providing a bridge between an individual and her/his 
own ultimate end (happiness). For utilitarians there can be no objective measure of equality. 
Rather, equality is made up of an aggregation of individual ends whose specificity matters 
little so long as happiness is derived from them. It could be argued that the only objective 
 
80 About the individualist tendencies of utilitarian ethics, Bentham adds “what then are the actions which it can 
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as it is the art of directing a man’s own actions, may be styled the art of self-government, or private ethics […] 
[Agents] under the influence of man’s direction, are susceptible of happiness. [Jeremy Bentham, An 
Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation (Kitchener: Batoche Books, 2000), 225.] 
81 Mill, Utilitarianism, 210. 
82 Bentham in Mill’s Utilitarianism, 233; and Callinicos, 42. 





facet of equality from a utilitarian standpoint emerges from an equal desire to pursue one’s 
own conception of happiness. 
Rawls inscribes his theory as a continuation, not of utilitarian ethics, but of the work 
of traditional social contract thinkers such as Locke, Rousseau, and Kant.84 These influences 
ground Rawls’ conception of justice firmly within the liberal democratic nexus. A ‘well-
ordered’ democratic society provides the context for his model of ‘justice as fairness’.85 In 
contrast to utilitarianism’s consequentialist ethics, Rawls produces an ideal theorisation of 
justice and equality concerned with what they ought to be in a liberal democratic context.86 
In the early pages of his foundational opus A Theory of Justice Rawls contrasting features of 
his approach with utilitarianism: 
In utilitarianism the satisfaction of any desire has some value in itself which must be 
taken into account in deciding what is right. In calculating the greatest balance of 
satisfaction it does not matter, except indirectly, what the desires are for. […] we ask 
no questions about their source or quality but only how their satisfaction would affect 
the total of well-being. […] In justice as fairness, on the other hand, persons accept in 
advance a principle of equal liberty and they do this without a knowledge of their more 
particular ends. They implicitly agree, therefore, to conform their conceptions of their 
good to what the principles of justice require, or at least not to press claims which 
directly violate them.87 
Rawls aims to provide a viable egalitarian and liberal alternative to the utilitarian 
conception of justice as desirable ends. Utilitarianism is concerned by no other motives than 
the achievement of happiness (which often morphs into the categories of pleasure or well-
 
84 Rawls, xviii. 
Rawls is widely considered as one of the most influential political thinkers of the 20th century. A Theory of 
Justice, published in 1971, undeniably represents one of the most thorough modern conceptualisations of 
democratic justice. It has been praised by academics and politicians alike, while its intellectual impact on 
contemporary academic discussions has been enormous. [US president Bill Clinton, upon awarding John Rawls 
with the ‘National Humanities Medal’ declared that he was “perhaps the greatest political philosopher of the 
20th century”. [The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “Remarks by the President at Presentation of 
the National Humanities Medal September 29th 1999”: 
https://clinton4.nara.gov/WH/New/html/19990929.html.];  
On the academic impact of John Rawls’s theory see The New York Times, “John Rawls, Theorist on Justice, Is 
Dead at 82,” http://www.nytimes.com/2002/11/26/us/john-rawls-theorist-on-justice-is-dead-at-82.html.]   
85 Joshua Cohen, “Democratic Equality,” Ethics 99 (1989): 734.  
86 Chantal Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox, 63; and A Companion to Rawls, 44. 





being), disregarding the source of individual desires. On the other hand, Rawls’s theory 
contains an ideal contractual dimension, necessitating a general pre-agreement on the good 
to be desired and the kind of justice to be achieved. From a Rawlsian standpoint, justice and 
equality cannot result from purely self-interested conducts. This makes Rawlsian justice a 
more collective endeavour, aiming to curb the effects of individualistic behaviours by clearly 
setting out the ideal conditions and the type of agreement that will facilitate justice.  
With his ideal theory of ‘justice as fairness’, Rawls attempts to reconciliate individual 
liberty and equality.88 He does so by developing a number of key concepts aiming to clarify 
and legitimate his position. Within the large pool of original concepts attributable to Rawls, 
some are crucial for grasping the ideal and egalitarian character of his position. The 
interdependent ideas of ‘original position’ and ‘veil of ignorance’ serve to illustrate the 
rationale behind one’s decision to promote justice. Rawls invites his readers to imagine a 
situation preceding birth in which an individual has no knowledge of her or his future 
professional status, nationality, appearance, or social class. He then claims that in this original 
position, rational individuals placed behind a veil of ignorance will be led to adopt a collectivist 
and egalitarian outlook, since every possible outcome can be envisaged.89 This context is the 
idealised platform on which Rawls introduces his two principles of justice: the efficiency 
principle and the difference principle. The latter, also referred to as the ‘least advantaged’ 
principle, rests on the original position to state that “social and economic inequalities are to 
be arranged so that they are to the greatest expected benefit of the least advantaged.”90 In 
other words, an individual in the original position and whose vision is blurred by the veil of 
ignorance will be led to distribute justice in favour of the least advantaged in order to limit 
the impact of finding oneself in this position.91 In a hypothetical situation when individual 
 
88 Ibid, 179. 
89 White, Equality, 41; and Rawls, 121.  
Rawls is conscious of the ideal facet of his theory when he writes that “it might be protested that the condition 
of the veil of ignorance is irrational.” [Ibid, 120] 
90 Ibid, 72. 
91 Rawls is considered alongside Jürgen Habermas as one of the main philosophical influences of contemporary 
theories of deliberative democracy. [See John S. Dryzek, Foundations and Frontiers of Deliberative 
Governance. (Oxford: Oxford University press, 2010).] From the deliberative standpoint, democracy depends 
on a consensus regarding what constitutes the common good which results from rational and collective 
deliberation amongst free and equal members of the demos. [Seyla Benhabib, “Towards a deliberative Model 
of Democratic Legitimacy” in Democracy and Difference: Contesting the Boundaries of the Political, ed. Seyla 
Benhabib (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1996), 69; and Joshua Cohen in Debates in Contemporary 





autonomy is constrained by a lack of information on one’s future, one is led to choose the 
most egalitarian distribution of justice in order to limit the risks of ending up in a precarious 
situation. Following the difference principle, equal distribution results from a constrained 
choice in which individuals relate to others only by virtue of projecting themselves into 
precarity. 
The difference principle is inseparable from the principle of efficiency which holds that 
“a configuration is efficient whenever it is impossible to change it so as to make some persons 
(at least one) better off without at the same time making other persons (at least one) worse 
off.”92 The efficiency principle is an economic principle based on Pareto optimality stating that 
resource are allocated most efficiently when markets reach a competitive equilibrium.93 
Rawls provides a detailed account on how goods can be distributed most efficiently through 
an ideal conception of the market: 
Under certain conditions competitive prices select the goods to be produced and 
allocate resources to their production in such a manner that there is no way to 
improve upon either the choice of productive methods by firms, or the distribution of 
goods that arises from the purchases of households. There exists no rearrangement 
of the resulting economic configuration that makes one household better off (in view 
of its preferences) without making another worse off. No further mutually 
advantageous trades are possible; nor are there any feasible productive processes 
that will yield more of some desired commodity without requiring a cutback in 
another. For if this were not so, the situation of some individuals could be made more 
advantageous without a loss for anyone else. The theory of general equilibrium 
explains how, given the appropriate conditions, the information supplied by prices 
 
Joshua Cohen is perhaps the most notorious Rawlsian deliberative democrat. Cohen aims to ground Rawlsian 
justice by rearticulating it around notions of rational discussions and consensus, which for deliberativists 
should occupy the democratic space. He clarifies his approach to justice as fairness when writing about the 
relevance of the notion of the veil of ignorance for democratic politics: “the constraints on arguments that are 
captured by the veil of ignorance are not founded on the concept of morality or the concept of justice but on 
the democratic conception of persons as free and equal. So the model of justification associated with justice as 
fairness – unanimous agreement in the original position – expresses a form of normative reflection suited to a 
democratic society. [Joshua Cohen “For a Democratic Society,” 98.] While both thinkers implicitly acknowledge 
the centrality of interests in a democratic framework, they aim to rationalise them through the creation of a 
‘pure’ democratic space (the original positon for Rawls and the ecclesia or the forum for Cohen). 
92 Rawls, 58. 





leads economic agents to act in ways that sum up to achieve this outcome. Perfect 
competition is a perfect procedure with respect to efficiency.94 
 Although more technical and less justice-oriented than the difference principle, the 
efficiency principle has implications that directly affect Rawls’s egalitarian ambitions. The 
principle of efficiency is regimented, not by an ideal original position, but by an ideal 
conception of the market. According to the latter, “the market achieves an efficient outcome 
even if everyone pursues his own advantage.”95 Idealised as perfectly competitive, open, and 
efficient, the market is the mode of resource allocation that is most compatible with justice 
as fairness.96 The efficient and auto-adjusting qualities of markets have been challenged by a 
number of renowned economists.97 Prominent amongst them is Joseph Stiglitz who uses the 
2008 global financial crisis to illustrate the extent to which idealised conceptions of markets 
as efficient and stable fail to accurately portray the imperfect and sometimes irrational reality 
of market exchange.98 For Stiglitz, these idealised conceptions remain blind to the inefficient 
and inegalitarian tendencies of really existing markets.99 By treating the market as a system 
of distribution that always tends towards equilibrium, Rawls occults the fact that certain 
market mechanisms (especially financial transactions and capital appreciation) directly 
contribute to fostering inequalities.100 Rawls’s belief in market efficiency has theoretical 
implications for his theory of justice as a whole. The efficiency principle naturalises market 
exchange, hence legitimising market-induced inequalities in the process. Rawls is faced with 
the impossible task of undermining inequalities through an account of justice that partially 
 
94 Rawls, 240. 
95 Ibid, 316. 
96 About this Rawls declares that “If markets are reasonably competitive and open, the notion of pure 
procedural justice is a feasible one to follow.” [Ibid, 273.] 
97 On the limits of considerations of the markets as efficient see Sanford J. Grossman, and Joseph E. Stiglitz “On 
the Impossibility of Informationally Efficient Markets,” American Economic Review 70 (1980): 393–408; Joseph 
E. Stiglitz, The Price of Inequality How Today’s divided Society Endangers our Future (New York: W.W. Norton & 
Company), 2012; Andrew W. Lo and Craig A. MacKinlay. A Non-Random Walk Down Wall Street (Princeton: 
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Randomly,” Industrial Management Review 6 (1965): 41–49; Burton, G. Malkiel, "The Efficient Market 
Hypothesis and Its Critics," Journal of Economic Perspectives 17 (2003): 59-82; and Ray Ball, “The Global 
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Finance 21 (2009): 8-16. 
98 Joseph E. Stiglitz, The Price of Inequality, 10 
99 For Stiglitz markets suffer from an inability to solve the issue of unemployment which he considers as “the 
worst failure of the market, the greatest source of inefficiency, and a major cause of inequality.” [Stiglitz, The 
Price of Inequality, 9, 26.] 
100 For more on the inegalitarian impact of market exchange, see Thomas Piketty, Capital in the 21st century 





rests on recognising the efficiency of an institution that is itself a vector of inequalities. 
Naturalising the market or ignoring its inegalitarian tendencies is not specific to Rawls’s 
thought, it appears to be a proclivity shared by most liberal egalitarians that remain to be 
discussed in this chapter. 
Although A Theory of Justice is a profoundly egalitarian work, it fails to identify the 
market economy as an obstacle to promoting justice as fairness.101 Besides, Rawls’s 
distributive framework is only loosely tied to economic equality in that it does not entail a 
deep reconsideration of the modes of production and distribution of economic goods. Writing 
about the role of the economic sphere in the promotion of justice as fairness, Jacques Bidet 
claims that Rawls “shows complete faith in the market economy to assure economic 
rationality and dynamism.”102 Bidet notes that Rawls’s confidence in the market is perceptible 
in the disjunction between the two principles of justice, attributing the efficiency principle to 
the economic sphere and the difference principle to the political sphere.103 This 
differentiation reflects the priority of liberty over equality in Rawls’s theory.104 The priority of 
liberty (and thereof, the efficiency principle) is a reminder that Rawls’ work remains, despite 
its egalitarian ambitions, deeply anchored in the liberal tradition resting primarily on 
individual liberty, autonomy, and the promotion of self-interests.105 In his view, “liberty can 
only be restricted for the sake of liberty itself.”106 As a result, equality is mostly discussed 
through the prism ‘equal liberty’, or equality mediated by rights, and individual autonomy.107 
The substantive core of Rawlsian egalitarianism undoubtedly resides in the difference or ‘least 
advantaged’ principle. Yet, through the veil of ignorance, Rawls portrays individuals as self-
interested in a way that echoes the utilitarian characterisation of individuals as utility-
maximising agents: 
 
101 Callinicos, 50. 
102 Jacques Bidet, John Rawls et la Théorie de la Justice (Paris : Presses Universitaires de France), 1995. 
103 Ibid. 
104 Rawls describes the priority of liberty within his two principles of justice as follows: “By the priority of 
liberty I mean the precedence of the principle of equal liberty over the second principle of justice. The two 
principles are in lexical order, and therefore the claims of liberty are to be satisfied first. Until this is achieved 
no other principle comes into play. The priority of the right over the good, or of fair opportunity over the 
difference principle.” [Rawls, 214.] 
105 Callinicos, 48. 
106 Rawls, 214. Also see Bryan Barry, “John Rawls and the Priority of Liberty,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 2 
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A rational person is thought to have a coherent set of preferences between the 
options open to him. He ranks these options according to how well they further his 
purposes; he follows the plan which will satisfy more of his desires rather than less, 
and which has the greater chance of being successfully executed.108 
As Alex Callinicos rightfully points out, individuals in the original position remain 
rational in the narrow, utilitarian sense.109 Regardless of the lack of information provided by 
the veil of ignorance, agents promote justice as a result of uncertainty in order to minimise 
the risks (pains) of finding oneself in an unfair position. The difference principle remains the 
by-product of utility-driven behaviour despite emanating from the idealised space of the 
original position. Behind the veil of ignorance, motives for achieving justice are negative 
insofar as individuals are driven by self-interest rather than a fundamental desire to favour 
the least advantaged. That is not to say that Rawls’s account of justice should be conflated 
with a utilitarian position. When the American thinker constructs an ideal theory of justice 
mediated by abstract concepts prioritising the most deprived members of society, utilitarians 
perceive a multiplicity of equivalent ends that are to be aggregated to promote the common 
good.110 When Rawls considers that actions must follow from a pre-agreement on what 
justice represents, Bentham and Mill elevate the ends of human actions as a moral 
standard.111 Inasmuch as Rawls favours distributive justice, consequence-oriented utilitarians 
are merely concerned with the maximisation of welfare.112 A Theory of Justice is a pioneering, 
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Discussions of equality centred on the pursuit of welfare or well-being are not limited to utilitarianism. Various 
respected contemporary liberal scholars like Thomas Christiano have established the promotion of equality of 
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yet controversial egalitarian contribution to the liberal tradition.113 Building on the originality 
of the difference principle, Rawls’s theory represents an important attempt to re-substantiate 
equality in a liberal democratic context. Yet, Rawls paradoxically aims to redistribute equality 
through an institution (the market) and a type of conduct (self-interested behaviour) that are 
irremediably geared towards promoting inequalities. 
Not unlike Rawls, Dworkin defends that theory must begin with an abstract regulating 
ideal.114 He also constructs his egalitarian theory within a redistributive framework oriented 
towards achieving equality beyond its formal consideration through rights and parliamentary 
representation.115 Dworkin’s egalitarian position came to the fore in the early 1980s with two 
long articles entitled What is Equality? Each article is dedicated to one specific form of 
equality: equality of welfare and equality of resources.116 Dworkin’s objective with this 
twofold account of equality is to decide which conception of equality is best suited to an 
appealing political ideal.117 Early in the first piece, Dworkin outlines the nuances between his 
accounts of welfare and resources. 
The first [general theory of distributional equality] (which I shall call equality of 
welfare) holds that a distributional scheme treats people as equals when it distributes 
or transfers re- sources among them until no further transfer would leave them more 
equal in welfare. The second (equality of resources) holds that it treats them as equals 
 
Christiano’s concept of ‘equal advancement of interests’ according to which “[society’s] institutions are 
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114 “Legal Positivism,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/legal-
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when it distributes or transfers so that no further transfer would leave their shares of 
the total resources more equal.118 
The contrast drawn between these two forms of equality is subtle but significant. 
Associating redistributive equality and welfare entails paying attention to each individual’s 
specific requirement, which may greatly vary in scope. On the other hand, equality of 
resources demands that citizens be provided with equal resources from which they can 
benefit as they see fit. In his first article, Dworkin attempts to refine the broad concept of 
welfare into more specific categories. One of the values that he associates to welfare is 
success. In assessing equality of success, he is confronted with the issue of designating an 
overarching measure of success as welfare. There must be a shared understanding of what 
success represents if it is to be designated as the central value from which resources can be 
equally distributed.119 Even at an individual level, there can be many of such measures and 
neither utilitarianism nor welfare economics provide a satisfactory response to this 
dilemma.120 Enjoyment is another form of welfare which Dworkin considers. This notion is 
closer to the utilitarian conception of welfare as the pursuit of pleasures and the avoidance 
of pains.121 A significant issue with both enjoyment and success is the existing discrepancy in 
the level of welfare people attribute to these values.122 If a substantial portion of a 
hypothetical population does not consider notions such as success or enjoyment as significant 
contributors to welfare, then any equalisation by means of redistribution is meaningless. In 
attempting to theorise the merits of welfare equality, Dworkin is faced with a seemingly 
unsurmountable issue: generalising a notion (welfare) which mainly rests on subjective 
preferences.123 
Ultimately, Dworkin rejects welfare egalitarianism based on what he refers to as the 
‘expensive tastes argument’. The latter specifies that those with ‘champagne tastes’ will 
inevitably require more income to achieve the same of welfare as those with humbler 
needs.124 In other words, welfare is an essentially subjective category. Individuals perceive 
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their needs based on their own experiences shaped by their direct environments. This 
argument is perhaps best explained from a sociological point of view. If welfare is 
redistributed equally in a society composed of various socio-economic groups who associate 
well-being to their respective socio-economic conditions, then great inequalities will remain 
as each group will determine their required level welfare in function of their own past 
experiences. Even if the general average of welfare rises, those habituated to greater tastes 
and level of comfort are likely to require comparatively higher levels of welfare than those 
who have never experienced such comfort.125 The problem of expensive taste ultimately 
leads Dworkin to focus his egalitarian ambitions on resources.126 
Dworkin’s account of resource equality is entirely based on a market mode of 
allocation. In his view, the market is as much an analytical device as an actual political 
institution that sets the price of resources to be equally distributed.127 He illustrates his 
distinctive take on redistribution through the idea of a society-wide auction in which each 
citizen is assigned identical bidding power. Richard Arneson provides a concise description of 
Dworkin’s complex auction-based system of redistribution: 
In  this  auction,  ownership  is  interpreted  as  ownership  of  hours  of  time  of  the 
person who has the resource, and ownership of time in turn is interpreted as 
ownership  of  labour  power  –  the  right  to  demand  from  the  possessor  of  the  
resource  the highest  amount  of  money  that  the  person  could  have  earned  in  
the  labour  market working  for  the  length  of  time  that  is  owned.  On this 
conception any talent an individual possesses that enhances the value of an hour of 
her labour power is an internal resource that is up for grabs in the imagined auction.128 
Through this generalised auction, individual talent and time are traded on the basis of 
equal resources. Unlike Rawls, Dworkin’s egalitarian framework entertains an 
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uncompromising relationship with the market. There is no principle of justice that will redirect 
market outputs towards the least advantaged members of society. The distribution of goods 
is regulated by markets on which individuals are responsible for trading their own labour 
power.129 Dworkin aims to reconcile individualism with the pursuit of substantive equality 
through market exchange.130 A strong critique of Dworkin’s model, Elizabeth Anderson, 
claims that individual market choices cannot provide any indication as to what must be 
redistributed on a collective basis. Instead, she defends that an egalitarian theory must 
provide the conditions for pursuing equality collectively.131 
Especially bothersome to Dworkin’s critics, is the importance he attributes to 
individual luck in his model. Dworkin divides the notion of luck in two categories; ‘brute’ luck 
and ‘option’ luck, each of which are relevant to his action-based model. Option luck includes 
the outcome of “deliberate and calculated gambles”, or one’s acceptation of “an isolated risk 
he or she should have anticipated and might have declined.”132 In contrast, brute luck 
emanates from risks that are not deliberate gambles.133 Dworkin favours option luck or 
controlled risk-taking. He proposes that the state insure individuals against the detrimental 
outcomes of brute luck to the extent that it is essentially unfair and may affect anybody.134 
Despite this specific case of state intervention, individual responsibility remains the main 
arbiter of resource equality through the calculation of risks defining option luck.135 Ultimately, 
Dworkin’s individualistic take on egalitarianism is contained in the statement that “people 
pay the true cost of the lives that they lead.”136 The auction-based market simply insures that 
individuals be paid a fair price for their labour power and their inclinations towards risk-
taking. Anderson accurately describes luck egalitarianism as a hybrid between capitalism and 
the welfare state valuing an extreme form of individualism through which people are held 
responsible for the outcomes of their own actions on a capitalist market.137  
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Whereas Rawls remains dedicated to the pursuit of collective welfare alongside the 
good functioning of markets, Dworkin treats equality as an outcome of individual market 
transactions. The collective facet of distributive equality is largely evacuated from his model 
in favour of a plainly atomistic political ideal. Arneson goes as far as claiming that luck 
egalitarianism is so bleak and unforgiving that it even betrays liberal ideals.138 Similarly, 
Anderson claims that risk and luck are fully incompatible with democratic equality, for the 
latter takes root in security.139 Whereas Rawls largely conceals the strong individualistic and 
market-based dimension of justice as fairness through concepts such as the veil of ignorance 
and the original position, Dworkin is bolder in his egalitarian consideration of individual 
responsibility and market outcomes.  
Both Rawls and Dworkin aim to substantiate equality through redistributive 
frameworks that rely on individual autonomy and market exchange. They treat the market as 
a fair mode of resource allocation, largely overlooking its inegalitarian tendencies. This 
ultimately leads them to naturalise markets and the inequalities they engender. Both Rawls 
and Dworkin are committed egalitarians and the sophistication of their redistributive models 
is undeniable. However, they seem unwilling to confront the paradox according to which their 
egalitarianism rests on upholding an institution that generates most of the inequalities they 
aim to undermine. Through this paradox, equality is only revealed as a result of correcting 
inequalities rather than a positive political ideal. In other words, naturalising markets 
inexorably reformulates the question of equality negatively as the possibility to curb 
inequalities in an imperfect but unquestionable liberal democratic context.140 The same 
paradoxical logic is at work within the association of individual self-interest and equality. The 
latter is only achieved as a by-product of self-interested individual choices blurred by 
imperfect information generated by ideal concepts like the veil of ignorance. Less concerned 
with issues of redistribution, thinkers to be discussed in the next section focus on achieving 
equality through the recognition of marginalised identities and cultures. 
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Reclaiming Equality through Recognition: Fraser, Young, and Benhabib 
Thinkers such as Nancy Fraser, Seyla Benhabib, Iris Marion Young, or Charles Taylor 
argue, albeit differently, that the pursuit of equality rests on recognising historically 
marginalised cultures and identities through further inclusion. This contemporary intellectual 
movement has had a palpable political impact on western liberal democracies through the 
enactment of minority rights such as gay marriage, positive actions, or the expansion of 
individual rights to previously overlooked identities. This movement has had an even greater 
impact on civil society through the proliferation of public debates tied to identity politics, 
religious and LGBTQ rights, or what constitutes offensive language in the public sphere. In 
view of the increasing confluence of questions of identity and culture with equality, the work 
of influential theorists who have directed their egalitarian concerns towards these issues must 
be discussed. 
One recurrent theme in contemporary literature on culture and identity is the idea of 
recognition originating in Hegel’s philosophy.141 In Redistribution or Recognition, Fraser 
provides a clear definition of Hegelian recognition: 
Recognition designates an ideal reciprocal relation between subjects in which each 
see the other as its equal and also separate from it. This relation is deemed 
constitutive for subjectivity; one becomes an individual subject only in virtue of 
recognising and being recognised by, another subject.142 
The concept of recognition is relatively straightforward. One can be deemed a subject 
only after being recognised and recognising oneself as such. Here, equality emerges through 
the reciprocal act of recognising oneself into others. We are all subjects to the extent that we 
perform this act of mutual recognition. Taylor remarks that the meaning of the concept of 
recognition became more specific at the turn of the 18th century, becoming embroiled with 
liberal democratic ideals. This shift brought about a new form of “individualized identity, one 
that is particular to me, and that I discover in myself.”143 This reorientation of recognition 
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responds to the individualistic demands of liberalism. The dual dimension of identifying 
oneself into others as subjects and discovering oneself for one’s own sake constitutes the 
theoretical core of contemporary discussions of recognition. Today, conceptualisations of 
recognition usually takes shape through “demands for the equal status of cultures and of 
genders.”144 Recognition in its current form tends to be associated with furthering the 
inclusion of ‘misrecognised’ identities and cultures into formal political and economic 
processes.  
 Nancy Fraser, arguably one of the most engaging thinkers of recognition, clearly 
differentiates her view from that of Honneth and Taylor who treat recognition as “the 
fundamental, overarching moral category, while treating distribution as derivative.” Fraser 
considers recognition and distribution to be matters of justice unlike Honneth and Taylor who 
tie recognition to self-realisation.145 This distinctive approach to justice takes root in a belief 
that notions of redistribution discussed in the previous section and recognition are not 
mutually exclusive, that their opposition is a “false antithesis.”146 On the contrary, Fraser 
perceives their association as necessary. Recognition and redistribution form the bedrock of 
her egalitarian vision embodied within the idea of ‘perspective dualism’. The cultural 
reordering consistent with recognition “may work through a variety of different institutions, 
including kinship, religion, and the law.”147 On the other hand, her approach to redistribution 
does not fully refute market mechanisms but remains articulated around a strong critique of 
neoliberalism and the processes of marketisation and financialization it engenders.148 The 
central aim of perspective dualism is to challenge the conceptual rigidity between issues of 
economic redistribution and cultural recognition: 
Redistribution and recognition do not correspond to two substantive societal 
domains, economy and culture. Rather, they constitute two analytical perspectives 
that can be assumed with respect to any domain. […] Distributive measures [may be 
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used] to redress misrecognition and recognition measures to redress 
maldistribution.149 
Fraser rightfully aims to erase the division between the institutional ordering of both 
redistribution (economic) and recognition (political). She does so by remaining strongly 
committed to ideals of political recognition and economic redistribution while recognising 
that neoliberal markets hinder such egalitarian pursuits. Particularly interesting within 
Fraser’s critique of neoliberalism is the argument that marginalised and misrecognised groups 
have been appropriated by neoliberal markets.150 Rather than being provided with the levels 
of political recognition and shares of economic redistribution they need and deserve, 
minorities are invoked in the name of merit and encouraged to ‘rise to the top’ in a neoliberal 
environment.151 For Fraser, neoliberal excesses foster economic as well as cultural 
inequalities.152 From the standpoint of perspective dualism, the modes of neoliberal 
redistribution and recognition can change. Such shift takes place through a renewed 
commitment in human rights and redistributive measures that reject the neoliberal ethos and 
remain under close state supervision.153 By discussing misrecognition alongside questions of 
economic redistribution, Fraser demonstrates the extent to which notions of social and 
economic inequalities are linked. Her account of perspective dualism can be located on the 
far-left corner of the liberal egalitarian tradition. Remaining committed to the equalising 
capacity of human rights and tightly controlled markets, she nonetheless rejects the 
inegalitarian tendencies of neoliberalism. 
Other thinkers of recognition have been more inclined to develop their egalitarian 
models against the work of distributivists. This is the case for Young who conceptualises her 
‘politics of difference’ in response to the shortcomings of redistribution. In her view, 
redistribution “fails to bring social structures and institutional contexts under evaluation.”154 
The social structures to which Young refers here are tied to oppression either conceived as 
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marginalisation, exploitation, powerlessness, cultural imperialism, or violence.155 For Young, 
distributivists often remain blind to trends of systemic oppression that directly impact 
distributive patterns.156 She identifies three pressing issues occulted by distributive accounts 
of justice: decision making issues or “the rules and procedures according to which decisions 
are made”, “division of labor as an institutional structure [involving] the range of tasks 
performed in a given position, the definition of the nature, meaning, and value of those tasks, 
and the relations of cooperation, conflict, and authority among positions”, and culture 
including “symbols, images, meanings, habitual comportments, stories, and so on through 
which people express their experience and communicate with one another.”157 Young’s 
account of justice aims to expand economic justice while prioritising cultural inclusion. Where 
Rawls and Dworkin trust the market to assign economic roles and allocate resources 
efficiently, Young demands that questions surrounding the division of labour and economic 
domination be reopened. Yet, economic equality is not Young’s primary objective. Her 
account of justice is guided by social equality or “the full participation and inclusion of 
everyone in a society’s major institutions, and the socially supported substantive opportunity 
for all to develop and exercise their capacities and realize their choices.”158 
Young refutes the universalist tendencies of Rawls’s veil of ignorance through which 
differences become irrelevant.159 Although Rawlsian justice prioritises ‘the least advantaged’ 
members of society, such broad label inevitably flattens identities and particularities into a 
quantifiable socio-economic category.160 For Young, differences are crucial for they may be a 
vector of exclusion. Realising equality does not depend on overlooking or whitewashing 
differences but on recognising and upholding them.161 A politics of inclusion is one that aims 
to break long-running trends of sexist, homophobic, racist, and xenophobic exclusion from 
liberal democratic institutions. Differences are valued not for identity’s sake, but in the name 
of groups remaining underprivileged and overwhelmingly excluded from most liberal 
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accounts of equality. For Young, identity can only be defined in relational terms. One cannot 
individually curate a ‘self-narrative’ to be presented as identity.162 As opposed to more recent 
developments in identity politics whereby gender is treated as an increasingly fluid and 
changing category, Young frames her account of inclusion according to social difference 
rather than substantial identity.163 The politics of recognition cannot be one that pins 
individual claims against each other.164 Instead, demands for recognition materialise as 
“claims against discrimination, unequal opportunity, political marginalization, or unfair 
burdens.”165 
Defining equality through the recognition and inclusion of marginalised or unfairly 
treated groups “sometimes requires different treatment for oppressed or disadvantaged 
groups.”166 This is a paradox of the politics of recognition. Unequal treatment is invoked in 
the name of equality in order to compensate for past exclusions. An issue with this approach 
is that it forsakes inclusion to make room for compensation. This has become especially clear 
through the development of identity politics in recent years. In several instances, legitimate 
demands for further equality have been accompanied, not primarily by a drive towards 
further inclusion into an enlarged demos, but by a politics of exclusion from the dominant 
group.167 In view of current scholarship, it is unclear how a politics of recognition may redraw 
the thin line that exists between the logic of inclusion and cooperation on one side, and that 
of exclusion and compensation on the other. This very contemporary dilemma challenges the 
work of Young as much as that of Fraser or Benhabib. 
Benhabib discusses cultural recognition through a deliberative model infused by the 
work of Jurgen Habermas.168 Her interest in associating deliberative democracy with 
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discussions of culture and identity stems from an interest in the increased fluidity of 
nationality, race, gender, or religion reflecting the current trend of globalisation associated 
with the ‘postmodern condition’.169 Far from considering this development as politically 
limiting, Benhabib sees in it an opportunity to develop a global “independent public sphere 
in which questions of identity, legitimacy, and sovereignty can be perpetually debated and 
discussed.”170 The postmodern shift is significant to the extent that discrediting grand political 
objectives allows for the possibility to recognise the value of multiple narratives, notably from 
those relegated to the margins of modernity such as women as well as ethnic and other 
minorities.171 In Benhabib’s work this transformation is probably best conveyed by a 
distinction between the demos and the ethnos, “between the ethnic, cultural, linguistic, and 
religious identity of a people, and the political constitution of the people as an organized, self-
governing body.”172 Differentiating between the demos and the ethnos demonstrates 
Benhabib’s commitment to treat cultural and identity-based groups as political entities in 
their own rights, or as a demos within the demos. 
Like Fraser and Young, the egalitarian facet of Benhabib’s model rests on inclusion by 
providing a political voice to those who previously lacked it. It is articulated around three 
central concepts: egalitarian reciprocity, voluntary self-ascription, and freedom of exit and 
association. Egalitarian reciprocity states that minorities must not be denied any forms of 
rights granted to the majority, while the two remaining concepts claim that individuals must 
not be limited to an essential group or identity, and should be entitled to self-identify with 
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various groups.173 In The Claims of Culture, Benhabib details how her fluid and inclusive view 
of cultural identity benefits from deliberation:  
There is no presumption that moral and political dialogues will produce normative 
consensus, yet it is assumed that even when they fail to do so and we must resort to 
law to redraw the boundaries of coexistence, societies in which such multicultural 
dialogues take place in the public sphere will articulate a civic point of view and a civic 
perspective of ‘enlarged mentality.’174  
One could argue that a model of equality based on culture and identity either depends 
on the formulation of new rights, or on the recognition and inclusion of those previously not 
subjected to the symbolic authority of already existing rights. This is consistent with 
Benhabib’s notions of egalitarian reciprocity and freedom of exit and association,175 two 
processes by which the law incorporates previously ignored subjects while new ‘cultural’ 
rights are enacted. Another plainly liberal aspect of Benhabib’s work which might interfere 
with the pursuit of substantive equality is her prioritisation of individuality. She understands 
individuality as “the unique and fragile achievement of selves in weaving together conflicting 
narratives and allegiances into a unique life history.”176 This definition is crucial to grasping 
Benhabib’s specific perception of culture as being “constituted through the narratives and 
symbolizations of their members” rather than “homogenous wholes.”177 In this atomistic 
definition of culture, individual autonomy takes precedence over cultural or national 
memberships. The egalitarian core of Benhabib’s model is founded on the capacity of any 
individual to claim the political relevance of a culturally distinct life experience. In other 
words, individuals express their political potential by demanding through deliberation that 
their specific cultural identity be recognised. By invoking the egalitarian virtues of individual 
choice, Benhabib does not account for the possibility that individuals might favour self-
exclusion over inclusion when demanding that their cultural particularities be recognised. 
Ultimately, Fraser’s perspective dualism, Young’s politics of difference, and 
Benhabib’s claim of culture only provide a partial alternative to distributive models of 
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equality. Through the prism of recognition, equality still depends on the elaboration of rights, 
individual choices, and market exchange. Although proponents of recognition call attention 
to important power dynamics largely ignored by distributivists, they do so in the name of the 
same liberal ideals. They are confronted to the same contradictions attached to reconciling 
individual choice with collective equality and compensating for the inegalitarian tendencies 
of market exchange. Associating recognition to individual choice is an issue to the extent that 
choice may be directed towards exclusion in the name of equality and difference, hence 
compromising the objective of achieving equality through inclusion.178 The atomistic facet of 
recognition reduces equality to a series of isolated claims demanding that individual or group 
specificities be formally recognised rather than substantively equalised.179 The next section 
will concentrate on the work of scholars who are uncompromisingly dedicated to 
conceptualising individual autonomy as the main impetus for realising democratic equality. 
 
Creating the Space for Equal Freedom: Sen and Pettit 
Both distributivists and advocates of recognition construct their models with a clear 
egalitarian ideal in sight. For Rawls and Dworkin this ideal rests on a fair and efficient 
redistribution of social and economic goods. For Fraser, Young, and Benhabib equality reveals 
itself through the active inclusion of marginalised minorities within political and socio-
economic institutions. Whereas both approaches celebrate individual autonomy and the 
virtues of unaltered choice, they do so in the name of achieving distinctive egalitarian ideals. 
This section will focus on the work of Amartya Sen and Philip Pettit for whom achieving 
equality is guided by practice rather than ideality. These pragmatic accounts of equality are 
dedicated to fulfilling the potential embodied in autonomous conduct more than any of the 
literature discussed thus far in this chapter. For Sen, achieving equality rests on considering 
everyone’s ‘capability to achieve’. In his view, focusing on capabilities “provides a 
straightforward account of the lack of freedom of the deprived people to achieve those 
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elementary functionings.”180 If equality is framed in terms of capabilities, then liberty will 
coincide with “the real opportunity that we have to accomplish what we value.”181 Rather 
than drawing an ideal path pointed towards realising equality and justice, Sen aims to equalise 
freedom and let capable individuals act on this equal condition.182 The idea of equal freedom 
also resonates with the work of contemporary republicans such as Philip Pettit. For Pettit, the 
state must guarantee equal freedom so that each citizen can enjoy “non-domination in a 
sphere of choice.”183 From the republican standpoint, the state and citizenry provide an 
egalitarian space in which individual opportunities can be realised.184 Both Sen and Pettit 
ground equality within a distinct space where individuals are able to achieve a certain level of 
autonomy. For Sen, this space is that of capabilities, while Pettit locates it within a state-
controlled environment. 
 Sen’s work is defined by interdisciplinarity. As a philosopher and an economist, his 
thought is more attuned to what may constitute a palpable obstacle to achieving equality.185 
This dual intellectual identity, articulated around the themes of justice, equality, poverty, and 
welfare through the prism of capabilities enabled his work to have more concrete impact than 
most academics.186 In Inequality Re-examined, Sen identifies two concrete forms of existing 
diversities that invariably challenge egalitarian pursuits: the heterogeneity of humanity, and 
the various points of view from which equality can be judged.187 Human heterogeneity 
constitutes a practical challenge, while the versatility of equality amounts to a theoretical 
challenge. Inasmuch as he is interested in theorising equality, Sen is also willing to address 
the practical challenge raised by existing inequalities. This constant oscillation between 
theory and empirical awareness echoes the work of Robert Dahl, even if the American thinker 
draws thicker lines between the democratic ideal and realistic egalitarian possibilities.188 For 
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Sen, the issue of egalitarian diversity must be addressed by asking ‘equality of what?’ Only by 
delimiting some space where all can be equal could an egalitarian proposition be ethically and 
socially plausible.189 Distinguishing equality based on categories such as resource, welfare, 
gender, opportunities, outcomes, or income is a common trend of egalitarian thought. Sen’s 
position differs to the extent that answering the question ‘equality of what?’ becomes a 
theoretical priority, overshadowing discussions of why equality is desirable.190 Diversities 
constituted by human heterogeneity and types of equality go hand in hand since “equality in 
one space goes with substantial inequalities in others.”191 Based on this, asking ‘what 
equality?’ is the only way to guarantee a theorisation of equality that is sensible to the 
diversities which define society. Unlike Dworkin or Rawls, Sen is guided by some level of 
pragmatism leading him to reject purely transcendental egalitarian theories.192 
 Sen addresses the problem of diversities through the capability approach. The latter 
states that “freedom to achieve well-being is to be understood in terms of people’s 
capabilities.193 Key here is the notion of ‘freedom of achievement’ through which 
“achievement is concerned with what we manage to accomplish, and freedom with the real 
opportunity that we have to accomplish what we value.”194 Treating freedom in this way, one 
must be sensitive to individuals’ real potentialities in addition to the nature of goods to be 
distributed or the type of groups and identities to be recognised in order to realise equality. 
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In the essay What is the Point of Equality?, Anderson outlines the benefits of the capabilities 
approach. 
One advantage of the capabilities approach to equality is that it allows us to analyze 
injustices in regard to other matters besides the distribution of resources and other 
divisible goods. One’s capabilities are a function not just of one’s fixed personal traits 
and divisible resources, but of one’s mutable traits, social relations and norms, and 
the structure of opportunities, public goods, and public spaces.195 
The capability approach provides an alternative interpretative framework to the 
problem of inequality.196 The egalitarian potential of capabilities is best understood in 
contrast to Dworkin’s approach to resources. In the same way that Dworkin disavows equality 
of welfare based on the ‘expensive taste’ argument, his endorsement of resource equality 
may be rejected from the capability standpoint. Indeed, Dworkin’s conceptual auction does 
not consider one’s capability to efficiently conduct beneficial transactions. Instead, Dworkin 
is merely concerned with equalising initial resources and the market’s efficiency in 
redistributing goods. When discussing Dworkin and equality of resources, Sen explains that 
freedom of choice entails that we “look at the choices that the person does in fact have, and 
we must not assume that the same results would be obtained by looking at the resources that 
he or she commands.”197 Sen is also critical of identity-based egalitarianisms discussed in the 
previous section. He interprets the decision to focus on specific identities as an act of closure 
by which the broadness of the world is “eclipsed by the narrowness of divisive 
temptations.”198 Whether challenging distributive or recognitive approaches to equality, Sen 
contests ideal theorisations of equality that remain blind to the great diversity and complexity 
of existing socio-economic relations.  
The capability approach stems from a critical assessment of certain liberal theories of 
equality such as utilitarianism, Rawls’ primary goods, or Dworkin’s luck egalitarianism.199 The 
contrast between these theories and Sen’s specific understanding of capabilities comes to 
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light through his discussion of poverty.200 Rather than focusing on well-being as a result of 
distribution (in the form of primary goods for Rawls, and resources for Dworkin), Sen puts an 
emphasis on poverty which “is not a matter of low well-being, but of the inability to pursue 
well-being precisely because of the lack of economic means.”201 For Sen, poverty is not simply 
the result of low income. It is a complex socio-economic variable that affects income as much 
as one’s capability to achieve.202 This deeper understanding of poverty, which far exceeds 
income-based definitions, echoes the Marxist concept of class. The proletarian class 
embodies a set of intertwined social relations which can simultaneously be economically 
disabling and politically enabling. Economically disabling because workers must sell their 
labour power to the bourgeoisie, and politically enabling because they are designated as the 
revolutionary class which is to bring about an egalitarian society.203 Sen’s view of poverty and 
capabilities clearly is not Marxist. But like the Marxist consideration of class, poverty 
understood through the capability approach articulates intricate layers of socio-economic as 
well as political relations. 
Sen’s emphasis on capability constitutes an important contribution to liberal 
discussions of equality. Whereas thinkers discussed earlier integrate individual autonomy to 
their egalitarian models, Sen deepens his exploration of autonomy through the notion of 
capability. By questioning whether individuals have the capabilities to act upon their 
autonomous condition, he challenges the idealist ambitions of redistributive and recognitive 
thinkers. He brings the question of inequality back on the ground by confronting it to the 
complexity of social relations and the indeterminacy of economic exchange. Inasmuch as Sen 
questions certain rationalist and universalist assumptions endorsed by most liberal 
egalitarians, he adopts the same naturalist stance towards market exchange. About the latter, 
he writes that “to be generically against the market would be almost as odd as being 
generically against conversations between people.”204 Like most thinkers discussed in this 
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chapter, Sen naturalises market relations and henceforth the inequalities they engender. 
Although Sen’s egalitarianism is grounded within the complexity of social relations, it remains 
blind to the purely individualistic and inegalitarian tendencies of markets. In a naturalised 
market environment, equality is once again reconsidered negatively through the possibility of 
compensating for inequalities and poverty while upholding individual autonomy and market 
exchange.205 
Not unlike Sen, the republican Philip Pettit is highly critical towards the idealist content 
of theories of justice like that of Rawls or Dworkin.206 He compares these theories to “manuals 
for how we ought to rectify God’s failures – rather than real-world manifestos for what the 
state should do in regulating the affairs of its citizens.”207 One distinctive trait of republican 
thought is indicting “the evil of subjection to another’s will – particularly in important areas 
of personal choice – as an ill that we all recognize and recoil from and at the same time as an 
ill that the state is well placed to deal with.”208 By refuting all forms of individual subjection, 
Republicans defend the virtues of individual autonomy as regulated by concrete but enabling 
state structures. Here, the state is not perceived as a force of subjection but as a framework 
that may guarantee a certain level of autonomy amongst individuals. Republican equality 
systematically realises itself through liberty and autonomy in a state-controlled environment. 
About the link between individual liberty, autonomy, the state, and equality in republican 
theory, Pettit explains that “in arguing that the state should be concerned in the first place 
with the equal freedom of its citizens, republicans held that citizens should each be assured 
of enjoying non-domination in a sphere of choice that came to be described as that of the 
fundamental or basic liberties.”209 Guided by the ideal of non-subjection, equality morphs 
into ‘equal freedom’, or ‘freedom as non-domination.’210 Although freedom as non-
domination clearly resonates with the liberal understanding of autonomy, Pettit claims that 
within the liberal tradition, “asymmetries in interpersonal power are not in themselves 
objectionable.”211 
 
205 This is also the position of Elizabeth Anderson who claims that “what we need is a theory of distributive 
justice for income and wealth that preserves the virtues of markets while imposing egalitarian constraints on 
market outcomes.” [Anderson “How Should Egalitarians Cope with Market Risks?,” 243.] 
206 For a mapping of the similarities between the work of Sen and Pettit, see Swan, “Republican Equality.” 
207 Pettit, On the People’s Terms, 126. 
208 Ibid, 1. 
209 Ibid, 8. 
210 Ibid, 5; and Swan, 434. 





 Pettit adds to the liberal understanding of autonomy as the expression of individual 
liberty that follows the dissolution of an oppressive state the necessity to free oneself from 
the will of other individuals. Through the notion of non-domination, autonomy is largely 
perceived negatively as the possibility to extract oneself from the will of others. In other 
words, it is not the enactment of autonomy but the prevention of heteronomy that becomes 
a priority under the imperative of non-domination. Here, heteronomy must be understood 
simply as the impossibility to act on one’s individual will.212 Avoiding the trappings of 
heteronomy, autonomy can be equalised as ‘orthonomy’ or “self-rule in which you guide what 
you believe and desire, intend and do, by the values that you endorse, however valuation is 
construed.”213 In this ‘orthonomous’ context, equality is not substantive but expressive in the 
sense that “the state should promote people’s enjoyment of undominated choice under the 
constraint that it treats them as equals, displaying an equal concern for each.”214 Expressed 
as such, equality is mediated twice. First through prioritising individual autonomy, and then 
through the state’s equalising intervention. Expressive equality is formal to the extent that it 
remains largely unconcerned with material equality.215 Pettit clarifies the republican position 
on material equality in Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government: 
[A] republican regime which seeks to maximize non-domination is bound to avoid 
initiatives that leave the intensity of non-domination unequal, but no such stricture 
applies to it leaving the extent of non-domination—in effect, leaving material 
resources—unequal. Without necessarily having to embrace a material egalitarianism, 
then, republican consequentialism is required to support what we can describe as 
structural egalitarianism.216 
 Here, Pettit suggests that that non-domination requires that the state somehow 
compensate for situations of excessive economic inequalities. This is a welfarist position by 
which the inegalitarian outcomes of market exchange are structurally compensated by the 
 
212 The notion of heteronomy will be further discussed in the next chapter in relation to neoliberalism. Pettit 
describes heteronomy as “a malaise – […] – that consists in forming a will over the relevant options that is not, 
as it is often put, your reflective or stable will, your true or real will.” [Ibid, 48.] 
213 Ibid, 49, 132, 281. 
214 Ibid, 89. 
215 Fabian Schuppert “Non-domination, non-alienation and social equality: towards a republican understanding 
of equality,” Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 18 (2015): 443. 






state. With Pettit’s republicanism, one is once again confronted to the naturalisation of 
market relations accompanying the work of most theorists discussed in this chapter. The 
originality of Pettit’s work resides in his uncompromising prioritisation of individual autonomy 
and state mechanisms in maintaining expressive equality. However, like liberal thinkers, he 
cannot avoid reducing egalitarianism to a matter of ‘correcting’ inequalities to the extent that 
equality is subdued by individual autonomy and that markets are set as unavoidable 
constraints on achieving substantive equality.  
 
Conclusion 
The advent of liberal democracy signals the theoretical conflation of two distinct and 
sometimes conflicting intellectual traditions. On the one hand, democracy persists as a 
declaration that the people ought to rule. On the other, liberalism aims to convey the 
emancipatory potential of individual liberty and autonomy through human rights and market 
exchange. Whereas the democratic call for a ruling demos requires a certain level of collective 
association, enacting individual autonomy thrives in non-interference. In order to maintain 
the individualistic condition of liberal ideality alive, democratic equality must be formalised. 
Such formalisation takes place chiefly through the enactment of human rights and 
parliamentary representation. Not content with the relative egalitarian emptying operating 
within liberal democracies, many contemporary liberal thinkers have attempted to reclaim 
substantive forms of equality in a liberal democratic context. In this chapter the work of these 
thinkers was divided in three categories: redistributivists, recognitivists, and thinkers 
concerned with achieving equality within a non-ideal framework.     
Through the notion of redistribution, both Rawls and Dworkin construct sophisticated 
models aimed towards redistributing justice and equality in a liberal environment shaped by 
individual autonomy and market exchange. Rawls’s ‘justice as fairness’ rests on the ideality of 
the difference and efficiency principles to prioritise the interests of ‘the least advantaged’. 
Alternatively, Dworkin focuses his redistributivists ambitions on resources. The latter are to 
be distributed through a generalised auction where individual time, labour power, and risks 
are traded ‘fairly’. Ultimately, both Rawls and Dworkin explicitly designate the market as the 
solution to its own inegalitarian excesses. The complex frameworks of distribution they 





With the concept of recognition, thinkers such as Fraser, Young, and Benhabib discuss 
equality through the possibility to include marginalised groups and identities within liberal 
democratic institutions that have long excluded them. Whereas Fraser aims to combine her 
account of recognition to redistributive endeavours through ‘perspective dualism’, Young 
proposes a ‘politics of difference’ in which socio-economically undermined groups are 
systematically considered prior to discussing justice. Similarly, Benhabib deploys a 
deliberative framework in which ‘claims to culture’ can be made in order to promote equal 
representation. Perhaps more than any other types of liberal egalitarianism, recognitive and 
identity-based approaches have had a profound impact on contemporary discussions of 
equality in liberal-democracies. The proliferation of identity politics in public debates has 
propelled many ideas first elaborated by recognitive thinkers to the forefront of concrete 
political movements. Interestingly, many of these movements have generated a challenge 
that neither Fraser, Young, nor Benhabib could foresee: associating equality with the inclusion 
of specific identities through individual choice in the language of rights risks promoting 
exclusion from the dominant group rather than the active inclusion of marginalised groups.  
The final section of this chapter focused on the work of Sen and Pettit, two thinkers 
willing to conceptualise equality in less ideal terms. Whereas Sen focuses on individuals’ real 
‘capacity to achieve’ in an autonomous context, Pettit describes equality as a situation of 
‘equal freedom’ to be guaranteed by the state. Although both thinkers express valid doubts 
towards idealistic considerations of equality, they are confronted to the same challenges 
stemming from prioritising individual autonomy and choice over equality. Like Rawls, 
Dworkin, and most supporters of recognition, they remain unable to come to terms with the 
inegalitarian tendencies of market exchange, hence reducing their egalitarianism to a set of 
methods for reducing inequalities. What emerges from the dialogue established in this 
chapter is the difficulty of reconciling liberal ideals of individual autonomy, choice, and market 
exchange with the pursuit of substantive equality. The next chapter will focus on the work of 
neoliberals for whom the inegalitarian impact of market exchange becomes a political force. 
It will be claimed through the figure of the contemporary neoliberal subject that the ideal of 
liberal autonomy has materialised into individual heteronomy, a subjective mode of conduct 
that thrives in market inequalities and works directly against the possibility to politically 






Neoliberalism and its Subjects: From Autonomy to Heteronomy 
 
Introduction 
The previous chapter showed that within the liberal democratic nexus, the question 
of equality is systematically mediated by that of individual autonomy and liberty. In a context 
where equality is expected to result from individual autonomy, redistribution and recognition 
remain overwhelmingly attached to the institutions of the market and human rights. Although 
advocates of economic redistribution and cultural recognition never fundamentally question 
the notion of market exchange, they all aim to regulate, adjust, or tame market mechanisms 
in the name of equality. Despite the eventual impossibility to fully conciliate the egalitarian 
promise of democracy with market exchange, the models put forward by these thinkers 
remain guided by the necessity to uphold equality. Neoliberalism represents a clear departure 
from these approaches. Although neoliberals and liberal egalitarians are both descendants of 
classical liberalism, they do not share the same concern for the political potential of equality. 
Where liberal egalitarians rely on the potential of autonomous individuals to come together 
in order to politically realise equality, neoliberals perceive individuals as competitors whose 
task is to fulfil their isolated self-interests on a variety of markets.1 
The broad set of ideas now known as neoliberalism rose from a relatively obscure 
corner of the liberal tradition to become the overwhelmingly dominant interpretative 
framework in governance, economics, business, and public discourse.2 Neoliberalism is 
underpinned by a radical reinterpretation of liberal ideals of individual liberty, autonomy, and 
 
1 Maurizio Lazzarato, “Neoliberalism in Action Inequality, Insecurity and the Reconstitution of the Social,” 
Theory, Culture & Society 26 (2009): 117; and Michael A. Peters “The Language of Neoliberal Education,” in 
Letnik XXIX, številka ed. Šolsko polje and Mitja Sardo 2018, 64. 
2 David Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 1,3.  
John Clark provides an impressive list of contexts to which the term neoliberal has been associated in 
academic literature:  “states, spaces, logics, techniques, technologies, discourses, discursive framework, 
ideologies, ways of thinking, projects, agendas, programs, governmentality, measures, regimes, development, 
ethno-development, development imaginaries, global forms of control, social policies, multiculturalism, audit 
cultures, managerialism, restructuring, reform, privatization, regulatory frameworks, governance, good 
governance, NGOs, third sector, subjects, subjectivities, individualization, professionalization, normalization, 
market logics, market forms of calculation, the destatalization of government and the degovernmentalization 





self-determination.3 Whilst the epistemic link between classical liberalism and neoliberalism 
is clear, neoliberal thinkers like Friedrich Von Hayek, Ludwig Von Mises, and Milton Friedman 
invite their readers to fundamentally reconsider the role of the state, the pervasiveness of 
the market, and the political status of individual agency. From the neoliberal perspective, the 
classical understanding of the state as the main allocator of resources is refuted. Its main 
function beyond maintaining order is to provide “a framework within which free competition 
could flourish and the price system operate effectively.”4 In lieu of various forms of state 
interventions, market rationality must be extended to most, if not all, domains of social life.5 
Within this framework, the individual becomes the only locus of economic and political 
agency. Neoliberalism having become the most impactful branch of liberalism in recent 
decades, it is vital to assess the status held by equality within the current neoliberal consensus 
and to determine the forms (if any) of neoliberal politics. What does the popularity of 
neoliberalism signify for accounts of liberal equality presented in the previous chapter? Can 
egalitarian politics be recovered in a neoliberal context that is fundamentally hostile to 
collective endeavours? If not, where does equality stand beyond the current neoliberal 
horizon? These are all questions that this chapter will aim to address. 
 The supremacy of individual agency is crucial to neoliberal thought. Liberal egalitarians 
discussed in the first chapter endeavoured to reconcile individual liberty with collective goals 
through various models such as the least advantaged principle, the average utility principle, 
or cultural recognition.6 From a neoliberal perspective, freedom and responsibility is first and 
foremost an individual matter.7 Collective outcomes are subordinated to the autonomous 
capacity of individuals, and there shall be no attempt to infringe on this capacity beyond what 
is required by the law. Within this profoundly individualistic context, state interventions 
become interferences in the natural course of a market that has become the only 
emancipatory horizon. The state stands as a necessary evil that must be kept at a distance by 
 
3 See Michel Foucault, Naissance de la biopolitique Cours au Collège de France 1978-1979 (Paris : Seuil Hautes 
Etudes), 2004. 
4 Milton Friedman, “Neo-liberalism and its prospects” in The Collected Works of Milton Friedman (Oslo: 
Farmand, 1951), 92. 
5 Harvey, 3. 
6 See Chapter 1. 
7 About individual responsibility, Hayek writes that “in a free society there cannot be any collective 
responsibility of members of a group as such, unless they have, by concerted action, all made themselves 
individually and severally responsible.” [Friedrich A. Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty (Chicago: University of 





empowered individuals. Consequently, equality is no longer seen as a necessary objective of 
politics nor, as the utilitarians would put it, as a means to maximise one’s utility. Instead, 
equality becomes a possibility amongst others that individuals may or may not desire to 
pursue.  
The failure of 20th century collectivisms deeply affected the work of early neoliberals 
like Hayek and Friedman.8 This transpires in their rejection of the state. The collective capacity 
of the state, having constituted the core of fascist and socialist societies, was now perceived 
as a threat to individual liberty. Yet, it would be a mistake to interpret neoliberalism merely 
as a reactionary ideology as is the case for a lot of critical work produced on the topic.9 
Neoliberalism represents more than the marketisation of the liberal democratic project. In 
this chapter it will be interpreted not merely as a radically individualistic development of 
liberalism, but as also as a symptom of the political shortcomings of liberal democracy. 
Focusing fully on the autonomous capacity of individuals in a market context, neoliberals can 
bypass the liberal paradox according to which equality must be reconciled with market 
exchange. Framed in these terms, neoliberalism exceeds its categorisation as a reactive 
ideology to be understood as a radical attempt to liberate individuals from the clutches of all 
collectivities apart from the market. Considered as a symptom of the political impotence of 
liberal democracy, neoliberalism ultimately reveals the impossibility to ‘realise’ equality 
through the deployment of individual autonomy. Under neoliberalism, equality and collective 
politics are set aside in a last-ditch attempt to emancipate individuals, blurring the lines 
between autonomy and purely desire-driven heteronomous behaviour. 
Neoliberal political economy rests on the postulate that individuals are fundamentally 
unequal.10 In this state of generalised inequality, politics and market relations are not driven 
towards collective nor egalitarian objectives, but towards competition. According to Michel 
Foucault and his intellectual descendants, neoliberalism summons atomised individuals to 
compete against each other as ‘entrepreneur of themselves’.11 As auto-entrepreneurs, 
neoliberal subjects are discouraged from entertaining any form of collaborative relationship 
 
8 Geoffroy de Lagasnerie, La derniere Lecon de Michel Foucault sur le neoliberalisme, la theorie et la politique. 
(Paris : Fayard, 2012). Also see Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty. 
9 Notable examples include Wendy Brown, Undoing the Demos: Neoliberalism’s Stealth Revolution (New York: 
Zone Books, 2015), and Noam Chomsky, Profit Over People (New York: Seven Stories Press, 1999). 
10 Lazzarato, 117. 





that is purposeless or non-instrumental.12 The concept of ‘entrepreneur of the self’ denotes 
a subjective conduct that goes far beyond the utilitarian appraisal of individual self-interests. 
For Foucault, the auto-entrepreneur is his “own producer, being to himself his own capital.”13 
This concept highlights two distinct facets of neoliberalism; the complete individualisation of 
all economic and social relations, and the subsequent reinvestment of individualised conduct 
on a variety of competitive markets. Not only are capital, production, consumption and 
exploitation individualised under neoliberalism, they are also measured against other 
individuals’ capacity to do so.  
Since one of the most distinctive facets of neoliberalism is a profound suspicion of any 
collective effort incompatible with market logic, the figure of the individual encompasses the 
potential as much as the limits of neoliberal conduct.14 If neoliberalism represents the 
consecration of individualism, then its conceptual intricacies are most legible through the 
figure of its individual subject. Who is the subject of neoliberalism? In contemporary liberal 
democracies this figure arguably has two faces: homo economicus, and homo democraticus. 
The economic individual populates economic models and reflects neoliberalism’s total 
commitment to market forces. It produces, consumes, and competes in a marketised world, 
striving to overcome obstacles and most importantly other individuals.15 Homo-economicus 
is not an unfamiliar figure, it has wandered throughout the history of liberal thought and 
neoclassical economics in the gaze of a utility-maximising and self-interested subject. Yet, 
neoliberal economicus may be distinguished from its older iterations based on particular 
character traits tied to individualisation. One relates to auto-entrepreneurship or the process 
of not only producing goods but also oneself. This is what Michel Ferrer and Wendy Brown 
 
12 Byung-Chul Han, Psychopolitics (London: Verso, 2017). 
13 Foucault, Naissance de la biopolitique, 232. 
14 About the advantage of focusing on individual rather than collective conduct, Milton Friedman explains that 
“What is true of individual action is equally true of collective action, except that a majority is perhaps even less 
likely to consider explicitly the long-term significance of its decision and therefore is even more in need of 
guidance by principles.” [Milton Friedman, “Adam Smith’s Relevance for 1976,” address to the Mont Pelerin 
Society, 27 August 1976, box 55, folder 21, Friedman Papers, 2.]  
About the process of individualisation which he associates with neoliberalism, Marcel Gauchet writes that “the 
process of individualisation contains from the beginning a subjective facet that exceeds its objective 
expression. [Marcel Gauchet, L’avenement de la democratie IV, Le Nouveau Monde (Paris : Gallimard, 2017), 
609.] Also see Daniel Stedman Jones, Masters of the Universe Hayek Friedman and the Birth of Neoliberal 
Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012), 18. 
15 This competitive aspect of neoliberalism was explicitly acknowledged by Friedman: “[neoliberalism] . It 
would seek to use competition among producers to protect consumers from exploitation, competition among 
employers to protect workers and owners of property, and competition among consumers to protect the 





refer to as ‘human capital’, whose accumulation transforms individuals into investors of 
themselves.16 Finally, Byung-Chul Han’s concept of ‘auto exploitation’ or the process by which 
one becomes “an auto-exploiting labourer in his or her own enterprise” can also be associated 
to the neoliberal economic subject.17 
The democratic individual, although closely related, is a more complex specimen. It 
strives to be political in a neoliberal environment that negates equality and politics.18 In an 
apparently hostile context, homo democraticus attempts to remain political by turning itself 
into an exhaustive political unit. Like any other social relation or process, politics is also 
individualised under neoliberalism.19 individuals represent the beginning and end of 
neoliberal politics. Invested in themselves, neoliberal democratic subjects designate their 
own individual bodies as distinct political spheres. Although neoliberalism is separated from 
any form of collective endeavour, individuals still relate to each other politically as producers 
and consumers of political images. In this political market, one interacts merely by seeking 
confirmation of oneself into others.20 No longer seen as agents that one can exchange and 
potentially collaborate with, other individuals represent a multiplicity of mirrors on which one 
can measure the potential of her or his political convictions. Rather than a proliferation of 
varied political units, what emerges from these interindividual interactions is what Byung-
Chul Han refers to as an ‘inferno of sameness’, a connected yet excluding relation that “levels 
essential differences” and ultimately eliminates otherness.21  
This chapter will be divided in four sections. The first will aim to assess the political 
significance of neoliberalism in relation to more classic forms of liberalism remaining directed 
towards politically realising equality. The distinctive features of neoliberal thought will be 
discussed through the work of classic neoliberal thinkers like Friedrich Hayek and Milton 
Friedman. Both Hayek and Friedman laid the theoretical groundwork of neoliberalism by 
invoking economic liberalism directly against the state and its egalitarian ambitions. Then, the 
historical and political impact of neoliberalism will be read through the work of Michel 
 
16 Michel Feher, “Self-Appreciation; or, The Aspirations of Human Capital” Public Culture 21  (2009): 30. Also 
see Wendy Brown, Undoing the Demos. 
17 Han, Psychopolitics, 5. 
18 About the complex relationship between politics and neoliberalism, Marcel Gauchet writes, “the political is 
summoned in the name of its own negation.” [Marcel Gauchet, L’avenement de la democratie IV Le Nouveau 
Monde, 66.] 
19 Ibid, 303. 
20 Han, The Agony of Eros (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2017), 18. 





Foucault. Through the notion of ‘entrepreneur of the self’, Foucault offers an account of 
neoliberal individualisation and competition that exceeds purely negative critiques of 
neoliberalism. The third section will attempt to draw a conceptual portrait of homo 
economicus. The economic subject lays at the core of neoliberalism as a producer, a 
consumer, but also as a competitor constantly measured and valued in relations to other 
atomised individuals. The final part of this chapter aims to produce a sketch of homo 
democraticus in a marketised and largely depoliticised environment. Ultimately, the workings 
of economic and democratic subjectivities in a neoliberal context signal that the modern 
divide between reasoned autonomous action and heteronomous desire-driven behaviour no 
longer holds, declaring the impossibility to achieve equality through the veil of individual 
autonomy. The hegemony of neoliberal ideals further undermines the possibility of ‘realising’ 
equality in contemporary liberal democracies where individualism and market competition 
reign supreme. As Gauchet concisely points out, “autonomy was thought as the solution, it 
happens to be the problem.”22 The chapter will close on a call for discussing equality beyond 
the ideal of individual autonomy and market-induced inequalities. 
 
The Neoliberal Shift 
In the space of a few decades, neoliberalism rose to prominence to the point of 
becoming integrated into the way many understand and experience the world in liberal 
democracies.23 In his Brief History of Neoliberalism, David Harvey produces a concise 
definition of a term that is often misunderstood: 24  
Neoliberalism is in the first instance a theory of political economic practices that 
proposes that human well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual 
entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework characterized 
by strong private property rights, free markets, and free trade.25 
 
22 Gauchet, L’avenement de la democratie IV Le Nouveau Monde, 635. Own translation. 
23 Harvey, 3. 
24 For Rajesh Venugopal, “neoliberalism is now widely acknowledged in the literature as a controversial, 
incoherent and crisis-ridden term, even by many of its most influential deployers.” [Rajesh Venugopal, 
“Neoliberalism as concept,” Economy and Society, 44 (2015): 166.] 





To the extent that it is market-driven, neoliberalism is often equated to neoclassical 
economics.26 Although the neoclassical consideration of markets as auto-regulating 
institutions had a profound impact on the neoliberal approach to economics, neoliberalism is 
more than a mere economic doctrine. It is also a branch of political economy for it concerns 
itself with the role of states and governments in accommodating market mechanisms and 
unleashing individuals’ economic potential. The concrete political impact of neoliberalism is 
best exemplified by monetary policies put in place by the governments of Margaret Thatcher 
and Ronald Reagan throughout the 1980s. At the heart of their economic policies was an 
emphasis on market growth fuelled by a steady increase of the money supply, spectacular tax 
cuts, and market deregulations.27 With the objective of fighting inflation and freeing 
individuals from state-imposed regulations, these policies quickly fostered economic 
inequalities.28 This was especially true in the United States where ‘Reaganomics’ radically 
changed the scope of government intervention into the economy, and redefined the status 
of individual responsibility in economic relations.29 As a market-driven branch of political 
economy neoliberalism aims to greatly limit the impact of state intervention on the lives of 
autonomous individuals. This is the paradox that reveals the radicality of the neoliberal 
proposition; disregarding traditional politics and collective action, only to find political 
answers through market exchange and within individuals interacting in a fundamentally 
inegalitarian context.    
 
26 The economist Hyman P. Minsky defines the neoclassical synthesis as the belief that “fiscal and monetary 
policy measures can eliminate persistent unemployment and that there are self-correcting forces within 
decentralised markets that set the economy at full employment.” [Hyman P. Minsky, Stabilizing an Unstable 
Economy (New Haven: Yale university press. 1986), 100.] In academic debates, neoliberalism is often used as a 
synonym for neoclassical economics. [Stedman Jones, 87.] 
27 In Capital in the 21st century, Thomas Piketty breaks down the economic beliefs underpinning Friedman’s 
monetary policies: “The crisis was primarily monetary, and therefore its solution was also monetary. From this 
analysis, Friedman drew a clear political conclusion: in order to ensure regular, undisrupted growth in a 
capitalist economy, it is necessary and sufficient to make sure that monetary policy is designed to ensure 
steady growth of the money supply.” [Piketty, 712.] On the link between monetary policies and neoliberalism, 
also see Gauchet, 40. 
28 Piketty empirically confirms that policies implemented by Reagan in the 1980s and picked up by other 
governments over the last three decades have greatly increased income inequalities in the US: “Since 1980, 
income inequality has exploded in the United States. Th e upper decile’s share increased from 30– 35 percent 
of national income in the 1970s to 45– 50 percent in the 2000s— an increase of 15 points of national income. 
if change continues at the same pace, for example, the upper decile will be raking in 60 percent of national 
income by 2030.” [Piketty, 20, 294.] 
29 About the policy shift that followed Reagan’s election, Harvey explains that “Corporate taxes were reduced 
dramatically, and the top personal tax rate was reduced from 70 to 28 per cent in what was billed as ‘the 
largest tax cut in history’. And so began the momentous shift towards greater social inequality and the 





 The core ideas of what is now known as neoliberalism emerged most clearly in the 
writings of Friedrich Hayek, and Milton Friedman.30 The political failures of socialism and 
fascism formed the basis of their deep scepticism towards all forms of collectivism.31 About 
this very point, Geoffroy de Lagasnerie notes that early neoliberals saw a direct correlation 
between the rejection of liberalism and the emergence of totalitarianism.32 They did so in a 
way that exceeded a condemnation of the obvious oppressive features of European fascism 
and Soviet socialism, incorporating Keynesianism and social-democratic ideals within their 
critique.33 Hayek, who obtained a Nobel prize in economics in 1974, perceived collective 
planning as fundamentally incompatible with liberalism.34 In The Constitution of Liberty, he 
outlines the basis for his unconditional commitment to individual liberty. The latter is seen as 
“the source and condition of most moral values”, implying that we cannot “appreciate the 
value of freedom until we know how a society of free men as a whole differs from one in 
which unfreedom prevails.”35 Liberty thereof always responds to its absence in a situation 
where the state reigns supreme. Throughout Hayek’s work, liberty must be understood 
chiefly as an individual quality. Individuals, not collectivities, bear the responsibility and 
capability for better decision making.36  
Hayek’s commitment to individualism should not be equated to a utilitarian position 
tying individualisation to better governance. Through the claim that one cannot achieve 
freedom if under the influence of someone else’s will, Hayek also brings a moral element to 
his argument.37 Accordingly, one must object any attempts “to impress upon society a 
deliberately chosen pattern of distribution whether it be an order of equality or of 
inequality.”38 Any collectivist endeavour to determine the right course of economic 
distribution and individual conduct is identified as liberticidal. From this point onwards, 
 
30 See Hayek, The Road to Serfdom (London: Routledge), 2001; and Milton Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press), 1962. 
31 Gauchet directly associates the rise of neoliberalism with the degeneration of the socialist project over the 
same period. [Gauchet, L’avenement de la democratie IV Le Nouveau Monde, 99-102.] 
32 Geoffroy de Lagasnerie, La derniere Lecon de Michel Foucault sur le neoliberalisme, la theorie et la politique  
33 Ibid. 
34 “The Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel 1974 
Gunnar Myrdal, Friedrich von Hayek Press release,” 9 October 1974, 
https://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economic-sciences/laureates/1974/press.html.  
35 Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978), 6. 
36 Ibid, 83, 124. 
37 Ibid, 135. 





pursuing equality becomes an obstacle to individual emancipation and the good running of 
the market. Hayek’s rejection of egalitarianism also stems from the belief that equality can 
only be formal (equality before the law) since “not only has liberty nothing to do with any 
other sort of equality, but it is even bound to produce inequality in many respects.”39 Far from 
attempting to reach a political compromise between liberty and equality or accounting for 
their mutual dependence, Hayek believes inequalities to be an inevitable outcome of liberty. 
It would be self-defeating to attempt to undermine inequalities, for they simply stand as the 
concrete and inevitable facet of liberty.40 Rather than a symptom of political wrongdoings, 
the presence of inequalities confirms that individuals are effectively free.41 As one of the 
concrete facets of individual liberty, inequalities act as an empirical catalyst for the 
deployment of neoliberalism. The threat of totalitarianism under the gaze of collectivism, and 
the association of individual liberties with inequalities constitute the concrete base of Hayek’s 
unconditional consideration of the market as an emancipatory force for individuals. Away 
from the rigidity and pre-determinacy of collective planning, the ‘free’ market offers a 
framework that can be auto-regulated by individual self-interests, creating “an invisible order, 
which delegitimates the claim of any human power to take command of society.”42 In Hayek’s 
work, totalitarianism exceeds its Lefortian consideration contained within the monarch’s 
body to include any collective claim over the good running of individual lives.43 
Milton Friedman is another figurehead of neoliberalism. Member of the so-called 
‘Chicago School’ which he helped turned into the epicentre of neoliberal thought, Friedman 
obtained a Nobel prize only two years after Hayek, shortly before Margaret Thatcher and 
Ronald Reagan were to make neoliberalism the guiding light of their economic policies.44 
Friedman expressed clear reservations towards collectivism and the state as early as 1951 
 
39 Ibid, 85. 
40 For Jason Read, neoliberalism is not merely an ideal theory but also an ideology that ambitions to reveal an 
realist ‘natural’ state of affair: “[Neoliberalism] is an ideology that refers not only to the political realm, to an 
ideal of the state, but to the entirety of human existence. It claims to present not an ideal, but a reality; human 
nature.” [Jason Read, “A Genealogy of Homo-Economicus: Neoliberalism and the Production of Subjectivity,” 
Foucault Studies 6 (2009): 26.] 
41 Writing about Hayek’s empirical approach to the market, Pierre Rosanvallon explains that “In his view, the 
market was not an ‘invention’ that emerged full- blown from the brain of some economist. It was rather the 
result of a cumulative, adaptive pro cess based on human experience. [Rosanvallon, 236.] 
42 Ibid. 
43 See Claude Lefort, Essais sur le politique XIX-XXe siècles (Paris: Editions de Seuil), 1986. 
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when he dismissed the state’s capacity to solve poverty and prevent selfish interests as 
naïve.45 In an article entitled Neoliberalism and its Prospects, he explained that ‘collectivist 
philosophy’ should not be undermined based on its noble objectives but on the failed means 
used to achieve them.46 Here, ‘the means’ are state power and central planning, resulting 
from the illusion that the economic activity of millions of people could be coordinated 
efficiently.47 Not unlike Hayek, Friedman’s argument is clearly imprinted by a fear of 
totalitarianism. In his view, “a state with power to do good by the same token is in a position 
to do harm; and there is much reason to believe that the power will sooner or later get into 
the hands of those who will use it for evil purposes.”48 The state and its centrally planned 
economic policies is seen as a bad bet whose outcomes are at best inefficient and potentially 
catastrophic. In response to the deadlock of state intervention, Friedman proposed a new 
type of faith in the market. Under this belief system, state intervention would be reduced to 
fostering market competition, preventing monopolies, providing a stable monetary 
framework, and relieving acute misery.”49 The state was to remain present, but only as a 
passive technician watching the perfect bicycle of the market run its course and allocate 
resources.50 Unlike distributivists like Rawls and Dworkin who also recognise the efficiency of 
markets in allocating resources, Friedman rejects any attempts to substantively curb the 
effects of market exchange.51 From a neoliberal point of view market efficiency depends, not 
on the market’s capacity for fair distribution, but on its ability to function independently of 
state interventions.  
Regarding inequalities, Friedman’s position is remarkably close to Hayek’s. Julio H. 
Cole summarises Friedman’s stance in three points: (1) inequalities are desirable in any 
healthy economic system, (2) inequalities are unavoidable in a free-market economy, and (3) 
actual levels of income inequalities are often exaggerated.52 Two specific beliefs appear to 
underpin Friedman and Hayek’s considerations of inequalities. One is a moral commitment to 
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46 Ibid, 91. 
47 Ibid, 90. 
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49 Ibid, 92. 
50 The ‘perfect bicycle’ is a term coined by economist Paul Samuelson to highlight the auto-regulating 
capacities of the market. See Timothy Sinclair,  “The Queen and the perfect Bicycle” (2009) 
http://insidestory.org.au/the-queen-and-the-perfect-bicycle/. 
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individual liberty erected against the spectre of totalitarianism. The other recognises 
inequalities as an empirical sign that individual liberties are effectively unrestrained from any 
form of collective action. Although a healthy economy is not itself measured on its capacity 
to foster inequalities, neoliberals perceive inequalities as a consequence of individual liberty 
which in turn conditions the deployment of market-based neoliberal politics. Inasmuch as 
totalitarianism represents the concrete failure of collectivist politics, inequalities stand as the 
concrete face of individual liberties that is the starting point to any form of neoliberal politics. 
Although equality is not necessarily undesirable for Friedman, it must always be secondary to 
freedom. Rather than an objective to be achieved, equality may be a possible ‘by-product’ of 
neoliberal politics underpinned by a regime of freedom and inequalities.53  
An important difference between 19th century liberalism and neoliberalism according 
to Friedman is that laissez-faire has given way to the establishment of a competitive order.54 
No longer a hands-off approach to the market, neoliberalism is an active commitment to the 
economic and political virtues of competition amongst individuals. This declaration does not 
only highlight the difference between liberalism and neoliberalism, it also foreshadows the 
possibility of a neoliberal brand of politics primarily driven by market competition. There 
remains an undeniable theoretical lineage between classical economic liberalism and 
neoliberalism. In many ways, neoliberal thought may even be considered as a politicisation 
and radicalisation of specific facets of economic liberalism such as free market competition 
and the notion of individual subject. No classical thinker has been more revered by neoliberals 
than Adam Smith.55 Both Hayek and Friedman were deeply influenced by Smith’s concept of 
the ‘invisible hand’ introduced in An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of 
Nations: 
He [the individual] generally, indeed, neither intends to promote the public interest, 
nor knows how much he is promoting it […] he intends only his own gain, and he is in 
 
53 About equality, Milton and Rose Friedman write that “A society that puts equality—in the sense of equality 
of outcome—ahead of freedom will end up with neither equality nor freedom.... On the other hand, a society 
that puts freedom first will, as a happy by-product, end up with both greater freedom and greater equality.” 
[Milton and Rose D. Friedman, Free to Choose (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1980), 148.]  
About the precedence taken by freedom over equality in neoliberalism, Michael A. Peters writes that “the 
market-driven ideology puts an  emphasis  on  freedom  over  equality  where  ‘freedom’  is  construed  as  the  
capacity  to  exercise  a  rational  choice  in  the  marketplace  based  on  one’s  self-interest.” [Peters, 64.] 
54 Milton Friedman, “Neo-liberalism and its Prospects”, 93. 






this, as in many other cases, led by an invisible hand to promote an end which was no 
part of his intention. Nor is it always the worse for the society that it was no part of it. 
By pursuing his own interest he frequently promotes that of the society more 
effectually than when he really intends to promote it.56 
What Smith offers with this metaphor is a new conceptualisation of the relationship 
between individual and collective interests. Individuals pursuing their own ends are also 
unconsciously promoting the common good, which is the most effective way to fulfil the 
interest of all. Although Smith still puts a strong emphasis on the value of the common good, 
his appeal in the eyes of neoliberals resides in his prioritisation of individual interests. This 
specific point will lead Friedman to label Smith’s invisible hand as “a flash of genius.”57 
Breaking the myth of this seemingly perfect theoretical matching between Smith and 
neoliberals, Simon Glaze explains that the link between the two is not as straightforward as it 
might appear. About the neoliberal appropriation of the invisible hand, he observes that this 
short passage tends to be isolated from the rest of Smith’s argument and hence 
misunderstood.58 In certain chapters of The Wealth of Nations Smith openly support 
government interventions and warns against the dangers of self-interested behaviour, 
contradicting two founding beliefs of neoliberal thought.59 
Neoliberals’ use and misuse of the symbolism of Smith’s invisible hand metaphor 
arguably exhibits the rupture that exists between classical liberalism and neoliberalism. Even 
for those branches of liberalism that are most closely related to neoliberal thought such as 
Smithian economics and utilitarianism, the fulfilment of collective interest embodied by the 
 
56 Adam Smith, An Inquiry Into the Nature and Causes of the The Wealth of Nations Books I, II,III,IV, and V 
(Amsterdam: Metalibri, 2007), 349-350. 
57 In Free to Chose: a Personal Statement Milton Friedman alongside his wife and co-author Rose Friedman 
explain what is brilliant about Smith’s discovery: “Adam Smith's flash of genius was his recognition that the 
prices that emerged from voluntary transactions between buyers and sellers—for short, in a free market—
could coordinate the activity of millions of people, each seeking his own interest, in such a way as to make 
everyone better off. It was a startling idea then, and it remains one today, that economic order can emerge as 
the unintended consequence of the actions of many people, each seeking his own interest.” [Milton Friedman 
and Rose Friedman, Free to Choose, 13-14.] 
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common good remains the most desirable end for a society. For John Stuart Mill, the 
utilitarian standard “is not the agent’s own greatest happiness, but the greatest amount of 
happiness altogether.”60 Individual self-interests become objectively valuable only when they 
are aggregated within average utility. For other liberal traditions such as social contract 
theories discussed in chapter one, limits on individual self-interests are set by the contract 
itself or other mechanisms that aim to constrain individual pursuits in the name of a common 
good.61 The subordination of individual interests to the interest of all by means of politics is a 
recurring feature of liberalism from Kant and Rousseau to Rawls and Sen.62 One of the novelty 
of neoliberalism is to step away from considerations of the common good and equality by 
merely invoking politics in the name of individual interests.63  
The radical individualisation of liberal beliefs at the core of neoliberalism may be 
perceived as an attempt to respond to the collective limits of liberalism. The previous chapter 
showed how attempting to pursue equality through individual autonomy regulated by 
markets and human rights has proven to be a strenuous task. More than a mere branch of 
liberalism, neoliberalism arguably constitutes a reaction to its egalitarian shortcomings.64 The 
originality of neoliberalism resides in its complete abandonment of egalitarian and collective 
pursuits that have traversed the history of political liberalism. In a situation where equality 
“has ceased to inspire any living faith”, neoliberals refocus autonomy towards purely 
individualistic ends.65 Through this shift, neoliberalism may be conceived as a critique of 
political liberalism.66 This critique is founded on the failure of 20th century’s collective 
experiments as well as the political impotence of the classical association between autonomy 
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and equality. If individual freedom truly is a fundamental imperative, then any attempts to 
‘correct’ or ‘solve’ inequalities will prove counter productive. Following the neoliberal ethos, 
autonomy only begins when one is freed from collective constraints, including that of 
materialising equality. Mobilising the ‘free’ market and the inequalities it engenders as an 
emancipatory field, neoliberals fully dismiss the political value of equality. 
Neoliberal thought blurs the classical divide between economic and political liberalism 
while establishing a clear hierarchy between the two. Political answers are to be found within 
economic liberalism since the market has become the only emancipatory horizon in an 
environment where collective projects are essentially suspicious, and inequalities display the 
potential of individual freedom. More than an economic doctrine, neoliberalism is a branch 
of political economy that has affected public policy more than any other over the last four 
decades. At its core, it rests on a deep suspicion of collective political projects and state 
interventions. The transition between liberalism and neoliberalism marks a critical shift from 
the collective capacity of individuals to autonomously assemble in order to realise equality, 
to an emphasis on the political and economic virtues of unrestrained individual liberty. From 
a neoliberal standpoint, equality has very little value. Instead, neoliberal politics may only 
materialise through further marketisation and individualisation. These processes arguably 
constitute the concrete facet of neoliberalism, further outlining the impossibility of enacting 
equality in a neoliberal environment.  
 
Marketisation 
So far, this chapter has been dedicated to deciphering the roots and specificities of 
neoliberal thought. Inasmuch as a theoretical account of neoliberalism is needed, it does not 
provide the full scope of its political ambitions. Over the last four decades, neoliberalism has 
come out of its theoretical shell to materialise into a concrete set of policy prescriptions 
shaping the political economy of contemporary liberal democracies. Based on this abrupt 
shift, contemporary critics have too often dismissed neoliberalism as a purely destructive 
force both in thought and practice. Examples include Wendy Brown and Sheldon Wolin’s 
interpretation of neoliberalism as an anti-democratic ideology, Noam Chomsky’s view of 





of neoliberal practices with human tragedies.67 The point here is not to claim that these 
accounts are unfounded, or that neoliberal policies have proved successful. Rather, it is to 
argue that neoliberalism cannot be effectively criticised, let alone understood, if it is framed 
merely as a negative and destructive ideology.  
About this critical trend, De Lagasnerie remarks that “neoliberal theories are largely 
perceived as dangerous and reactionary, its authors being portrayed as shady characters and 
harmful ideologues who played a key role in market deregulation and disengaging from the 
welfare state.”68 These critical thinkers find themselves speechless in the face of 
neoliberalism’s radicality, having no choice but to return to the comfort of a democracy that 
‘once was’. These approaches imply a type of critical nostalgia by which highlighting the 
dangers of the new neoliberal situation necessitates returning to a democratic past that was 
‘undone’ or destroyed.69 If neoliberalism stands merely as a destructive force, then the 
objective of politics is to reclaim a past and fuller form of democracy whitewashed by the 
expansion of neoliberalism. Such nostalgia for a lost democratic ideal is precarious, 
preventing one from fully grasping the political-economic implications of neoliberalism. Not 
unlike some of the liberal egalitarians discussed in the previous chapter, critical thinkers 
mentioned above frame their accounts of democracy away from any clear consideration of 
its historical association with economic liberalism. As a result, the frontier between economic 
liberalism and neoliberalism becomes indecipherable. Every market mechanism risk being 
presented as the toxic intrusion of neoliberalism within an untainted democratic sphere 
rather an integrant part of the liberal democratic project. Limiting neoliberalism to a type of 
market nuisance on the good running of democratic politics, these authors largely overlook 
the radical proposition of neoliberal politics. In contrast to these accounts of neoliberalism 
rooted in nostalgia, De Lagasnerie argues that one of Foucault’s last lesson was to ask, “not 
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what liberal logics undo or destroy, but to the contrary ask what they produce.”70 Building on 
Foucault’s account of neoliberalism, it may be argued that neoliberalism rests on two 
distinctive processes: marketisation and individualisation. 
The strength of Foucault’s account of neoliberalism resides in his ability to perceive its 
political ambitions. He introduces neoliberalism, not as an economic erosion of democratic 
politics, but as a novel form of governmentality rearticulated around market logic. This vision 
took shape through his lectures at the College de France on The Birth of Biopolitics:  
The problem of neo-liberalism was not how to cut out or contrive a free space of the 
market within an already given political society, as in the liberalism of Adam Smith and 
the eighteenth century. The problem of neo-liberalism is rather how the overall 
exercise of political power can be modelled on the principles of a market economy. So 
it is not a question of freeing an empty space, but of taking the formal principles of a 
market economy and referring and relating them to, of projecting them on to a general 
art of government.71  
Outlining neoliberalism’s specificity in relation to earlier forms of liberalism, Foucault 
tells us that the aim of neoliberal thinkers is not to implement market mechanisms within a 
formal liberal democratic framework, nor gear the market towards an equal distribution of 
resources and goods. Instead, it is to elevate the market as the sole institution from which 
economic and political life can be thought. Although Foucault associates what he calls “the 
autolimitation of governments” with the classical liberalism of the 18th and 19th century, he is 
keen to emphasise that neoliberalism shall not be understood as a mere resurgence of 
liberalism.72 The radical project of neoliberalism is to evaluate “whether a market economy 
can in fact serve as the principle, form, and model for a state which, because of its defects, is 
mistrusted by everyone.”73 Neoliberalism constitutes a new art of governing which rests on 
individual self-interests and an unbound faith in the market’s capacity to positively impact 
 
70 De Lagasnerie, Own-translation. 
71 Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics Lectures at the College de France, 131. On this point, also see Gauchet, Le 
Nouveau Monde, 657. 
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every aspect of social life.74 Grasping the novelty of neoliberalism is facilitated by using 
Foucault’s notion of ‘governmentality’. The latter far exceeds the common understanding of 
governance as the policy-implementation capacity of a state. Instead, governmentality 
embodies “the ensemble formed by institutions, procedures, analyses and reflections, 
calculations, and tactics that allow the exercise of power”75 Neoliberal governmentality 
represents the shift by which populations are no longer considered through the prism of the 
state as collectivities, but according to the market as individuals. Under neoliberalism, the 
market is more than a natural or inevitable institution that must be accommodated within a 
liberal democratic framework. Instead, “one must govern for the market, rather than because 
of the market.”76  
Neoliberalism requires that markets take precedence over the state, largely stripping 
it of its supervisory and regulative powers.77 The expansion of market logic concerns not only 
the state, but all areas of social life. It is essential to point out that notions of ‘marketisation’ 
or ‘commodification’, denoting an expansion of market logic to non-economic domains, are 
not a neoliberal invention. It is a facet of capitalism that has fascinated critical thinkers from 
Marx onwards.78 Neoliberalism simply constitutes the historical pinnacle of a process that has 
accompanied capitalism since its inception. Neoliberal marketisation may still be read 
through these classical critiques of capitalist reification.79 Perhaps the only shortcomings of 
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applying these approaches to a neoliberal context is their inability to anticipate the absence 
of any concrete political alternative to the supremacy of market forces in the early 21st 
century.80 The hegemonic position of the market under neoliberalism has synchronously 
accelerated and deepened the effects of marketisation on subjects and their social 
environment.81 The neoliberal environment can be defined as a forever expanding market. In 
its neoliberal form, the market far exceeds its classical consideration as a limited zone of 
economic exchange. Although market logic remains articulated around notions of production, 
consumption, and competition, it now provides a framework incorporating most spheres of 
social life. From amorous relationships to education, from free time to politics, neoliberalism 
offers the possibility to live one’s life according to the dictates of a diversified market, largely 
detached from the constraints of collective life.82      
In the absence of concrete collective alternatives to neoliberalism, the market roams 
free. The hegemonic status held by the market is perhaps the most significant facet of 
neoliberal marketisation. As a mirror of unleashed individual liberties, the spread of 
inequalities cements the foundations of an all-encompassing market. In contrast to the liberal 
consideration of individual autonomy as a pathway to collective life and egalitarian pursuits, 
neoliberal marketisation begins from a state of inequality amongst atomised individuals. As 
Maurizio Lazzarato declares, “a government of the market based on competition and 
enterprise must ensure that all are in a state of ‘equal inequality’.”83 Market rationality is not 
necessarily more effective nor ideologically superior to its collective counterparts. Yet, 
according to neoliberals only markets have the capacity to guarantee that individual 
preferences be expressed freely, independently of any collective coercion. The market poses 
no collective threat to liberty for it is the only institution that does not infringe on individual 
autonomy. One of the insights of neoliberal thought was to perceive the capacity of markets 
to contain both collective and heterogenous elements. The appeal of the market rests 
primarily on the belief that it “may be used for a variety of diverging individual goals”, 
suggesting that “it will never rest on collective goals.”84 From that perspective the market is 
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faceless and noisy, both undecipherable and unintelligible.85 Far from being a hindrance, such 
heterogeneity means that the market can never be under the influence of a pre-determined 
collective endeavour. Believing markets to be the only institution capable of channelling 
unmediated individual preferences, neoliberals declares that marketisation is not only 
inevitable but also desirable.  
By treating market relations as exceptional, neoclassical economists and neoliberal 
theorists have elevated the market to a sacral entity. This higher status is best exemplified by 
the neoclassic consideration of markets as ‘exogenous’, existing outside of all other social 
relations.86 At the core of this belief is the idea that “market institutions somehow act 
exogenously as a structural constraint upon society rather than having been constituted 
endogenously by society.”87 This possibility goes hand in hand with an interpretation of the 
market as an already existing ‘natural’ entity.88 The market can only stand at a distance from 
the social world if it precedes it and works independently from it. Framed in these terms, it 
provides a self-adjusting framework for trade that structures individuals and works 
autonomously from human (outside) influence. This exogenous reading of the market has 
been severely undermined by many esteemed political economists claiming that the market 
cannot be thought as an institution that exists independently of its subjects’ social 
existence.89 About this presupposition, Michel Callon asks, “If economic theory knows so little 
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about the marketplace, is it not simply because in striving to abstract and generalize it has 
ended up becoming detached from its object?”90 Beyond the technical implications of this 
question for economic theory, one can see through these discussions how the neoclassical 
abstraction of markets as exogenous and self-regulating has impacted the neoliberal 
consecration of the market as the only potent collective entity. Although neoclassical 
economists and neoliberals share a similar level of dedication to the market, their objectives 
are not identical. Unlike neoclassical economics, the ambitions of neoliberalism are not 
scientific but political. The market does not only reveal precious economic data about the 
world we inhabit. Rather, marketisation opens a world of possibilities for individuals whose 
preferences have the potential to be expressed exponentially on a great variety of markets. 
To the extent that the market represents a perfect snapshot of individual preferences, it may 
also constitute an unalienable sphere of individual emancipation.  
Another distinctive trait of neoliberal marketisation is attached to the fast increasing 
‘financialization’ of the economy. This process denotes an economic displacement away from 
production towards the realm of finance. Michel Feher defines financialization as an 
economic shift by which “corporate governance is concerned less with optimizing returns on 
investment over time than with maximizing the distribution of dividends in the short run.”91 
Accordingly, the major preoccupations of corporations become “capital growth or 
appreciation rather than income, stock value rather than commercial profit.”92 The 
prominence of finance in the neoliberal economy represents more than a strategic change. It 
also reveals that economic benefits can be redefined from returns to growth, from capital 
accumulation to capital expansion. Consequently, the growth and stability of the financial 
sector has become the main economic aim of neoliberal states.93 The impact of this economic 
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production, a situation that closely resembles the current neoliberal order: “The proportion between capital 





realignment is far-reaching today, Harvey even claiming that neoliberalism means “the 
financialization of everything.”94  
The implications of neoliberalism’s fixation on capital growth and the financial sector 
may be read through Thomas Piketty’s Capital in the 21st Century. In this extensive study of 
the relationship between capital and inequalities, Piketty remarks that “when the rate of 
return on capital exceeds the rate of growth of output and income […] capitalism 
automatically generates arbitrary and unsustainable inequalities.”95 If neoliberal 
financialization entails further emphasis on capital growth, one can project than the gap 
between capital and economic growth (including output and income from labour) risks 
widening further. Building on Piketty’s analysis, setting up policies focused on capital growth 
and deregulating financial investments will ultimately lead to an increase in economic 
inequalities.96 The discrepancy between income emanating from labour and that stemming 
from capital can only grow if neoliberal economic policies are directed towards capital 
expansion. To the extent that capital grows faster than output and wages, “The entrepreneur 
inevitably tends to become a rentier, more and more dominant over those who own nothing 
but their labor.”97 Although there has been an increase in economic inequalities in many 
countries having implemented neoliberal policies, the causation between neoliberalism and 
the production of inequalities remains hard to evaluate to the extent that the concrete policy 
application of neoliberal ideals remains relatively recent.98 Nonetheless, Piketty’s 
comprehensive account of the discrepancy between capital and labour incomes offers an 
economic framework through which neoliberal financialization may be conceived as a vector 
of inequalities. Inasmuch as neoliberalism is theoretically rooted in a state of inequalities, its 
 
Wherever capital predominates, industry prevails:  wherever revenue, idleness. Every increase or diminution 
of capital, therefore, naturally tends to in- crease or diminish the real quantity of industry, the number of 
productive hands, and consequently the exchangeable value of the annual produce of the land and labour of 
the country, the real wealth and revenue of all its inhabitants. Capitals are increased by parsimony, and 
diminished by prodigality and misconduct.” [Smith, The Wealth of Nations, 263.] 
94 Harvey, 33. 
95 Piketty, Capital in the 21st Century, 1, 25, 34. 
96 Focusing on the French context, the economist Olivier Godechot advances that the finance industry has 
played “a major role in the return of wage inequality in France.” Analysing income, he writes that “although 
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overrepresentation is as considerable as that achieved by the finance industry in the last 10 years.” [Olivier 
Godechot, “Is finance responsible for the rise in wage inequality in France?,” Socio-Economic Review (2012): 
10, 458, 460.] 
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focus on capital growth also signals that neoliberal policies have the potential to generate 
concrete inequalities of income. 
The current trend of financialization provides a revealing insight into the essence and 
pace of neoliberal marketisation. Largely detached from industrial production, marketisation 
rests on a process of ‘capitalisation’ rather than ‘commodification.’99 The commodity form, 
so crucial to Marx’s account of capitalist alienation, has not disappeared but carries less 
symbolic weight in a financialised economy.100 Financialization increasingly dematerialises 
capital, resting on elusive ‘stocks’ and abstract ‘funds’ rather than the commitment to a 
specific productive enterprise. In this context, capital growth is attached to a multitude of 
markets on which investments can be ‘diversified’, and risks ‘spread.’ The proliferation of 
markets is concomitant with capital growth which may itself be identified as a vector of 
inequalities. In other words, the financialization of the economy, indexing value on capital 
growth rather than income or profit, rests on the creation of ‘new markets’ that risk fostering 
further inequalities. In a neoliberal political economy, marketisation, financialization, and 
inequalities work hand in hand. 
The proliferation of financial services and products has had an enormous impact on 
the policy prescriptions of states as well as supranational institutions such as the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO), the International Monetary Fund (IMF) as well as the World Bank.101 In 
addition to the transformation of established institutions, financialization also entails that 
financial organisations such as rating agencies have seen their political influence rise 
exponentially.102 Marketisation and financialization have overexposed markets and their 
individual subjects to the forces of competition.103 At the market level, the collective necessity 
to produce is subordinated to the imperative of capital growth and the competitive drive to 
create and perform on new markets. The next section will focus on the subjective effects of 
 
99 About the subordination of production to financialisation and marketing, Gauchet writes that “the 
elaboration of new financial products, leveraged investments, and marketing tend to overcome productive 
work in the strict sense, reducing it to a secondary function.” [Gauchet, Le Nouveau Monde, 54. Own 
translation.] 
100 See Marx, Capital Vol. 1. 
101 Harvey, 3. 
102 For more on the political influence of rating agencies see Sinclair, The New Masters of Capital (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press), 2005. 
103 About the concrete detrimental effects of financialisation on wage earners, Lazzarato explains that 
“financialisation has transformed the pension funds of wage earners and public employees into a fiscal 
resource for the enterprise, with the consequence that savings are co-opted for the benefit of capital, thus 





these developments. The spread of marketisation and financialization ensures that neoliberal 
subjects are no longer merely defined as producers or consumers, but also by their 
competitive potential. Growth (both individual and economic) and competition are arguably 
the two main modes of conduct systematically displayed on neoliberal markets. Whereas 
production tends to be a collective enterprise (one that underpins Marxism in its entirety), 
growth and competition are more consistent with the individualist tendencies of 
neoliberalism. The speculative, consumer-based, and immaterial inclinations of financial 




The previous section has showed that expanding and financialised markets structure 
the neoliberal environment. The sacralisation of individual agency against any forms of non-
market collectivities pinpoints the effects of neoliberalism to two main levels of analysis; the 
marketised neoliberal environment, and the individual subject whose experience of the world 
is shaped by this environment. To catch a glimpse of the impact of neoliberalism on its 
subjects, one must first recognise the significance of its complete commitment to 
individualism. Firmly opposed to any form of collectivity, neoliberalism rests on a process of 
‘individualisation’. For Gauchet, “the reorganisation of collective life around coexisting 
individuals driven by the urge to defend their rights and pursue their self-interests institutes 
the basis of neoliberalism’s ideological dominance.”104 In his view, the true novelty of 
neoliberalism resides in the modes of individual expression it generates.105 The process of 
individualisation at the core of the neoliberal project signifies that grasping the radicality of 
the neoliberal proposition requires investigating the distinctive traits of the subjective types 
it moulds. Contained within a marketised environment, these modes of expressions are most 
legible through the figure of the economic subject. The neoliberal economic subject exceeds 
its classical consideration as utility-maximiser. The unprecedented sprawling capacity of the 
neoliberal market renders the identity of the neoliberal subject fluid and uncertain. More 
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than a cold rational accumulator, contemporary homo-economicus takes shape through 
Foucault’s concept of ‘entrepreneur of the self.’106 A product of neoliberal marketisation and 
individualisation, contemporary economicus is for itself its own capital, producer, and income 
generator.107 Through its competitive drive and fixation on individual self-interest, neoliberal 
homo economicus appears not as an autonomous agent but as a desire-driven heteronomous 
subject valued on its capacity to surpass others. 
Homo-economicus forms the theoretical backbone of most market-based economic 
models. David Wilson and William Dixon define early conceptualisations of the economic 
subject not as a type of human being but as an abstraction from it, a human considered merely 
according to its economic capacity.108 Homo economicus has changed since its one-
dimensional conceptualisation as a mere rational calculator.109 To understand how 
economicus conceptually grew from a utility maximising agent to a fluid entity adapting to 
diversified neoliberal markets, it is vital to retrace its roots. This task is made more difficult by 
the fact that economicus does not have clear theoretical origins.110 Whereas Wilson and 
Dixon locate its genesis in ancient Greece within the writings of Xenophon as a philosophical 
defence of instrumental conduct, many thinkers are content to attribute its birth to the 
utilitarian writings of John Stuart Mill.111 Economicus’ uncertain past has also been associated 
to the work of thinkers such as Thomas Hobbes and Adam Smith.112 Overall, the economic 
subject tends to be an amalgamation of portraits drawn by these classical thinkers. It might 
equally be represented by Smith’s merchant or Bentham and Mill’s rational utility maximiser, 
two figures that had a deep impact on neoclassical economics.113 What all these accounts 
have in common is their consideration of individuals as subjects of interests. The scattered 
and clouded theoretical history of homo economicus arguably limits its study to only two clear 
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conceptualisations; the subject of interests of classical models and its current neoliberal 
development.114  
When surveying debates revolving around homo economicus it is interesting to notice 
that apart from the work of Foucault and his intellectual heirs, the economic subject is usually 
reduced to its classical interpretation. In light of these considerations of the economic subject 
as a stable and invariable entity, many thinkers have outlined the gap existing between the 
subject of economic models and its empirical counterpart.115 As Elizabeth Anderson points 
out, despite having dominated the theoretical world of economics for more than a hundred 
years, “the evidence against the hypothesis that humans generally are ‘as if’ expected utility 
maximisers is overwhelming.”116 Such empirical rebuttal does not mark the end of the 
conceptual economic subject, nor does it signify that subjects have broken free from the 
dictates of individual self-interests. Rather, it signals that the conduct of economic agents has 
changed in accordance with their neoliberal environment. Rather than outlining the empirical 
discrepancy between classical economicus and contemporary subjects, this shift calls for a 
new conceptualisation of economic subjectivity fitted to a neoliberal context that exceeds its 
neoclassical and utilitarian interpretations. Economic subjects have not disappeared, they 
have evolved in accordance with neoliberal marketisation and must be identified as such.   
Not content with the contemporary relevance of the classical figure of homo 
economicus, Foucault lays the groundwork for grasping the subtleties of neoliberal 
economicus: 
The characteristic feature of the classical conception of homo oeconomicus is the 
partner of exchange and the theory of utility based on a problematic of needs. In neo-
liberalism […] there is also a theory of homo oeconomicus, but he is not at all a partner 
of exchange. Homo oeconomicus is an entrepreneur, an entrepreneur of himself. […] 
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being for himself his own capital, being for himself his own producer, being for himself 
the source of [his] earnings.117 
Foucault considers homo economicus as an evolutive subject able to adapt to the 
epistemic implications of the transition between liberalism and neoliberalism. From the 
rational man of economic exchanges populating microeconomic models, the economic 
subject has morphed into ‘an entrepreneur of the self’. As such, it is guided solely by 
individualistic considerations. The emphasis Foucault puts on individual ownership is crucial 
for it designates the individual body as the exhaustive terrain of economic rationality in a 
neoliberal context. Economic activity is conveyed through and by the individual body 
presenting itself as a form of micro-enterprise interacting with others in an instrumental 
capacity. The concrete effects of neoliberal individualisation on subjects become especially 
clear through the notion of risk. Under neoliberalism, the task of insuring against risks (both 
individual and collective) is no longer assigned to states but to individuals.118 Insuring oneself 
against illnesses, accidents, or damages increasingly becomes the responsibility of individuals 
who must protect themselves using their private income.119 In a fully marketised and 
individualised environment, every aspect of social life takes the guise of an investment whose 
risks are carried by individuals. To the extent that one is ‘free to choose’, the state has no 
place interfering with the outcome of one’s decisions regardless of whether the latter 
generate pleasures or pains. This vision directly contradicts Dworkin’s view of the state as an 
institution insuring against market risks and bad ‘brute’ luck.120 In a neoliberal context, luck 
and risk, like profit and growth are the sole property of auto-entrepreneurs. 
Auto-entrepreneurs should not be associated to employees working together towards 
a common objective within the same firm. Instead, they constitute a “framework of a 
multiplicity of diverse enterprises connected up to and entangled with each other.”121 
Multiplicity also applies to the individual’s life itself, reflecting one’s connection to a multitude 
of interested relationships from friendships to retirement plans.122 About this, Lazzarato 
explains that “economic man is integrated within the ensemble of the economic not by a 
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subtraction of rights but by a multiplication of his own interests.”123 Neoliberal subjects are 
not fully isolated from each other. They connect in the course of promoting their individual 
self-interests, a task for which other individuals may be instrumental. Inter-connectedness is 
undoubtably one of the main collective characteristics of neoliberalism.124 Whereas 
individuals should avoid working together towards a common objective that would 
compromise their individual freedom, they must remain connected to optimise returns on 
their respective investments. In Lazzarato’s words, “it is on condition of preserving one’s 
selfish interests that the multiplication and satisfaction of the needs of the collectivity can 
happen.”125 The neoliberal ethos simply eliminates the classical connection between 
individual self-interest and a shared common good so crucial to liberal thought. National 
prosperity, equality, or collective well-being are no longer desired outcomes or potential 
after-effects of individual action. Rather, economic action becomes individual action for its 
own sake. There can be no infringement on self-interested behaviours besides that imposed 
by the law.  
Within a society composed by a superposition of self-interests, Foucault considers that 
there can be only one true social policy: economic growth.126 Only this abstract measure of 
economic ‘well-being’ has the capacity to aggregate a multitude of diverging interested 
behaviours.127 Unpacking the notion of economic growth, one can arguably identify three 
types of subjective behaviour that sustain it: production, consumption, and competition.128 
For Foucault, neoliberal subjects still produce but only as a result of consumption.129 
Through the prism of consumption, what is being produced is the subject’s own satisfaction 
and experience.130 Foucault operates an inversion by which production no longer represents 
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means towards creating value through economic goods, but the end-result of consumption. 
Following this interpretation, production is displaced twice in a neoliberal context: away from 
collective work towards individual fulfilment, and from economic means towards individual 
ends. Neoliberal production is not that of commodities but that of experiences, enjoyment, 
and individual fulfilment. According to this shift, individuals do not seek capital inasmuch as 
they become capital in and for themselves.131 To depict this neoliberal transformation, Michel 
Feher deploys the concept of ‘human capital’. The latter is best understood against the 
classical consideration of homo economicus. About the specificity of human capital, Feher 
explains that “an investor in his or her human capital is concerned less with maximizing the 
returns on his or her investments whether monetary or psychic than with appreciating, that 
is, increasing the stock value of, the capital to which he or she is identified.”132 Through the 
concept of human capital, Feher applies the effects of neoliberal financialization to subjective 
conduct.133 The concept of human capital may be read as an actualisation of Foucault’s 
theorisation of the economic subject. Instead of behaving like a stable enterprise generating 
profit, the subject of neoliberalism is closer to a volatile stock, appreciating and depreciating 
according to market movements.  
There are numerous implications to recognising neoliberal production through the 
prism of consumption and neoliberal conduct through the fluctuations of financialised human 
capital. One is that neoliberal production becomes a fully individualised process. The 
production of satisfaction now stems not only from the accumulation of material goods, but 
from a broader range of subjective experiences. A good example of that was provided 
elsewhere by Foucault through the notion of ‘art of existence’. He describes this ‘artform’ as 
intentional actions on the part of subjects seeking “to transform themselves, to change 
themselves in their singular being, and to make their life into an oeuvre that carries certain 
aesthetic values and meets certain stylistic criteria.”134 The notion of ‘art of existence’ appears 
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perfectly compatible with the neoliberal era and the concept of human capital. Being capital 
in and for itself, homo economicus competes as itself with others while seeking appreciation. 
Career, social status, belongings, salary, but also appearance, attitude, or culture become 
markets on which the neoliberal subject ‘grows’ (gains value) in relation to others. The 
production of satisfaction emerges not only from consumption, but also from producing and 
affirming a certain character trait or lifestyle to others that itself represents a form of 
individual human capital.135  
Besides production and consumption, neoliberal economicus chiefly relates to others 
through competition. Foucault was able to foresee that the neoliberal fixation on economic 
growth would inevitably heighten competition amongst subjects.136 In his view, the market-
driven society imagined by neoliberals is “a society in which the regulatory principle should 
not be so much the exchange of commodities as the mechanisms of competition.”137 At a 
subjective level, erecting competition as a core economic principle implies that “friction 
between units will increase and occasions of conflict and litigation multiply.”138 Linking 
Foucault’s discussion of competition back to the question of inequality, Lazzarato claims that 
fostering competition is facilitated by the proliferation of inequalities.139 In his view, 
“appetites and instincts are not given: only inequality has the capacity to sharpen appetites, 
instincts and minds, driving individuals to rivalries.”140 Unlike neoliberal theorists who treat 
 
135 About this, Lazzarato writes that one “cannot become the new homo oeconomicus without being ‘a 
lifestyle’, a ‘way of being’, a moral choice, a ‘mode of relating to oneself, to time, to one’s environment, to the 
future, the group, the family.’” [Lazzarato, 121.] 
This reading echoes the work of Thorstein Veblen’s concept of ‘conspicuous consumption’ developed in his 
Theory of the Leisure Class at the turn of the 19th century. In this pioneering work, Veblen aims to study the 
sociology of consumption amongst wealthy individuals. About the cultivation of taste that it is necessary to 
have in order to make an impact on others, Veblen writes: “This cultivation of aesthetic faculty requires time 
and application, and the demands made upon the gentleman in this direction therefore tend to change his life 
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inequalities as a mere reflection of individual freedom, Lazzarato views them as a condition 
of competitive markets. If the spread of competition is set as an objective of neoliberal 
politics, inequalities are needed to generate envy amongst individuals who have less. Lack 
pushes those individuals to compete for more in order to elevate themselves on the 
marketplace. Beyond basic subsistence, one’s willingness to compete is generated by the 
realisation that achieving or accumulating more is a possibility. In a market environment, this 
potential is displayed by inequalities because some must have more in order to motivate 
others to compete and take their place. Relatively equal individuals are less likely to be 
competitive since lower inequalities means less discrepancy between individuals and classes, 
and therefore less incentives to compete for more. 
The specificity of neoliberal competition is more easily grasped by interpreting the 
market as an intersubjective process. Inasmuch as market gains are driven by self-interests, 
they are also dictated by the behaviour of other actors on that market. Nuancing the 
neoliberal claim that economic prosperity is a purely individual affair, political economists 
such as Hall, MacKenzie, or de Goede demonstrate that market transactions are always the 
result of some form of social interaction.141 Applying this reading to financialised markets, 
frictions and conflicts take the form of pure competition necessitating constant and quick 
responses to the behaviour of other subjects. In the same way that investment bankers try to 
shortsale borrowed assets before their competitors, the economic subject conceived as 
human capital will aim to outdo or anticipate the decisions of other individuals on a variety 
of markets ranging from job hunting to holidaying or fashion.142 In a financialised context, 
decisions are made quickly, returns are expected in the short run, and conflicts tend to be 
more observational than confrontational.  
Lazzarato’s association of inequality and competition allows for the possibility to 
deepen the exploration of marketised relationships beyond the necessity to dominate or 
overcome others economically. In a neoliberal context, individuals observe the successful 
other not only as a competitor but also as a model. Competition arises not from a natural urge 
to dominate others, but from the desire to achieve or obtain what one does not yet have that 
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has been displayed by others. Conceiving of competition as a form of domination, Frederic 
Lordon adds to that point by claiming that “the primary meaning of domination consists in 
one agent’s having to pass through another to access the object of desire [yet] the intensity 
of domination is directly proportional to the intensity of the desire of the dominated.”143 
Desires generated by a state of inequalities are the primary motor for one’s urge to compete 
with and dominate others. Considering intersubjectivity in this way suggests that competition 
and gains must exceed their purely economic categorisations. Within diversified neoliberal 
markets, satisfaction may stem from intersubjective relations such as recognition, kinship, 
admiration, domination, as well as economic success. Neoliberal markets are polymorphous, 
pushing the content of competition and the meaning of individual satisfaction beyond their 
usual economic setting. The paradox of neoliberal competition is that inasmuch as other 
individuals stand in the way of individual growth; they may also embody success to be 
reproduced. In a fully marketised and individualised environment, inequalities guarantee that 
economic behaviour is regulated, not by the state, but by the capacity or incapacity of others 
to perform.  
For neoliberals the spread of competition is a positive opening of market logic. Market 
competition encourages individual autonomy by providing further opportunities for self-
expression. Contrastingly, Byung-Chul Han warns his readers about the illusory character of 
the subjective developments associated with neoliberalism. Han adds a deeply critical layer 
to Foucault’s commentary on neoliberalism. In his view, Foucault fails to perceive the coercive 
dimension of the neoliberal imperative to ‘be free’.144  Instead, Han argues that “the freedom 
of Can generates even more coercion than the disciplinarian Should, which issues 
commandments and prohibitions.”145 Whereas the injunction ‘should’ is limited, ‘can’ is 
not.146 By transforming individual autonomy into a coercive category, “Neoliberalism 
represents a highly efficient, indeed an intelligent, system for exploiting freedom.”147 The 
ideological core of the neoliberal project is to free individuals from collective constraints, 
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subsequently allowing them to compete on a variety of markets and fulfil their economic 
potential. For Han, the neoliberal project of full individual autonomy has failed. Rather than 
overcoming collective exploitation, neoliberalism simply individualises it by requiring that 
subjects be autonomous and efficient. Like everything else, exploitation is now a task assigned 
to individuals under the neoliberal imperative to ‘be free’: 
As an entrepreneur of the self, the achievement-subject is free insofar as he or she is 
not subjugated to a commanding and exploiting Other. However, the subject is still 
not really free because he or she now engages in self-exploitation— and does so of his 
or her own free will. The exploiter is the exploited. The achievement-subject is 
perpetrator and victim in one. Auto-exploitation proves much more efficient than allo-
exploitation because it is accompanied by a feeling of liberty. This makes possible 
exploitation without domination.148 
What may originally appear as an expansion of individual freedom and autonomy 
reveals itself to be an individualisation of exploitation. This new form of disciplinary power is 
what Han labels ‘psychopolitics’.149 Endorsing Foucault’s interpretation of neoliberal subjects 
as ‘entrepreneur of themselves’, Han warns of the danger of being stuck in the liberticide trap 
of ‘self-optimisation’.150 In his words, “the self-as-a-work-of-art amounts to a beautiful but 
deceptive illusion that the neoliberal regime maintains in order to exhaust its resources 
entirely.”151 From his perspective, self-optimisation and auto-exploitation result from a 
calculated effort on the part of the neoliberal regime. Observing the economic behaviour of 
neoliberal subjects, it becomes clear that exploitation has not been eliminated but simply 
displaced. Using Hegel’s master/slave dialectic, Han interprets the neoliberal era as a 
historical stage where slaves and masters form a unit embodied within individuals 
themselves.152 Either as “enslaved masters or slaves who think themselves masters”, 
neoliberal subjects bear witness to the conversion of exploitation from collective over 
individuals to individuals over themselves.153 As opposed to being empowering, the 
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transformation of subjects into individualised ‘projects’ should be interpreted as “a more 
efficient kind of subjectivation and subjugation.”154 In the neoliberal realm, the complete 
individualisation of liberty paradoxically compromises the expansion of individual autonomy. 
Building on arguments advanced by Foucault, Lazarrato, and Han, it becomes clear 
that the neoliberal economic subject has fallen short of fulfilling the ideal of autonomy. 
Cherished by liberal and neoliberal thinkers alike, individual autonomy has turned into an 
imperative whose materialisation generates individual conducts that are never truly ‘free’ 
from the influence of others. The neoliberal subject embodies the contradiction by which 
elevating individual autonomy as a societal goal is inevitably sustained by heteronomous 
relations.155 Here, heteronomy must be understood both as one’s incapacity to be free from 
the will of others, and in the Kantian sense  as “acting in accordance with one’s desires rather 
than reason or moral duty.”156 In regard to others, heteronomy is palpable in the neoliberal 
subject’s inclination to compete with and instrumentalise others in order to foster individual 
growth. If competition is indeed an objective of neoliberal politics, then its subjects are not 
truly autonomous nor free for its success depends on overcoming and surpassing others.157 
Inversely, neoliberal competition also requires that more fortunate individuals (those with a 
higher level of human capital) stimulate others’ desires to ‘reach higher’. In both cases, other 
individuals play a crucial role in fostering competition, hence interrupting the ideal of living 
according to the dictate of individual autonomy. Even from a purely individualistic standpoint, 
neoliberal homo economicus displays heteronomous tendencies by projecting its desires onto 
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morality” and which is a “law to itself”, heteronomy is a property of the will which “does not give the law to 
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157 On the domination associated with neoliberal competition, Lordon writes that “domination can still be 
defined as the asymmetrical relation arising from the fact that one person’s pursuit of his or her desire passes 
through another. The dependence of an interest on another person makes the interested person ipso facto 





a multitude of markets. As an entrepreneur of itself, the neoliberal subject is pushed towards 
auto-exploitation by its desire to achieve, accumulate, and overcome others.158 The intrusion 
of heteronomy within the collective and individual experience of homo economicus confirms 
the ultimate impossibility to sustain individual autonomy as a political force.159 The next 
section will show that the inevitable degeneration of the ideal of individual autonomy into 
desire-driven heteronomous behaviours is even more palpable through the figure of homo-
democraticus, the political subject of neoliberalism. In a political environment where 
individuals are expected to collaborate as a collective, the neoliberal subject reduces politics 
to an individual affair by relating to others purely based on conspicuous desires. 
 
Homo Democraticus 
The previous section showed that homo economicus has gone from a rational 
producer and accumulator of material resources to a unique individual project fluctuating 
along markets as human capital. The neoliberal shift signals the point where the liberal ideal 
of individual autonomy became fully indistinguishable from purely desire-driven 
heteronomous conduct. The ‘right’ choice so valued by classical liberals has morphed into ‘My 
choice’, meaning that one’s decision is right so long as it is lawful and individually based.160 In 
a fully marketised and individualised environment where subjects are driven by desires and 
competition, what remains of politics? Far removed from the liberal effort to achieve equality, 
neoliberal politics truly comes to light through a chain of paradoxes that reveal the 
heteronomous character of neoliberal homo democraticus. Overly connected to others yet 
distant from them, conspicuous but private, striving to stand out by resembling others, the 
political behaviour of the neoliberal subject is defined by heteronomy for it is chiefly guided 
by desires.161 Paradoxes here refer not to a tension between individual and collective life (as 
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is the case under liberalism), but to one’s capacity to be at once guided by its own individual 
desires and market oneself as an object to be desired by others. As human capital, one 
appreciates not only by pursuing self-interested goals but also by presenting oneself as 
valuable in the eyes of competitors. Neoliberal heteronomy elevates individual desire as the 
only way to relate to oneself and others. In this context, homo democraticus embodies the 
inevitable transformation of the ideal of liberal autonomy into heteronomous conduct, as 
well as neoliberalism’s complete individualisation of politics.  
 How does one experience politics in a neoliberal environment founded on a suspicion 
for collective life, unhinged individualism, and the marketisation of social life? For Wendy 
Brown, homo democraticus has been eradicated by homo economicus in the same way that 
politics has been ‘undone’ by neoliberalism.162 In her view, the subjects generated by 
neoliberal marketisations have eliminated the very idea of ‘the people’ and collective life.163 
In other words, economised subjects stand in the way of the good running of collective 
politics. This critical reading, although relevant, misses the radicality of the neoliberal 
proposition. Despite its political shortcomings, neoliberalism cannot be considered as a mere 
threat to politics. It is much more than a destructive ideology. It would be counterproductive 
to read neoliberal politics through the prism of classical liberalism and its emphasis on the 
pursuit of collective goals such as equality.164 Taking an alternative approach, one may claim 
that neoliberalism does not aim to ‘undo’ politics, but instead suggests that individuals in a 
market framework themselves constitute political answers. Like every other sphere of social 
life, politics has not been eliminated but individualised in a neoliberal context.165 This new 
form of politics must be divorced from any collectivist ambitions, for the individual subject 
has become the only relevant political terrain. As Gauchet remarks, “the perceptual shift 
concerning collective unity has enabled the individualisation of politics, separating subjects 
 
individual self-interests has remained, but the political objectives and the ways in which subjects relates 
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as much as it has freed their individual dynamics.”166 Modelled on human capital, the 
neoliberal democratic subject becomes the sole producer and consumer of politics on a 
market of competing individuals. Politics has not vanished, it has morphed into a purely 
individual enterprise seeking to produce satisfaction heteronomously through fulfilling 
desires and being validated by others.  
 Prior to discussing the specific types of individualised conduct generated by neoliberal 
politics, it is essential to mention the trend of marketisation that has affected electoral politics 
in recent decades. Attempts by political elites to shape their public image and discourse to 
appeal to the greatest number of voters has been a feature of parliamentary democracy long 
before the advent of neoliberalism.167 However, this practice has conspicuously accelerated 
in recent years through the idea of political marketing.168 The latter originates from its 
corporate counterpart and both practices really took off in the second half of the twentieth 
century when neoliberal thought was still in its infancy.169 Philippe J. Maarek defines 
commercial marketing as “the set of means by which a business venture may create, maintain 
and develop its market, or, if one prefers, its clientele.”170 Political marketing simply 
constitutes the transposition of this corporate imperative to the realm of politics.  
 In a context of marketised politics where political elites consider electoral victory “not 
only a standard expectation, but also an end in itself”, how is electoral politics experienced 
by the democratic subject?171 For Colin Crouch, “mass citizens play a passive, quiescent, even 
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apathetic part, responding only to the signals given them.”172 Han follows a similar route, 
drawing a portrait of the neoliberal citizen as a passive and disinterested spectator: 
Neoliberalism makes citizens into consumers. The freedom of the citizen yields to the 
passivity of the consumer. As consumers, today’s voters have no real interest in 
politics – in actively shaping the community. They possess neither the will nor the 
ability to participate in communal, political action. […] The call for transparency 
presupposes occupying the position of a shocked spectator. It is not voiced by engaged 
citizens so much as by passive onlookers. Participation now amounts to grievance and 
complaint. With that, the society of transparency, inhabited by onlookers and 
consumers, has given rise to a spectator democracy.173 
 Within this detailed description of citizen engagement in the neoliberal age, Han 
concurrently associates the political subject to a passive consumer and a shocked spectator. 
Parliamentary politics remains present, but only as a mediocre performance for which 
spectators have little or no interest besides shock value. Following the thread of neoliberal 
individualisation, parliamentary politics even in its marketised form can no longer have a 
monopoly on political life. If neoliberal subjects become capital in and for themselves, political 
opinions must be capitalised on and displayed to others in a way that inevitably escapes 
parliamentary representation. Parliamentary politics is not the main political stage of 
neoliberalism. In its place, the neoliberal subject stands as a political actor as much as a 
political platform. This brand of individualised politics is clarified by Han’s consideration of 
transparency as a disciplinary dispositive of neoliberalism. Transparency “seeks to supress 
deviation” in order to achieve general conformity. It does so by establishing total 
communication, “as if everyone were watching over everyone else.”174 On a transparent 
market, subjects do not only police themselves to optimise their returns. They also police 
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others according to the general rule that all must be seen. There is no place to hide for homo 
democraticus, information must be complete for the political market to function efficiently.  
 In a transparent world, heteronomy takes the guise of visibility. Subject to the gaze of 
an abstract ‘Other’, individual behaviour is constantly regimented by the judgements of 
others. Through the dictate of neoliberal visibility, subjects seek recognition from other 
individuals rather than the state. The ethical measure of one’s behaviour is provided by the 
amalgamated glare of a multitude of individuals. Gauchet remarks that in this context, the 
gaze of others is only secondary to the look one imposes on her/himself.175 Constant scrutiny 
only leads to further self-discipline for displaying an honest (non-marketised) image of oneself 
risks depreciating one’s human capital. An individual must first self-examine before investing 
itself on a market. Being recognised by others is greatly facilitated by displaying a curated 
image of oneself.176 Through the judgement of others, one also seeks the confirmation of 
oneself for oneself.177 The neoliberal subject’s constant desire for recognition inevitably 
embeds one further into narcissism.178 Through transparency, heteronomy once again 
reappears twofold as an interruption of individual autonomy by the will (or gaze) of others 
and as a mediation of one’s will through individual desires.179 
 Transparency and interconnectivity erase individual differences. By seeking 
recognition from the greatest number, one must inevitably conform to the expectations of 
‘the Other’ conceived as an aggregation of individual ‘observers’. Driven towards conformism, 
individuals have no choice but to surrender certain distinctive traits in the process.  This has 
become especially palpable through social media.180 Han associates social media to a form of 
‘nearness’, seeking to “to bring the Other as near as possible, to close any distance between 
ourselves and him or her, to create proximity.”181 The paradox of nearness resides in its 
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propensity to atomise individuals rather than bringing them together as a collective.182 Under 
neoliberalism, ‘coming together’ does not concern a group of individuals collectively 
assembling around a common project. Instead it demands that individual images, things, or 
experiences be shared to others and turned into human capital. The distance here comes 
from the fact that ‘sharing’ is mediated by capital exchange and one’s desire for recognition. 
In other words, proximity is only valuable so long as it contributes to appreciating human 
capital through higher visibility. Unlike the ‘coming together’ associated with collective life, 
nearness only requires atomistic individuals to seek intersubjective recognition. More 
connected than ever online, neoliberal subjects have never been so remote from each other.  
 Another paradox emerges from the political behaviour neoliberal subjects stemming 
from the rapport between recognition, individual singularity, and equivalence. Rosanvallon 
provides an account of these entanglements in his discussion of neoliberalism as an ‘age of 
singularity’: 
To be recognized as being “like” others therefore means to be recognized for the 
human generality one contains. But this human generality has taken on a broader, 
more complex meaning. It has come to include the desire to have one’s 
distinctiveness— one’s history and personal characteristics— recognized by others. 
No one wants to be “reduced to a number.” Everyone wants to ‘be someone’.183 
 Although intersubjective recognition is largely based on individuals’ capacity to project 
themselves into the gaze of others, the neoliberal subject also requires that its singularity be 
recognised. Han also points to the strange cohabitation of singularity (differences) and 
sameness in a neoliberal context. However, he refuses to recognise the singularity laid out by 
neoliberal subjects as genuine. If singularity is engaged on a market as human capital, then it 
must be consumable. Reified as a marketable character trait, singularity paradoxically comes 
at the cost of eliminating meaningful differences for its primary goal is to be recognised and 
categorised by others.184 In a fully marketised environment, distinctive individual opinions 
and characteristics can directly contribute human capital growth. Yet, marketisation requires 
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that singularity be “flattened out into an object of consumption”, differences being reduced 
to signs of equivalence rather than singularity.185  
 The marketisation of homo democraticus into a recognition-seeking subject is 
palpable through what Jodi Dean identifies as the neoliberal transformation of politics “into 
commodifiable ‘lifestyles.’”186 Lifestyles offer the possibility to group a multitude of individual 
opinions into a commodifiable package. Categorised as such, individuals are represented as 
yuppies, bohemians, vegans, gym bunnies, or eco-friendly rather than singular autonomous 
beings. Lifestyle politics provides individuals with the “affective thrill of radicality” in an 
environment where actual political participation is limited.187  Pre-packaged into distinct 
lifestyles, political statements are voiced or visibly presented to others without aiming to 
provoke an actual debate. Social media epitomises this type of communication, providing a 
controlled environment requiring no real contact or exchange with others. Lifestyle politics 
offers a simulacrum of collectivity through which isolated individual opinions are flattened 
and conflated without ever having to substantially confront each other. Contained within a 
specific lifestyle, individuals seek to identify with others without necessarily cooperating with 
them. Representing a grouped display of individualised political opinions more than a 
collective effort, lifestyle politics remains perfectly consistent with the neoliberal ethos by 
stopping where collectivity begins.188 If lifestyles were to turn into substantive political 
statements rather than mere postures, the capital-value of its members would depreciate for 
it would no longer be marketable. Lifestyles provide neoliberal subjects with the illusion of 
belonging while guaranteeing that individual preferences be easily equated and grouped into 
marketable categories. 
 Individualised neoliberal politics can take many forms ranging from T-shirts displaying 
a certain message to social media posts, or even sharing pictures online.189 Although its 
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message can be explicit, neoliberal politics always rests on a representation of oneself. The 
self-marketised display of subjects’ personality, opinions, and achievements is the face of 
human capital. The moment this display is seen by others, it enters a market with its own 
specific set of rules, fostering competition amongst subjects. Political correctness, radicalism, 
conformism, conservatism, open-mindedness can all serve as ideological templates on which 
subjects affirm their political opinions. Transparent, marketised, and individualised, 
neoliberal politics generates new political spaces that parliamentary politics often fails to 
occupy. Altered beyond recognition, individualised homo democraticus nonetheless survives 
in an environment where collectivist ambitions have disappeared from the political horizon. 
In the same way that homo economicus has grown from a rational accumulator to an 
‘entrepreneur of the self’, democraticus has developed from an individual striving to find a 
common ground between her/his self-interests and collective goals to a recognition-seeking 
individualised political sphere. Because neoliberal politics rests on displaying and marketising 
one’s human capital, it is constantly mediated by the gaze of others. Neoliberal politics is 
never fully individualised for it must be marketed to and consumed by other individuals. 
Regimented by desires and the judgement of others, homo democraticus and homo 
economicus personify the degeneration of the liberal ideal of autonomy into unrestrained 
heteronomy. More than any other aspects of neoliberalism, the neoliberal subject embodies 










In contrast to the political ambitions of classical liberals, neoliberal thinkers deny the 
political virtues of equality and remain suspicious of any form of collectivity that might 
threaten individual liberty and autonomy. From a neoliberal standpoint, individuals and 
markets remain the only vehicles of emancipation. Through this radical reinterpretation of 
liberal ideals, social relations become fully individualised and marketable. Economic subjects 
turn into auto-entrepreneurs and auto-exploitators of themselves fully responsible for the 
growth of their own human capital on a variety of markets. In this context, competition is 
elevated as the main mode of social conduct by which individuals perceive each other either 
as obstacles to overcome or models to uphold in an inegalitarian market context. A similar 
process is at work within the intersubjective relationships of democratic subjects. Unable to 
approach politics collectively, neoliberal subjects relate to themselves and others either as 
desiring or desired subjects. 
Whereas liberals call upon subjects to realise equality and the common good by means 
of individual autonomy, neoliberals simply encourage subjects to fulfil their individual desires 
regardless. In that sense, the shift between liberalism and neoliberalism also announces the 
transformation of the ideal of autonomy into heteronomous conduct. The collective potential 
of autonomy has given way to an emphasis on individual desire for its own sake. Whereas 
liberal egalitarians aim to conciliate individual self-interest and market exchange with equality 
and justice, neoliberals fully confine emancipation to the domain of the market and 
unrestrained individual desires. The contemporary spread of neoliberal values opposing any 
forms of collective politics at once indicates the egalitarian limits of liberal models 
underpinned by individual autonomy, and the impossibility to conceptualise equality within a 
neoliberal framework. In other words, the current hegemony of neoliberalism suspends the 
egalitarian potential of autonomy by reinvesting it fully onto the market as heteronomy. In a 
world regimented by inequalities and competition amongst individuals, equality is 
systematically sacrificed. By surrendering collective ideals and subverting autonomy into 
heteronomy, neoliberalism signals that the liberal project to realise equality by means of 
individual autonomy has failed.  
Trapped into the impasse of liberal equality, one must let go of the possibility to 





inequalities it fosters. How does one recover the concept of equality in the mist of market 
inequalities and neoliberal heteronomy? Jacques Rancière and Alain Badiou propose to treat 
equality as a starting point of politics rather than its objective. This suggestion represents 
much more than a mere inversion of the liberal ideal of equality as a goal to be achieved. 
Starting equal allows for a radical rethinking of the political potential of equality by which 
subjects are not empowered through individual autonomy, but by acting upon their equal 
capacity to enact and materialise egalitarian politics. For Rancière, this capacity is the 
property of ‘everyone and anyone’ and must be declared to the people in order to interrupt 
‘the method of inequality’ that characterises most liberal thought. The next chapter will be 
dedicated to Rancière’s egalitarian proposition and introduces an argument that will be 
maintained throughout this thesis: in order to materialise egalitarian politics, one must always 






















Part II | Restarting Equal: Subjectivation and Emancipation 
 
Chapter 3 
Jacques Rancière and the Egalitarian Presupposition 
 
Introduction 
Within the liberal democratic nexus, considerations of equality are systematically 
subordinated to questions of individual liberty and autonomy. This applies to proponents of 
distributive justice as much as to neoliberals who refute equality in the name of individual 
liberty and market exchange. For redistributivists such as Rawls and Dworkin, equality may 
be achieved when certain individual choices and market behaviours are adjusted as means to 
allocate resources fairly and efficiently. Although laudable, their models suffer from an 
inability to question the efficiency and inegalitarian potential of markets and a tendency to 
reduce equality and justice to a question of individual choice. These limitations also apply to 
Sen’s capability approach and Pettit’s republicanism. Similar issues arise from the work of 
Fraser, Young, and Benhabib. By reducing equality to a question of identity and inclusion, they 
often invoke individual choice and, in some cases, remain oblivious to the inegalitarian impact 
of market exchange. Besides, reading equality through the prism of identity has the potential 
to promote inclusion as much exclusion. Putting further emphasis on individual autonomy, 
neoliberals construct a political economy articulated around individualisation and 
marketisation. In the neoliberal context, the spread of inequalities supports a state of 
generalised competition in which individuals aim to ‘realise themselves’ on a multitude of 
markets. Whereas proponents of distribution and recognition largely overlook the 
inegalitarian tendencies of the ‘free’ market, neoliberals uphold them. The hegemonic status 
held by neoliberalism exposes the metamorphosis of the ideal of individual autonomy into its 
heteronomous opposite. Aloof to the task of collectively realising equality, individuals are 
guided by their desires and that of others in a fully marketised environment. 
Even if the democratic promise of a ruling demos has been distorted by its encounter 
with autonomy and heteronomy, some contemporary thinkers remain uncompromisingly 





Jacques Rancière. To briefly summarise Rancière’s political thought, one could say that he 
takes democracy up on its own egalitarian promise. Rather than mediating democracy 
through questions of liberty or autonomy, Rancière deepens his exploration of democratic 
equality. The first consequence of this decision is the impossibility to conceptualise equality 
negatively as a result of curbing inequalities.1 Instead of perceiving equality as an objective of 
politics, Rancière treats it as its starting point.2 Viewed in this way, equality becomes a 
presupposition that must be continually verified.3 What exactly does this egalitarian 
presupposition entail? The philosopher’s answer is deceptively simple: “this equality is simply 
the equality of anyone at all with anyone else.”4 Rancière makes the bold claim that people 
are fundamentally equal regardless of any individual traits or attributes. Equality no longer is 
a question of rights, distribution, or recognition to be guaranteed by the state. Rather than a 
political objective attained by ‘correcting’ inequalities, equality exists in its own terms and 
acts as a fundamental condition of politics.5 Thinking equality as a presupposition enables 
Rancière to consider its radical political potential fully. Envisaged as a starting point, equality 
exceeds its usual categorisation as a goal of politics to become an inherently powerful method 
and conceptual framework breaking with an existing order of inequalities. In the discussion 
unfolding in this thesis, Rancière’s method is crucial for it offers a theoretical pathway out of 
the impasse of liberal egalitarianism. No longer constrained by the inegalitarian limits of 
markets and the imperative of individual autonomy, Rancière opens the emancipatory 
potential of equality by reframing it as the radical proposition that anyone is capable of 
anything. 
Rancière’s egalitarian vision comes in plain sight in opposition to Plato’s infamous 
critique of democracy in book VIII of The Republic.6 Whereas Plato rejects the democratic 
regime based on the anarchical postulate that anyone can rule, Rancière endorses democracy 
precisely on the same grounds. The anarchical dimension of Rancière’s conceptualisation of 
politics as the rule of ‘everyone and anyone’ is mainly revealed by this adversarial encounter 
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with Plato’s philosophy. In contrast, the main intellectual influence of Rancière’s 
egalitarianism is Joseph Jacotot, a pedagogue born two decades before the French revolution 
whose career was dedicated to creating a method of ‘intellectual emancipation’.7 Rancière 
honours Jacotot in The Ignorant Schoolmaster, praising his postulate that students and 
masters are capable of equal intelligence. Jacotot’s notion of equality of intelligence is 
essential to Rancière’s consideration of equality as an emancipatory force. Rancière’s 
intellectual itinerary is evidently not limited to these two thinkers. A former student of Louis 
Althusser, he eventually shifted away from the work of his teacher to focus on the archival 
unearthing of the voices of nameless 19th century workers, artists, and thinkers.8 Rancière’s 
oeuvre oscillates between philosophical commentary and archival work, but it always 
revolves around the egalitarian promise that anything can be learned from anyone and that 
politics is the domain of all.  
Rancière’s political thought is underpinned by a distinction between politics and the 
police.9 The police must not be understood merely as law-enforcement, but as the totality of 
dispositives deployed by the state to manage and order communities. The police is that which 
counts the parts of a whole, hence congealing existing inequalities and hierarchies.10 
Conversely, politics appears as the actualisation of the egalitarian presupposition breaking 
with the police order.11 Unlike previously discussed thinkers, Rancière theorises politics as a 
rare interruption of the ‘normal’ police order.12 Politics understood as a radical rupture with 
an existing order of inequalities is substantiated by “the inscription of a part of those who 
have no part” in the police.13 Treating egalitarian politics as a form dissensus, Rancière 
constructs a distinctive interpretation of democracy. Rather than being articulated around a 
consensual demos, democracy (which is always associated to politics in Rancière’s work) 
becomes the scene on which the rift between the logic of the police and the presupposition 
of equality is played out.14 Perceiving politics as an interruption of the police’s assignment of 
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leçon d’Althusser (Paris : La Fabrique Editions, 2012). 
9 Jacques Rancière, Aux bords du Politique (Paris : Gallimard, 2004), 16 ; and Costas Douzinas in The Idea of 
Communism, 102. 
10 Rancière, Disagreement, 10. 
11 Rancière, Aux bords du Politique, 16. 
12 May, The Political Thought of Jacques Rancière, 138. 
13 Rancière, Disagreement, 123. 





roles and places forbids any rapprochement of politics with a process of identification. As a 
“mode of subjectivation”, politics is antithetical to identity to the extent it refers to a 
‘supernumerary’ collective that escapes any existing categorisation.15 
Subjectivation is a crucial facet of Rancière’s account of egalitarian politics. As a 
process, it designates the subject as a product of politics. There can be no pre-political 
subject.16 In contrast to liberal and neoliberal considerations of the subject as an existing 
autonomous individual, Rancière sees the subject as neither here nor an individual. Instead, 
a subject is produced from collectively dismantling the configurations and functions 
determined by the police order and recognising that equality is ‘already here’.17 
Subjectivation begins as a break from the existing police order and continues with the 
egalitarian  establishment of a new collective entity.18 Despite a clear conceptual scission 
between subjectivation and identification, Rancière endows the subjectivised collective with 
the task of speaking on behalf of those who have no part (sans-parts).19 The Rancierian 
political subject does not endorse a new identity besides that of speaking in the name of those 
who have none.  
Inasmuch as Rancière offers a much-needed re-conceptualisation of equality as a 
starting point of politics and a radically new portrait of the subject, his account of 
subjectivation says little about concrete steps to be taken towards realising egalitarian 
politics. He provides no clear clues regarding the true forms which egalitarian politics may 
take. Offering a conceptual way out of the impasse of liberal autonomy, Rancierian 
subjectivation empowers subjects as much as it unsettles the political horizon. This is arguably 
the particularity of Rancière’s political thought. Despite radically opening the concept of 
equality beyond its liberal considerations, Rancière does not account for the way or the 
means through which equality may materialise besides the foundational ‘staging’ of the 
 
15 Keith Bassett, “Event, politics, and space: Rancière or Badiou’?,” Space and Polity 3 (2016): 1-14. 
16 Rancière, Au bords du Politique, 225. 
17 Rancière Disagreement, 40. 
18 Joseph J. Tanke, Jacques Rancière : an Introduction (London Continuum, 2011), 66. 
19 Rancière, Disagreement, 8, 88; and Rancière, Au Bords du Politique, 239.  
Bruno Bosteels provides a concise account of Rancière’s consideration of the police, politics and the sans-
parts: “For Rancière, politics is the clash of two heterogeneous processes-the process of the police and the 
process of equality. He views the police. as "an order of bodies that defines the allocation of ways of doing, 
ways of being, and ways of saying . . . It is an order of the visible and the sayable." He then uses "politics" to 
designate "whatever breaks with the tangible configuration whereby parties and parts or lack of them are 
defined by a presupposition that, by definition, has no place in that configuration-that of the part of those who 





people enabling subjectivation. The point will be made in this chapter that Rancière’s radical 
conception of equality constitutes an important but sudden contribution to political theory. 
Following the intensity of the egalitarian declaration and the spontaneous constitution of a 
political subject, equality remains confined to an uncertain political horizon clouded by the 
anarchical fabric of the demos. To the extent that Rancierian politics is the domain of 
‘everyone and anyone’, it could also be ‘anything’ so long as it is indexed on the egalitarian 
presupposition. 
In order to convey how Rancière’s political thought offers an egalitarian way out of 
the liberal impasse, this chapter is divided in four parts. The first will discuss Rancière’s 
egalitarian presupposition as a direct theoretical break from authors who define equality 
merely in relation to inequalities, consensus, and a clear hierarchical model. The strength of 
Rancière’s egalitarianism is most legible when read against thinkers such as those discussed 
in chapter one who begin with inequalities only to set equality as a goal to be achieved. The 
second section will concentrate on the relationship between equality, dissensus, and anarchy 
operating in Rancière’s work. Rancierian politics demands a radical rupture from existing 
situations, revealing the disorder constitutive of ‘the people’ as much as the fallacy of policed 
hierarchies generated by states and markets. Then, the discussion will move on to Rancière’s 
commitment to Jacotot’s concept of equality of intelligence. If equality can be thought as an 
emancipatory method, what does it entail and how does it disturb the police’s inegalitarian 
distributions? The chapter will close on a discussion of Rancière’s account of subjectivation. 
Having recognised the necessity of subjectivation for egalitarian politics, it will question 
whether people’s subjectivation into a nameless political collective is a sufficient condition 
for realising egalitarian politics. 
 
Against the Method of Inequality 
The first chapter of this thesis argued that theories of distributive and recognitive 
justice address equality negatively, or as a result of erasing existing inequalities. The complex 
models put forward by thinkers such as Rawls, Dworkin, Fraser, Young, or Sen all aim to solve 
the ‘problem’ of inequalities.20 Whereas the work of these scholars is rich and contrasted, 
 






they all build on the assumption that inequalities must be eliminated in order to achieve 
justice and equality. Whether the goal of equality is attained through distribution or 
recognition, inequalities remain a starting point. It was claimed earlier that these negative 
conceptions of equality reveal an unwillingness to question the institution of the ‘free’ market 
as a promoter of inequalities. Proponents of recognition and distribution tend to either 
portray the market as an inevitable entity or work to correct and improve its inegalitarian 
tendencies.21 This stance towards the market is problematic for various reasons. First, it 
prevents theorists from considering equality positively. Erecting the market as an 
unsurpassable institution is arguably one of the main reasons why these models fail to 
conceptualise equality as a starting point of politics. The ever-present market solidifies the 
belief according to which equality is first and foremost a question of correcting inequalities.22 
Another problem with this theoretical postulate is that it forsakes the question of equality to 
the realm of political and economic liberalism. The democratic promise of a ruling demos is 
displaced to become a question of rights, distribution, and recognition. Following liberal 
egalitarians, democrats are theoretically transfigured from those who rule to those who 
appeal to the state for rights, goods, and recognition. 
 Having surrendered any egalitarian ambitions, neoliberal politics also begins with 
inequalities. Yet, rather than trying to solve or correct inequalities, neoliberals treat them as 
an inevitable reflection of individual freedom.23 In a fully individualised market environment, 
inequalities can be instrumentalised to foster competition amongst subjects.24 Liberals and 
neoliberals pursue radically distinct political objectives. Yet, they concord on appointing 
inequalities as the starting point of their respective political projects. For the former, the 
problem of inequality must be solved through redistribution, recognition, and individual 
autonomy. For the latter, inequalities encourage heteronomous individuals to develop 
 
21 Whereas proponents of recognition often omit the political economy of equality, Distributivists tend to 
articulate their models around market distribution. For distributive accounts see Rawls, A Theory of Justice; 
and Ronald Dworkin, “What is Equality? Part 2: Equality of Resources,”. For recognition see Nancy Fraser and 
Axel Honneth, Redistribution or Recognition?; Axel Honneth, The Struggle for Recognition; and Charles Taylor, 
Multiculturalism and the Politics of Recognition. 
22 May associates distributive approaches to justice to the idea of ‘passive equality’ according to which “some 
form of equality is to be ensured by an institution for the sake of those whose equality is at stake. It is to be 
given, or at least protected, rather than taken or enacted by the subjects of equality.” [May, The Political 
Thought of Jacques Rancière, 3.] 
23 See Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom, and Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty. 






themselves as capital on a multitude of markets. Whether they are celebrated or frowned 
upon, inequalities occupy the top of the political agendas of most thinkers discussed thus far 
in this thesis. Exploring the political potential of the concept of equality entails letting go of 
its negative consideration. It necessitates moving beyond the appropriation of equality as a 
question of inequality tied to rights and market distribution, allowing for the possibility to 
paint an untainted image of a more equal world.25  
 One way to consider equality positively is to treat it as a starting point of politics rather 
than its goal. In the wake of this theoretical shift, the state can no longer be considered as a 
corrector of inequalities. In lieu of the state, the empowered subject must be thought as an 
embodiment of equality rather than its passive recipient. Starting with equality entails that it 
be already present as a fundamental condition of the demos, regardless of the subsequent 
presence of states or markets. This approach is radical to the extent that it escapes the 
conceptual frameworks and social arrangements commonly associated with equality. 
Rancière’s work demonstrates that it is possible to think equality in such uncertain terms. 
About those thinkers who treat equality merely as a question of inequalities, he writes that 
“the passion for inequalities is the vertigo of equality, idleness in the face of the infinite task 
that the latter requires, fear when confronted to what a reasonable being owes to himself.”26 
For Rancière, focusing on inequalities reflects an unwillingness to face the possibility that 
people may be fundamentally equal. In Rancièrian terms, inequalities only exist as a reaction 
to equality.27 Taking inequalities as a theoretical premise is equivalent to admitting that the 
demos is not and cannot be equal. 
 During a recent intellectual debate with Axel Honneth, one of the most acclaimed 
theorists of recognition, Rancière explained that he considers inequality as a method rather 
than an incontestable socio-economic reality: 
They [social scientists] never stopped finding a new type of illusion in the forms of 
consciousness of those who thought they were acquiring science, a new form of 
 
25 About the hegemony of inegalitarian considerations of equality, Rosanvallon writes that “Equality has 
become a sort of remote deity, which is routinely worshipped but has ceased to inspire any living faith. When 
used at all, it is generally as a sort of negative incantation— ‘reduce inequalities’— without a corresponding 
positive image of a better world.” [Rosanvallon, 8.] 
26 Jacques Rancière, Le maître ignorant cinq leçons sur l’émancipation intellectuelle (Paris : Atheme Fayard, 
1987), 134. Own translation. 





inequality subjecting those who thought they were moving toward equality. They 
never stopped demonstrating that people were ignorant when they thought they 
knew something, passive when they thought they were active, subjected to 
exploitation by the very illusion of being free, and so on. The method for reaching 
equality in an indeterminate future was in fact a method for postponing it 
indefinitely.28 
Rancière presents the method of inequality as fundamentally deceptive. Whereas 
‘common’ people might believe in equality, social scientists endeavour to continuously 
uncover new forms of inequalities that ultimately prove them wrong. Following this 
argument, the method of inequality appears to deny equality in various ways. Firstly, it 
reasserts a clear hierarchical divide between those who know (social scientists) and those 
who do not (the people being studied).29 The inegalitarian method also denies equality based 
on the simple idea that one must believe in inequalities to study them. “Inequality works to 
the extent that one ‘believes’ it”, ‘it’ being the very distribution of the positions.30 To put this 
point in the language of social science, there is an inegalitarian bias of the observer towards 
inequalities. Perhaps more importantly, this simple statement demonstrates the importance 
of the notion of faith for Rancière’s approach to equality and inequality. In order to either 
‘tackle’ inequalities or ‘see’ equality, one must first believe in one or the other. 
Through his depiction of the method of inequality, Rancière begins to reveal facets of 
his own egalitarian method. The method of inequality is itself a reversal of his egalitarianism 
which depends on an effacement of hierarchies and a belief in foundational equality.31 From 
a Rancierian standpoint, equality and inequality are two opposed presuppositions: “there is 
no path from inequality to equality. There is either a path from equality to equality or a path 
from inequality to inequality.”32 Regarding the relationship between equality and inequality 
his position is straightforward; one may decide to believe and therefore start either with 
equality or inequality. However, the social scientist’s drive to uncover inequalities always 
works against equality. As Alberto Toscano points out about Rancière’s position, “in starting 
from inequality, the social sciences subordinate the possibility of emancipation and equality 
 
28 Ibid, 135. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Jean-Philippe Deranty, Jacques Rancière : Key Concepts (Durham: Acumen, 2010), 10. 





to the reality of hierarchy and disempowerment.”33 The mere act of identifying inequalities 
forecloses the possibility of recognising the political potential of equality.  
 The method of inequality is not limited to social sciences, it also applies to the broader 
category of political philosophy. In his most political work, Rancière explains how most 
historical political arrangements and the philosophies underpinning them are attached to 
inequality rather than equality.34 Whereas political philosophy often concerns itself with 
equality, it systematically aims to set limits on the equal capacity of the demos.35 Here, 
‘concern’ must be read pejoratively. For Rancière, political philosophers are often worried 
and anxious when faced with the possibility that equality may be a fundamental condition of 
politics. These anxieties stem from the belief that their position is somehow separate from 
the people who form the object of their knowledge.36  It is as if existing equality must be 
tamed in order to be ‘properly’ investigated and ‘theorised’ by the political philosopher. 
Building on Rancière’s critique, equality emerges as a paradox of political philosophy. Already 
present as an essential facet of the demos, the presupposition of equality is denied by 
philosophers eager to reformulate its essential proposition. For equality to appear under the 
lens of the social scientist or within the arguments of the philosopher, its overwhelming 
presence as a condition must first be occulted. In turn, social scientists and political 
philosophers’ template for a ‘good democracy’ intellectually responds to a self-repeating 
state of inequalities concealing the ever-presence of equality.37 Far from a benign 
methodological error, ‘the politics of the philosophers’ is “an ideological fallacy that 
perpetuates relations of domination.”38  
 
33 Alberto Toscano, “Anti-sociology and its limits,” in R. Stamp & P. Bowman (eds.), Reading Rancière (London: 
Continuum, 2011), 222. 
34 May explains that for Rancière, “The goal of political philosophy is to create or foster or militate for a police 
order to ensure that the part that has no part continues to have no part. Political philosophy justifies their 
having no part.” [May, The Political Thought of Jacques Rancière, 45.] 
35 Jacques Rancière, Disagreement, 63. 
36 Rancière, “The Method of Equality”, 138. 
37 Etienne Balibar, “Historical Dilemmas of Democracy and Their Contemporary Relevance for Citizenship,” 
Rethinking Marxism 20 (2008): 526; and Kristin Ross, “Rancière and the Practice of Equality,” 67. 
38 Deranty, “Rancière and Contemporary Political Ontology,” Theory & Event 6 (2003): 
https://muse.jhu.edu/article/44780. 
In Disagreement, Rancière breaks down the process through which political philosophy degenerates into the 
philosopher’s politics: “Faced with the unthinkable political nexus of the equal and the unequal, the program 
of political philosophy (or rather, of the politics of the philosophers) is defined as the achievement of the true 
essence of politics […] The solution, in a word, is to achieve the essence of politics by eliminating this 
difference from itself that politics consists of, to achieve politics by eliminating politics, by achieving 





Rancière does not amalgamate the entire spectrum of political philosophy into a single 
category. Instead, he defines political philosophy’s leaning towards inequalities through three 
historical forms of thought: archipolitics, parapolitics, and metapolitics.39 He rejects the 
method of inequality by formulating a thorough critique of these three figures of political 
philosophy stretching from Plato and Hobbes to Marx and Bourdieu.40 Rancière’s opposition 
of politics and philosophy is a key facet of his political ontology which offers a crucial leeway 
into his distinctive understanding of equality.41 It must be noted that democracy has a political 
monopoly on Rancière’s understanding of equality as a presupposition.42 Equality is thereof 
often implicitly associated and even equated with democracy in his work. Taking this 
conjunction into account, disregarding equality becomes equivalent to hating democracy.43 
Rancière rebukes archipolitics, parapolitics, and metapolitics precisely on these grounds. 
Amongst the three categories of political philosophy drawn out by Rancière, archipolitics is 
the most recurrently criticised. This type of philosophy originates with Plato and denotes “the 
project of a community based on the complete realization of the arkhe of community, total 
awareness, replacing the democratic configuration of politics with nothing left over.”44 
Archipolitics depends on a clear structure in which everyone hold their rank for the good of 
the community.45 It is a clearly defined and hierarchical project that enables the 
‘psychologisation’ and ‘sociologisation’ of politics.46 
Throughout his critique of archipolitics, Rancière designates Plato as the instigator of 
the inegalitarian method.47 This reading is mainly based on Plato’s infamous critique of the 
democratic regime laid out in book VIII of the Republic. Plato takes issue with the democratic 
 
39 Rancière, Disagreement, 65. 
40 Bosteels, The Actuality of Communism, 81. 
41 Deranty, “Rancière and Contemporary Political Ontology.” 
42 Despite being fully dedicated to the concept of democracy, Rancière refuses to identify contemporary 
representative parliamentary states as democracies. In his view current representative states fall under the 
label of representative oligarchies, or “the exact opposite of democracy.” [Rancière, Hatred of Democracy, 59-
60.] 
43 This particular point is the main thesis of Rancière in Hatred of Democracy. See Jacques Rancière, Hatred of 
Democracy. 
44 Rancière, Disagreement, 65. 
45 Ibid, 65, 67.  
May points out that Archipolitics is opposed to politics to the extent that it does not assert the equality of 
everyone and anyone. [May, 43]. On the emancipatory potential of this argument see Rancière, Le maître 
ignorant cinq leçons sur l’émancipation intellectuelle; and Jacotot, Manuel de l’émancipation intellectuelle, 
xxxviii. 
46 Archipolitics, particularly through the work of Plato, seems to provide a continuous counterpoint to 
Rancière’s egalitarian vision. Rancière, Disagreement, 68-69.  





regime’s propensity to address and value everyone equally. Speaking through Socrates, Plato 
denounces the democrat’s disregard for established identities and hierarchies.48 He decries 
the anarchical expression of democratic equality by which the lines between a master and a 
slave, a teacher and a student, or a parent and a child become blurred. This is only one facet 
of Plato’s effort to undermine democracy, but this argument enables him to claim that the 
democratic constitution contains every other since it accommodates what everyone wants to 
see in it.49 Rancière endorses democracy precisely for the same reasons that Plato rejects it. 
Against platonic archipolitics, he explains that “politics has no arche, it is anarchical”, and that 
“democracy supports this point.”50 Rancière’s view of politics may be read as a complete 
antithesis of Plato’s archipolitics. 51 For the French thinker, politics begins when the part of 
those who have no part is counted, “when the equality of anyone and everyone is inscribed 
in the liberty of the people.”52 When Plato and his intellectual descendants see chaos, 
disorder, and anarchy in the democratic regime, Rancière perceives equality and therefore 
politics.53  
The two remaining categorisations deployed in Rancière’s critique of political 
philosophy, parapolitics and metapolitics, are not as crucial in grasping the specificity of 
Rancière’s egalitarianism. Parapolitics is associated with Aristotle and reframes politics as a 
question of aesthetics, invoking the people while putting them at a distance from decision-
making.54 The good parapolitical regime “is one that takes on the appearances of an oligarchy 
for the oligarchs and democracy for the demos.”55 Unlike archipolitics, parapolitics does not 
 
48 On democratic equality’s disruption of established identities Plato writes: “a father accustoms himself to 
behave like a child and fear his sons, while the son behaves like a father, feeling neither shame nor fear in 
front of his parents, in order to be free. A resident alien or a foreign visitor is made equal to a citizen, and he is 
their equal. […] A teacher in such a community is afraid of his students and flatters them, while the students 
despise their teachers or tutors.” [Plato, The Republic, trans. G.M.A Grube (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing 
Company, 1992), 233, 562a-562e. 
49 Rancière, Aux bords du Politique, 79. 
50 Rancière, “Politics, Identification, and Subjectivization,” The Identity in Question 61 (1992): 59. 
51 Peter Hallward remarks that Rancière’s propositions often begins as an inversion of the Platonic position 
according to which “to each kind of person there is but one allotted task: labour, war or thought.” [Peter 
Hallward “Staging Equality, On Rancière’s Theatrocracy,” New Left Review 37 (2006): 112.]  
52 Rancière, Disagreement, 123. 
53 Interestingly, Rancière explains that Plato’s unwillingness to recognise that politics could be the concern of 
everyone is often linked to the notion of time: “Plato tells us that manual workers cannot busy themselves 
with the common goods because they do not have time to focus on anything else than work. They cannot 
leave their post because work does not wait.” [Rancière, Le partage du sensible: esthétique et politique (Paris: 
La Fabrique éditions, 2000), 13. Own Translation. 
54 Rancière, Au bords du politique, 40; and Rancière, “The People’s Theatre: A Long Drawn-Out Affair” in The 
Intellectual and his People: Staging the People 2, 2. 





fully dismiss the political virtues of equality. Instead, it inscribes them within the police order, 
distorting and reframing the egalitarian presupposition into the police logic of identification 
and redistribution.56 Parapolitics arguably encompasses the work of scholars discussed in 
chapter one who value equality as a political objective to be mediated by the state rather 
than an essential presupposition. Alternatively, metapolitics is a discourse on the falseness of 
politics. It is associated with Marx in that it presents “the truth of politics is the manifestation 
of its falseness.”57 Viewed this way, politics become a question of uncovering the ideological 
and alienating forces at work in society.58 Although critical, metapolitics differs from 
Rancière’s egalitarian vision for it requires political philosophy to messianically announce the 
truth of the falseness of the people’s condition.  
Rancière’s critique of inequality as a method at work in political philosophy and social 
sciences introduces his distinctive egalitarian vision. Accepting equality as a presupposition 
entails first and foremost refuting the position of those who do not take equality for granted. 
Rather than conceptualising new forms of equality to be pursued, Rancière considers having 
faith in the egalitarian presupposition to be more critical than elaborating on it 
philosophically. Presupposing equality primarily means operating “the rupture of the 
inegalitarian belief or inegalitarian knowledge.”59 Assuming equality might be as easy for 
those who have no part as it is daunting for those whose legitimacy rests on rank, status, or 
the possession of knowledge. When in the position of the social scientist or the political 
philosopher, the difficulty of accepting equality as a presupposition is twofold. It implies 
recognising that one’s own voice does not exceed any others while accepting that equality 
thrives in disorder rather than order. In other words, there is a subjective as well as an 
objective element to refuting the method of inequality. Subjectively, lambda citizens must 
believe in their equal potential while thinkers (possessors of knowledge) must give up their 
 
56 May, The Political Thought of Jacques Rancière, 44-46. 
57 Rancière, Disagreement, 82. 
58 Rancière explains the link between metapolitics and ideology through the figure of Marx: “For the truth of 
falseness, Marx in his genius invented a key word that all modernity has adopted, at times even turning it 
against him. He called it ideology. Ideology is not just a new word for simulacrum or illusion. Ideology is the 
word that signals the completely new status of the true that metapolitics forges: the true as the truth of the 
false. Not the clarity of the idea in the face of the obscurity of appearances; not the truth as an index of itself 
and of falseness but, on the contrary, the truth of which the false alone is an index, the truth that is nothing 
more than highlighting falseness, the truth as universal interference.” [Ibid, 85.] 





faith in the value of their privileged position.60 The next section will focus specifically on the 
anarchical and dissensual dimensions of Rancière’s political thought. Enacting the egalitarian 
presupposition demands accepting the anarchical dimension of a demos that escapes any 
labels generated by the police order. Unlike thinkers discussed in chapter one who aim to 
accommodate equality within an existing economic and political framework, Rancière claims 
that the mere declaration of equality requires the dissolution of all policed hierarchies 
including those generated by existing states and markets. 
 
Anarchy and Dissensus 
It is on the question of order, rank, and competence that Plato and his archipolitical 
heirs are most reluctant to accept equality as a presupposition.61 Rancière views Plato’s 
critique of democracy as an attempt to “put an end to politics as it spontaneously and 
democratically presents itself.”62 This spontaneous state is the ‘anarchical autoregulation of 
the demos.’63 Rancière associates anarchy with the multiplicity and indiscernibility of the 
people.64 Far from a barrier to politics, the anarchical presentation of the demos is the face 
of the egalitarian presupposition for Rancière.65 If politics has no arkhe, one must accept the 
anarchical potential of everybody and anybody in order to uphold equality as a 
presupposition.66 Through his anarchical consideration of politics, Rancière often introduces 
 
60 The subjective aspect of breaking with the inegalitarian presupposition is what Rancière refers to as 
emancipation, or “the decision to verify that there are not two kinds of souls or two kinds of intelligence.” The 
relationship between presupposing equality and emancipation will be further discussed in the second part of 
this chapter. [Ibid, 140.] 
61 In the early pages of Disagreement, Rancière vividly describes what he understands to be Plato’s anxiety 
towards the egalitarian presupposition carried by the democratic regime: “[The problem] is that at the 
people's assembly, any mere shoemaker or smithie can get up and have his say on how to steer the ships and 
how to build the fortifications and, more to the point, on the just or unjust way to use these for the common 
good. The problem is not the always more but the anyone at all, the sudden revelation of the ultimate anarchy 
on which any hierarchy rests.” [Ibid, 16.] 
62 Rancière, Au Bords du Politique, 35. Own translation. 
63 Ibid. 
64 Ibid, 12, 13, 35. 
65 Todd May points out that Rancière is one of the few French political thinkers willing to associate his work 
with the politically charged notion of anarchism: "Among recent French thinkers, only Rancière has been 
willing to align his thought with the term anarchism. Only Rancière has been willing not only to reject the 
Marxist spectre which hovers over progressive European thought, but also to refer in a positive way to the 
tradition that, during most of the twentieth century, was thought to have been left to the dustbin of history." 
[May, “Rancière and Anarchism” in Jacques Rancière and the Contemporary Scene, ed. Jean Philippe Deranty 
and Alisson Ross (London: Continuum, 2012), 117.] 





democracy as an empty ‘supplement’ founded on “nothing but the absence of entitlement to 
govern.”67 Following the egalitarian presupposition and the anarchical presentation of the 
demos, the only entitlement to govern is that which is owned by those “who have no more 
entitlement to govern than to be governed.”68 To start with equality entails accepting 
everyone’s (in)capacity to rule as the only legitimate political position. For Todd May, 
Rancière’s anarchist consideration of the demos reveals a dual commitment to “a critique of 
domination in all its forms and an embrace of active equality.”69 Committing to the equal 
capacity of ‘everyone and anyone’ serves to identify haters of democracy as much as it clears 
the path for true egalitarian politics.70 
Archipolitics is a reaction against the unpredictability and multiplicity of the demos. 
Its proponents aim to institute the rule of ‘the One’, providing a clear hierarchical measure of 
the social and a well-rounded order in which each agent has a specific role and place.71 
Opposing the anarchical multiple to an ordered ‘One’ is another way for Rancière to 
demonstrate his commitment to equality as a starting point of politics. Indeed, there is a clear 
temporality to the idea of presupposing. Whatever is supposed is assumed to already be 
there. For Rancière equality is always a starting point, it is already present when political 
thought or action occur. In the same way, the multiple (the two) always precedes the one in 
his work.72 The multiple making up the anarchical demos and displaying equality is always 
antecedent to the constitution of a ‘One’. Despite its foundational status, equality is not an 
ontological principle for Rancière. Inasmuch as equality is not a political goal, nor does it 
constitute its essence or being.73 Mitch Rose goes as far as claiming that equality stands as a 
 
67 Ibid, 236 ; and Rancière La haine de la Démocratie, 48. Own translation. 
This reading clearly echoes Lefort’s consideration of democracy as an empty space depicted in chapter one. 
See Lefort, The Political Forms of Modern Society Bureaucracy, Democracy, Totalitarianism. 
68 Rancière, La haine de la Democratie, 53. 
69 May, The Political Thought of Jacques Rancière, 93. 
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of deduction, decision or direction.” [« Entretien avec Jacques Rancière, » cited in Hallward, Staging Equality, 
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‘pre-ontological’ category for Rancière.74 Equality is not a ground but an assumption that can 
only be practically verified by the demos.75 Preceding politics and philosophy, equality 
remains a simple declaration. The act of declaring and verifying equality is the political event 
itself.76 
 Related to the notion of multiple and the anarchical fabric of the demos is Rancière’s 
claim that politics does not depend on order and coherence, but on disagreement and 
dissensus. As he writes in On the Shores of Politics, “the essence of politics is the manifestation 
of dissensus, the presence of two worlds in one.”77 From Rancière’s standpoint, oneness and 
consensus are forces that work directly against politics. The problem with consensus is 
contained in the maxim that “the whole is all, and nothing is nothing.”78 Associating 
consensus with politics presupposes, not equality, but the inclusion of all parties in advance 
regardless of whether they have a part or not.79 What is being included is not the people in 
its chaotic composition, but a clearly categorised aggregation of its parts into one. Striving for 
oneness in the form of order and consensus allows intellectuals to occult equality to 
concentrate fully on imposing the rightness of their political visions. Viewed this way, 
consensus is the result, not of a rational and democratic process, but of a division of the 
community from itself.80 It is a distorted amalgamation of the parts and non-parts making up 
society into a polished whole.81      
Refuting the political value of consensus enables Rancière to define politics “not as 
the art of directing communities, but as a dissensual form of human action, an exception to 
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77 Jacques Rancière, On the Shores of Politics, 241. 
78 Rancière, Disagreement, 124. 
79 Ibid, 116. 
80 Ibid, 121. 
81 Ibid, 123.  
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the rules according to which the regrouping and directing of human groups is operated.”82 
Politics in Rancierian terms is a rupture with what is generally accepted as politics.83 
Rancière’s opposition to consensus is not merely limited to its procedural effects. His 
dissensual standpoint is wider, declaring that politics cannot be limited to a general and 
consensual agreement on what politics is. From this perspective, politics should be opposed 
to the congealment characterising social institution such as the state. Politics materialises in 
rare breaks from the consensual (and therefore imposed) understandings of what constitutes 
‘good’ politics. From a Rancierian standpoint egalitarian politics is rare and sudden, only 
occasionally altering the pre-assigned categories of the police.84 
The specificity of Rancière’s dissensus-based view of politics evidently raises the 
question of whether politics is possible in the context of existing liberal-democracies. 
Rancière’s stance on this possibility is categorical; contemporary democracies are effectively 
post-political and therefore post-democratic.85 In Disagreement, Rancière defines post-
democracy as “the government practice and conceptual legitimization of a democracy after 
the demos, a democracy that has eliminated the appearance, miscount, and dispute of the 
people.”86 From this standpoint, contemporary democracies are to be interpreted as formal 
representations of the demos emptied of any egalitarian content. Rancière’s dissensual 
position also questions the compatibility of his radical view of politics with the institution of 
the state. In this regard, Rancière’s answer is once again straightforward: “Every state is 
oligarchical”, and its existence depends on a surrendering of the political.87 Rancière’s 
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repudiation of the state sheds light on his understanding of politics as a scission from what is 
consensually recognised as unsurpassable in politics, namely,  consensus, order, and the 
state.88 
Rancière’s continuous intellectual confrontation with hierarchy and consensus points 
to another antagonism fundamental to his thought. This theoretical rift opposes the logic of 
politics and that of police. Rancière separates the two by distinguishing the method in which 
each counts the parts of a social whole: 
There are two ways to count the parts of a community. The first merely counts real 
parts, empirical groups defined by differences in birth and social functions, the 
positions and interests that constitute the social body, excluding any forms of 
supplement. In addition to this, the second way also counts ‘a part of those who have 
no parts’ (surplus). We will call the first way police and the second politics.89 
Based on this distinction between police and politics, it becomes clear that the three 
figures of political philosophy (archipolitics, parapolitics, and metapolitics) as well as social 
sciences correspond to the logic of the police rather than politics.90 Policing is also a trait of 
liberal and neoliberal states whose starting point is systematically defined by a state of 
inequalities.91 They belong to the police order by “ensuring that the part that has no part 
continues to have no part”, therefore working against the presupposition of equality.92 On 
the other hand, the particularity of politics is to give a central part to those who have none. 
It is “the absence of an entitlement to rule that constitutes the very nature of the political 
space.”93 Politics speaks on behalf of the uncounted, by neutralising any count of parts.94 
Although antagonistic, the relationship between politics and the police is not purely 
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conflictual. Politics depends on its encounter with the police for it lacks an object of its own.95 
As Toscano points out about the police/politics bipartition, “though there may be a worse or 
a better police there can be no such thing as the overcoming of the split between the two 
logics.”96 Politics works against the police logic without ever undermining it completely. 
Politics’ sole principle is equality which “is not peculiar to it and is in no way in itself 
political.”97 Instead, “all equality does is lend politics reality in the form of specific cases to 
inscribe, in the form of litigation, confirmation of the equality at the heart of the police 
order.”98 Henceforth, the notion of police cannot be limited to a negative category. If not the 
soil from which equality can grow, it is the site on which equality can be seen after its 
encounter with politics. The conflictual yet nuanced relationship between politics and police 
illustrates the process by which “politics essentially undoes the given.”99 
The intricate link between equality, politics, and the police is surely best characterised 
by Rancière’s concept of ‘repartition of the sensible’ (partage du sensible).100 Rancière 
introduces it as “a relation between occupations and equipments, between being in a specific 
space and time, performing specific activities, and being endowed with capacities of seeing, 
saying, and doing that “fit” those activities.”101 In deploying this elusive concept, Rancière 
ambitiously attempts to theorise the multidimensional link between what is sensorially 
experienced and what is thought.102 Hallward explains that every verification of equality is 
inevitably part of this repartition.103 The cutting and assemblage making up the repartition of 
the sensible concerns the social world in its totality regardless of whether it is enacted by the 
police or politics.104 Both the police and politics constitute modes of distribution of the 
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sensible.105 Unlike ideology which also conveys how thoughts translate into actions, the 
sensible’s repartition is not a question of metapolitical knowledge or policed illusion, but of 
consensus or dissensus.106 The fate of the sensible is decided prior to its repartition. Like 
equality and inequality, one either chooses to believe and therefore start with dissensus or 
consensus. In both cases, a foundational decision determines the sequence of events that 
follows. The reappearance of the binary opposition between consensus and dissensus within 
the question of the sensible demonstrates the sheer impossibility to bypass or avoid its 
repartition. It also shows that the repartition of the sensible does not have to be a process 
that works against equality and politics. Although a consensus-based police distribution is 
possible, it will occult the possibility of politics. However, it is equally conceivable that the 
repartition of the sensible may shine light on the presupposition of equality through 
dissensus.107  
Rancière’s political thought is positioned not against inequalities, but against the 
method that enables inequalities to be thought and perceived. Departing from inequalities, 
consensus, and the police order, he conceptualises equality as a presupposition rather than a 
goal. Equality does not require to be invented or pursued since it is already a non-political 
condition of politics.108 Politics can only take shape against the method of inequality and 
under the condition of equality revealed by the anarchical composition of the demos. Politics 
lacks an arche for it rests on the equality of everyone and anyone, including those who have 
‘no part’. Rancière links equality and politics through dissensus, disorder, and emancipation 
from policed categorisations. By pre-assigning roles and identities, consensus forsakes 
equality as a presupposition and forbids the occurrence of politics. The clear conceptual 
bipartition between consensus/dissensus, police/politics, anarchy/order, serves to illustrate 
the radically emancipatory character of Rancière’s thought. Egalitarian politics is not to be 
realised within an existing framework. There is no ‘safe space’ of politics ensuring that 
deliberation and decisions are taken in an orderly manner. Instead, politics emerges only as a 
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breaking away from liberal democratic certainty through which the anarchical and polemical 
voices of the people begin to be heard. Having presented key aspects of Rancière’s dissensual 
thought in light of his rejection of the method of inequality, the next section will concentrate 
on the emancipatory power and political potential of his egalitarian method. 
 
Equality as Emancipation 
Thus far, this chapter has endeavoured to show that Rancière’s unique approach to 
equality is dependent on rejecting inequality as a method, and theoretically relocating 
equality as a presupposition rather than an objective of politics. It has also discussed the 
extent to which Rancière’s thought rests on the anarchical equality of everyone and anyone 
and dissensus rather than consensus. Through these radical propositions, Rancière 
significantly expands the political potential of equality. Starting with equality offers the 
possibility to conceive of equality positively, independently of any inequalities generated by 
existing state and market structures. The aim of this section is to show precisely how 
presupposing equality can become an emancipatory force, allowing for the possibility to 
conceptualise the materialisation of equality away from the method of inequality 
characterising liberal thought in its entirety. 
Nowhere is the emancipatory potential of equality clearest than through Rancière’s 
engagement with Joseph Jacotot’s work. Jacotot was a French thinker and a pedagogue born 
in 1770 who dedicated his career to developing a method of ‘intellectual emancipation.’ A 
devote republican, he served as a parliamentary representative for a few years before fully 
dedicating himself to research at the university of Louvain.109 It is there, confronted with the 
task of writing and teaching in a language he did not speak, that he stumbled upon his 
method. The latter has three principles: “all men have equal intelligence, every man has 
received from god the faculty to instruct himself, everything is in everything.”110 Jacotot’s 
ground-breaking method did not go unnoticed, catching the attention of European 
governments willing to explore the potential of his research.111 Nonetheless, Jacotots’s 
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intellectual legacy did not reach far beyond the curious minds of the early 19th century. That 
was the case until Rancière published The Ignorant Schoolmaster in 1987, reviving the great 
legacy of this intellectual maverick. The impact of Jacotot’s method on Rancière’s 
egalitarianism is so deep, that Deranty goes as far as claiming that Rancière’s most political 
works Disagreement and On the Shores of Politics are merely “the conceptual development 
and re-appropriation of Jacotot’s revolutionary politics of education.”112 
 Perhaps the best way to illustrate the egalitarian potential and significance of Jacotot’s 
method is to recount one of Jacotot’s teaching anecdote. Rancière does exactly that in the 
early pages of The Ignorant Schoolmaster. Unable to speak or understand a word of Flemish 
and faced with students who had no knowledge of French, Jacotot resolved to assign them to 
read a bilingual edition of Fenelon’s Telemachus (the only bilingual publication available at 
the time), and to produce a summary in French of what they thought they had read.113 As 
Rancière points out, “necessity  had  constrained  him  to  leave  his  intelligence  entirely out  
of the  picture.”114 This frustrating situation forcing Jacotot to leave traditional teaching 
methods aside turned out to be an extraordinary discovery: 
By chance, a grain of sand had gotten into the machine.  He had given no explanation 
to his “students” on the first elements of the language.  He had not explained spelling 
or conjugations to them.  They had looked for the French words that corresponded to 
words they knew and the reasons for their grammatical endings by themselves.  They 
had learned to put them together to make, in turn, French sentences  by  themselves: 
sentences whose spelling and grammar became more and more exact as they 
progressed through the book; but, above all, sentences of writers and not of 
schoolchildren. Were the schoolmaster’s explications therefore superfluous? Or, if 
they were not, to whom and for what were they useful?115 
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Expecting nothing from this experience, Jacotot instead discovered the method that 
would guide the rest of his intellectual life. It questioned the utility of the schoolmaster’s 
explications, and as a result, the schoolmaster’s legitimacy as a possessor of knowledge.116 
Building on Jacotot’s discovery, Rancière explains that the master-student relationship is 
conditioned by the notion of explication: “It is the explicator who needs the incapable and 
not the other way around; it is he who constitutes the incapable as such. To explain something 
to someone is first of all to show him he cannot understand it by himself.”117 In other words, 
one’s position as a provider of knowledge fully depends on a willing recipient. However, this 
recipient does not depend on the provider’s explications in order to acquire such knowledge. 
Jacotot and Rancière both claim that masters and students are engaged in a fundamentally 
asymmetrical and unequal relationship justifying their respective roles. While the teacher 
systematically gains legitimacy through the act of explicating to the supposedly ignorant, the 
students are likely to gain nothing from this relationship that they could not have uncovered 
out of their own will. Besides, students might have more to lose by entering a relationship 
consolidating their identification as those without knowledge, or as Rancière would phrase it, 
those ‘who have no part’.118  
Jacotot’s method, like many of Rancière’s claims, is deceptively simple. Jacotot’s 
discovery far exceeds a mere reversal of the master/student relationship. Starting with the 
claim of equal intelligence, the method of intellectual emancipation offers the possibility to 
fundamentally question the police’s pre-assignment of roles that Rancière associates with 
consensus.119 It is surely this prospect that theoretically brought the two thinkers together 
more than 150 years apart. Rancière’s insight was to perceive that the egalitarian content of 
Jacotot’s work far exceeds the realm of education. Within his reading of Jacotot, Rancière 
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focuses on the notion of equality of intelligence. His discussion of the concept revolves around 
three central themes; language, emancipation, and will. These three elements constitute a 
strong bond between intellectual emancipation and Rancière’s egalitarian politics. The task 
of this section is to elucidate the specific meanings Rancière attributes to these terms that 
shed light on his political claims. 
The Ignorant Schoolmaster reveals as much about Jacotot’s pedagogy as it does about 
Rancière’s political thought, the voices of the two authors becoming increasingly 
indistinguishable throughout the book.120 Although the narrator’s voice is aptly unidentifiable 
in this work, language is a crucial component of Rancière’s interpretation of equality of 
intelligence. As he concisely points out, “equality requires a common language”, since it is “as 
a speaking being that man is fundamentally equal to anybody.”121 Viewed this way, language 
appears irremediably linked to equality, and therefore incorporated within its presupposition. 
One must start with language in the same way that one starts with equality. Rancière 
designates language as an essential piece of the egalitarian presupposition when he writes 
that “the material ideality of language refutes any opposition between the  golden race and  
the  iron  race,  any hierarchy— even an  inverted  one— between  men  devoted  to  manual  
work  and men destined to the exercise of thought.”122 Once again, Rancière attacks Plato’s 
archipolitical dismissal of the demos by arguing through Jacotot that anyone who has access 
to language also has an equal access to others and to a common understanding the world 
that surrounds them. What could justify a rigid assignment of social roles and labels 
(expert/ignorant, manual/intellectual…) if everybody has a shared capacity for language and 
therefore an equal capacity for comprehension? Rancière’s response is that nothing justifies 
such repartition for “a man can always understand another man’s words.”123 Based on this 
essential postulate on language and intelligence, there can be “no ground whatsoever for the 
exercise of power.”124 
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Starting with equality signifies starting with language. It is only through speech that 
individuals can relate equally, exposing inequality as a masquerade.125 Language uncovers the 
futility of inequality by revealing equality as everyone’s capacity to share through speech, a 
fundamentally human condition.126 Perhaps the most concrete example of language as a 
conveyor of equality is the process of learning one’s mother tongue. Rancière repeatedly 
makes use of this case when discussing the role of language in Jacotot’s work: 
According to the unequal returns of various intellectual apprenticeships, what all 
human children learn best is what no master can explain: the mother tongue. We 
speak to them and we speak around them. They hear and retain, imitate and repeat, 
make mistakes and correct themselves, succeed by chance and begin again 
methodically, and, at too young an age for explicators to begin instructing them, they 
are almost all— regardless of gender, social condition, and skin color— able to 
understand and speak the language of their parents.127 
Far from philosophical abstractions, Rancière provides his reader with a concrete and 
relatable example of equality of intelligence. Learning one’s mother tongue prior to having 
access to instruction is an essentially human trait. Too young for instruction and with limited 
brain power, infants are equally able to acquire language at a pace far exceeding the 
assimilation of an ‘instructed’ second language at an older age. Rancière links his discussions 
of language to politics through the notion of ‘the wrong’. The latter designates the universal 
form in which politics occurs by expressing equality of “the part of those who have no part, 
to the conflict between parts of society.”128 Breaking down the concept, May explains that 
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wherever there is an inequality there is a wrong that must be addressed.129 Only by expressing 
the wrong caused by inequalities can “the people identify with the whole of the 
community.”130  
Expressing a wrong is done by manifesting or staging it.131 Rancierian politics has a 
clear theatrical dimension, “creating a stage, making a stage visible, making a scene, where 
previously there seemed to be none.”132 In the name of those who have no parts, actors on 
the political stage create ‘polemical scenes’, displaying a wrong and exhibiting the 
ineffectuality of inequality as much as the essentiality of equality.133 Staging constitutes  
another form of language with the potential to express the inegalitarian masquerade to 
everybody. The difficulty in staging a wrong lays in “knowing whether the subjects who count 
in the interlocution ‘are’ or ‘are not,’ whether they are speaking or just making a noise […] 
knowing whether the common language in which they are exposing a wrong is indeed a 
common language.”134 Since one of the traits of political subjects is to break from pre-
assigned identities, they often fail to express a single voice on stage. Instead, they speak in 
“shattered, polemical voices, dividing at each time the identity they put on stage.”135 Yet, the 
successful staging of a wrong (the presentation of equality) has the potential to reconfigure 
the order of domination imposed by the police by exposing its miscount.136 From a Rancierian 
perspective, the sharing of language plays a key role at various stages of politics. First, it 
conveys equality by being accessible to all independently of instruction. It also embodies 
equality by providing the means through which individuals can share and exchange 
reciprocally. Finally, language contributes to manifesting a wrong whose staging becomes 
“the original structure of all politics.”137 Following Rancière, language emerges as a bridge 
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between equality and politics. Through the concrete figure of the stage, it also exemplifies 
how the complex relationship between equality and politics may materialise in concrete 
reality.  
However essential to politics, language itself does not justify the necessity to consider 
equality as a presupposition conditioning politics. Beyond discussions of language, one could 
ask what is political about Rancière’s egalitarianism. The answer, as often with Rancière, is 
quite direct. The egalitarian presupposition is political for it puts individuals on the path of 
emancipation.138 Rancière defines emancipation as “a set of practices guided by the 
supposition that everyone is equal and by the attempt to verify this supposition.”139 The 
declaration that everyone and anyone is equal must be verified prior to entering the realm of 
emancipatory politics. Language, though fundamental, appears insufficient in fully effecting 
the politicisation of equality.  
Following Jacotot, Rancière treats emancipation as the verification that “intelligence 
is the same in all its operations and that it belongs to everybody.”140 Verifying equality 
depends on the will of individuals to confirm that they are equally intelligent to any other 
members of the community. Verification is not itself a guarantee for emancipation as “each 
situation can be dealt with either as an occasion for the verification of inequality or as an 
occasion for the verification of equality.”141 Verifying that intelligences are equal does not 
belong to the domain of science, let alone knowledge. Instead, equality creates its own self-
generating space that can only be verified through emancipation.142 In other words, 
emancipation is the political demonstration of the egalitarian presupposition. Verifying 
equality rests primarily on a subjective commitment.143 One must be willing to have faith in 
 
138 Rancière position on emancipation differs greatly from the use that is commonly made of the term in 
contemporary political theory and popular culture. Emancipation is commonly associated with the liberation of 
certain oppressed groups that are defined through identity or class, and the capacity of these groups to 
achieve equal status with those who are in a position of dominance. For Rancière, emancipation concerns 
anyone. Emancipation is not merely attached to a levelling out of the social field through reparation, 
recognition, representation, or redistribution of certain groups, but to declaring that equality is a 
presupposition that must be verified. As Hallward writes, emancipation is “the blurring of the opposition 
between they who look and they who act, between those who are trapped by their function or identity and 
those who are not.” [Hallward, “Staging Equality,” 115.] 
139 Rancière, “Politics, Identification, and Subjectivization”, 58; and Rancière, Recognition or Disagreement, 18. 
140 Rancière, “The Method of Equality,” 139; and Rancière, “Politics, Identification, and Subjectivization,” 18. 
141 Ibid. 
142 Rancière, Au bords du politique, 93. 
143 For Hallward, “Rancière’s axiomatic conception of equality rightly affirms the primacy of subjective 





equality in order to verify it. Emancipation understood in these terms requires that 
individuals, if not fully emancipated, be open to the possibility of equality as a presupposition. 
If that is not the case, inequality will be verified in its place. Discussions making up the 
previous section of this chapter demonstrated that following Rancière, one does not have to 
fundamentally believe in the political virtues of inequalities to perceive them. Rather, 
inequalities become apparent when one fails to recognise equality for what it is (a 
presupposition). Both equality and inequality result from the strength of one’s subjective 
commitment to equality. Either the commitment is strong and emancipation is possible, or it 
is absent and inequality will be verified in place of equality, rendering emancipation 
unachievable.144 According to Jacotot’s method, it is not knowledge but rather the belief that 
“society exists only through distinctions, and nature presents only equalities” that conditions 
people for emancipation.145  
Can Jacotot be considered as an ignorant schoolmaster? After all, his innovative 
method results from years dedicated to theorising education. Rancière understands Jacotot, 
not as a genius or a savant, but as a type of egalitarian prophet whose power resides in 
announcing the benefits of his discoveries to the poor.146 Looking back at Jacotot’s role in 
communicating his method to the people in The Ignorant Schoolmaster, Rancière recognises 
that emancipation under the name of equality cannot be personified by a single individual. 
Jacotot, just like any of his disciples, only has the power to announce that all intelligences are 
equal.147 Jacotot’s role in relation to his own method is once again tied to language. The 
ignorant schoolmaster does not teach so much as he announces the emancipatory power of 
equality to those who do not play a part.148 The towering figure of the master is effaced as 
soon as the messianic statement that ‘all intelligences are equal’ is uttered.149 As a self-
professed disciple of Jacotot, Rancière has the same task. Remaining faithful the 
presupposition of equality and Jacotot’s method of intellectual emancipation, Rancière has 
 
144 Toscano, “Anti-Sociology and its Limits,” 222. 
145 Jacotot, Enseignement universel : Musique, 3d ed. (1830), 194-195. 
146 Rancière, The Ignorant Schoolmaster, 18. 
147 Rancière, Le maitre Ignorant, 21. 
148 Politics for Rancière only occurs in a context where hierarchies are absent and little is specified besides the 
staging of a wrong and the consideration of equality as a presupposition. This relatively evasive consideration 
of politics leads Hallward to claim that “Rancière’s conception of equality, tends towards improvisation.” 
[Hallward, “Staging Equality,” 120.]  
149 The egalitarian power of this statement is truly revealed by the declaration that “One could teach what one 
did not know, […] that a poor and ignorant father could, if he was emancipated, conduct the education of his 





no choice but to dismiss his authoritative status as a philosopher following the declaration of 
equality. Recognising equality as a presupposition requires that the categories of status and 
identity be rendered irrelevant.150 Only this way can the sensible be redistributed equally and 
along the lines of dissensus. 
 
Subjectivation and the Political Stage 
This chapter attempts to follow the conceptual path drawn out by Rancière’s 
distinctive conception of equality. Abandoning ‘the method of inequality’ at core of political 
philosophy and social sciences, one must dissent from the police order’s pre-imposed 
identities. Egalitarian politics requires that the people be accepted in its spontaneous and 
anarchical presentation. Through the emancipatory claim that anyone is capable of anything, 
equality can be declared and staged on behalf of ‘those who have no parts.’ What follows 
from the declaration of equality is its enactment through a process of ‘subjectivation.’ 
Treating subjectivity as a process already entails that subjects are made rather than given. In 
May’s words, “To engage in a democratic politics is not to discover a subject of politics; it is 
to create one […] Equality is not received, it is made…”151 In contrast to liberal and neoliberal 
approaches, the Rancierian subject is not an individual acting autonomously or 
heteronomously. Fully detached from individualistic concerns, subjectivation deploys the 
egalitarian presupposition on a ‘new’ collective political subject continuously working 
towards creating equality.152  
Rancière’s subject is a complex figure since it must persist as a ‘non-identitarian’ 
entity.153 Although it speaks and acts on behalf of those who have no parts, the subject is not 
to be confounded with this pre-political category.154 The political subject cannot be equated 
to the proletariat, marginalised groups, or dominated classes for it always erases pre-existing 
 
150 For Rancière subjectivation entails deidentification to the extent that a subject’s name must be “different 
from any identified part of the community.” [Rancière, Disagreement, 37, 59.] On Rancière’s consideration of 
identity, Oliver Davis explains that “subjectivation is never simply the assertion of an identity but the refusal of 
an identity imposed by others, by the police order.” [Oliver Davis, Jacques Rancière (Cambridge: Polity Press, 
2010), 376.] 
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categories by enacting a ‘third people’.155 Although Rancière’s account of subjectivation 
remains fully aligned with his ground-breaking conceptualisation of equality, the subject’s 
non-identity and emptiness ultimately makes it impossible to extract a clear picture of what 
egalitarian politics could be. Remaining faithful to his categorical rejection of ‘the politics of 
the philosophers’, and to the anarchical presentation of the demos, Rancière has no choice 
but to efface himself and his thought after introducing subjectivation. Post-subjectivation 
politics must remain an open question if it is to be dissensual, spontaneous, and truly in the 
hands of the people.  
Subjectivation begins with one’s dissensual extraction form the hierarchical order 
imposed by the police. As mentioned earlier, the inegalitarian fallacy must be exposed 
through speech and the enactment of a wrong. Subjectivation only results from successfully 
exposing the wrong as such.156 Expressed on behalf of the uncounted, the wrong embodies 
the confrontation of two worlds, “the world where they [the uncounted] are and the world 
where they are not, the world where there is something ‘between’ them and those who do 
not acknowledge them as speaking beings who count and the world where there is 
nothing.”157 Subjectivation always begins with the unveiling of the fallacy of inequality. Unlike 
the metapolitical denunciation of ideology and alienation, there is nothing behind the veil of 
inequality but everyone’s equal intelligence. Staging the wrong does not expose a power-
driven conspiracy. It simply displays the police’s denial of equality’s constant presence. Rose 
reminds Rancière’s readers that “speaking about one's lack of access or belonging is not in 
and of itself political.”158 Rather subjectivation is activated when those who have no voice are 
heard by those who do, when those who have no part are finally seen as equal by those who 
already belong. Only from this rare moment when the whole relates to its most concealed 
parts, can the police order fundamentally transform as a result of subjectivation. In May’s 
words, “to become a subject is to make oneself appear where there had previously been only 
categories, and indeed categories that rendered one or one’s experience more or less 
invisible.”159 
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Although it might be tempting to simply merge the recurrent figure of ‘those without 
parts’ with that of political subject, such conflation would be fallacious. The two categories 
are evidently not mutually exclusive, but the passive identification of not having a part does 
not guarantee subjectivation. As Rancière himself points out, “you cannot account for the 
construction of the political subject out of the suffering of the individuals who are involved in 
the creation of this subject.”160 The unrelatedness of victimisation and subjectivation is best 
exemplified by Rancière’s distinctive interpretation of the term ‘proletariat’: 
In Latin, proletarii meant "prolific people"-people who make children, who merely live 
and reproduce without a name, without being counted as part of the symbolic order 
of the city. Proletarians was thus well-suited for the workers as the name of anyone, 
the name of the outcast: those who do not belong to the order of castes, indeed, those 
who are pleased to undo this order (the class that dissolves classes, as Marx said). In 
this way, a process of subjectivization is a process of disidentification or 
declassification.161 
Here, Rancière presents his category of those without parts under the banner of the 
proletariat.162 The originality of this reading resides in the fact that he mobilises the notion of 
proletariat, not based on class identification, but subjectivation.163 Proletarians are not 
political subjects by virtue of being an exploited labour force, but because their (non)position 
in society may encourage them to emancipate from a consensus-based and inegalitarian 
repartition of the sensible.164 Rancière’s demand to act ‘on behalf of those who have no parts’ 
 
160 Rancière, “The Method of Equality,” 122. 
161 Rancière, “Politics, Identification, and Subjectivization,“ 5. 
162 Having emancipated from Marxist theory since his theoretical break with Althusser, Rancière is not fixated 
on the category of proletariat. He interchangeably uses labels such as ‘the poor’, the people, or proletariat to 
refer to those who have no parts. [Rancière, Disagreement, 39]. 
163 Rancière appears willing to define the category of proletarian and worker more as a process than an 
identitarian subject: “’workers’ does not designate an already existing collective identity. It is an operator 
performing an opening. The real workers who construct this subject do it by breaking away from their given 
identity in the existing system of positions.” [Rancière “The Method of Equality,” 92-3.] 
For more on Rancière’s discussion of 19th century workers see Jacques Rancière, Proletarian Nights (London: 
Verso), 2012; and Jacques Rancière, Courts Voyages au Pays du Peuple (Paris: Point), 2015. 
164 The class-based political subjectivation of the proletariat achieved by reclaiming the means of production 
from the bourgeoisie is concisely summarised in Marx and Engels’s Communist Manifesto: “the first step in the 
revolution by the working class is to raise the proletariat to the position of ruling class to win the battle of 
democracy. The proletariat will use its political supremacy to wrest, by degree, all capital from the bourgeoisie, 
to centralise all instruments of production in the hands of the State, i.e., of the proletariat organised as the 





is useful to make sense of his rejection of pre-subjectivised identities. Hallward remarks that 
“a political subject is someone who acts out the principle of equality, who plays the role of 
those who have no role.”165 Due to the conceptual wall erected between identity and 
equality, Rancière has no choice but to allow everybody to speak on behalf of those who have 
no parts. Only enabling those without parts to speak by virtue of them being excluded would 
mean falling into the identarian trap of policed categories. Political subjectivation requires 
that one’s belonging to a specific class, status, or role be erased. Remaining coherent with 
Rancière’s egalitarianism demands that subjectivation be only “contingently related to pre-
existing social identities.”166 Fully coherent with equality as a presupposition, Rancière’s 
notion of acting or speaking ‘on behalf of’ is more problematic in light of his dismissal of 
representations. Indeed, is not the capacity to speak on behalf of someone not the very 
function of representation? In his quest to oppose all types of identity, Rancière seems 
constrained to commit a parapolitical slip by which politics becomes a question of appearance 
if only for a moment. Another way to consider this paradox is to treat the staging of equality 
as a dramatization of politics for the people and by the people. This is Hallward’s position, 
interpreting politics as “the unauthorized and impromptu improvisation of a democratic 
voice.”167 Yet, in all its spontaneity, Rancière’s political staging fails to fully address its 
relationship with representation. 
Subjectivation entails deidentification.168 It does so by inscribing “a subject’s name as 
being different from any identified part of the community”, based on the postulate that 
“neither the we or the identity assigned to it, nor the apposition of the two defines a 
subject.”169 This is a complete reversal of theories of recognition discussed in chapter one 
that aim to turn identity into a fully political category.170 Engaged in a process of 
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subjectivation, identities serve no purpose apart from their vanishing. Yet, subjectivation 
represents much more than an elimination of identities. Joseph Tanke observes that 
deidentification is only a first step in the making of political subjectivity:  
The process of subjectivation contains two closely related moments. In the first 
instance there is the movement of dis-identification whereby the eventual subject of 
politics tears itself away from the identities, capacities, desires, and interests defined 
by the police. […] The second moment entails the creation of new subjectivities in 
excess of the parts already identifiable in the community. These political subjectivities 
revolve around ‘impossible identifications,’ names belonging to no one in particular 
[…] The impossible identification allows the subject to extend beyond itself. In doing 
so, it redefines its capacities and insists upon its commonality with others.171 
Only after staging politics can those with or without part claim to be subjects. Identity, 
even that which entails no parts, does not survive the process of subjectivation. Rancière 
confirms this when he writes that a political invention “is neither the feat of the sovereign 
people and its ‘representatives’ nor the feat of the nonpeople/people of labor and their 
sudden ‘awareness.’”172 Rather it is the task of a ‘nonidentitary third people’ “operating as 
such or under some other name and tying a particular dispute together on behalf of the 
uncounted.”173 The third people is the collective political subject able to produce inscriptions 
of equality detached from any claims to identity.174 Enacted against identity, subjectivation 
denotes a political beginning from which “all distributions of social competences and 
identities” are denied.175 Breaking from the logic of the police order, the subject is an 
invention.  
 
‘we’ is not the expression of an identity; it is an act of enunciation which creates the subject that it names.” 
[Rancière, Recognition or Disagreement, 86, 92-93.] 
171 Tanke, 66-67. 
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What defines a political subject besides its ‘impossible’ relationship with identity? For 
Rancière, the subject has no self.176 It must be defined negatively as ‘emptiness’ or ‘absence’ 
insofar as “the ‘we’ is not the expression of an identity; it is an act of enunciation which 
creates the subject that it names.”177 The subject generates and defines itself as collective. 
Neither Rancière nor anyone can claim the collective subject by identifying its parts without 
undermining the egalitarian promise it contains.178 Not only would such claim compromise 
emancipation, it would also relegate Rancière to the position of political philosopher that he 
so vehemently rejects. The Rancierian subject carries only one name, ‘the equal capacity of 
everyone and anyone.’ In accordance with the egalitarian presupposition, May produces a 
portrait of the subject in contrast to the neoliberal individual: “Rather than seeing others 
among the demos as competitors for the same scarce, one begins to see them as just like 
oneself, engaged in the same struggle, confronting the same adversary.”179 Political 
subjectivation is the taking hold of equality on the subject through its verification. It is the 
dismantlement of inequalities, hierarchies, and competition through the realisation that all 
are effectively equal.  
By verifying equality, one begins to see oneself in others. The hierarchical divides that 
once stood between individuals are presented in all their absurdity and arbitrariness. In a 
world where ranks and status have been erased, collective politics becomes evident for the 
equal capacity of everyone has been revealed. Individualistic behaviour inevitably becomes 
nonsensical based on the impossibility to reduce anyone to her or his identity. Conducts 
associated with marketised neoliberal subjects lose their appeal in a context where one’s 
individuality reflects that of everybody else. The other no longer serves as a measuring stick 
for one’s capital on a field of inequalities. Rather, the other becomes a reflection, for looking 
at them is fundamentally the same as looking at ‘Us’. Far from a set limit on individual 
potentiality, declaring equality is also a form of individual emancipation. Ironically, the 
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Rancierian subject has the potential to conceptually approximate the liberal ideal of 
autonomy more than any subjective figure deployed throughout the liberal tradition. Less 
focused on the opinions and behaviours of other individuals, Rancière’s subject is likely to be 
more detached from competition and desire-driven behaviours. In other words, heteronomy 
is less likely in a social context regimented by equality as a presupposition. 
The Rancierian subject is more decipherable as a moment in time than a personified 
figure. This moment of clarity is that upon which equality is verified. Beyond the instant of 
verification, it is difficult to portray Rancière’s political subject without venturing into pure 
theoretical speculations. Since the equal subject has no masters, it creates itself. For Rancière 
there is no fixed subject, only subjectivations. As poetic as this sounds, considering the subject 
as a continuous process also exposes the political limitations of Rancierian subjectivation. By 
remaining sealed-off from any form of identification, the Rancierian subject cannot be 
conceptualised as a concrete entity. The beauty of subjectivation as an open and spontaneous 
process only accountable to equality comes at the cost of its enclosing into the realm of pure 
abstraction. Away from identification and intellectual prescriptions, political subjectivation is 
on constant hold, awaiting the anarchical awakening of the demos. Nina Power perfectly 
summarises the difficulty of fully divorcing subjectivation from identity: “Rancière is obliged 
to resort to the admittedly appealing motif of ‘the community of equals’, which would either 
dispense with mastery all together (a totality without a master – a kind of anarchistic utopia) 
or ‘an equality which is held together under a pure empty mark of mastery’ (mastery without 
a master).”180 As an anarchical figure, the Rancierian subject forbids the conceptualisation of 
egalitarian politics beyond subjectivation. There can be no speculative political thinking, let 
alone strategic planning for the post-subjectivation moment. 
Fixated on breaking with the logic of the police, Rancière is forced to efface himself as 
a thinker to let the anarchical demos politically fulfil the egalitarian presupposition. It may be 
for this reason that he has “little to show us for how the egalitarian moments of eruption and 
dissensus might establish themselves as a new mode of ‘proper’ politics.”181 Rancière does 
not provide a clear picture of what politics could be beyond a total effacement of existing 
inequalities and identities. It is as if the radicality of his own thought paradoxically prevents 
him from idealising politics beyond the declaration of equality and the enactment of 
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subjectivation. Unlike most social scientists and political philosophers, Rancière refuses to 
give way to any forms of inegalitarian bias within his own work, including that which involves 
his own identity and status as a political philosopher. The result of this commitment is 
twofold. First, it allows Rancière to open and expand the notion of equality more than any 
other contemporary thinker. On the other hand, it prevents him from guiding subjects on the 
path of concretely materialising egalitarian politics. In the words of his friend Alain Badiou, 
whose account of equality and subjectivation will be discussed in the following chapter, 
Rancière’s system tends to ‘pit phantom masses against an unnamed state’, hence preventing 
the possibility of effectively organising politics.182 
 
Conclusion 
By treating equality as a starting point rather than a goal of politics, Rancière radically 
widens the horizon of emancipatory politics. Relentlessly discrediting political philosophers 
and social scientists who aim to uncover or ‘resolve’ inequalities, Rancière anchors his political 
thought on an uncompromising commitment to equality and an anarchical consideration of 
the demos. Building on the argument that aiming to eliminate inequalities ultimately 
contributes to their proliferation, Rancière radicalises equality into a disturbing force with the 
potential to shatter categories drawn out from the police order. Through dissensus and the 
anarchical composition of the demos, pre-assigned identities are rendered irrelevant by the 
declaration of equality in the name of ‘those who have no part’. The strength of this 
declaration most clearly takes shape through Rancière’s engagement with ‘the ignorant 
schoolmaster’ Jacotot. Alongside Jacotot, Rancière declares that all intelligences are equal, 
exposing the masquerade of hierarchies and status based on rank. Following this declaration, 
politics becomes the domain of anyone and everyone, for there can be no division of 
competence amongst the demos if politics is to take place. Ensuing from the declaration and 
staging of equality, politics is conditioned by a process of subjectivation. Resisting any form 
of identification, the Rancierian subject is not that without parts nor an autonomous 
individual, but a new collective entity that forms around the verification of equality. The non-
identitarian character of subjectivation forbids it from closing upon itself, leaving the task of 
 





creating the new subject to the anarchical demos itself. As powerful and important as 
Rancière’s consideration of equality is, his account of subjectivation is let down by the 
strength of his commitment to undermining identities at all cost. Ultimately, Rancière’s 
opening of the political horizon appears as a theoretical eclipse. Although beautiful, it 
vanishes as spontaneously as it appeared, forbidding the possibility to think political 
materiality in its name. The next chapter will be dedicated to Alain Badiou’s conceptualisation 
of egalitarian politics as a procedure of truth. Like Rancière, Badiou treats equality as a 
starting point of politics. He also follows Rancière in his consideration of politics as a rare and 
spontaneous event breaking with the established order of what is generally accepted as such. 
Yet, unlike Rancière, Badiou is willing to conceptualise egalitarian politics beyond the moment 
of subjectivation. Through his complex mathematical ontology and axiomatic consideration 






Badiou and Egalitarian Politics: Being, Becoming, and Appearing 
 
Introduction 
Alain Badiou is undeniably one of the leading figures of contemporary French 
philosophy.1 This success might first appear as the logical culmination of a prolific and linear 
intellectual career. It is instead the result of the elaboration of a complex and wide-ranging 
philosophy whose polemical potential is only exceeded by its sophistication and originality. 
The son of mathematician, he inherited a passion for this discipline which provides the 
foundation of his ontology carefully laid out in his magnum opus Being and Event. The 
incorporation of complex mathematical models to philosophy, a gesture quite unique 
amongst contemporary continental thinkers, is a distinctive trait of Badiou’s thought.2 
Mathematics is not the only field to have a bearing on Badiou’s philosophy. Discussions of 
theatre and poetry also regularly appear in is his writings.3 In fact, interplay between 
philosophy and other specific disciplines or practices such as Art, Love, Politics, and Science is 
a cornerstone of his work.4 He understands these four categories as ‘truth procedures’ that 
philosophy must attend to.5 Here, the term ‘truth’ is crucial in situating Badiou’s thought in 
relation to his contemporaries. Whereas most French philosophers of his generation notably 
including Gilles Deleuze, Jacques Derrida, Michel Foucault, or Jean-Francois Lyotard 
 
1 In France, Badiou is often introduced as the most read and commentated living French Philosopher. See Julie 
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mathemes.” [Alain Badiou, Being and Event (London: Continuum, 2007), xiv.] 
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philosophy. See Alain Badiou, Pornographie du temps present (Paris: Fayard), 2013; and Alain Badiou, 
Rhapsody for the Theatre (London: Verso), 2013. 
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endeavoured to deconstruct truths and grand narratives, Badiou remained philosophically 
committed to conceptualising the category of truth and faithful to his political ideals.6 
                     Inasmuch as art, love, and science remain a passion and a constant source of 
philosophical inspiration, Badiou is best known for his engagement with politics both in 
thought and action.7 A wide range of thinkers and activists have had a lasting influence on 
Badiou’s Philosophy. One may cite Plato and Mao Zedong who remains Badiou’s central 
influences when it comes to political action, Louis Althusser who taught Badiou at the Ecole 
normale supérieure, the psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan, Saint-Paul, or Jean-Paul Sartre. 
Badiou’s life as a militant as much as his philosophical work remain irremediably linked to 
equality and politics. This is best demonstrated by his constantly renewed fidelity in the idea 
of communism. Fidelity, a key concept of Badiou’s philosophy, mirrors the thinker’s own 
commitment to militantism and communism, outlining the proximity of subjective action and 
thought in his understanding of politics.8  
The ever-presence of politics in Badiou’s work should not be interpreted as belonging 
to the realm of political philosophy. This is a label which he vehemently rejects and actively 
undermines.9 Against this established tradition, Badiou considers philosophy as a means to 
decrypt the complex and sudden emergence of truth within the four ‘generic’ procedures of 
Art, Love, Politics, and Science.10 Whereas political philosophers endeavour to think politics 
and its subjects from a privileged intellectual position, Badiou considers political truth to be 
 
6 Peter Hallward and Slavoj Žižek provide a great account of Badiou’s philosophical positioning vis a vis his 
contemporaries in their introductions to Badiou a Subject to Truth. [See Peter Hallward and Slavoj Žižek, 
Badiou a Subject to Truth (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota press), 2003.] 
7 Badiou is known not only for his philosophical work but also for his fervent political activism which has had a 
deep impact on his understanding of politics since the 1960s. The chief political inspiration for his militantism 
was Maoism, brought to light by the events of the cultural revolution in China and, to a lesser extent, the 
revolts of May 1968 in France. During this period, Badiou contributed alongside Natacha Michel and Sylvain 
Lazarus to the creation of the Maoist group l’Union des Communistes de France marxiste-leniniste (UCFml), 
followed in 1985 by the Organisation Politique (OP). [Bruno Bosteels, Badiou and Politics (Durham: Duke 
University Press), 2011.] 
8 In an interview with Bruno Bosteels, Badiou himself acknowledged this correspondence between his militant 
fidelity to the event of May 1968 and his philosophy: “I think that, to use my own terminology, my fidelity to 
what happened in that period is unquestionable, but it is also profound, because I think that a large part of my 
philosophy at bottom is an attempt fully to come to terms, including from my own experience, with what 
happened then, while at the same time explaining the reasons for remaining loyal to those events.” [Badiou, 
‘Can Change be Thought?’ in Bosteels, Badiou and Politics, 289.] 
9 This rejection is most clearly laid out in Metapolitics and will be discussed in the first section of this chapter. 
See Alain Badiou, Metapolitics (London: Verso), 2005. 





the result of an ephemeral event to which subjects are attached through their fidelity.11 The 
notion of event is undoubtedly one of the most emblematic of Badiou’s philosophy. It 
designates the interruption of an established situation through the intrusion of a truth during 
which what previously seemed impossible becomes a subjective possibility.12 By discarding 
philosophies that aim to produce their own truth, Badiou philosophically empowers political 
subjects by proclaiming them subjects of truth. In his own words, “people think, people are 
capable of truth.”13 
Badiou’s concept of event together with his critique of political philosophy outline his 
fidelity in the people’s spontaneous capacity to politically act upon their equal condition. 
Politics is no longer thought from above but emerges unexpectedly amongst the people 
themselves. This approach clearly echoes the previous chapter’s discussion of Rancière’s 
egalitarianism. Not only do both thinkers aim to bring political philosophy down from its 
intellectual pedestal in order to empower political subjects, they also share a fundamental 
commitment towards equality as the starting point of politics.14 Conceived as an axiom by 
Badiou and a presupposition by Rancière, equality fundamentally conditions the existence of 
politics for both thinkers.15 The originality of Badiou’s approach lies not in his consideration 
of equality as a starting point of politics but in his willingness to conceptualise and formalise 
politics beyond the emergence of an event. Where Rancière refrains from thinking politics 
beyond subjectivation, Badiou constructs a complex but coherent account of post-evental 
politics underpinned by his concepts of truth, subject, and fidelity. Far from being the pinnacle 
of politics, the event is merely the emergence of the new whose legacy must be realised by 
the rigorous work of faithful subject themselves.16 Although the work of both thinkers carry 
equivalent theoretical weight in regards to equality, Badiou offers a crucial conceptual 
opening into the process through which politics may appear in the world, allowing his readers 
to conceive of politics beyond the mere declaration and ‘staging’ of equality.  
 
11 Badiou, Metapolitics, 23. 
12 Alain Badiou in The Idea of Communism I, ed. Costas Douzinas and Slavoj Žižek (London: Verso, 2010), 16-17. 
13 Badiou, Metapolitics, 98. 
14 Badiou clearly acknowledge the similarity between Rancière’s and his approach to equality. In Logics of 
Worlds, he writes, “Rancière’s conception of equality inspired me, and still does, because of its axiomatic 
power: equality is never the goal, but the principle. It is not obtained, but declared. And we can call politics the 
consequences, in the historical world, of this declaration. [Badiou, Logics of Worlds, 560.] 
15 Badiou, Metapolitics, 99; also see Keith Bassett, “Event, politics, and space: Rancière or Badiou’?,” Space and 
Polity 3 (2016): 1-14. 





This chapter is concerned with Badiou’s unique and far-reaching conceptualisation of 
politics as a truth procedure.17 Its structure follows the chronology of Badiou’s process-based 
approach to politics.  It will start with a discussion of Badiou’s ontology and his axiomatic 
consideration of equality. As the fundamental starting point of politics, equality remains 
present at all stages of Badiou’s political discussions, conditioning the philosophical 
deployment of crucial concepts such as political truth, event, subject, fidelity, and body. The 
discussion will then move on to the notion of event and its proximity with that of political 
truth. In this section, the succinct temporality and disruptive capacity of the event will be 
discussed alongside Badiou’s understanding of truths as ‘infinite’ and faithful subjects as local 
incarnations of truths. The last section will look at processes by which politics appears in 
Badiou’s political thought. Through the logic of appearance, truthful politics reveals itself 
alongside the idea of communism in contrast to what he refers to as a life ‘emptied of idea’ 
bearing the name of democratic materialism. Despite outrunning Rancière further down the 
path of egalitarian politics, Badiou remains quite reluctant to conceptualise politics as 
concrete materiality. Discussed as an idea, a truth, or a subject, Badiousian politics remains 
largely confined to an objectless world. Refusing to venture into the field of political economy, 
his discussion of the object of politics is often contained with the notion of the body. Although 
Badiou discusses the body at length, he does so in a way that systematically subordinates it 
to the ‘truthful’ subject. In other words, appearing political materiality always seems to be at 
the service of absolute political truths and its subject. The body serves to execute political 
truths but has no substantive role in materialising egalitarian politics. This arguably limits 
egalitarian politics to a largely transcendent and immaterial process, allowing for the 
possibility to treat the materialisation of equality from a purely dogmatic standpoint.  
 
Being Equal  
Badiou’s philosophy is generally associated with the ‘ontological turn’ in political 
thought.18 This intellectual movement is philosophically indebted to the philosophies of 
Martin Heidegger and Jacques Lacan, incorporating the work of a wide range of contemporary 
 
17 Badiou, Metapolitics, 29. 





thinkers including Jacques Derrida, Giorgio Agambden, Chantal Mouffe or Slavoj Žižek.19 In 
the Actuality of Communism, Bruno Bosteels discusses the subtleties and novelty on the 
ontological turn: 
[contemporary ontology] presupposes neither the presence of being nor the identity 
of being and thinking as a guide for acting. On the contrary, ontology nowadays, in a 
well-nigh uniform fashion, tends to be qualified as spectral, nonidentical, and 
postfoundational. It tries to come to terms not with present beings, but with ghosts 
and phantasms; not with entities or things, but with events-whether with events in 
the plural, or, alternatively, with the singular event of the presencing of being as such, 
which should never be confounded with a given present, albeit a past or future one.20 
One of the main consequences of focusing on the absence of being rather than its 
presence has been the impossibility of extracting a determinate form of politics from 
ontology.21 This turn has provided significant challenges to contemporary thinkers of 
emancipatory politics developing their thought alongside or in spite of this spectral ontology. 
This equally applies to radical thinkers of democracy such as Wendy Brown, Chantal Mouffe, 
Ernesto Laclau, Tony Negri or Jacques Rancière and contemporary communists like Alain 
Badiou, Bruno Bosteels, Jodi Dean, or Slavoj Žižek. All face the task of thinking politics in the 
present-absence of a ground.22 
 Taking this turn can easily lead into the intellectual impasse of theorising politics while 
failing to account for its materialisation. This is one of the main issues with Rancière’s 
egalitarianism. Badiou is willing to provide a solution to this dilemma, making his philosophy 
one of the most stimulating contribution to contemporary political thought. The full scale of 
Badiou’s distinctive ontology takes shape in Being and Event, first published in 1988. In this 
work, whose title resonates as a response to Heidegger’s Being and Time and an homage to 
Sartre’s Being and Nothingness, Badiou constructs an especially complex ontology through 
 
19 Ibid. 
20 Ibid, 43-44. 
21 Ibid, 44. 
22 About this ambiguity Oliver Marchart writes, “the ontological weakening of ground does not lead to the 
assumption of the total absence of all grounds, but rather to the assumption of the impossibility of a final 
ground, which is something completely different as it implies an increased awareness of, on the one hand, 
contingency and, on the other, the political as the moment of partial and always, in the last instance, 
unsuccessful grounding. [Oliver Marchart, Post-Foundational Political Thought: Political Difference in Nancy, 





mathematics. In his view, being is pure multiplicity, implying that ontology considered as the 
science of being-qua-being is mathematics itself.23 Badiou’s equation of ontology and pure 
multiplicity is grounded in the mathematical models of Georg Cantor’s set theory in which a 
set is understood as “the grouping into a totality of quite distinct objects of our intuition or 
our thought.”24 Set theory is concerned with infinite sets, entailing that every set is already 
part of another set which is itself part of another set… It is axiomatic to the extent that it 
provides its own set-based universe which has now become a recognised mathematical 
standard.25 Writing about the philosophical appeal of set theory, Badiou breaks down its 
theological tendencies: 
[Cantor] ties the absoluteness of being not to the (consistent) presentation of the 
multiple, but to the transcendence through which a divine infinity in-consists, as one, 
gathering together and numbering any multiple whatsoever. […] [Cantor] saw that the 
absolute point of being of the multiple is not its consistency—thus its dependence 
upon a procedure of the count-as-one—but its inconsistency, a multiple-deployment 
that no unity gathers together.26 
Badiou reads Cantor as a theologian for whom set theory represents “the rational 
demonstration of the disunion between infinity and the One.”27 Understood in these terms, 
divine infinity is no longer the sole bearer of the infinity of being. Instead, the latter is carried 
across by a multiplicity of infinities.28 Following Badiou’s dense philosophical reading of set 
theory, multiplicity appears as ungraspable and unnameable, transcended only by multiplicity 
itself. Quentin Meillassoux succinctly summarises Badiou’s ontology as the equation of being 
 
23 Badiou, Being and Event, xiii.  
Pure multiplicity signifies that multiples being presented in an ontological situation have no other predicates 
than their own multiplicity. [Badiou, Being and Event, 28.] The most crucial implication of pure multiplicity is 
that ‘the one’ is not. [Alain Badiou, Théorie du sujet (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 2014), 23.] Alex Ling breaks down 
the notion of pure multiplicity and the subsequent absence of the one in non-mathematical language: “if there 
is no ultimate consistency or unity to being […] then being must be that which ‘in-consists’ [….] one [what is 
consistent] is not, strictly speaking, what is.” On the other hand, “what is per se is multiple (devoid of any 
instance of the one, radically withdrawn from all possible unification).” [Alex Ling, in Alain Badiou: Key 
Concepts ed. A.J Bartlett and Justin Clemens (London: Routledge 2014), 49.]. 
24 Badiou, Being and Event, 38; For more on Badiou’s ontological use of Cantor, see Quentin Melllassoux, Après 
la Finitude, Essai sur la necessite de la contingence (Paris : Editions du Seuil, 2006), 141-143. 
25 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, “Set Theory.” https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/set-theory/.  
26 Badiou, Being and Event, 42. 
27 Alain Badiou, L’immanence des vérités L’être et L’évènement 3 (Paris : Fayard, 2018), 421. 





and multiplicity to the point where being is nothing but multiplicity.29 Bosteels considers 
Badiou’s use of mathematics not to be crucial in grasping his political thought.30 If that was 
the case, Badiou’s politics would only be accessible to mathematicians able to grasp the 
complex numerical models deployed in Being and Event. It may however be claimed that 
Badiou’s ontology brings forward several concepts and procedures that simultaneously 
reflect and shed light upon the egalitarian content of his political thought. Viewed through 
the prism of set theory, mathematics are themselves intrinsically egalitarian.31 The 
fundamental notion of pure multiplicity already demonstrates inherent egalitarian traits by 
disregarding the content of interrelated multiples resisting to the one. Badiou perceives in set 
theory the potential of freeing ontology from the overbearing spectre of ‘the One’, opening 
new possibilities for a philosophical justification of equality.32 His distinctive ontological 
approach neither corresponds to a theological ontology of ‘the One’, nor to a “empiricist or 
pragmatic ontology founded on relation.”33 Suggesting that the former approach was 
favoured in the classical age, while the latter defines modernity, he suggests that pure 
multiplicity has the potential to offer a third ontological alternative.34 Badiou’s application of 
set theory to ontology already hints at his understanding of equality as a fundamental axiom 
 
29 Quentin Meillassoux, “History and Event in Alain Badiou,” Parrhesia 12 (2011): 2.  
Perhaps the best way to present Badiou’s understanding of being as pure multiplicity in non-mathematical 
terms would be to equate it to the notion of the Lacanian real succinctly defined as an “impasse of 
formalization.” This enigmatic adage conveys the inaccessible and constantly fluid character of being as pure 
multiplicity. Badiou often refers to the Lacanian real to refer to his ontology. [Bosteels, Badiou and Politics, 88, 
163.]  
Slavoj Žižek, one of the foremost philosophical disciples of Lacan, explains this interpretation of the real 
through the latter’s status as “thoroughly non-substantial [as] a product of failed attempts to integrate it into 
the symbolic.” [Slavoj Žižek, Tarrying with the Negative (Durham: Duke University Press, 1993), 129.]  
Related to mathematics the impasse of formalisation is tied to the matheme’s attempt to formalise “the real 
as impossible, as the impasse of thinking.” [Samo Tomsic, “Matheme” in The Badiou Dictionary, ed. Steve 
Corcoran (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2015), 199.] What emerges from the philosophical analogy 
between Lacan’s real and Badiou’s view of being as pure multiplicity is their common ungraspable and 
unrecognisable dimension, hence impossible to effectively formalise. 
30 Bosteels, Badiou and Politics xviii. 
31 On this point Badiou writes, “in mathematics, regardless of whether demonstrations prove right or false, “all 
of them in the last resort, speak of the pure multiple, thus of the form in which the ‘there is’ of being-qua-
being is realized.” [Badiou, Being and Event, 241.] 
32 Keith Bassett considers the egalitarian content of Badiou’s ontology in contrast to Rancière’s: “Badiou’s 
concept of equality is embedded in a formal and complex ontology of being, whereas Rancière insists equality 
is not an ontological principle at all, but a presupposition that only exists through its practical verification.” 
[Bassett, 6.] 
33 Badiou, L’immanence des vérités, 40. Own Translation. 
34 Ibid. About the ontological revolution unleashed by Cantor’s set theory Badiou writes, “[Cantor] 
simultaneously refutes religious transcendence and its Kantian critique, theological dogmatism and modern 





of politics rather than a formal objective, setting the stage for the primordial role attributed 
to equality in his political thought.35  
Apart from the foundational decision to begin with equality, Badiou also shares with 
Rancière the view that equality is fundamentally incompatible with the notion of pre-assigned 
identities.36 About the difficult relationship between truth and identity, he writes that “truth 
is diagonal relative to every communitarian subset; it neither claims authority from, nor 
constitutes any identity.”37 Far from being directed to a particular set of individuals, truth is 
“offered to all, or addressed to everyone.”38 Accepting pure multiplicity as ontology demands 
that truth be universal, forbidding the possibility that it be intelligible only to particular 
subsets. The productive relationship between equality and non-identity is palpable in 
Badiou’s ontology through the concepts of ‘void’ and ‘generic multiple’. The enigmatic 
concept of the void is the ‘proper name’ of being. It follows “the legislative Ideas of the 
multiple” as “the pure utterance of the arbitrariness of a proper name.”39 As the proper name 
of being, the void echoes the unnameable character of being. Yet, far from an empty form, it 
also embodies inclusion.40 The void is a foundational multiple. Ontology commences where 
the void unfolds and subsists in every multiple presentation as “the proper name of being.”41 
It is undetectable, shapeless and yet, included in everything.42 The anonymity and un-
particularity of the non-identitarian void allows for its universal inclusion. The void, in its total 
presence and refusal of belongings, is fundamentally egalitarian. The concept of the void 
 
35 Badiou, Metapolitics, 99.  
36 As discussed in the previous chapter, Rancière considers that subjectivation entails deidentification to the 
extent that a subject’s name must be “different from any identified part of the community.” [Rancière, 
Disagreement, 37, 59.]; About this, Oliver Davis explains that “subjectivation is never simply the assertion of an 
identity but the refusal of an identity imposed by others, by the police order.” [Oliver Davis, Jacques Rancière 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 2010), 376]  
On the differences and similarities between Badiou’s and Rancière’s ontologies, also see Jean-Philippe 
Deranty, “Rancière and Contemporary Political Ontology” Theory & Event 6, (2003): 
https://muse.jhu.edu/article/44780.  
37 Alain Badiou, St Paul The Foundation of Universalism, translated by Ray Brassier (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2003), 14. 
38 Badiou, St Paul, 14. 
39 Badiou, Being and Event, 59. 
40 Badiou provides a clear account of the unique status of the void when he writes that “the void is a subset of 
any set: it is universally included; – the void possesses a subset, which is the void itself. […] The first property 
testifies to the omnipresence of the void. It reveals the errancy of the void in all presentation: the void, to 
which nothing belongs, is by this very fact included in everything. […] The void is thus clearly in a position of 
universal inclusion” [Badiou, Being and Event, 86.] 
41 Ibid, 59. 





silently guides Badiou’s reader through his specific understanding of equality as an axiom of 
politics. The void’s facelessness and capacity for universal inclusion are two sides of the same 
egalitarian coin. Naming the void would irremediably limit its impact to particular subsets, 
prohibiting it from universal inclusion in the process.  
 In addition to the void, the concept of ‘generic multiple’ also clearly conveys the 
egalitarian character of Badiou’s ontology. Taking shape in Cantor’s ‘revolutionary’ set theory, 
the generic multiple shares a number of non-identarian characteristics with the void such as 
unnameability, un-constructability, or indiscernibility.43 Anonymity preserves the egalitarian 
specificity of the generic. In Conditions Badiou explains this predicate when he writes that “a 
truth is essentially generic, implying that it can have no distinctive traits that enable it to be 
considered hierarchically.”44 The absence of name signals the impossibility of division, 
classification, and exclusion. Far from reductive, the term generic demands that all multiples 
be reached by truths. Far from detrimental, non-identity is a prerequisite for universal 
inclusion in Badiou’s work. Beyond anonymity, a multiple can only be generic if it is subtracted 
from the knowledge of an existing situation. Because “knowledge excludes ignorance” and its 
ethical maxim is to “act and speak such that everything be clearly decidable”, existing 
knowledge plays a detrimental role in the emergence of truths as generic procedures.45 As 
the ‘being of a truth’, the generic multiple is un-representable but Badiou undertakes to show 
that it may be thought.46 The being of a truth is generic to the extent that it is simultaneously 
indeterminate and complete, occupying the gaps of existing knowledge.47 There is a 
superposition of paradoxes in this statement that must be broken down to make sense of the 
relationship between the generic and truth. First, a generic is indeterminate insomuch as it is 
absent and thereof indiscernible. However, it is complete in its relationship to truth whose 
 
43 Badiou, Being and Event, 355. 
44 Alain Badiou, Conditions (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1992), 248. Own translation.  
About the egalitarian content of Badiou’s Ontology, Peter Hallward explains that “It is a rudimentary principle 
of Badiou's ontology, that all elements which belong to a situation belong (or are presented in, or exist, or 
count) in exactly the same way, with exactly the same weight.” [Peter Hallward, "Badiou's Politics: Equality and 
Justice," Culture Machine [Online], 4 (2002).] 
45 Badiou, Being and Event, 314. 
46 Badiou, Being and Event, 16. 
47 Ibid.  
In L’Immanence des vérités, Badiou clearly states that “any thought contains a choice between the 
constructible or the generic.” Generic thought is of course rarer since it entails “affirming without proof nor 
empirical certainty that there exists non-constructability and undecipherable truth hidden behind the veil of 






emergence always breaks with existing knowledge. Truth contradicts knowledge since 
existing finite knowledge will always be oblivious to the novelty of infinite truths in the generic 
procedures of Art, Love, Politics, and Science.48 Inasmuch as knowledge is everywhere 
present and encyclopaedic, truth only succinctly appears through the occurrence of an event. 
Both knowledge and truth are opposed in terms of content, temporality, and presence. 
From this brief discussion of Badiousian ontology, one can see that equality occupies 
a crucial role within Badiou’s philosophy. Inasmuch as his formal demonstrations suggest a 
clear egalitarian tendency, Badiou also provides a direct account of the status held by equality 
within his political thought. Equality is the essential axiom of politics understood as a truth 
procedure.49 Anindya Bhattacharyya clarifies the Badiousian understanding of axiom that 
stems directly from mathematics:     
Badiou's axiomatics derives strictly from modern mathematics, as opposed to the 
more traditional notion of an axiom. In ordinary speech, an axiom typically means a 
self-evident first principle, one whose validity is so universally accepted that it does 
not require any kind of proof. But this is not how mathematicians use the term. When 
mathematicians calI something an axiom, they are not claiming there is anything self-
evident about it. Rather the axiom is simply posited as a starting point for logical 
reasoning. It marks a decision for thought to proceed in one direction and not another, 
and an inaugural decision at that.50 
Here the term ‘decision’ is crucial. Mathematicians designate an axiom that will serve 
as the foundation of all subsequent calculations. All demonstrations that follow must carry 
this axiomatic logic in order to be thought. An axiom does not depend on any factors other 
than its own declaration. Thus it must be understood as a leap of faith on the part of both 
thinker and subject. To claim that equality is the point from which politics begins requires that 
one’s belief in that axiom be strong enough to generate complete commitment to the 
 
48 Bosteels, Badiou and Politics, 173.  
In Logics of Worlds, Badiou provides a formal definition of ‘generic procedure’: “We call generic procedure the 
ontological process of the constitution of a truth, that is the production of a present […] The word generic 
stems from the fact that […] the object of the world constituted by the ensemble of this production, or the set 
of the consequences of the evental trace, is a generic set in the sense given to this word by the mathematician 
Paul Cohen: a set as little determined as possible, such that it is not discernible by any predicate.” [Badiou, 
Logics of Worlds, 586.] 
49 Badiou, Metapolitics, 100. 





procedure it inaugurates. An axiom is rooted in faith for “it can neither be proved nor 
guaranteed”, but truthful politics cannot emerge without it.51 Politically, axiomatic equality is 
“the strictly egalitarian recognition of the capacity for truth”, contained within the declaration 
that people think and are capable of truth.52 Equality appears in Badiou’s work as a kind of 
meta-truth conditioning the truth procedure of politics itself. It simultaneously provides 
foundation and guidance to the unfolding of a political truth. Equality inaugurates and clears 
the path for the occurrence of a political truth. 
Equality is singular amongst axioms to the extent that it puts ‘the people’ in charge of 
its political constitution, for its very essence is based on this popular capacity. The double 
inclusion of the people, first as subjects conceptually incorporated into the axiom and second 
as political actors, is unique to the political procedure. Badiou elucidates this unique political 
property in Metapolitics:  
Politics is the sole truth procedure that is not only generic in its result, but also in the 
local composition of its subject. Only politics is intrinsically required to declare that 
the thought that it is the thought of all. This declaration is its constitutive prerequisite. 
[…] politics treats the infinite as such according to the principle of the same, the 
egalitarian principle. […] The infinite comes into play in every truth procedure, but 
only in politics does it take first place.53 
Politics conceived as a generic procedure differs from Art, Love, and Science based on 
its foundational connection to an inherently egalitarian and generic subject. In this context, 
justice is “the theoretical name for an axiom of equality [referring] to a wholly disinterested 
subjectivity.”54 Justice simply names the egalitarian axiom and the subjective political 
procedures it enables.55 There can be no justice without the prior recognition of the 
egalitarian axiom. On the other hand, axiomatic equality depends on disinterested subjects 
 
51 Badiou, Metapolitics, 99. 
52 Ibid, 98; About this statement Hallward writes, “A generic or axiomatic politics asserts affirms the 'political 
capacity of all people', the principle that 'everyone can occupy the space of politics, if they decide to do so'” 
[Hallward, Peter. "Badiou's Politics: Equality and Justice".] 
53 Badiou, Metapolitics, 141-143; Interestingly, Hallward often uses the terms axiom and generic 
interchangeably. See Hallward, Peter. "Badiou's Politics: Equality and Justice". 
54 Badiou Metapolitics 100. 
55 In Metapolitics, Badiou provides a brief definition of justice as an outcome of political truths enabled by 
axiomatic equality: “We shall call 'justice' that through which a philosophy designates the possible truth of a 





to the extent that it inaugurates a political sequence that concurrently precedes and exceeds 
subjects. In a context in which symbolisation and representation have no hold, subjects exist 
as un-particular, faithful, equal, and disinterested. Drawing inspiration from Rousseau’s 
notorious scepticism towards political representation, Badiou posits equality as the 
fundamental condition of general will.56 Viewed this way, equality precedes a generic political 
procedure by presenting itself as an innate condition of the people itself.57 On the relationship 
between equality and politics, Badiou writes that “As an intrinsic qualification of general will, 
equality is politics, such that, a contrario, any in-egalitarian statement, whatever it may be, is 
antipolitical.”58 This interdependence is supplemented by the belief that politics in its bare 
form is the existence of the people.59  The common appears as essentially equal to the extent 
that it is not ‘made’ political by an added layer of representation that would negate general 
will and the intrinsic equality it embodies.  
The axiomatic recognition of equality and the subjective empowerment it generates, 
coupled with the rejection of any types of political representations of the people are arguably 
the points where Badiou’s and Rancière’s thoughts are most undistinguishable. By positing 
equality as a presupposition and a declaration from which politics emanates, Rancière also 
points to the subject as the political protagonist par excellence.60 His distinctive interpretation 
of Jacotot’s concept of equality of intelligence closely resembles Badiou’s axiomatic 
statement that “people think, people are capable of truth”.61  In both cases the people is 
trusted to realise its political potential through subjectivation free of any hierarchical 
guidance. It is henceforth not a surprise to see both Badiou and Rancière vehemently rejecting 
the tradition of political philosophy. There are clear similarities between both critiques of 
political philosophy. One is the argument that philosophers cannot and must not generate 
 
56 Badiou writes about Rousseau that “[his] acuity extends to his perception that the norm of general will is 
equality. This is a fundamental point. General will is a relationship of co-belonging of the people to itself. It is 
therefore only effective from all the people to all the people. […] It is because general will indiscerns its object 
and excludes it from the encyclopaedias of knowledge that it is ordained to equality. […] Rousseau rigorously 
proves that general will cannot be represented, not even by the State: ‘The sovereign, which is solely a 
collective being, can be represented only by itself: power can quite easily be transferred, but not will.’” 
[Badiou, Being and Event, 347.] Also see Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract (London: Penguin Books), 
1968; For a good analysis of the Rousseauist content of Badiou’s thought see Simon Critchley, Faith of the 
Faithless, (London: Verso), 2012. 
57 Badiou, Being and Event, 68. 
58 Ibid, 347 
59 Ibid, 348. 
60 See Rancière, On the Shores of Politics and chapter 3. 





truths.62 In other words, philosophy can no longer fully determine its object.63 Although 
Badiou and Rancière frame this argument differently, in each case it emanates from a desire 
to detach the philosopher from the elitist task of shaping and directing subjects towards what 
is thought to be ‘good’ politics.64 Both also agree that political philosophers cannot be 
separated and placed above the world from which their philosophy springs. In other words, 
philosophers are not entitled to a privileged political position. they cannot decide what 
prescribes politics, since that is the task of equality conceived as an axiom or a presupposition.  
By deciding to ground both subject and political philosopher in a world of existing 
truths, Badiou theoretically steps away from Rancière. For Badiou, philosophy must strive to 
be at the service of truths, proposing a conceptual framework in which “the contemporary 
composability of these conditions can be grasped.”65 In other words, the purpose of 
philosophy is to serve the truth procedures of Art, Love Politics, and Science. As discussed in 
the previous chapter, Rancière usually avoids associating the category of ‘truth’ to politics.66 
Rancière’s reluctance to venture into the land of truthful politics arguably prevents him from 
conceptualising politics beyond subjectivation.67 On the one hand, providing an account of 
truthful politics would contradict his commitment to the anarchical character of the demos. 
On the other, it would assimilate his work to that of political philosophers aiming to dictate 
 
62 The clearest illustration of Badiou’s rejection of political philosophy may be found in Metapolitics. Throughout 
the book, the political philosopher is described as having the triple advantage of being first an analyst of the 
“brutal and confused objectivity which constitutes the empirical character of real instances of politics”, then 
“the one who determines the principles of the good politics”, and finally “the one exempt from militant 
involvement in any genuine political process.” [Badiou, Metapolitics, 10.] Each of these positions has a 
particularly antipolitical resonance for Badiou. The first is the figure of the ‘expert’ who reacts to empirical trends 
he or she recognises as desirable or unavoidable. The second figure is the elitist philosopher who can set political 
standards from a distance, a point of view both separated and higher to that of the politicised people. The third 
figure depicts an intellectual unwilling to put her/his capacities at the service of a true political cause, refusing 
her/his political subjectivation. Badiou illustrates his rebuttal of political philosophy through Hannah Arendt’s 
Lectures on Kant's Political Philosophy. Based on Kant’s simultaneous admiration for the French revolution as a 
historical occurrence and rejection of its revolutionary actors, Arendt agrees that there is a clash “between the 
principle according to which you should act and the principle according to which you judge.” [Badiou, 
Metapolitics, 12.] From a Badiousian perspective, Kant and Arendt’s position is deeply problematic as it detaches 
the experience of politics from its thought. The philosopher is endowed with the task of thinking and historicising 
politics in opposition to its imperfect (yet real) manifestation in the world. See Hannah Arendt, Lectures on Kant’s 
Political Philosophy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press), 1992. 
63 Alberto Toscano in Badiou, Being and Event, xix. 
64 For Rancière, this position is fundamentally inegalitarian since it emanates from the belief that subjects do 
not have an equal capacity to think and act politically. [Jacques Rancière, Disagreement, 63; and Rancière, 
Recognition or Disagreement, 138.] 
65 Badiou, Being and Event, 4, 341. 
66 Nina Power, “Which Equality? Badiou and Rancière in Light of Ludwig Feuerbach,” Parallax 15 (2009): 65. 





what is to be the content of politics in place of the people. Conversely, Badiou conceptualises 
politics beyond subjectivation by recognising that truths may be thought in spite of their 
unpredictability.68 Although thinkable truths remain elusive, belonging to Artistic, Loving, 
Political, and Scientific procedures that escape the creationist ambitions of political 
philosophers. 
Both Rancière and Badiou recognise the need to detach philosophy from its 
foundational ambition of generating ‘pure’ truth. The originality of Badiou’s proposition is 
that philosophy operates on the basis of already existing truths that are both the source and 
target of philosophy.69 Not unlike equality for politics, truth procedures condition philosophy, 
providing the raw material for philosophical enquiry. In the case of politics, one must be 
careful not to assign to philosophy the task of decoding any ‘real life’ occurrences that are 
attached to politics in the general sense of the term (parliamentary politics, consumer groups, 
identity politics…). Politics conceived as a truth procedure is rare, brief, and singular. It is a 
fragment of truth which allows philosophy to think.70 The rarity of politics is yet another 
similarity between the work of Badiou and Rancière.71 Whereas many contemporary critical 
theorists consider politics to be everywhere present in the form of power struggles 
(emblematised by the statement that the personal is political), they both recognise politics as 
an exceptional and unusual occurrence.72 Yet, only Badiou is willing to conceptualise politics 
as a truthful process breaking from existing knowledge and representations.73 By doing so, he 
draws philosophy towards a world of existing and absent truths placing the ancestral 
discipline on level terms with generic procedures. Once relocated, philosophy must identify 
and interpret the discontinuous evental sequences constituting generic procedures (only 
philosophy can achieve this task).74 In other words, philosophy has the noble task of 
 
68 Badiou, Being and Event, 16. 
69 Badiou, Metapolitics, xxxiii. 
70 Ibid, 97. 
71 Rancière, Disagreement, 139. Also see Hallward, “Staging Equality, On Rancière’s Theatrocracy,” 123. 
72 Looking at the evolution of Badiou’s thinking regarding the relationship between philosophy and politics, 
Bosteels writes, “philosophy should no longer abdicate its own powers by subordinating both itself and the 
four truth procedures to a single one of them, as Badiou himself claims to have done with politics under the 
influence of Marxism. ‘Everything is political;' the recurrent slogan of the 1960s and 1970s, signals precisely 
such a subordination of philosophy to one of its conditions of existence-a process that Badiou now rejects as a 
‘suture’ of philosophy.” [Bosteels, Badiou and Politics, 25.] 
73 Badiou, Being and Event, 327. 









The previous section introduced Badiou’s distinctive ontology. Approaching ontology 
through set theory enables Badiou to associate being with pure multiplicity and to desacralize 
the unicity of ‘the One’. A particularity of pure multiplicity is to be neither representable nor 
unifiable, confirming Badiou’s adherence to an ontology of absence rather than presence. 
This shift enables Badiou to “renounce god without losing any of its advantages.”76 Far from 
being erased, the transcendent and infinite qualities of ‘the One’ are split open only to be 
redistributed amongst nameless multiples.77 This foundational philosophical gesture sets the 
stage for Badiou’s axiomatic consideration of equality infusing the entirety of his political 
thought. Moving away from purely philosophical discussions, the following section remains 
dedicated to unfolding the subtleties of Badiou’s egalitarianism. It will do so by discussing 
how equality subsists within a political truth procedure inaugurated by an event. If equality is 
a condition of being, what kind of politics can rightfully endorse the label of metapolitics? 
How, where, and when does such politics occur for Badiou? Who bears the transcendent 
power of truth? These questions must be answered in order to grasp the singularity of 
Badiou’s account of egalitarian politics.  
 Because politics emanates from a rare event breaking with the order of existing 
institutions and knowledge, it is often discussed in relation to what stands in its way. 
Conceptualising state institutions as obstacles to politics enables Badiou to consolidate his 
account of politics as a process of emancipation. One overarching entity whose undoing 
conditions the existence of politics is the state of a situation. It is usually associated to the 
classical figure of the state and often represents, like knowledge, an obstacle to truth.78 It was 
shown earlier that Badiou’s consideration of being is different from his qualification of what 
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76 Badiou, L’immanence des vérités, 27 Own translation. 
77 The dismantlement of Oneness into the multiplicity of the people is yet another shared commitment 
between Badiou and Rancière. For more on this see Deranty, “Rancière and Contemporary Political Ontology” 
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is in the world. His ontology takes root in absence rather than presence so that what is is not 
being but rather what is presented in a structured situation.79 This distinction implies that, 
despite being here, the state of an existing situation does not contain truths. On the contrary, 
truths emerge as a rupture with a present situation through the incalculable appearance of 
an event in the domains of Art, Love, Politics, or Science.80 With the idea that there are no 
truths in existing situations, Badiou exposes the strange temporality of his political thought. 
Although truths are measurable in empirical time, they constitute an exception, a break from 
empirical reality that can itself be grasped from “any other point of time or any other 
particular world.”81 Political truths are not reflections of existing collective consensuses, 
political behaviours or opinions, but precisely what breaks the certainty of the existing state 
of that situation. Ontologically, situations are structured by the operation of ‘counting as one’ 
multiples that are presented within it.82 This operation consists in splitting multiples into 
consistencies, identifying and counting as one multiples which previously were ungraspable 
pure multiples.83 The result of this operation is what a situation presents in the form of a 
structured presentation.84 Although pure multiplicity is already present as the name of being, 
the state attempts to identify, organise, and rename its parts as a means to strengthen its 
hold over the situation.85 
The crucial point for Badiou is that the ‘count as one’ reveals the operation of a second 
count by which “all situations are structured twice.”86 The second count designates the state’s 
re-presentation of pure multiples already belonging in a situation merely by virtue of being 
here as such. It is from this ‘count of the count’ that Badiou differentiates between 
presentation and representation, structure and metastructure, or a situation and the state of 
a situation. The state of a situation is associated with the second representative operation 
since it is not concerned with the elements of a situation, but with “the way these elements 
are grouped into parts or subsets of this situation.”87 Each operation contains a distinctive 
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vocabulary. Whereas elements belong to a situation, subsets are included to the state of this 
situation.88 The choice of words characterising the state of a situation hardly conceals 
Badiou’s disdain for the state and political representation.89 The idea that elements belong to 
a situation may be associated to an egalitarian and rightful political project, while the 
inclusion of subsets denotes a mechanical, detached, and almost bureaucratic process.90 
Breaking with pure abstraction, Badiou offers an illustration of the shift between a situation 
and its state:  
A family of people is a presented multiple of the social situation (in the sense that they 
live together in the same apartment, or go on holiday together, etc.), and it is also a 
represented multiple, a part, in the sense that each of its members is registered by 
the registry office, possesses French nationality, and so on.91 
Whereas presentation can be associated to what is clearly visible and present, 
representation denotes a secondary identification, a reification of what has already been 
presented. More concretely this implies that the oppressive power of the state is revealed by 
the reifying bureaucratic dimension of recounting or re-labelling its parts. The state of the 
situation is an obstacle to politics to the extent that it is concerned with the identification of 
parts, a process that is incompatible with axiomatic equality.92 Belonging is itself a sufficient 
process of identification, for the one who belongs is that who is (presented) here.93 
 
88 Badiou, Being and Event, 103. 
89 Bosteels, Badiou and Politics, 38. 
90 In Being and Event, Badiou directly acknowledges a co-dependence between the notions of equality and 
belonging. [Badiou, Being and Event, 415.] 
91 Badiou, Being and Event, 174. 
92 Hallward explains the antagonism between Badiou’s egalitarian conception of politics and identity or the act 
of naming: “a political or generic community is a community that exists for as long as it is able to resist naming 
itself, making itself into an identity.” [Hallward, "Badiou's Politics: Equality and Justice".] 
93 Two recurring figures of Badiou’s political discussions illustrate the cruciality of this break between 
presentation and representation. One the one hand, the voter is included in the state of a situation since the 
act of voting quite literally denotes ‘the count of the count’ at work in statist representation. One’s inclusion as 
a voter does not in any way guarantees political subjectivity for it is irremediably tied to the state of a 
situation. [Badiou, Being and Event, 107.] On the other hand, an immigrant here illegally belongs to a situation 
merely by virtue of her/him being here, just like any other person also present in this situation. [Alain Badiou, 
“What Is to Be Thought? What Is to Be Done?,” 15.] This does not imply that belonging is a synonym of 
political subjectivity, but that it is one of its conditions. However, inclusion, representation, and the state 
exclude and prevent political change. [Badiou, Being and Event, 110.]   
The idea of belonging exhibits the axiomatic character of equality at work in Badiou’s thought. Whoever is 
here (presented in a situation) already belongs. It is only through the second count defining state 
representations that inequalities appear. Three types of structures emerge as a result of the 
belonging/inclusion dialectic, “the normal, which are presented and represented; the singular, which are 





Badiou recognises the conflation between his concept of state of the situation and the 
classical conception of state when claiming that the rejection of the latter is a prerequisite for 
the possibility of politics.94 The characterisation of the state as a hindrance concerns political 
action as much as political thought. For Badiou, the state is not merely the place of power 
policing the emergence of alternative forms of politics. Rather, it represents in its very 
essence the impossibility to think politics and the impasse of equality.95 The rejection of the 
state is yet another position that is common to both Rancière and Badiou. Rancière similarly 
dismisses the political capacity of the state based on its misidentification of the people, 
leading to policing rather than politics.96 Surpassing or dismantling the state has also been a 
common theme of communist literature from Marx to Lenin.97 However, Badiou also 
incorporates the sacrosanct institution of party within his political critique, placing him at 
odds with many contemporary communist thinkers for whom the state and the party do not 
stand in the way of emancipation and equality.98 Badiou, like Rancière, designates the state 
as a ‘non-thought’, requiring that politics be approached differently.99 Yet, unlike Rancière or 
contemporary communist thinkers like Slavoj Žižek or Jodi Dean, he is willing to think and 
formalise the process by which truthful politics happens and appears beyond the state 
through the conceptual deployment of ‘the event’.    
 
Such classification leaves little to the reader’s imagination. Full representation is irremediably tied to the state 
and the imagery it produces, it is waste since it refutes any form of belonging, closing itself off to equality. At 
the other end of the spectrum, the singular structure escapes the state completely. It is pure belonging and 
therefore faithful to the egalitarian axiom. Its singularity mirrors the brevity and novelty that characterises an 
event through which truth are produced. [Ibid, 101.] 
94 Hallward, "Badiou's Politics: Equality and Justice"; and Bosteels, Badiou and Politics, 29. 
95 Badiou in The Idea of Communism I, 17. 
96 Rancière, Disagreement, 109; and Rancière, La Haine de la Démocratie, 79. 
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disappear.” [Karl Marx, “Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right 1843.” 
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provided by Marx in the 1844 Manuscripts.” [Badiou, Metapolitics, 79.]  
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Horizon in which she dismisses Badiou’s rejection of the state and the party. She perceives his emphasis on the 
subject as an individualisation of communism which damages its essentially collective roots. [Jodi Dean, The 
Communist Horizon (London: Verso, 2012), 194-195, 207.] In a similar fashion, Žižek argues that “politics 
without the organizational form of the Party is politics without politics.” [Slavoj, Žižek, Revolution at the Gates 
(London: Verso, 2002), 297.]  





In a context where political truths cannot emerge from the existing state of a situation, 
what is the process by which politics comes to light? The answer to that question, as is often 
the case with Badiou’s philosophy, is as enigmatic as it is powerful: “the inception of a politics 
of its statements, prescriptions, judgements and practices is always located in the absolute 
singularity of an event.”100 An event is a unique rupture with the existent (normal order) of a 
situation, it is real change, the possibility of possibilities that previously were 
unconceivable.101 Events are always bound to the generic procedures of Art, Love, Politics, 
and Science. Politically, an event provides a way out of the rigidity of a situation and its state 
by transcending nameless multiples and re-presented individuals into truthful subjects. The 
truth of egalitarian politics arises at the junction of an event and a subject’s fidelity to that 
event.102 Equality arguably appears in three forms within the political procedure inaugurated 
by an event. It first emerges alongside the event’s unveiling of the state’s inegalitarian mode 
of re-presentation, it then shines through the truthful novelty of an occurring event, and 
ultimately persists through the eternal possibility of a new form of subject-based politics. 
The event is undoubtedly the most recognisable concept of Badiou’s philosophy. 
Although it remains consistent with the common usage that is made of the term as “a thing 
that happens or take place”, Badiou’s definition is far subtler.103 Through its unexpected 
occurrence, an event is “the maximal becoming of the intensity of existence of what was the 
proper inexistent of the site”, absolutizing the inexistent.104 Put more simply, an event is the 
“necessary upsurging of that which has no name.”105 Simply by virtue of becoming, an event 
“is itself more than a fact, which is in turn more than a modification.”106 It is truth in action, 
for truth requires not only the support of pure multiplicity but also that of an evental 
occurrence.107 Evental truth cannot be philosophically thought, nor does it establish itself as 
the ‘to come’ of the political. Rather than the culmination of political thought, an event is a 
singularity “with which a thought begins.”108 It is as spontaneous as it is unexpected since its 
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truthful content materialises as a break from the existing state of a situation, insisting “in 
exception to the forms of the ‘there is.’”109 A novel event escapes the count of the state, 
remaining unpredictable as a fact.110 It startles the state of a situation by emerging as faceless 
and indecipherable through the means of existing knowledge.111 Based on Badiou’s 
opposition of present knowledge and absent truth, Hallward points out that the philosopher’s 
motto becomes “trust only in what you cannot see.”112 One must break with empiricism in 
order to capture the substance of an event as “what subtracts itself from all experience: the 
ontologically un-founded and the transcendentally discontinuous.” 113 
The event does more than merely offer a mysterious counterpoint to the state. In fact, 
it works directly against the state, revealing the latter’s monopoly on the situation and the 
fallacy of its representative apparatuses. Badiou depicts the confrontation between the event 
and the state as an interruption through which the state is measured, given a figure, and 
revealed in its excessive power and repressive facet.114 It is as if the state was caught out at 
its own power game by the eruption of an event, its role shifting from that of the measurer 
to the measured, from the observer to the observed. An event puts the state at a distance 
and measures it in all its excess.115 Viewed in this light, a political event first appears as a 
critical device, deconstructing the state’s inegalitarian re-presentation of its parts prior to 
introducing the real possibility of equality.116 In order to incarnate the new, an event must 
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first shine light on the (mis)representations of the state.117 It must reveal the absurdity of the 
second count operated by the state on its parts, assigning numbers and identities to a 
collective whose only distinctive trait is that of pure multiplicity. The event’s uncovering of 
the state’s miscount also reveals the state’s unwillingness to proceed from the egalitarian 
axiom, choosing to divide and categorise instead of basing its operations on the premise that 
all are equal and therefore essentially indivisible. In Badiou’s work, the projection of the 
truthful content of an event is clearly facilitated by the state’s incurable political impotence. 
An event conveys equality not simply by interrupting the inegalitarian categories of a state, 
or through the new political possibilities it offers, but also by containing itself amongst the 
elements of its site “thus being presented by the very presentation that it is.”118 Presented in 
these terms, a political event is immanent to itself.119 It is also immanently egalitarian by 
breaking the laws of the count to embrace pure belonging. Provided that it has a site, the 
event is an intrusion of the real of equality into presented reality.120 
Despite his reservation towards developing an empirical account of the event, Badiou 
concedes that its occurrence depends on the existence of a site. An evental site is an abnormal 
multiple, one that is presented but whose content escapes representation, entailing that the 
site itself is not part of the situation.121 A site is abnormal since “none of its terms are counted-
as-one as such; only the multiple of these terms forms a one.”122 It must be thought less as a 
geographical location than a moment during which the discrepancy between ontological 
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equality possible in this fixed distance […] finally, it seeks to anticipate the generic applicability of the 
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being and empirical presence (being-there) is cancelled.123 About the spatial presence of a 
site, Badiou enigmatically declares that the evental site is simply a multiple on the ‘edge of 
the void.’124 A site is “an ontological figure of the instant”, appearing “only to disappear.”125 
Bosteels calls attention to the fact that set theory does not recognise the existence of 
previously uncounted multiples that mathematicians label as ‘extraordinary’.126 The event 
itself is an extraordinary occurrence, a fundamentally “rare sequence through which political 
truth is constructed.”127 Politics, resulting from an event, is the formulation of “unheard-of 
and seemingly absurd possibilities”, it is ‘the art of the impossible’, making the impossible 
(within the state of a situation), possible.128 A site supports this brief evental moment during 
which the wall between the politically impossible and empirical reality crumbles, where 
political truth become palpable if only for an instant. An evental occurrence is always brief 
and does not in itself define a long political sequence. Rather, it is an ephemeral beam of truth 
which inaugurates rather than exhausts a political procedure.  
In Badiou’s work, the event conditions the possibility of egalitarian politics. It does so 
by unveiling the unfair count of the state, belonging only to itself, and by enacting a truth that 
transcends its subjects. The notions of event and truth are mutually constitutive. An 
untruthful event is emptied of any meaning, while a truth will fail to reach its subjects without 
the support of an event.129 The notion of truth lingers throughout Badiou’s writings. This 
complete commitment to truth is unusual within the landscape of contemporary theory. As 
shown in the previous chapter, Rancière whose conceptualisation of equality is closest to 
Badiou’s, refuses to explicitly incorporates the notion of truth to his work. Although 
Rancière’s conception of equality appears to implicitly endorse the status of truth, he discards 
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the term as too categorical.130 For Badiou however, there can be no doubts on the existence 
of truths. For him “there are bodies and languages except that there are truths.”131 Truths 
theoretically enable Badiou to conceptualise politics beyond the mere declaration or 
axiomatisation of equality. Although the foundational status held by equality persists as a 
pillar of Badiou’s political thought, acknowledging the presence of truths substantiates his 
understanding of event, subject, and ultimately politics. To the extent that the egalitarian 
axiom conditions politics in its entirety, the latter must be substantiated by an evental truth. 
What makes politics truthful? Badiou explores the depths of this question in his latest 
publication The Immanence of Truths. 
 Whereas Badiou links the category of truth to other distinctive concepts such as 
generic procedures and events, his latest book is specifically dedicated to the ‘immanence’ of 
truths. As immanent possibilities, truths offer a pathway towards ‘infinity’: 
Truths are in an immanent relationship with the absolute meaning of their own value. 
[…] the sign of such absolute immanence is provided by the infinite value of a truth. A 
truth is always witness to the possibility of an imminent transition from finitude to 
infinity.132 
 Truths are infinite, offering limitless possibilities in a finite world. The exceptional 
status of truths is conferred by their universal value.133 When occurring through an event, a 
truth is infinitely open to all. Unlike the state which addresses each of its parts in different 
(finite) ways, a truth speaks to its subjects with one universal voice. This truthful voice is 
universal not only in relation to the totality of subjects it speaks to, but also in accordance to 
its potential to be “transported, transmitted, translated towards other worlds, possible or 
real.”134 Inasmuch as the universality of truth is addressed to all, it can also be heard through 
time echoing the occurrence of a past event.  A fundamental condition for the occurrence of 
all truths is their capacity to overcome finitude.135 In this framework, the event presents itself 
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as “an exception within the necessary chain of finitude.”136 Finitude must be understood 
negatively as what is to be undone by truth, the oppressive limit placed upon human action.137 
Badiou identifies four types of finitudes: religious oppression, state oppression, economic 
oppression, and philosophical oppression.138 State oppression and, to a lesser extent, 
philosophical oppression have already been discussed as obstacles to truth earlier in this 
chapter. The third and final section of this chapter will provide more concrete examples of 
state and economic oppression as well as their political alternatives interrupting the normal 
finite state of a situation by revealing the infinity of truths through an event. The event is a 
universal window on infinite political possibilities.  
In addition to his consideration of truths as infinite, Badiou treats truths as ‘absolute’. 
The event itself is not an absolute beginning, but the truth that it unfolds is.139 To treat truths 
as absolute means denying any form of relativism that might deny its universality.140 Hence, 
finitude is associated not to the absolute status of a truth (truths having been liberated from 
the religious imposition of ‘the One’), but to the act of questioning the universality and 
applicability of a truth. Politically, Badiou’s absolute commitment to truths is arguably 
problematic. First, it appears to contradict his consideration of axioms. If, as it was discussed 
earlier, the egalitarian axiom lays the ground for the very possibility of a political procedure, 
political truths must correspond to that axiom. Following Badiou’s own philosophical 
framework, only the egalitarian axiom appears as absolute within a political procedure, for 
there can be no politics in the absence of that axiom. From this postulate, truths can never 
be fully absolute for their existence is relative to the axiom of equality declaring “a universal 
capacity for truth”, and “a wholly disinterested subjectivity.”141 If either the universal capacity 
of the people is refuted or particular interests become entangled within the course of a 
political truth procedure, then that truth will arguably lose sight of its axiom. Badiou forsakes 
this possibility by absolutizing truths. Yet, by his own account, truths are relative to the 
existence of an axiom. This would imply that political truths are absolute apart from their 
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belonging to the egalitarian axiom, a conditionality that Badiou does not acknowledge. This 
theoretical oversight is problematic, allowing for the possibility that absolute truths may 
somehow exceed the axiom from which they spring. This possibility can be envisaged at 
various levels of Badiou’s political thought; from his discussions of the truthful subject and his 
account of political failures, to his interpretation of past political procedures such as the 
Chinese cultural revolution.  
 While an event acts as the spectacular eruption of a truth within the false 
representations of the state, it remains merely a ‘moment’ of truth. Badiou often reminds his 
reader that a political truth procedure subsists beyond its evental inception.142 The 
transcendental of an event effectively begins, not with an event, but when formerly counted 
individuals allow their transformation into truthful subjects.143 Badiou defines the subject as 
“any local configuration of a generic procedure from which a truth is supported”, a “local 
point of truth.”144 As an incarnation of truth, the subject’s distinctiveness is most clearly 
revealed by its role within a truth procedure. In Being and Event, Badiou clarifies the uncertain 
position of subjects involved in a truth procedure that both includes and exceeds them:  
Being the local moment of the truth, the subject falls short of supporting the latter’s 
global sum. Every truth is transcendent to the subject, precisely because the latter’s 
entire being resides in supporting the realization of truth. The subject is neither 
consciousness nor unconsciousness of the true. The singular relation of a subject to 
the truth whose procedure it supports is the following: the subject believes that there 
is a truth.145 
Badiou suggests that subjects are connected to truth merely through their faith in its 
promise. However, the relationship between an event and its subject is complex, depending 
on the subjective procedures of ‘intervention’ and ‘fidelity’, and spreading over a non-linear 
temporality. However fragile, this connection with the subject is constitutive of the event for 
it allows the latter to be named and persist through time.146 A subject’s intervention in a 
political procedure excludes thoughtless action. Subjects will only take part in the procedure 
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if their intervention is consistent with the political truth initiated by the event.147 Because of 
the event’s ephemeral dimension, Oliver Marchart explains that it “can only be experienced 
as something that has vanished.” 148 After its eclipse, “it will be recorded in its very 
disappearance only in the form of a linguistic trace.”149 This evental trace highlights the path 
that subjects must follow in order to recognise the event as such.150 Only through the 
politicised intervention of a subject can an event that has already vanished be named.151 The 
subjective impact of an event is located less in its occurrence than in its retroaction.152 The 
subject is more than the passive observer of an uncontrollable event. The faithful subject 
directly contributes to the illumination and enactment of truth embodied in a singular event. 
There is a clear egalitarian suggestion to the idea that an event effaces itself to leave its 
subjects with the task of elucidating its truth. Following this logic, truth is not imposed but 
discovered and acquired. The sum of the processes by which a subject retraces the truth of 
an event is what Badiou terms ‘subjectivation’ or the becoming of a subject.153 Only through 
this post-evental work can the human animal be “seized and traversed by the trajectory of a 
truth.”154 This entails that a subject can only be subject to truth; be it amorous, artistic, 
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political, or scientific. Framed within a truth procedure, the subject becomes the only bridge 
“between the phenomenal persistence of a world and its evental rearrangement.”155 This 
subject-based approach to evental truth denotes a new type of materialism by which subject 
must ‘always rebegin’ to identify the consequences of an event in one of the four generic 
procedures.   
Intervention and the act of naming do not fully ensure the subjective consolidation of 
an event. The process of fidelity completes a truth procedure and is crucial in understanding 
the way politics materialises in Badiou’s thought. Retracing an evental truth is itself 
conditioned by subjective fidelity, the subtleties of which are explained in Being and Event:   
A fidelity is always particular, insofar as it depends on an event. There is no general 
faithful disposition. Fidelity must not be understood in any way as a capacity, a 
subjective quality, or a virtue. Fidelity is a situated operation which depends on the 
examination of situations. Fidelity is a functional relation to the event. […] What allows 
us to evaluate a fidelity is its result: the count-as-one of the regulated effects of an 
event. Strictly speaking, fidelity is not. What exists are the groupings that it constitutes 
of one-multiples which are marked, in one way or another, by the evental 
happening.156 
Here, fidelity appears quite distinct from its prevalent understanding. Badiou refuses 
to associate it to any subjective capacity. Instead, fidelity finds its footing in evental 
consequences, counting-as-one the outcomes of an event. Unlike intervention which defines 
itself in the act of naming the event, fidelity denotes a count. Rather than naming the 
nameless, it operates a kind of sorting, opening up to “to the general distinction of one-
multiples presented in the situation, according to whether they are connected to the event 
or not.”157 Fidelity concurrently appears as a laborious task as much as a subjective path to 
truth, for it is “the operator of faithful connection which rules the procedure and institutes 
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the truth.”158 The transcendental of an event truly takes effect in subjective fidelity, since “the 
faithful subject is nothing but the activation of the present of the truth under 
consideration.”159 Far from a passive commitment, fidelity refers to an active process by 
which subjects are constituted as such and truth is activated. Identifying the trace of an event 
is only the commencement of a subjective truth procedure after which “one must incorporate 
oneself into what the trace authorizes in terms of consequences.”160 Only through this active 
commitment is the merging of truth and subject enabled.   
  Who is the subject of a truth? Badiou’s disdain for any form of identification 
complicates the process of drawing a conceptual subject. The latter must remain abstract 
since “a subject subtracts itself from every community and destroys every individuation.”161 
Representing a truthful subject figuratively would compromise Badiou’s philosophical project 
of undermining any form of finitude. However, he concedes that a subject must be a collective 
being of ‘citizen militants’.162 Militant must be understood here as “militant of truth”, a 
subject dedicated to the activation of a truth procedure.163 Badiou’s commitment to the 
subject as a collective category reflects his dedication to a form of egalitarianism for which 
individual agency has little political value.164 Neither individual nor communitarian but 
collectively committed to truth, the subject’s pronoun is not ‘I’ or even ‘we’ but ‘aside from’ 
and ‘except that’.165 As a local vehicle of truth, a subject wears the properties of that truth as 
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its own. Just like a truth, a subject cannot be named in the language of existing knowledge 
whose categories it aims to overcome. As such, the subject carries a crucial political role. 
Conceived as an activator of truths, it is simultaneously constituted and constitutive of truths. 
Although there can be no subject without the occurrence of a truthful event, a truth will fall 
into oblivion without the work of faithful subjects. This constitutive element is empowering 
for subjects are not only subjected to an enacted truth, but an integral and active part of that 
truth. Once again, Badiou confirms his commitment to equality by putting subjects in charge 
of their own political destiny.  
The event and its subject are entangled in a mutually constitutive relationship 
articulated around truth. Although there can be no subjectivation without the foundational 
occurrence of an event, the ephemeral occurence of the latter depends on a subject’s fidelity 
for its historicising. The triad formed of the event, the subject, and truth is not static. The 
relationship between these three elements is multi-layered and non-linear. By constructing a 
unique account of this triangular relationship, Badiou manages to empower and transcend 
the figure of the subject. By vanishing, an event sets the political stage for a transcended and 
elevated subject. The evental trace merely puts the subject on its tracks. Political truth is not 
merely the pure consequence of an event but also the result of the work and fidelity of a 
collective subject. The egalitarian potential of Badiou’s conceptualisation of the event, truth, 
and the subject is considerable. No longer crushed under the weight of theological truth, nor 
abandoned on the edge of abyssal liberty, the faithful subject of an event can truly enact 
politics.  
 
The Appearing of Politics 
Badiou’s account of a political procedure refers to transcendence and as a result does 
not clearly indicate the process by which egalitarian politics comes to effectively materialise 
in the world. Badiou aims to fill this theoretical gap in Logics of Worlds by developing more 
concrete philosophical categories such as ‘appearing’, ‘subject-body’, ‘point’, and the object. 





truthful politics within his more polemical work.166 Such politics takes shape in ‘the idea’ of 
communism, standing for equality and against what Badiou refers to as democratic 
materialism. Badiou constructs a conceptual account of political materiality rooted in a 
complete rejection of relativism and an unconditional commitment to the idea of 
communism. Badiou’s rejection of any degree of relativism when it comes to political 
appearances reveals the limits of his absolute consideration of political truths underpinned 
by a certain disdain for objective categories such as the body. By requiring that all be 
transcended by truth regardless of the situation, he allows for the return of a political ‘One’ 
dictated less by the egalitarian axiom than dogmatic imperatives. Badiou pushes his 
conceptual exploration of equality into the fields of political appearances further than any 
other contemporary thinker. Yet, the material pathways he opens remain obscured by his 
largely objectless consideration of politics. 
The subject, even in its strong Badiousian interpretation, remains a theoretical entity. 
Badiou reminds us that “the declaration that there is a (formal) theory of the subject is to be 
taken in the strong sense: of the subject, there can only be a theory.”167 This theoretical limit 
should not be seen as an obstacle to the materialisation of egalitarian politics. In fact, a 
subject requires “not only that it have a being, but also that it have an appearing."168 In Logics 
of Worlds, Badiou builds on the equation of being with pure multiplicity introduced in Being 
and Event to “show how instances of being-multiple might come to appear as situated objects 
of a world.”169 Deepening his exploration of the subject as a local point of truth he claims that 
“the appearing of truths is that of wholly singular bodies (post-evental bodies), which 
compose the multiple materiality wherein special formalisms (subjective formalisms) are set 
out.”170 Far from denying the theoretical subject an opportunity to exist in the world, Badiou 
deploys the concept of subject-body which names “the materiality of a subject of truth.”171 
The body is simply “The singular object that makes up the appearing of a subject.”172 In an 
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objective world, the body literally embodies the truth of a subject.173 In After Finitude, 
Meillassoux offers a clear account of the relationship between a transcendental subject and 
its body in a way that appears consistent with Badiou’s conceptualisation: 
If the transcendental subject is localized among the finite objects of its world, […] this 
means that it remains indissociable from its incarnation in a body; in other words, it is 
indissociable from a determinate object in the world.[…] Objective bodies may not be 
a sufficient condition for the taking place of the transcendental, but they are certainly 
a necessary condition for it.174 
Meillassoux’s depiction of the relationship between a transcendental subject and its 
body is applicable to Badiou’s logic of appearance. Although a body cannot singlehandedly 
incarnate the transcendental capacity of a truth, it is needed for a truth to appear in the 
objective world. The body offers the objective means through which subjective truth 
effectively comes to light.  
This development is crucial for the applicability of Badiou’s political thought. Endowed 
with a body, a truthful subject is no longer limited to its conceptual form. Truth is also 
inscribed on the subject’s body understood as “a mode of appearance in a world determined 
by a subject that has developed its fidelity to the trace of an event.”175 The conjunction 
between a truthful subject and its body (envelope) is materialist “to the extent that it 
subordinates the universality of a relation to the global being of the world.”176 Through the 
figure of the body, Badiou attempts to expand the reach of his political theory from realm of 
pure thought to the material world. To claim that truths appear also entails that they must be 
subjectively experienced. Badiou labels these experiences “intra-worldly relations” or 
affects.177 The appearance of political truth is felt when “a political sequence signals its 
existence point by point through an enthusiasm for anew maxim of equality.”178 
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A body of truth is not any body. In the same way that a subject of truth is not reducible 
to an individual, a subject-body of truth must prove its fidelity to an evental trace.179 Badiou 
names this process ‘the point’. More than any other concept, the point illustrates the material 
applicability of a political truth. A point is “that which the transcendental of a world imposes 
on a subject-body, as the test on which depends the continuation in the world of the truth-
process that transits through that body.”180 The point is the necessary passage of truth from 
being to appearing in the world. For the body, the point is a simple test with two possible 
outcomes. Either a body acts as the appearing point of a truth or it decides not to go through 
the point, betraying the event and cutting evental truth short of appearing.181 By 
conceptualising the point as a test of fidelity, Badiou reasserts the absoluteness of truths.  
This time it is not the axiom but the body that is constrained by absolute truths. The body is 
confronted with the illusory choice of either complying with a truth or betraying it. The 
transcendental either imposes itself on the material world or disappears as a result of the 
subjective imperfections of that world. Badiou defends the point as a binary based on the 
postulate that the transcendental of a truth itself has a binary structure: it either is or isn’t.182 
A body that fails to go through a point persists as a body, but merely as an “inert or 
inconsequential subjective form.”183 In order to be subjectivised, the body has no choice but 
to accept evental truth or run the risk of being alienated from any generic procedure. 
Whereas a truthful subject is constituted by the transcendental of an event, its subject-body 
is cut-off from any access to truth beyond its consent.  
This signifies that the appearing of an event must be perfectly in line with its idea. 
Subjectively, this entails that a subject-body be required to appear as the mirror image of a 
theoretical subject in order for politics to materialise. Badiou offers two categories for those 
bodies that fail the test of the point by refusing to comply with an evental truth: reaction and 
occultation.184 Whereas reaction represents a rebuttal of progress (in that case politics), 
occultation corresponds to a fascist position by which truth is erased.185 There are several 
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issues with this account of the body’s experience of a point. Inasmuch as Badiou states that 
bodies ontologically belong to pure multiplicity, he does not hesitate to name and classify 
them according to their position towards a point.186 Although Badiou blames the state for 
hierarchically dividing pure multiples, a similar operation is at work within his logic of 
appearing. The hierarchy is clear between a body destined to produce a present, deny it, or 
occult it.187 Badiou fails to explain why he allows for the counting of bodies while every other 
level of a truth procedure (axiom, event, subject) escapes that count.  
Besides the fact that counting and labelling bodies is philosophically and politically 
incongruous, it also removes any political agency to subject-bodies. For politics to happen, an 
event must occur, and a subject must act towards retracing its truth. In contrast, a body has 
no choice but to accept a truth, reducing the act of appearing to a mere formality within the 
larger scheme of a truth procedure. Badiou’s disregard for objective bodies arguably 
originates from his unwillingness to mediate the absoluteness of truths. The success of a truth 
procedure resides in the triangular relationship between an egalitarian axiom, the truth it 
constitutes, and a subject (both in theoretical and appearing form). The work of a theoretical 
subject conditions the very success of a political procedure. On the other hand, a subject-
body has no power in assessing the mode of appearance of a truth. Being the only entity to 
gain access to the material outcome of a political event, the subject-body has no say besides 
acceptance, denial, and occultation. These categories are politically limiting. They could be 
exceeded by pulling the egalitarian axiom closer to the materialist ground of appearances. 
This way, the axiom defined by the statement that “people think, people are capable of truth” 
could be supplemented by the declaration that ‘people see, people are capable of recognising 
truth.’188 To claim to be materialist means accepting that objective conditions also 
substantiate politics. 
 Badiou’s political neglection of bodies becomes clearly apparent in his critique of 
democratic materialism. This term is used to define the contemporary conviction according 
to which “there are only bodies and languages.”189 It represents the subjective condition of 
an atonic world, a world devoid of points.190 In a situation where truth is an impossibility, “the 
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body is the only concrete instance for productive individuals aspiring to enjoyment. Man, 
under the sway of the power of life, is an animal convinced that the law of the body harbours 
the secret of his hope.”191 Postmodernism is for Badiou just another name for democratic 
materialism.192 He is willing to work against this intellectual current instigated by thinkers like 
Deleuze, Derrida, Foucault, or Lyotard to assert that ‘also there are truths.’ Abandoning truth 
in favour of relativism engenders a constant return to the politically limited figures of the 
body and language.193 In a truthless world, the democratic subject is misguided towards its 
own individual self, preferring “itself to every situation.”194 The “identarian fetishism of the 
individual” is the only possible path in a situation which forbids truths.195 The main intellectual 
issue with democratic materialism is its relativist take on the world by which “there exists 
nothing but opinions.”196 Although valid, Badiou’s critique of democratic materialism as an 
incarnation of relativism often overwhelms his conceptual account of the body.   
Democratic materialism reflects the count of the democratic state. It rests on the 
state’s juridical recognition (re-presentation) of the multiplicity of bodies and languages. As 
Badiou concisely puts it, “everything and every-one deserves to be recognized and protected 
by the law.”197 ‘Everyone’ here concerns an accumulation of bodies easily numbered and 
labelled by the state, a multitude of individuals whose solitary pursuits deceptively pulls them 
further away from any procedure of truth. It is the simulacrum of freedom offered by the 
democratic state as well as its representative capacities that are to blame for democratic 
materialism. Individual bodies are simply products of their re-presentation by the state.198 
Badiou’s depiction of democratic materialism should not be considered in isolation but rather 
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as part of his critique of the contemporary state of the situation bearing the name of 
democracy.  
For Badiou democracy is polyform; existing as a form of state, a companion to 
capitalism, and subjectively through the figure of desire-driven individuals and democratic 
materialism. The contemporary democratic situation is that of parliamentary states 
“governed by three norms: the economy, the national question and, precisely, democracy.”199 
Badiou’s critique of the state often merges with a disquisition of capitalism and a platonic 
critique of democracy. He rejects democracy as a regime of individual interests, promoting 
equivalence rather than equality.200 This reading is indebted to Plato’s dismissal of democracy 
found in The Republic.201 In the same way that Cantor inspires Badiou’s ontology, Platonism 
constantly illuminates Badiou’s critique of democracy. In book VIII of Republic Plato depicts 
democracy as a regime driven by individual desires. 202 A substantial amount of Badiou’s 
political thought has been dedicated to reviving Plato’s critical acuity towards democracy. 
Platonism is the point where Badiou and Rancière’s egalitarianism most clearly part ways. 
Whereas Rancière dismisses the Greek philosopher as an archipolitical hater of democracy, 
Badiou builds on Plato to deploy his own critique of democracy and subsequent endorsement 
of communism.203 
No piece of work embodies Badiou’s Platonism more clearly than his 
‘hypertranslation’ of Plato’s Republic. In his Republic, Badiou rewrites and re-actualise Plato’s 
masterpiece, attempting to render Platonism evermore relevant to contemporary 
audiences.204 Evidently, this contemporary version of Republic is more than a translation. 
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Badiou directs the Socratic dialogue towards his own philosophical and political interests in 
equality and communism. This philosophical homage is crucial to exposing Badiou’s 
argumentative proximity with Plato when it comes to democracy. Writing about the transition 
between oligarchy and democracy, Badiou (interpreting Plato and speaking through Socrates) 
explains that the shift occurs “when the imperative to enjoy […] becomes an unlimited general 
imperative.”205 What Badiou extracts from book VIII of Republic is that democracy is 
essentially a regime defined by the freeing of individual desires.206 This reading enables him 
to interpret Plato not like Rancière as a hater of democratic equality, but as the first thinker 
to question the political virtues of democratic individualism.207 
Democratically liberating individual desires denotes a purely directed and formal type 
of freedom. For Badiou, democratic freedom is normless since it merely postulates that one 
may live as she/he desires. The only norm of such freedom is that of secluded private interest, 
reducing man to pure animality.208 In other words, liberating desires is a simulacrum of 
freedom which enslaves rather than enlightens.209 Subjectively, the life of a democrat 
“becomes a clandestine exploration of infinite but small pleasures.”210 For both Plato and 
Badiou, the democrat lives an heteronomous life emptied of truth, confused by the glossy 
appeal of instant satisfaction.211 Characterising democratic freedom as a type of unleashed 
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animality implies a regression, while the idea according to which the pursuit of individual 
pleasures can be liberating exposes the illusory character of democracy. For Badiou, the 
heteronomous tendencies of neoliberalism such as those depicted in chapter two are 
essentially attached to the democratic form. 
Aside from producing a distinctive type of (non)freedom, democracy promotes purely 
formal equality, rendering equality and inequality indistinguishable.212 Democratic equality is 
artificial to the extent that it applies to anything unequal. Badiou interprets this Platonic 
assertion through the prism of Marxism, tying the illusory character of democratic equality to 
“the monetary principle, the universal equivalency or fungibility that bars any possibility of 
real difference.”213 Here, Badiou associates the illusion of democratic equality to Marx’s 
concept of commodity fetishism through which commodities and labour are indexed only 
according to their monetary (exchange) value rather than their use value.214 This conjunction 
between Plato and Marx discloses two central traits of Badiou’s position on democracy. The 
first is that democracy rather than enabling equality, produces equivalence through 
quantification (the count of its parts). The second is that in Badiou’s political thought, 
democracy and capitalism are irremediably linked.215 
Badiou’s critique of democracy is not limited to his philosophical engagement with 
Plato. In his more polemical work, he designates contemporary practice of democracy as 
“parliamentary fetishism.”216 By denouncing democracy as such, he points to the ‘cult of 
numbers’ which characterises the contemporary assimilation of democracy to the ‘irrational 
procedure’ of voting.217 Badiou’s rejection of parliamentary politics is simultaneously tied to 
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his dismissal of the state and his painting of democracy as a regime of interests.218 Voting is 
at the heart of the representative process, reducing the state to a “non-egalitarian inventory 
of human beings.”219 It works against equality by including (counting or naming) those parts 
that fundamentally belong in a situation. From a Badiousian point of view parliamentary 
politics is deeply anti-political, overlooking axiomatic equality to conflate a representative 
count to a transparent expression of popular will. Voting cannot constitute a duplicate of the 
people’s voice. Following Badiou’s ontology, voting is a re-presentation of a people already 
belonging to a situation. Parliamentary politics does not only ignore the first presentation of 
the people, it annuls the egalitarian potential of the latter by counting its parts through the 
electoral procedure. The voices of the people are not amplified but muted by being electorally 
recorded by the state.  
 The general state of equivalence characterising democracy engenders the confusion 
of the people with its representation, blurring the differences between a subject and its body, 
and displaying the pursuit of individual desires as a mode of liberation. Ultimately, Badiou 
concludes that this state of confusion has elevated democracy to the status of untouchable 
emblem of contemporary society.220 Confusing democracy with equality, liberty, and even 
the common has generated a situation in which one cannot, in good faith, stand opposed to 
democracy. For Badiou, equality is not democracy. Faced with the democratic emblem, 
Badiou reasserts his fidelity to Plato by claiming that “everything consensual is suspicious as 
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far as the philosopher is concerned.”221 The Badiousian critique of democracy should not be 
equated to a rejection of the political capacity of the people. It is a rejection of the tainted re-
presentation of the people put forward by the state under the emblem of democracy, an 
emblem so large that it conceals the possibility of realising politics under the true name of 
equality. For Badiou, this eternal possibility bears the name of communism and always 
depends on the occurrence of a truthful event.  
In addition to democracy’s parliamentary relationship with the (representative) state 
and its heteronomous inclinations, Badiou asserts that democracy should be rejected based 
on is its acquaintance with capitalism. There is no doubt for him that the individual ‘liberty’ 
unleashed in a democratic context is really reduced to “the freedom to trade and 
consume.”222 Badiou labels the convergence of democracy and capitalism ‘capitalo-
parliamentarism.’223 In D’un Désastre Obscur, he writes that “capitalo-parliamentarism is the 
tendentially unique mode of politics, the only one which combines economic efficiency 
(hence the profit of the proprietors) with popular consensus.”224 The finite regime of ‘the 
One’ defining contemporary politics is not democracy in its naked form but the result of its 
merging with capitalism. It is as if under a regime defined by equivalence rather than equality, 
even democracy and capitalism have become indistinguishable through a process by which 
“democracy politically supports and secures the private ownership of the means of 
production.”225 It is clear here that a consumerism-driven market economy is perfectly fitted 
to a Platonic critique of democracy as a regime of individual desires. Badiou makes a 
philosophical leap between Plato and Marx with the concept of capitalo-parliamentarism. 
Through this critical union, Badiou establishes that truthful politics must stand opposed to 
both democracy and market capitalism. 
Following Badiousian philosophy, what is the true name of politics? For Badiou, 
egalitarian politics can only bear the name of communism. This response evidently calls for 
clarifications. Even though Badiou’s communism can be sketched from his theoretical 
 
221 Badiou, Metapolitics, 79. 
222 Badiou, Being and Event, xii;  
223 In L’immanence des vérités, Badiou associates capitalo-parliamentarism with a language of repetition that 
serves to confuse anything and everything in order to preserve the regime of equivalence at work in markets 
and democracy. [Badiou, L’immanence des vérités, 414.] 
224 Alain Badiou, D’un désastre obscur. Droit, Etat, Politique (La Tour d’Aigues: Editions de l’Aube, 1991), 37. 





discussions of political truth procedures, it must also be presented in the concrete form of its 
appearance. What does Badiousian communism entail, and what warrants its successful 
appearance?  Badiou generally defines communism as an ‘Idea’. During a conference fittingly 
entitled “The Idea of Communism” Badiou explained his distinctive use of the term:  
[As] the subjectivation of an interplay between the singularity of a truth procedure 
and a representation of History […] the Idea exposes a truth in a fictional structure. In 
the specific case of the communist Idea, which is operative when the truth it deals 
with is an emancipatory political sequence, we will claim that 'communism' exposes 
this sequence (and consequently its militants) in the symbolic order of History. In 
other words, the communist Idea is the imaginary operation whereby an individual 
subjectivation projects a fragment of the political real into the symbolic narrative of a 
History. It is in this sense that one may appropriately say that the Idea is (as might be 
expected!) ideological.226 
Badiou presents the idea of communism as the imaginary supplement of a truth 
procedure. The idea guides political subjects by inscribing their work into the scheme of a 
larger communist history. The idea is “an infinite anticipation of the possibility of a generic 
universe that must be confirmed in the real.”227 Because an idea is infinite, communism 
cannot be limited to its history nor to its specific historical forms for it is attached to the 
emergence of the new within a political procedure. Theoretically, the notion of idea can be 
associated to that of ‘principles’ or ‘direction’ following the platonic postulate that true life 
and true politics depend on an idea.228 Going against the pejorative resonance of the term 
‘ideology’ in contemporary theory, Badiou simply defines it as “something that has to do with 
an idea.”229 Considered as an idea, communism conveys the possibility of alterity in the face 
of the world as it is (capitalo-parliamentarism).230 
Really existing communisms are just one of the many possible materialisations of its 
larger idea. Although Badiou considers ideas to be infinite and therefore eternal, any 
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contemporary engagement with communism must be discussed in light of its historical forms. 
Only by confronting the consequences of these often-unsuccessful political procedures on 
existing bodies can Badiou’s communism become politically legible. Bosteels rightfully claims 
that it would be both naïve and ineffective to re-actualise communism without considering 
its historical iterations.231 Drawing conclusions from ‘really existing communism’ is especially 
crucial for Badiou both as a thinker and a militant.232 Badiou’s take on the history of 
communism is most clearly laid out in The Communist Hypothesis. Conceiving of communism 
as a hypothesis allows Badiou to suggest that it remains relevant to the contemporary 
situation, while coming to terms with its past failures. He is clear on the latter point, 20th 
century communisms have completely failed.233 He is quick to add however that this failure 
concerns not the hypothesis or idea of communism, but its materialised sequences. As with 
the subject and its body, appearances often fail to convey the power of an idea or a theory. 
Badiou’s definition of the communist idea is coherent with his suggestion that an 
event can always be resurrected, bringing to light “the egalitarian invariants of every 
sequence.”234 He illustrates the possibility of ideological resurrection through the historical 
declination of the ‘Spartacus-event’. Starting with a slave rebellion in ancient Rome, the 
heritage of this event re-emerged with Toussaint Louverture in Haiti when the revolutionary 
was dubbed ‘black Spartacus’, and again during the Spartacist uprising in Germany.235 In each 
of these cases, political sequences were cut short and ended tragically. Yet, the name 
‘Spartacus’ persisted through time, applying equally to a variety of political events unfolding 
all over the world. In the same way, Bolshevism and Maoism still belong to the communist 
idea. For Badiou, what remains from these sequences is not their authoritarian degeneration, 
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but the egalitarian politics which at a certain moment carried their name. An event might be 
revived by its subjects based on the equality it once embodied.236 For Badiou, politics must 
allow for the possibility of “a space for failures” in which the latter will ultimately become an 
impossibility.237  
 Communist sequences can fail, but the idea of communism is eternal. This account of 
the idea of communism echoes the uncertain temporality and infinite faithful procedure 
characterising an event.238 In his most political and polemical work, Badiou also draws clear 
conclusions from the failure of specific political sequences. The Chinese cultural revolution 
remains a constant source of political inspiration for him. In an article written with Bosteels, 
Badiou gives a concrete account of the appeal of the cultural revolution that includes details 
of its demise:  
Within this movement an absolutely amazing freedom reigns, tendencies openly 
confront each other, the journals, tracts, banners and never-ending mural posters 
multiply revelations of all kinds along with the political declarations. […] Processions 
with gongs, drums, inflamed proclamations go around until late at night. On the other 
hand, the tendency toward militarization and the uncontrolled action by shock groups 
soon make their appearance. The general slogan speaks of a revolutionary fight 
against old ideas and old customs. Many groups gave this slogan a destructive and 
violent, even persecutory, interpretation. The hunt against women wearing braids, 
against lettered intellectuals, against hesitant professors, against all the “cadres” who  
do  not  practice  the  same  phraseology  as  such  and  such  splinter group,  the  
raiding  of  libraries  or  museums […] The  truth  is  that,  armed  only  with  the  slogan  
of  “the  fight  of  the  new  against  the  old,”  many  Red  Guards  gave in  to  a  well-
known  (negative)  tendency  in  revolutions:  iconoclasm,  the  persecution  of  people  
for  futile  motives, a sort of assumed barbarism.239 
 Despite the freedom unleashed by its political sequence, the cultural revolution’s 
positive revolutionary spirit was quickly undermined by the proliferation of repressive and 
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violent practices. It is interesting to note that Badiou always points to the subject-body for 
the failure of political sequences. He acknowledges that abusive red guards were acting in 
accordance to the truth of this event, namely fighting for the new against the old by 
reinvigorating the revolutionary spirit against the increasingly bourgeois tendencies of the 
existing communist party.240 Yet, he perpetually points to the subject-body (in that case: 
‘abusive red guards’) to account for political failures. Truth being absolute, failure must be 
blamed on bodies. We have no choice but to fall back on Badiou’s classification of subject-
bodies as either reactive or obscure to explain failure. This is a classically dogmatic account of 
political action which states that ‘whoever is not with us is against us.’ Insomuch as the truth 
of the moment is never to blame for failure, one must designate subject-bodies as either 
reactive or obscurantist. In the case of the cultural revolution, Badiou assigns blame to 
obscurantist red guards who “devalue an ongoing (and thus unproven or unapproved) fidelity 
in favour of a rigid conformity to the absolute past of an allegedly original event or 
revelation.”241 These subjects are deemed obscure based on their “absolute commitment to 
Mao Zedong’s thought”, declaring that “one must apply Mao’s thought even without 
understanding it.”242 In other words, the strong but misdirected fidelity of subjects of the 
cultural revolution is the source of its implosion 
 For Badiou, neither Mao’s political decisions nor the truth it enacted are involved in 
the demise of the cultural revolution. Appearing subjects are held fully responsible for their 
inability to grasp the subtleties of this absolute truth. Badiou explains that Maoism was 
undermined by “its own reactive subject, and then of the becoming-obscure in which, in its 
extreme forms (the Khmer Rouge and Sendero Luminoso), it was shipwrecked.”243 Assigning 
blame for political failure merely to the subject-body is insufficient and arguably antagonistic 
to Badiou’s axiomatic deployment of equality. If axiomatic equality postulates that people 
think and are capable of truth, blaming those same faithful subjects for the failure of a political 
procedure seems self-defeating. To avoid questioning the absoluteness of political truths, 
Badiou undermines the egalitarian axiom by questioning the capacity of subjects from whom 
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that truth is activated.244 Against Badiou’s quasi-dogmatic position, it may be claimed that 
avoiding the transformation of communism into its authoritarian ghost does not depend on 
further consolidation of truth, but on reasserting equality as a fundamental axiom through 
the political potential of the subject-body. 
 
Conclusion 
Throughout his philosophical discussions of being, becoming, and appearing, Badiou 
deploys one of the most stimulating contribution to contemporary political thought. Within 
his mathematical ontology, Badiou is able conceptualise equality as a foundational axiom 
which systematically sets truthful politics in motion. Against identities assigned by the state 
of the situation, pure multiplicity defines the generic condition of all engaged in a political 
procedure. Badiou finds an ontological opportunity to secularise infinity through the concept 
of the pure multiple. The transcendent power of a political truth emerges with the occurrence 
of an event, or a truthful display of infinite possibilities. The evental moment is as bright as it 
is brief. True egalitarian politics occurs at the intersection of a simultaneously succinct but 
eternal event and its subject. From the event’s vanishing there remains only a ‘trace’ that 
political subjects must follow to gain access to its truth. Through this retracing, largely defined 
by the procedures of ‘intervention’ and ‘fidelity’, the subject directly works towards enacting 
egalitarian politics. More than any other Badiousian concepts, fidelity embodies the sequence 
by which one becomes subject as much as he or she concretely intervenes in materialising 
egalitarian politics.  
Considered as a secularisation of religious faith founded on ‘the One’, political fidelity 
constitutes the subjective process par excellence for Badiou. The great potential of his 
consideration of fidelity as a politically empowering process is only interrupted by his disdain 
for any objective consideration of politics, be it attached to the body, political economy, or 
simply imperfect materialisations of absolute truths. This is arguably the main issue with 
Badiou’s political thought. His subject-based account of egalitarian politics remains largely 
objectless. This is an issue for two reasons. On the one hand, it prevents one from providing 
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an account of fidelity as an objective process for the materialisation of politics. On the other, 
it elevates subjective transcendence as the only mode of access to political truths 
independently of any objective factors. As a result, Badiou appears unphased by the 
possibility that a political truth be objectively enforced on existing bodies. While theoretical 
subjects play a substantive role in enacting a political sequence, bodies simply formalise it. 
Refusing to do so condemns one to a life emptied of all meaning or truth.   
Badiou’s subordination of bodies to subjects is also palpable in his discussion of 
democracy and communism. Badiou rejects ‘democratic materialism’ through a re-
actualisation of Plato’s critique of democracy. Democratic materialism denotes the possibility 
to live a meaningless life reduced to the dictates of bodies and language. In contrast, 
communism persists as an eternal idea whose resurrection is necessary for the very possibility 
of egalitarian politics. Here again, there is a clear hierarchy between the subjective 
commitment associated with communism as a transcendent idea and the accessible, yet 
purely formal reality of bodies and language related to democratic materialism. Badiou 
systematically prioritises a quasi-theological approach to politics measured against the 
strength of one’s subjective commitment. The theological dimension of egalitarian politics 
will be the topic of the next chapter. Through the work of St Paul, Kierkegaard, Agamben, and 
Critchley, the potential of faith as a political process will examined. Building on Badiou’s 
discussion of fidelity, the next chapter will propose that religious faith be differentiated from 
political fidelity based on the possibility to treat fidelity as a process containing both a 







Part III | The Egalitarian Leap: Materialising the Collective 
Subject-Body through Political Fidelities 
 
Chapter 5 
Faith and Equality 
 
Introduction 
The question of whether equality can be materialised through politics has traversed 
the four previous chapters of this thesis, each reflecting a distinct theoretical approach to the 
concept of equality. The first chapter was concerned with the work of thinkers who set 
equality as a goal to be achieved through individual autonomy in a liberal democratic context. 
The discussion then moved on to the fading role of equality within the current neoliberal 
consensus where fulfilling the economic potential of atomised individuals reigns as the main 
political objective. Chapter three focused specifically on Jacques Rancière’s redefinition of 
equality as a starting point of politics from which anyone is capable of ruling. The fourth 
chapter centred on Alain Badiou’s conceptualisation of equality as an axiom conditioning the 
emergence of a political event to which subjects must remain faithful for political truths to 
appear. Beyond the great range of possibilities enabled by these propositions, it is striking to 
observe that each of them incorporates a distinct form of belief or faith in the political 
capacity of either individuals or collectives. For liberal egalitarians, such belief is directed 
towards individuals’ autonomous capacity to organise collective life to achieve equality 
without compromising individual liberty. Alternatively, neoliberals strongly believe in 
individuals’ propensity to fulfil their desires and economic potential in an open and extensive 
market context. Rancière’s faith is directed towards equal intelligence and the subsequent 
possibility to realise the democratic promise of a ruling demos free of any form of 
representation. Finally, Badiou invokes faith through subjective fidelity as a crucial step in the 
process of achieving truthful politics. However diverse, all these examples signal the 





 The objective of this chapter is to assess the importance of faith for egalitarian politics. 
Engaging with the work of St Paul, Søren Kierkegaard, Alain Badiou, Giorgio Agamben, and 
Simon Critchley, faith will be interpreted as a profound yet uncertain process with the 
potential to impact not only faithful subjects but also the objective conditions of the world in 
which it is practised.1 The discussion laid out in this chapter will not revolve around the 
intellectual leap faith required from political thinkers to conceptualise new egalitarian 
frameworks. Rather, it will concentrate on the possibility that faith, considered as a collective 
process, may contribute to the materialisation of egalitarian politics. In other words, it will 
argue that faith as a process is well suited to mobilise a collective around an egalitarian ideal. 
Unsurprisingly, theorisations of faith are predominantly theological. Within this chapter, 
theological approaches to faith will be represented by the work of St Paul and Kierkegaard. 
Paul was an apostle. Author of the oldest extant Christian document, his writings on faith 
have never ceased to fascinate theologians and political thinkers alike for almost two 
thousand years.2 His message of love and equality, as well as his radical relationship to faith 
still resonate today in a way that far exceeds the realm of Christian theology. Kierkegaard was 
a philosopher and devote Christian who, perhaps more thoroughly than any other modern 
thinker, deepened the intellectual exploration of faith as the highest subjective commitment. 
For Kierkegaard faith is a supreme passion, a relationship of subjective inwardness on which 
knowledge has no hold.3 Beyond their capacity to associate faith with love, equality, and 
passion against the certainty of existing knowledge, these two thinkers should be studied 
based on the profound impact they maintain on contemporary political theory.  
Although modernity is classically read as a progressive evacuation of the religious from 
the political stage, there appears to be a revival of interest in the relationship between politics 
and theology amongst contemporary thinkers such as Giorgio Agamben, Alain Badiou, and 
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Simon Critchley.4 These thinkers are particularly interested in the political potential of Pauline 
theology.5 The meaning of Paul’s conversion to Christianity, the temporality of his 
messianism, the inclusiveness of his message, and the relationship he establishes between 
faith and law are all facets of Paulinism that resonate with contemporary politics. Inspired by 
the openness and egalitarian content of Paul’s teachings, Badiou treats the apostle as the 
founder of universalism. Pauline theology exerts a deep influence on Badiou’s philosophy, 
informing his conceptualisation of the event, as well as his account of subjective fidelity, and 
truth.6 In The Time that Remains, Agamben takes interest in the temporality (the ‘time of the 
now’, and the ‘time that remains’) of Paul’s messianism.7 On the other hand, Critchley builds 
on the work of Paul, Rousseau, and Kierkegaard to argue for the benefits of a godless faith to 
be directed towards a necessary political fiction.8 All these contributions help elucidating a 
problem opened in the previous chapter regarding the subjective commitment needed to 
think equality as an axiom, politics as an event, and subjective fidelity as a process of truth. 
The unlikely encounter between radical political thought, Pauline theology, and Kierkegaard’s 
philosophy clears new conceptual avenues for egalitarian politics that risk remaining 
indiscernible from the viewpoint of more rigidly secular political thought. The theoretical 
paths opened by this intellectual encounter are abundant; from the possibility to consider 
faith itself as an egalitarian political process, to differentiating between objective and 
subjective levels of faith, and conceptualising fidelity as a form of political faith for a godless 
world.  
 
4 The argument according to which modern politics establishes itself as a weighing out of religion has been 
extensively discussed by Marcel Gauchet. See Gauchet, Que Faire ? Dialogue sur le communisme, le capitalisme 
et l’avenir de la démocratie (Paris: Philo Editions 2014), 39. Own translation; also see Marcel Gauchet, The 
Disenchantment of the World (Princeton: Princeton University Press), 1999; and Jean-Luc Nancy, Church, State, 
Resistance  Political Theologies and Public Religions in a Post-Secular World (New York: Fordham University 
Press), 2006, 103.]  
Many modern thinkers have nuanced this antithetical account by arguing that there remains a theological 
element to modern politics. From Rousseau’s Civil Religion, Spinoza’s theological-political treatise to Carl 
Schmitt’s Political Theology, the theoretical intersection of religion and politics has consistently remained an 
area of interest for political theorists throughout the years. [See Jean Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract ch4 
(London: Penguin Books, 1968; Baruch Spinoza, Theological-Political Treatise (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press), 2007 (1670); Carl Schmitt, Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty, trans. George 
Schwab (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005),] 
5 Brian Britt, “The Schmittian Messiah in Agamben's The Time That Remains” Critical Inquiry 36 (2010): 262.  
6 See Alain Badiou, St Paul The Foundation of Universalism. 
7 See Giorgio Agamben, The Time that Remains. 





In order to assess the significance of faith for egalitarian politics, this chapter is divided 
in three sections. The first will consider the egalitarian content of faith through its relationship 
with love, knowledge, inclusion, identity, and temporality. This will be achieved by analysing 
the message of Paul’s letters and its contemporary (re)interpretations. By conceiving of faith 
as inseparable from love and inclusion, and antithetical to established knowledge and 
identities, Paul radically opens the egalitarian potential of faithful commitment. The second 
part of this chapter will be dedicated to differentiating between the objective and subjective 
dimensions of faith. Through Kierkegaard’s work, it will be shown how faith may be 
considered as the fullest form of subjective commitment. It will also be claimed alongside 
Critchley that Agamben and Badiou’s radically antinomian readings of Paul’s relationship to 
the law can be misguiding.9 The point will be made that subjective faith must be 
supplemented by an objective component that may take the form of a law or an axiom 
embedded in the constitution of a political subject-body. The chapter will close on the 
necessity to differentiate between faith, which is attached to the figure of ‘the One’ and 
therefore fundamentally theological, and fidelity conceptualised as a political type of secular 
faith. Instead of being invoked through the unicity of ‘the One’, political fidelity is a process 
grounded in what Badiou refers to as ‘pure multiplicity.’10 Conceiving of political fidelity in 
these terms, ‘the people’ simultaneously become subject and object of their own fidelity 
through the figure of the collective subject-body. 
 
The Egalitarian Core of Faith 
Why focus on faith when discussing the concept of equality? There are many 
theoretical pathways between politics and theology that do not traverse the notion of faith. 
As Carl Schmitt famously declared, “All significant concepts of the modern theory of the state 
are secularized theological concepts.”11 In a context where many theorists decide to either 
oppose politics and religion or draw them closer together, faith arguably engages the two 
 
9 Etymologically, antinomian signifies ‘against the law’ in Greek (Anti: ‘opposite’, ‘against’ + Nomos: ‘Law’). The 
term has been associated with Paul throughout the history of Christianity. It signifies that “Christians are by 
grace set free from observing any moral law” and can therefore be justified by faith. [The Oxford Dictionary of 
the Christian Church, edited by F.L Cross (London: Oxford University Press), 1958, 62.] 
10 See Badiou, Being and Event (London: Continuum), 2007. 





traditions on a much deeper level.12 Faith is the uncertain link between a subject and what 
he or she designates as true. Agamben succinctly defines Pauline faith (pistis) as “the act of 
recognising something as true.”13 Defining faith as one’s recognition of the true outlines its 
infinitely radical proposition: that a promise and its realisation may be part the same 
process.14 Framed as a such, faith encompasses not only belief but a profound commitment 
to a truth and its materialisation in the world. The idea of subjective commitment is perhaps 
where the concepts of faith and belief part ways. Whereas beliefs can be brittle and only 
require passive engagement, faith arguably demands that subjects be actively committed to 
what has been recognised as true. For Critchley, the singularity of faith lies in its potential to 
serve as an enactment of the subject merely through declaring the true.15 Viewed in this light, 
faith is a performative process that “brings the subject of faith into being.”16 Paul is often seen 
as the first theologian to have understood faith as a bridging of thinking and doing, a position 
that has inspired all thinkers to be discussed in this chapter.17 Viewing faith as a performative 
process connecting an idea to its active subjects can have strong implications for the study of 
politics. By offering itself to all and promising to empower subjects, faith already contains a 
strong egalitarian core that must be studied if one is to assess its potential as a political 
process. 
Far from the pessimism of John Grey who in Black Mass considers faith as an 
essentially eschatological and destructive act that can be indifferently attached to religion or 
political utopias, Agamben, Badiou, Critchley, Kierkegaard, and Paul show that faith can be 
treated as a collective process that is both enlightening and empowering for subjects.18 This 
shared position points to the possibility of considering the act of faith as an essentially 
egalitarian gesture based on its accessibility and inclusivity. An early exposition of the 
egalitarian content of faith can be found in Paul’s Letter to the Romans in which the apostle 
 
12 Recent scholarship taking a stance towards the necessity to take to draw politics and religion closer notably 
include Jeffrey W. Robbins, Radical Democracy and Political Theology (New York: Columbia University Press), 
2011; and Clayton Crockett’s Radical Political Theology (New York: Columbia University Press), 2011. 
13 Agambden, The Time that Remains, 113. 
14 Ibid, 91. 
15 Critchley, Faith of the Faithless, 164. 
16 Ibid, 13. 
17 Clayton Crockett, Radical Political Theology, 117. 
18 See John Grey, Black Mass Apocalyptic Religion and the Death of Utopia (London: Penguin Books), 2008; 
Christopher Hitchens, God is not Great (London: Atlantic Books), 2007; and Richard Dawkins, The God Delusion 





is keen to emphasise that Christ’s message is addressed ‘to all’.19 In the first chapter, Paul 
declares that “there is no distinction between Jew and Greek; for the same Lord is Lord of all, 
bestowing his riches on all who call on him.”20 Paul emphasises how identity is rendered 
irrelevant by the act of faith, putting all believers on an equal footing in the eyes of god. Later 
in the chapter he asks: “is God the God of Jews only? Is he not the God of Gentiles also? Yes, 
of Gentiles also, […] since God is one—who will justify the circumcised by faith and the 
uncircumcised through faith.”21 This egalitarian message of inclusion through faith is 
reiterated several times throughout Paul’s letters. Faith appears as a new beginning from 
which identities are rendered irrelevant. This ‘clean slate’ approach to faith is reasserted once 
again in Paul’s Letter to the Corinthians: 
Was anyone at the time of his call already circumcised? Let him not seek to remove 
the marks of circumcision. Was anyone at the time of his call uncircumcised? Let him 
not seek circumcision. For neither circumcision counts for anything nor 
uncircumcision, but keeping the commandments of God. Each one should remain in 
the condition in which he was called.22 
It is essential to put Paul’s egalitarian message into context to grasp its radicality. 
Paul’s indifference towards circumcision provoked outrage amongst other apostles like James 
who still valued Judaic rituals such as circumcision.23 Paul’s openness towards non-Jewish 
followers earned him the epithet of ‘apostle of the gentiles’. Not only is faith and therefore 
salvation open to all who wish to commit to Christ, according to Paul egalitarian inclusion 
conditions the truthfulness of a subject’s conviction. In order to be effected, faith must first 
be shared amongst equal subjects. About Paul’s institution of equality as a condition of faith, 
 
19 For Jacob Taubes, the word ‘all’ (pan) occupies a crucial role within Paul’s work. [Jacob Taubes, The Political 
Theology of St Paul, 26.] 
20 St Paul, “Letter to the Romans” in The Holy Bible English Standard Version (Crossway Publishers 2001), 1:12. 
21 Ibid, 1:29-30. 
22 St Paul, “First Epistles to the Corinthians” in The Holy Bible English Standard Version (Crossway Publishers 
2001), 7: 18,19,20. 
23 The confrontation of Paul and Peter (under the influence of James) on the issue of circumcision is told in 
Galatians 2: “But when Peter came to Antioch, I had to oppose him to his face, for what he did was very 
wrong. When he first arrived, he ate with the Gentile believers, who were not circumcised. But afterward, 
when some friends of James came, Peter wouldn’t eat with the Gentiles anymore. He was afraid of criticism 
from these people who insisted on the necessity of circumcision.” [St Paul in Holy Bible, New Living Translation 
(Carol Streams: Tyndale House Publishers, Inc), 2015.] About Paul’s relationship to other early Christians, Jacob 






Badiou writes that “For Paul, universality mediates identity. It is the ‘for all’ that allows me to 
be counted as one. Wherein we rediscover a major Pauline principle: The One is inaccessible 
without the ‘for all.’”24 For Badiou, ‘The One’ designates the figure of god that is only 
recognisable by all and for all. Paul appears to have been a huge influence for Badiou’s 
understanding of equality as an effacement of identity depicted in the last chapter.25 
Convinced by Paul’s radical egalitarianism, Badiou goes as far as claiming that Paul is ‘the 
founder of universalism.’26 This interpretation has earned him a fair share of criticism from 
thinkers such as Agamben and Critchley who argue that Paul did not have any universalist 
ambitions.27  
Also intrigued by the relationship between equality and identity, Critchley chooses to 
focus on Paul’s association of the faithful with the poor and the miserable. In The Faith of the 
Faithless, he argues that “Paul’s politics is a building-up of an unwanted offscouring that 
belongs neither to the world of the Romans nor of the Jews: an unclean husk, peel or skin 
scale, that which is sloughed off and thrown away, the human dregs and nail clippings of the 
world—the shit of the earth.”28 For Critchley, marginals who do not belong anywhere form 
the base of Paul’s political message.29 In this reading, the egalitarian content of Pauline faith 
is revealed by identifying with those who have nothing rather than discarding identity 
altogether. This echoes the discussion laid out in chapter three of the Rancièrian 
consideration of ‘those who have no part’ on behalf of whom equality must be declared.30 
Following Critchley, it does not suffice to say that all are equal in the face of faith. One must 
also empathise with those who have nothing and accept that their condition could be that of 
everyone. In his Letter to the Corinthians, Paul confirms the role of the poor in conveying the 
strength of his message: “when slandered, we entreat. We have become, and are still, like 
 
24 Badiou, St Paul, 97.  
Badiou’s universalist interpretation of Paul is strongly criticised by Agamben who claims that “The universal is 
not a transcendent principle through which differences may be perceived-such a perspective of transcendence 
is not available to Paul. Rather, this ‘transcendental’ involves an operation that divides the divisions of the law 
themselves and renders them inoperative, without ever reaching any final ground.” [Agamben, The Time that 
Remains, 52]. 
25 See Badiou, Metapolitics (London: Verso), 2005. 
26 See Badiou, St Paul. 
27 Agamben, the time that remains, 52. 
28 Critchley, 159. 
29 Ibid. About the economic dimension of Paul’s message, see Bruce Longenecker’s Remembering the Poor: 
Paul, Poverty, and the Greco-Roman World (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans Publishing Company), 2010. 





the scum of the world, the refuse of all things. […] I do not write these things to make you 
ashamed, but to admonish you as my beloved children.”31 More than a clear designation of 
the poor as a ‘chosen’ people, Paul appears to send a message of humility and equality 
through these verses: subjects are all equally powerless when confronted to the greatness of 
god. Far from limiting, Paul finds in this realisation a form of empowerment by which 
weakness can become strength.32 The socio-economic hierarchy between rich and poor is 
rendered irrelevant by the recognition of god as the maker of all things. The egalitarian 
content of Pauline faith interreacts with identity in two interrelated ways. First through the 
declaration that truth is accessible to all who dare to have faith regardless of status or origin, 
and then through one’s capacity to identify with those who have nothing, for we are all weak 
in faith, but such weakness and humility is a strength.  
Moving on from identarian concerns, temporality also plays an important role in 
conveying the radicality of Paul’s approach to faith. Although symbolically crucial, Paul’s 
conversion on the road to Damascus is not his spiritual starting point. 33 Badiou and Agamben 
call attention to the fact that Paul’s faith is founded on the Christ’s resurrection.34 Agamben 
attributes Paul’s retroactive commitment to the resurrection to the fact that he never 
physically met Jesus but only encountered him spiritually as the messiah.35 From Paul’s 
conversion onwards, there appears to be a temporal mismatch between Paul’s Christian life 
and Jesus’s existence pre-crucifixion. Paul’s un-relatedness to Jesus as a living being 
undeniably influenced his decision to base his faith on the Christ’s resurrection. Within Paul’s 
story, the declaration of faith once again appears as a new beginning. This pushes Badiou to 
interpret the resurrection as a Christ-event that conditions the entirety of Paul’s intellectual 
legacy.36 In his view, the core of Paul’s message takes root in the declaration of his faith in the 
 
31 St Paul, “First Epistles to the Corinthians”, 4: 13,14. 
32 Ibid, 12: 10. 
33 About this inaugural event, Badiou writes that “Paul draws from the conditions of his ‘conversion’ the 
consequence that one can only begin from faith, from the declaration of faith”, since “the sudden appearance 
of the Christian subject is unconditioned.” Badiou aims to show the importance of the unconditionality and 
unpredictability of the inaugural occurrence of Christian faith to Paul. Although Paul’s declaration of faith had 
no grounds, that same faith will condition the rest of his Christian life and forever provide consistency to his 
teachings. Had this accidental coming of faith not interrupted Paul’s life, he would have remained a lambda 
Roman citizen committed to Judaism. [Badiou, St Paul, 17-18.] 
34 Agamben, The Time that Remains, 126; and Badiou, St Paul, 14. 
35 Agamben, 126. For Taubes, the fact that Paul did not journey with Jesus unlike the twelve original apostles 
placed Paul on the path of becoming “a new kind of apostle.” [Taubes, 14.] 





Christ-event, for truth is a process, and not an illumination.”37 An illumination would have 
elevated Paul’s conversion to the status of event. Instead, Paul simultaneously declares and 
addresses his faith to the Christ-event of resurrection.  
The temporality of Pauline faith is not merely oriented towards the past of the Christ-
event. For Critchley, there is a struggle at work in Paul’s message concerning “the meaning of 
the future and the exact extent of the shadow that the future casts across the present: 
eschatological struggle.”38 Pauline faith as conceptualised by Critchley does not only refer to 
a past event, but also to a future that signals the end of times. This position is shared by 
Agamben who is concerned with the time located ‘in-between’ the declaration of an event 
and the final moments of history in what he refers to as ‘the time that remains.’39 In his book 
of the same name, Agamben clarifies that this precarious time is not to be conflated with the 
eschaton (the end of times). Rather, “What interests the apostle is not the last day, it is not 
the instant in which time ends, but the time that contracts itself and begins to end (ho kairos 
synestalmenos estin; Cor. 7:29), or if you prefer, the time that remains between time-and its 
end.”40 Whereas Badiou disregards the eschatological dimension of Pauline faith, Critchley 
and especially Agamben pay close attention to this particularity of Pauline ‘Messianic time’.41 
For Agamben, Messianic time starts with an evental opening and ends with the eschaton, 
emphasising that more time is required in order to truly achieve salvation.42 Like Badiou and 
Critchley, Agamben recognises that faith is put in action by its declaration.43 Yet he considers 
that ‘the time that remains’, being only conceptualizable in relation to an end-point, is that in 
which faith is effectuated.44 What Agamben points to when referring to remaining time or 
messianic time is most clear when considered in light of Paul’s reference to ‘the time of the 
now’ (ho nyn kairos).45 Agamben breaks down the significance of this concept by contrasting 
 
37 Ibid, 15. 
38 Critchley, 162. 
39 See Agamben, The Time that Remains. 
40 Ibid, 62; Also see St Paul, “First Epistles to the Corinthians”, 7:29. 
41 Agamben defines messianic time as a “part of secular time which undergoes an entirely transformative 
contraction […] the time that time takes to come to an end, or, more precisely, the time we take to bring to an 
end, to achieve our representation of time.” [Agamben, The Time that Remains, 67.] 
42 Ibid, 69. 
43 Ibid, 90. 
44 Ibid. 
45 About the category of ‘now-time’, Walter Benjamin writes, “Now-time, which, as a model of messianic time, 





the figure of the apostle concerned with ‘the time of the now’ to that of the prophet 
concerned with a time that remains ‘to come’.46 
Agamben’s temporal distinction between the figures of the apostle and the prophet 
is crucial in understanding the radicality of Paul’s egalitarian message.47 Living in the ‘time of 
the now’, an apostle waits neither for the end of time nor the arrival of the messiah, for the 
messiah has already come (at the point of resurrection marking the Christ-event). In this 
context, faith is not a simple declaration but also represents the activation of this 
declaration.48 In other words, ‘apostolic faith’ is a procedure that is activated in the present 
provided that an event has taken place and that the ‘time of the now’ is not eternal. This 
distinction is crucial, allowing faith to become an active procedure rather than mere hope.49 
Following Agamben’s reading of Paul through the concept of time, faithful subjects are called 
not only regardless of who they are, but also based on their presence in now-time and in view 
of ‘the time that remains’.50 Accepting this position relocates the egalitarian message of 
 
the history of mankind describes in the universe.” [Walter Benjamin, “On the Concept of History” in Selected 
Writings Volume 4 1938-1940 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press 2003), 396.] 
46 Agamben writes about the difference between apostolic and prophetic times that “each time the prophets 
announce the coming of the Messiah, the message is always about a time to come, a time not yet present. This 
is what marks the difference between the prophet and the apostle. The apostle speaks forth from the arrival of 
the Messiah. At this point prophecy must keep silent, for now prophecy is truly fulfilled. (This is how one 
should read its innermost tension toward closure.) The word passes on to the apostle, to the emissary of the 
Messiah, whose time is no longer the future, but the present. This is why Paul's technical term for the 
messianic event is ho nyn kairos ‘the time of the now’; this is why Paul is an apostle and not a prophet.” By 
recalling that there is a clear temporal gap between the messianic message of an apostle and that of a 
prophet, Agamben alerts his readers to the fact that “the widespread view of messianic time as oriented solely 
toward the future is fallacious.” Paul is the main instigator of this revelation, relocating the messianic moment 
in ‘the time of the now’. [[Agamben, The Time that Remains, 61, 77.] 
Walter Benjamin has also made use of Paul’s ‘time of the now’ which he associates with messianic time or “the 
figure which the history of mankind describes in the universe.” [Walter Benjamin, “On the Concept of History”, 
396.] 
47 Like Agamben, Critchley also locates the figure of the apostle (and therefore Paul) in the present while the 
prophet is tied to a future event. [Critchley, 172.] 
48 Agamben, The Time that Remains, 90. 
49 One must be careful to not associate ‘messianic time’ with chronological time. Agamben explains that 
messianic time, which incorporates ‘the time of the now’ and ‘the time that remains’ is “something like a time 
within time-not ulterior but interior.” To put it differently, messianic temporality is attached to a subject 
through faith. One cannot have access to the temporal breach opened by the Christ-event without a subjective 
commitment to faith. [Ibid, 67.] 
50 For Agamben the Pauline subject is embodied by the figure of the ‘remnant’, whose faith is not only 
conditioned by Christ’s resurrection but also by the ‘time that remains’. Agamben defines the remnant as “the 
figure, or the substantiality assumed by a people in a decisive moment, and as such is the only real political 
subject.” [Ibid, 57.] Critchley reminds his readers that the figure of the remnant was used by Paul who “sought 
to build up communities that, in his words, would be a ‘remnant, chosen by grace’”. [Critchley, 158.]  
For both Agamben and Badiou, the subject is a collective entity. The difference being that for Agamben, the 





Pauline faith from the horizon of a returning messiah to the concrete reality of faithful 
subjects. Paul’s message must perform in the now, especially since ‘the time that remains’ is 
limited. In a sense, Paul grounds faith in the materiality of existing time. About the importance 
of immediacy for faith, Kierkegaard writes that “in immediacy, the wish is to be capable of 
everything, and immediacy’s faith, ideally, is actually to be capable of everything.”51 Here 
again, the dividing line between remaining faithful to a promise and the materialisation of 
that promise appears to be extremely thin. If faith is anchored in an immediate and universally 
accessible world, it then has the potential to have a concrete impact on its subjects. Settled 
in the immediacy of now-time, faith is not a passive commitment to a returning prophet, but 
an active process which may empower or at least guide subjects. About this correspondence 
between thought and action inaugurated by Paul, Badiou writes that “The word pistis (faith, 
or conviction) designates precisely this point: the absence of any gap between subject and 
subjectivation […] (activating) the subject in the service of truth, forbidding him rest, the One-
truth proceeds in the direction of all.” 52 Inasmuch as it is ‘for all’, Paul’s message is also 
activated ‘in the now’ by faithful subjects.53 
Alongside identity and temporality, the egalitarian content of faith becomes clearer in 
contrast to knowledge. The antagonism between faith and knowledge has been a topic of 
great interest for Kierkegaard. In the early pages of Concluding Unscientific Practice, he 
depicts what he understands as a mutually exclusive relationship: “(knowledge) lying at the 
door of faith and coveting it, he (the faithful) is in such a precarious position that much effort, 
much fear and trembling, will be required if he is not to fall into temptation and confuse 
knowledge with faith.”54 Despite the uncertainty that faith brings, provoking fear and 
trembling to its subjects, it remains a much more powerful act than the acquisition of 
knowledge. Kierkegaard conceives of knowledge as an illusion that can only be acquired 
 
51 Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific practice, 387. 
52 Badiou, St Paul, 81.  
On this understanding of faith as a bridging of thought and action, both Agamben and Badiou seem to follow 
the footsteps of Walter Benjamin who claimed that “The messianic world is the world of universal and integral 
actuality. Only in the messianic realm does a universal history exist. Not as written history, but as festively 
enacted history.” [Benjamin, “On the Concept of History”, 404.] 
53 Kierkegaard also emphasises the effective impact of faith in the present when he writes that faith 
“accentuates actuality, existence, and paradoxically from the ethical, accentuates another’s actuality, not 
one’s own.” Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Practice, 487.] 





through approximations.55 In contrast, faith is presented as a direct link between a truth and 
its subject, a tremendous force “that turned fishermen into apostles, that can move 
mountains – if one has it!”56 Kierkegaard’s commentary on knowledge distinctly echoes 
Rancière and Badiou’s reservation towards this category.57 However, the particularity of 
Kierkegaard’s argument is to uncompromisingly elevate faith as the deepest form of 
subjective commitment. Knowledge is not undermined based on it reflecting a current 
situation, but because it obstructs the great power of faith through its approximations. One 
of the traps of overly relying on knowledge is to forget “what it is to exist and what inwardness 
means.”58 Inwardness conveys both passion and subjectivity and is most decisively expressed 
through faith.59 Kierkegaard even portrays the acknowledgement of one’s ignorance as a form 
of blessing, writing that “what distinguishes intellectual giftedness is the ability to present 
ever more clearly that it is and remains a secret for those who exist”, adding that it is 
“nevertheless a blessing, situated at the extremity of existence, to relate to this secret without 
understanding it, only having faith.”60 The passion of faith, despite carrying with it a load of 
uncertainty and fear, can be read as the truest expression of subjectivity. 
Kierkegaard’s opposition of knowledge and faith is essential for it helps uncovering 
another intrinsically egalitarian dimension of faith. If both knowledge and faith are 
understood as subjective processes aimed at attaining a form of truth, faith appears 
significantly more inclusive in several ways. Whereas knowledge acquisition requires a 
significant amount of time and resources, faith is directly accessible to anyone brave enough 
to believe. The act of faith only demands that a subjective leap be made since its process 
remains limited to the relationship between a subject and a truth. On the other hand, 
knowledge represents not only a temporal challenge but also an intellectual and social one, 
for one must be in the right dispositions (financial, educational, cognitive) to acquire it. 
 
55 Ibid, 68. Outlining the limits of knowledge, Kierkegaard writes, “even with this almost extraordinary 
knowledge or knowledgeable proficiency, I can in no way consider death something that I have understood.” 
[Ibid, 139.] 
56 Ibid, 28. 
57 Using a language that echoes Rancière’s discussion of Jacotot’s equality of intelligence, Kierkegaard explains 
the futility of hierarchical divides in a faithful context: “The true knight of faith is a witness, never the teacher 
[…] He who desires only to be a witness confesses thereby that no man, not even the most unimportant man, 
needs another's participation or is to be devalued by it in order to raise another's value.” [Søren Kierkegaard, 
Fear and Trembling/Repetition (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983), 80.] 
58 Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Practice, 220. 
59 Ibid, 29, 33. 





Knowledge is not a given nor is it ever given to any subject. It is deeply mediated by a 
multitude of objective factors that must be overcome if one is to gain access to its 
(approximate) truth. The objective mediations underpinning knowledge forbid many subjects 
from having any relationship to truth conceived as an outcome of learning. The radicality of 
faith lies in its capacity to deliver truth to all in an accessible way and independently of any 
objective interferences. Where knowledge demands time, selection, and division, faith simply 
requires a subjective commitment the leap. In its objective simplicity, the process of faith is 
far more inclusive than knowledge acquisition. Not only is the egalitarian content of faith 
rooted in the universality of its message, it also persists more concretely in the objective 
conditions of gaining access to truth through the act of being faithful. These objective 
conditions are minimal, demanding that one declares her/his commitment to truth. 
Unclouded by objective mediations, faith opens a subjective pathway to truth that is equally 
accessible to all. The objective content of faith will be further discussed in the following 
section. 
It would be a mistake to read faith through the prism of equality without accounting 
for the type of intersubjective relationships it promotes. Here again, the intellectual input of 
Paul and Kierkegaard is fundamental. According to Taubes, Paul commits a revolutionary act 
by conflating Jesus’s dual commandment to love god and to love your neighbour as yourself 
into the unique commandment to love one’s neighbour.61 To love Christ by loving one another 
is a recurring motif in Paul’s writings. In Galatians the apostle declares that “in Christ Jesus 
neither circumcision nor uncircumcision is of any avail, but faith working through love.”62 Love 
thus acts as a complement to faith, a substantiation of the faithful promise. Writing about 
Paul, Critchley explains that “Faith without love is a hollow clanging that lacks the subjective 
commitment to endure.”63 Not only is love part of Paul’s message, it is also a necessary 
component of the process of faith as the “fulfilling of the law.”64 What does it mean to love 
in the context of faith? For Critchley via-Paul it requires “an openness to love, love as giving 
what one does not have and receiving that over which one has no power.”65 For Taubes it 
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signifies that “the other person is needed”, that “I am not I, but we are we”, and finally that 
“in our need we are together in the body of Christ.”66 In both of these interpretations of love 
through faith, what emerges is a sense of selflessness and reciprocity, as well as the 
acknowledgement that we all equally belong as faithful subjects. Kierkegaard follows a similar 
route by claiming that “he who loves God without faith reflects upon himself; he who loves 
God in faith reflects upon God.”67 The combination of love and faith offers the possibility that 
individual concerns be redirected onto others who together embody the figure of god. 
Love provides a crucial conceptual link between faith and equality. Through the 
commitment to “love thy neighbour as thyeself”, the faithful recognise that their individuality 
does not exceed that of any other.68 To love as a subject means “that I am not centred on 
myself” for the neighbour matters just as much as I do.69 Love appears as a humbling and 
selfless process for both Paul and Kierkegaard. Far from a constraining commandment, it may 
be interpreted as an egalitarian opening in both thought and action. Insomuch as faith is 
directed to god, it is also directed to others with whom the faithful commitment is shared. 
Through the prism of love, the figure of god can have a humbling function, leading subjects 
to treat each other as equals in the existing world based on the impossibility to entertain an 
exclusive relationship to god as individuals.  
Through the writings of Paul, Kierkegaard, and their contemporary readers, faith 
appears as a process embodying intrinsically egalitarian characteristics. Starting with Paul’s 
announcement that the message of Christ must be accessible to all, the process of faith 
excludes the overvaluation of rigid identities and hierarchies. The declaration of faith itself 
constitutes a new collective identity in which the faithful are united rather than opposed. The 
temporality of Pauline faith is also of great political importance to the extent that it summons 
its subjects to live and act in the ‘time of the now’. No longer fixated on the horizon of a 
returning messiah, subjects are empowered to collectively materialise Christ’s truth in the 
world. Faith also reveals its egalitarian potential when considered in relation to knowledge. 
Whereas knowledge acquisition is a tenuous and selective process, faith enables subjects to 
gain access to truth merely by virtue of its declaration. As truthful process, faith appears 
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significantly more inclusive by involving subjects who might have been forever left on the 
shores of knowledge. Finally, the egalitarian core of faith comes in plain sight when read 
through the prism of love. If to be faithful entails loving others as oneself, then faith must be 
selfless, humbling, and egalitarian. 
 
Subjective and Objective Fidelities  
The previous section aimed to present the egalitarian content of faith in relation to 
inclusion, knowledge, temporality, and love. This section will focus on the objective dimension 
of faith. Thinkers discussed in this chapter approach faith primarily as a subjective process. 
There can be no doubts that an act of faith rests primarily on a subjective commitment to 
truth. What is the objective status of a process of such subjective intensity? Answering this 
question is crucial for the possibility to consider faith as a process for the materialisation of 
egalitarian politics. Kierkegaard builds a strong case against the possibility to understand faith 
in objective terms. Instead, subjectivity which he often refers to as ‘inwardness’ is itself 
truth.70 In Paul’s letters, the presence or absence of an objective facet of faith is chiefly 
contained within discussions of the relevance of law in relation to faith. This is undeniably one 
of the most debated topic of Pauline theology. At its core, this debate opposes the antinomian 
readings of thinkers like Marcion, Agamben, and Badiou who always place faith above the 
law, and those of Critchley and Taubes for whom the law remains a crucial element of Paul’s 
approach to faith. Within Paul’s work, the law arguably represents the exterior, non-
subjective angle of faith. To talk of the objective content of faith, one must mention the 
notion of proof to which most of the thinkers named above seem opposed to. Inasmuch as 
objectivity shall not be limited to scientific proof, the latter is often invoked as a challenge to 
faith’s subjective leanings. The question of objectivity is complex and ultimately condemned 
to remain unclear. Yet, it will be argued that equality conceived as an axiom (or law) coupled 
with the materialisation of a collective subject-body constitute the objective side of faith in a 
political context. 
 Kierkegaard’s work is essential for anyone interested in discussing faith through the 
objective/subjective dichotomy. In his view, only subjectivity conveys for true power of faith 
 





based on the assertion that “Christianity is spirit; spirit is inwardness; inwardness is 
subjectivity, subjectivity in its essential passion, at its maximum an infinitely personally 
interested passion for one’s eternal happiness.”71 Through these associations, Kierkegaard 
elevates faith as “the highest passion of subjectivity.”72 Faith, subjectivity, inwardness, and 
passion are so closely tied together that they often blur into one in his writings. To recognise 
faith as the deepest expression of subjectivity comes at a cost: objective uncertainty. If faith 
is constituted by the “contradiction between the infinite passion of inwardness and objective 
uncertainty”, to have faith also denotes an inability to grasp god objectively.73 Faith for 
Kierkegaard is an inward passion on which objectivity has no claim.74 He illustrates his position 
on objectivity through the notion of knowledge: “to believe with the understanding cannot 
be done at all, because the one who believes with the understanding talks only of job and 
wife and fields and oxen and the like, which are not at all the object of faith.”75 The aim of 
faith is not to generate an intelligible law of conduct for everyday life. Instead, “faith always 
thanks God,” and is “always in deadly peril in that collision of finite and infinite.”76 Not content 
with conceptualising faith as a subjective process, Kierkegaard warns against the dangers of 
attempting to understand faith in objective terms. The claim to objectivity will always get in 
the way of eternal happiness, for “this happiness inheres precisely in the infinite, personal, 
impassioned interest, and just this is what one gives up in order to become objective, just this 
what one lets objectivity trick one out of.”77 
 Kierkegaard is aware of the audacity of his claim against objectivity. He often treats 
faith as an absurd yet truthful process. In Fear and Trembling, he illustrates this apparent 
paradox through ‘the binding of Isaac’, by which Abraham is ordered by god to sacrifice his 
son Isaac before being stopped by god right before the act.78 About this dramatic episode, 
Kierkegaard writes that Abraham “had faith by virtue of the absurd, for human calculation 
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was out of the question, and it certainly was absurd that God, who required it of him, should 
in the next moment rescind the requirement.”79 Faith is absurd inasmuch as it pushes 
Abraham to go against any objective measure of righteousness. In the eyes of the law this act 
is proscribed by the commandment that ‘thou shall not kill’. Abraham’s commitment cannot 
be read as a self-interested act. Objectively, Abraham has nothing to gain from sacrificing his 
son. Yet, the sacrifice is commanded by god and enabled by faith. The absurd of faith is 
precisely the impossibility to objectively recognise its truth.80 Faith should not be associated 
to categories “that lie within the proper domain of the understanding”, such as the 
improbable, the unexpected, or the unforeseen.81 Faith is not a mistake or a miscalculation, 
but an objective absurdity that nonetheless embodies the truth of subjectivity. The 
paradoxical nature of Kierkegaard’s subjective approach to faith is probably best embodied 
in the statement that “when the believer has faith, the absurd is not the absurd.”82 Truth is 
only truthful in the eyes of the subject who has been touched by faith. 
 Kierkegaard often conflates the absurd with the ‘paradox’ of faith.83 This paradox 
states that if one has an absolute duty to god, then “the single individual as the single 
individual is higher than the universal and as the single individual stands in an absolute 
relation to the absolute—or else faith has never existed.”84 Alastair Hannay explains that in 
case faith is not regimented by this paradox, Abraham “must be considered either a criminal 
or a lunatic” since his sacrifice cannot be justified.85 As the highest passion of subjectivity, 
faith must elevate the subject above the universal in order to establish an absolute 
relationship between truth and subject. If such elevation is proscribed, then the power of 
faith will crumble. Kierkegaard’s unconditional commitment to subjective faith inevitably 
raises the possibility of opposing faith to reason.86 Based on his close reading of Kierkegaard, 
C.S Evans explains that “there is no conflict between faith and reason if reason can accept the 
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limitations of reason.”87 The purpose of faith is not to supersede reason but to provide 
another pathway to truth, one on which subjectivity is never compromised. On the conflict 
between religious narratives and reason, Badiou explains that “the dispute on the religious 
narrative is a dead end simply because the narrative is the object of the faithful’s desire, and 
that is precisely where faith resides. Thus, the subjective power of faith cannot be discussed 
in rational terms.”88 This perfectly conveys Kierkegaard’s understanding of faith as a 
profoundly subjective force destined to remain absurd from an objective and rational 
perspective. 
 In Paul’s letters, the question of objectivity arises in his discussion of the relationship 
between faith and law. Whereas Pauline faith can be defined as a deep subjective 
commitment to Christ’s resurrection, the law stands as the objective and external 
representation of god’s commandment. Paul’s ambiguous approach to the law mainly takes 
shape in his Letter to the Romans. It remains a source of great debate amongst theorists and 
theologians whether the message contained in this letter effectively pins faith against the 
law.89 Early in the letter, Paul is careful to differentiate between those merely ‘hear’ the law 
and those who perform or actively realise the law:  
For it is not the hearers of the law who are righteous before God, but the doers of the 
law who will be justified. […] For when Gentiles, who do not have the law, by nature 
do what the law requires, they are a law to themselves, even though they do not have 
the law. […] They show that the work of the law is written on their hearts, while their 
conscience also bears witness, and their conflicting thoughts accuse or even excuse 
them.90 
In these verses, the law appears as a spirit to be realised through the actions of the 
faithful. A gentile can carry the law without having formally acquired it, simply by acting in 
accordance to it. Rather than a heavy commandment imposed by god, Paul suggests that the 
law may naturally be reflected in the behaviour of those who have faith regardless of how 
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they came to it. This view is illustrated by Paul’s comments on circumcision which physically 
marks the difference between Jews and non-Jews, embodying the commitment to mosaic 
law. He declares that “circumcision indeed is of value if you obey the law, but if you break the 
law, your circumcision becomes uncircumcision”, later asking “if a man who is uncircumcised 
keeps the precepts of the law, will not his uncircumcision be regarded as circumcision?”91 
Here, Paul does not fundamentally reject circumcision. Instead, he suggests that it acts as a 
secondary symbolic recognition of the law. Preceding this secondary recognition is the rightful 
behaviour of the faithful acting according to the law without necessarily being aware of it. If 
indeed “a Jew is one inwardly, and circumcision is a matter of the heart, by the Spirit, not by 
the letter”, does this signify that faith always takes precedence over the law?92 To the extent 
that indifference towards circumcision and therefore identity represents an opening of faith, 
does it also signal a disavowal of the law? Paul clarifies his position in the seventh chapter of 
his Letter to the Romans: 
But now we are released from the law, having died to that which held us captive, so 
that we serve in the new way of the Spirit and not in the old way of the written code. 
[…] What then shall we say? That the law is sin? By no means! Yet if it had not been 
for the law, I would not have known sin. For I would not have known what it is to covet 
if the law had not said, “You shall not covet.” […] But sin, seizing an opportunity 
through the commandment, produced in me all kinds of covetousness. For apart from 
the law, sin lies dead. […] I was once alive apart from the law, but when the 
commandment came, sin came alive and I died.93 
Here, Paul denounces the corrosive effects of the law. He implies that one who has 
been touched by grace no longer requires the direction of the law, for faith alone suffices. 
Through his uncertain position on the law, Paul pushes one to differentiates between the 
objective (symbolic) status of the law and its subjective experience through faith. Considering 
that law may also reflect sin, he implies that the subjective (interior) procedure of faith is a 
more truthful process than the objective enactment of the law.94 The law structures the social 
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as much as it disrupts an existing faithful procedure. Badiou goes as far as claiming that Paul’s 
reflection on the law “points toward a theory of the subjective unconscious.”95 Without 
venturing so deeply into the human psyche, it is apparent that Paul confronts the subjective 
experience of religion to its early structuring process taking shape in mosaic law.  
In the centuries following Paul’s Letter to the Romans, many have opposed law and 
faith based on radically antinomian interpretations of his verses. This trend was inaugurated 
by Marcion of Sinope, a 2nd century theologist who saw himself as Paul’s disciple and for 
whom grace alone was the true essence of the gospel.96 Critchley explains that “in Marcion’s 
eyes, Paulinism represented a great revolution that had, already at the beginning of the 
second century, been betrayed and that required reformation.”97 Reformation in that case 
meant reasserting the Pauline distinction between law and faith.98 This reading remains very 
much alive in contemporary theory. For Agamben, Paul’s treatment of faith “is tightly 
interwoven with a critique of the law.”99 Interpreting Paul’s verses on circumcision, he writes, 
“that which, according to the law, made one man a Jew and the other a goy, one a slave and 
another a free man, is now annulled by the vocation."100 Agamben often interprets the law 
through the prism of identity and the divisions it deploys. In this context, faith demands 
expropriating old categorisations such as circumcised/uncircumcised or free/slave in order to 
renew the messianic commitment.101 Agamben’s critique of the law focuses primarily on this 
identarian element. Interpreting Paul’s ambivalence towards the law, he explains that “the 
law can be brought to fulfilment only if it is first restored to the inoperativity of power.”102 
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The law represents the old world of identifications whose deactivation conditions the 
deployment of faith as the true messianic force. In other words, the objective facet of the 
messianic (law) exists only to provide momentum to the subjective power of faith. 
Badiou offers another radically antinomian interpretation of Paul’s letter. From his 
standpoint, the Christ event interrupts the previous regime of discourse thereby relieving 
subjects of the law.103 Only after being relieved from the burden of the law can one 
emancipate from slavery and truly become a ‘son’.104 For Badiou, Paul’s message is clear: one 
must be saved from the afflictions of the law by committing to the Christ event through faith, 
since “for Paul there is only faith.”105 Not unlike Agamben, Badiou conceives of the subjective 
power of faith as a new beginning that delegitimises old objective commandments of the law. 
He opposes the law not directly to faith but to grace, for “grace is the opposite of law insofar 
as it is what comes without being due.”106 The unforeseen Christ event coordinates faith and 
grace in a way that renders law entirely superfluous.107  
Badiou’s antinomianism is also clearly palpable through his amalgamation of law and 
sin. It was shown earlier that Paul considers law as a mirror image of sin, for “if it had not 
been for the law, I would not have known sin”.108 Badiou develops a radical interpretation of 
this association, arguing that “sin is the life of desire as autonomy, as automatism”, while 
“The law is required in order to unleash the automatic life of desire, the automatism of 
repetition.”109 Although Paul’s position on the sinful content of the law is relative (sin merely 
“seizing an opportunity through the commandment”), Badiou conquers that the law does not 
only reflects the danger of sin, but also directly produces a regime of desires that conditions 
it. He even goes further by claiming that “sin is the life of death […] that of which the law and 
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the law alone is capable.”110 In Badiou’s view, the law does not merely reflect the possibility 
of sin but itself constitutes a sinful construct that offers nothing more than the perspective of 
a life of death, constituting the subject as powerless.111 In contrast to this grim prospect, faith 
constituted by the Christ event represents a new form of law belonging to life and the spirit 
of Christ.112 This reading of Paul clearly resonates with Badiou’s understanding of politics as 
a purely subjective process. The objective status occupied by the law in Paul’s teachings 
converges with the role played by state of the situation in Badiou’s work. Mosaic and Roman 
law, like the capitalo-parliamentary state, is what must be ruptured by the occurrence of a 
messianic event whose success depends on the faith and commitment of subjects.  
Critchley provides an interesting counterpoint to Agamben and Badiou’s antinomian 
readings of Paul as an adversary of the law. He writes that “If the law was not fully within me, 
as the awareness of my fallenness and consciousness of sin, then faith as the overcoming of 
the law would mean nothing.”113 Critchley seems to integrate Paul’s consideration of the law 
within a dialectical relationship with faith, showing how both dimensions play a part in the 
fabric of subjective consciousness. In his view, the Paulinism of Agamben and Badiou is more 
of “a crypto-Marcionism that risks a radical antinomianism in its attempt to break the 
connection between law and faith.”114 Critchley’s critique is substantiated by Paul’s 
declaration that although there is only one god “who will justify the circumcised by faith and 
the uncircumcised through that same faith”, we must not “overthrow the law by this faith” 
but uphold it.115 Even according to Agamben, this verse “makes for the stumbling block of 
every reading of the Pauline critique of the law.”116 Despite Paul’s foundational approach to 
faith as a subjective process of truth, could the objective status of the law remain an active 
component of that process? Paul offers no clear arguments against this possibility.117 Even 
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after centuries of antinomian interpretations of his work of which Badiou’s and Agamben’s 
are some of the latest iterations, Paul’s message remains ambiguous enough so that the 
objective status of the law cannot be completely excluded from the process of faith. 118 
Paul’s antinomian readers are furthered challenged by his declaration in chapter ten 
of Letter to the Romans that “Christ is the culmination of the law so that there may be 
righteousness for everyone who believes.”119 To conceive of Christ as the telos of the law 
implies that the law (nomos) and Christ’s resurrection (Christ event) are two sequences of the 
same process. Concentrating on this very passage, theologian Charles Lee Irons believes that 
Paul “presupposed that the object of law was righteousness.”120 Although “believers are not 
righteous by doing the law personally”, Christ has realised the object of law in the form of 
righteousness and in the name of the faithful.121 In light of this reading, the law appears not 
as an obstacle to faith, but as a precondition of Christ’s sacrifice and subsequent resurrection. 
This position remains consistent with Agamben and Badiou’s consideration of the law as ‘old’ 
in relation to the novelty of Paul’s consideration of faith.122 However, unlike Agamben and 
Badiou’s antinomian readings, it does not imply that the law is obsolete, challenging their 
interpretation of faith as a deactivation or erasure of the law.123 As Critchley points out, “for 
Paul, we do not escape from the law”, it remains present within subjects throughout the 
faithful procedure.124 
Paul and Kierkegaard both put a strong emphasis on the subjective content of faith. 
Ultimately, faith primarily rests on the relationship between a truth and its subject. The 
subjective power of faith is undisputable for most thinkers discussed in this chapter. Yet, 
grasping its objective status is a more perilous task. Against Kierkegaard and antinomian 
readings of Paul, it is possible to claim that faith depends on some form of nomos that does 
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not compromise its subjective strength. In a political context, this role is arguably fulfilled by 
equality.  
The two preceding chapters have shown how for both Rancière and Badiou, equality 
stands as the precondition of politics. Their accounts of politics as a subjective process 
depends on a consideration of equality as an objective certainty. For politics to have a chance 
of occurring, equality must be present and recognised. Although Badiou clearly lays out his 
axiomatic account of equality, its link with political truths and the process of subjective fidelity 
demands further clarifications. Approaching equality as the axiomatic guarantee of politics 
thought as a subjective process suggests that faith be present at two distinct levels. First 
objectively as the recognition of equality as the unconditioned axiom or law of politics, and 
subjectively through committing to a political truth that conforms to that axiom.125 Far from 
an empirical fact, equality results from its deployment as an axiom to which one must be 
faithful to enable politics.126 To declare like Badiou that equality is merely given as an axiom 
is insufficient, for axioms must be believed and followed in order to be effected. Against the 
antinomianism of Kierkegaard, Agamben, and Badiou, it may be argued that the subjective 
strength of faith depends on a nomos, taking the form of a law for Christianity and an axiom 
for politics, in which subjects must place their faith for a truthful procedure to be activated 
and materialise through the constitution of a collective subject-body. Based on the limits of 
purely subjective and antinomian considerations of faith, the next section is dedicated to 
conceptualising its objective counterpart. Building on Badiou’s conceptualisation of fidelity 
discussed in chapter four, it will be argued that fidelity must be further differentiated from 
religious faith in ‘the One’ for it to fully reveal its political potential. One way to achieve this 
is to consider the necessity to materialise axiomatic equality through the constitution of a 
collective subject-body as the object of political fidelity. 
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Political Faith in a Godless World 
The contemporary dialogue opened by political theorists with theology is both 
necessary and fruitful. There is an undeniable paradox in the decision of using Paul or 
Kierkegaard’s discussions of faith to contribute to political theory. Yet, what results from this 
unique intellectual encounter is the proposition that considering faith as an egalitarian and 
inclusive process of truth can be equally relevant to religion and politics. It is vital to point out 
that neither Agamben, Badiou, nor Critchley’s work should be considered as instances of 
Christian illuminations. Agamben is interested in the novelty, impact, and uncertain 
temporality of Paul’s messianism. For Badiou, the religious content of Paul’s letters remains 
a fable.127 He reads Paul as “poet-thinker of the event” rather than a spiritual guide, filtering 
out beatification to retain the philosophical and political force of his message.128 For Critchley, 
faith is a process that should concern the ‘faithless’ as such. Therefore, it cannot be “the 
abstraction of a metaphysical belief in God.”129 In no way do these accounts generate a 
movement away from secularism. Instead, they set up the space for a deep engagement 
between theology and political thought that would have been prevented had the wall erected 
between progressive politics and religion not been breached. 
 If political faith is to remain a secular process despite its close conceptual resemblance 
with religious faith, what are its distinctive traits? A theoretical sketch may be extracted from 
Badiou’s notion of ‘fidelity’. As an adjective, the word is difficult to translate from French to 
English. In most of Badiou’s translations, fidèle is simply transcribed as ‘faithful’. In English, 
the term faithful can be equally applied to any kind of relationship; be they amorous, friendly, 
religious, or political. However, the French adjective fidèle tends to be used more secularly as 
a synonym for commitment. One can be fidèle in love, friendship, politics, but its link with 
religion is secondary. The term conveys notions of reliability, consistency, and strength of 
character but hardly divine attachment. Religious faith is plainly expressed by the word 
 
127 Badiou, St Paul, 4. 
128 Ibid, 2; For Badiou, the true power of evental truth is revealed by abandoning the content of the fable 
which “leaves as its remainder the form of these conditions and, in particular, the ruin of every attempt to 
assign the discourse of truth to preconstituted historical aggregates.” [Ibid, 6.] 
Despite Badiou’s close affinity with Paul, Christopher Watkins refuses to consider Badiou’s work as theological: 
“Just because Badiou uses the term ‘grace’ or ‘faith’, it does not mean that his writing is theological. 
[Christopher Watkins, Difficult Atheism Post-Theological Thinking in Alain Badiou, Jean-Luc Nancy and Quentin 
Meillassoux (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2011), 98.] 





croyant (believer).130 This etymological detail far from being irrelevant, is essential if one aims 
to differentiate between religious and political forms of faiths. 
Badiou does not explicitly differentiate between the processes of faith and fidelity. In 
fact, many ideas at the core of Badiousian political thought may be interpreted as a 
secularisation of Paul’s apostolic message.131 In an inversion of Badiou’s critical distance 
towards the substance of Paul’s faith, one may say that communism is ‘the fable’ of Badiou’s 
egalitarian political thought. Yet, Badiousian fidelity displays characteristics that are not 
applicable to faith in the way in which it has been discussed thus far in this chapter. In Being 
and Event, Badiou explains that “fidelity must not be understood in any way as a capacity, a 
subjective quality, or a virtue.” Instead, “fidelity is a situated operation which depends on the 
examination of situations. Fidelity is a functional relation to the event.”132 This clarification 
presents fidelity as a rational process resulting from the careful consideration of situations 
and the evental occurrence. As it was claimed in the previous chapter, fidelity must be 
understood as multi-layered process of truth, not an illumination descending from god. 
Rather than being left in awe by the sublime glory of god, the subject of truth is put to work 
by her/his fidelity to the event. About the type of transcendence characterising fidelity, 
Hallward writes, “truth does not descend from on high, a ready- made revelation”, instead 
“only the work that declares it constitutes it” as truth.133  
 One must be careful not to over-rationalise the subjective process of fidelity, keeping 
in mind that for Badiou “there is no proof of the event.”134 A political event, just like the 
Christ-event, is not justified by proof but by faith. Christopher Norris writes about Badiou’s 
concept of fidelity that “it has to do with those aspects that involve truthfulness to some idea, 
 
130 Larousse, « fidèle, » http://www.larousse.fr/dictionnaires/francais/fid%C3%A8le/33594. 
131 Badiou himself appears to find the origin of his concept of event within Paul’s writings. The brevity that 
Badiou assigns to the event is applicable to the Christ’s resurrection (Christ-event) as much as any revolution 
or social dynamic that falls under the label of a political event. What remains from the event is a symbolic 
memory or, as Badiou calls it, a ‘trace’. The trace is the crucial link between a subject and an event that has 
already occurred, it is what paves the way for the enactment of a truth procedure. For the trace to be 
meaningful, it must be followed by a subject. This subject takes on the appearance of a faithful Christian for 
Paul, and that of a militant for Badiou. Both being only attached to an evental truth by retracing its active 
substance through faith. In his antinomian reading of Paul, Badiou treats fidelity as ‘the law of truth’: “I call this 
universal power of subjectivation an evental fidelity, and it is correct to say that fidelity is the law of a truth. In 
Paul's thought, love is precisely fidelity to the Christ-event, in accordance with a power that addresses the love 
of self universally. Love is what makes of thought a power, which is why love alone, and not faith, bears the 
force of salvation.” [Quentin Meillassoux, “History and Event In Alain Badiou,” 3; and Badiou, St Paul, 90.] 
132 Badiou, Being and Event, 233. 
133 Hallward, Badiou: A Subject to Truth, 122; and Badiou, Saint-Paul, 53-55. 





hypothesis, theory, project, undertaking, or political cause that requires an investment of 
intellectual or political faith. beyond what is presently justified by the best available proof-
procedures or total evidence to hand.”135  
Another way to distinguish between faith and fidelity resides in the possibility for 
multiple political truths to emerge, while religious truth remains singular. This is a theme 
explored by Badiou in his latest publication L’Immanence des vérités:  
If there are indeed truths and not The Truth, it is because the absoluteness of a truth 
does not mean that a single truth is absolute. If that was the case, we would have to 
conclude that only the absolute is true, a statement that has clear theological 
implications. The laborious fidelity underpinning the becoming of truths is located in-
between existing multiplicities, of which truth are a part, and the absolute, to which 
truths are connected merely by means of belonging to these multiplicities.136 
 Badiou’s point here far exceeds a mere quantitative distinction between a singular 
religious Truth and multiple political truths. It reflects an attempt to philosophically 
acknowledge the ‘death of the One’ or the ‘death of God’ “without sacrificing the existence 
of truths nor their absoluteness.”137 In the absence of a single transcendent figure, god’s place 
is not emptied but replaced by pure multiplicity. Although pure multiplicity is ungraspable 
and infinite, it is ontologically reflected by the existence of ‘the people’ constantly defining 
politics.138 This gesture has tremendous political implications. The dislocation of Truth into 
the realm of pure multiplicity signifies that faith is no longer directed upward to god but 
horizontally towards others who together constitute pure multiplicity. This shift arguably 
allows for the possibility to distinguish faith from fidelity. Whereas religious faith demands 
that the difference between subject, truth, and the figure of god be clear, proclaiming the 
‘death of the One’ transcends pure multiplicity, rendering these divisions superfluous. If 
faithful (fidèle) subjects are contained within pure multiplicity, then they are not only the 
 
135 Christopher Norris “Fidelity” in The Badiou Dictionary, 132. 
136 Badiou, L’immanence des vérités, 379. Own translation. 
137 Ibid, 11. Own translation. About this very point, Norman Madarasz explains that “The hypothesis of a return 
of Gods ought to be ruled out, as it is the illusion arising from Being when captured under the equivalence of 
the One and the Infinite. The option of thinking Being un der the concept of pure multiplicity is sufficient to 
main tain philosophy within an atheistic fold. [Norman Madarasz in The Badiou Dictionary, 146.] 
138 Badiou, Being and Event, 348. For Badiou, subject-bodies exists both ontologically as pure multiplicity and 





subject but also the object of that fidelity. Inasmuch as political truth retains the transcendent 
potential of religious truth, it emerges from the people and demands that fidelity be invested 
by political subjects themselves. The figure of the people must remain present at every stage 
of the political procedure. From the inception of egalitarian politics within pure multiplicity, 
to the process of fidelity through which subjects are also the object of their own faith, and 
eventually to the appearance of political truths through subject-bodies, the people must be 
defended as the transcendent of a political truth procedure.  
 Fidelity must be distinguished from faith based on it being practiced by transcending 
subjects politically realising themselves as a collective rather than faithful recipients of a truth 
emanating from god. As an axiom, equality conditions the process of fidelity in its entirety. 
Necessary for the very possibility of a political event, equality also persists as the objective 
facet of fidelity, and eventually takes shape in the materialisation of a political truth through 
a collective. To think of equality through objective fidelity signifies that faithful (fidèle) 
subjects are aware of and believe in the cruciality of equality for politics. In the same way that 
for Paul non-Jews may respect mosaic law without formally acknowledging it, political 
subjects embody equality merely by virtue of being there. However, it is especially crucial that 
political subjects acknowledge the objective status of equality by recognising their own 
potential as a collective. Assuming that subjects are also objects of their own fidelity, rejecting 
the axiomatic status of equality is equivalent to doubting their collective political capacity, 
undermining the political procedure altogether. If fidelity is considered as a subjective as well 
as an objective procedure, then equality must also be materialised through the constitution 
of a collective subject-body. To the extent that equality already traverses subjects and bodies 
merely by virtue of them being there, politics does not. The materialisation of egalitarian 
politics rests on the active engagement (works) of both subjects and bodies in a way that 
exceeds Badiou’s account of evental retracing. The objective implications of attempting to 
materialise egalitarian politics will be further discussed in the next chapter. 
 Fidelity conceptualised as a secularisation of faith closely resembles Critchley’s notion 
of ‘faith of the faithless’. Critchley rightfully points out that “unbelievers still seem to require 
an experience of belief.”139 He treats faith not as a metaphysical belief in god, but as “fidelity 
to the infinite demand” on the part of the faithless. Building on the paradoxes of Pauline 
 





theology by which ‘weakness is strength’ and ‘slaves are free’, Critchley elevates the faithless 
as those whose faith is strongest.140 Unlike Badiou, Paul, or Kierkegaard, Critchley stays away 
from the notion of truth to instead treat the object of faith as a ‘supreme fiction’. He defines 
the latter as an “ethical commitment towards a possibility as yet unknown and inexistent in 
the situation, but still powerfully imagined.”141 Deploying the figure of the faithless allows 
Critchley to view faith with a certain theoretical detachment. This distance enables him to 
uncompromisingly link faith to fiction. From his standpoint, “in the realms of politics, law, and 
religion there are only fictions.”142 Coherent with his appreciation of paradoxes, he sees 
fictions as a sign of strength, not weakness.143 Although Critchley’s assessment of fiction is 
valid and necessary, fiction and truth do not have to be mutually exclusive. Going back to the 
process of fidelity, political truths must assume a quasi-fictional status to the extent that they 
are not plainly experienced through the event, but within the faithful procedure that aims to 
retrace that event.144 This applies to the Christ-event as well as political events for which truth 
is not achieved until the subject has become an active part of the procedure. Besides, as it 
was claimed in the last chapter, the absolute status of a political truth is only conditioned by 
its conformity to the egalitarian axiom and the capacity of its subjects to effectively 
materialise its promise through a collective body. Failure to do so will only result in the 
degeneration of truth into pure fiction. The fictional content of truths can only remain 
temporary, for fidelity redefined as both a subjective and objective process consolidates 
truths as truthful by laying the ground for their effective materialisation in the world.  
To conceive of fidelity as secular political faith does not entail a type of messianism by 
which a political truth becomes the ‘to come’ of politics. The idea of ‘democracy to come’ was 
first introduced by Derrida in his later work, most notably in Spectres de Marx. Derrida 
explains the concept as “an idea-event whose injunction commands to brings about that 
which will never present itself in full presence, [democracy to come] is the appearance of this 
gap between an infinite promise and its necessary set forms which are necessarily inadequate 
in measuring this promise.”145 The chronology of democracy to come is that of a messianic 
 
140 Ibid, 249. 
141 Ibid, 245. 
142 Ibid, 91. 
143 Ibid. 
144 See Badiou, Being and Event, and previous chapter. 
145 Jacques Derrida, Spectres de Marx (Paris; Galilée, 1993), 111. Own Translation; Paul Patton breaks down 





hope forever in waiting.146 It contains an unbridgeable gap between democracy’s messianic 
promise and its imperfect materialisation. From this standpoint, one must wait and hope for 
the arrival of a democracy that will always fall short of its egalitarian promise. This type of 
faith may be termed ‘prophetic’ for it is generated, not by the occurrence of an event, but by 
the absence of that event. From its inception, prophetic faith is strengthened by the absence 
of the messianic either through longing for a past that has vanished or a future that is yet to 
come.147 In contrast, Agamben reminds us that Paul’s messianic time “does not imply 
attachment or nostalgia; quite the opposite, for the recapitulation of the past is also a 
summary judgment pronounced on it.”148 From Paul’s standpoint, the past serves to 
consolidate the primacy of the present. This is the spirit that has inspired this chapter to 
conceptualise faith as an active process of politics. From the intrinsically egalitarian 
dimensions of faith tied to accessibility and immediacy, to its dual engagement with subjects 
at the objective and subjective level, and ultimately to the possibility of conceptualising 
political fidelity as a process elevating ‘the people’ as the subject-object of politics, fidelity 





determinate future form of democracy because the  ‘to come’ in this phrase does not refer to a future that will 
one day become present but to a structural future that will never be actualised  in any present. Rather than a 
future present it refers to the absolute future of pure invention, the unforeseeable and wholly other.” [Paul 
Patton, “Derrida, Politics and Democracy to Come,” Philosophy Compass 2 (2007): 772.] Similarly, Robbins 
explains that “[Derrida’s] eye is always set toward the future, its standard of law the impossible call for justice 
and equality. As such, there is a permanent breach between democracy as it is practiced and as it is imagined. 
After all, there are no actually existing democracies. [Robbins, Radical Democracy and Political Theology, 28.] 
146 Jacques Derrida, Spectres de Marx, 111. Own Translation. The forever postponed temporality of democracy 
to come is brilliantly contained in this Franz Kafka’s sentence: “The messiah will come only when he is no 
longer necessary; he will come only on the day after his arrival; he will come, not on the last day, but on the 
very last.” [Franz Kafka, Parables and Paradoxes, 1946.] 
147 Theoretical accounts of the messianic are still predominantly turned towards the absent past or future of 
politics. This is especially clear for most proponents of ‘radical democracy’ like Wendy Brown, Sheldon Wolin, 
Michael Hardt, or Antonio Negri. Frustrated with the inability of contemporary neoliberal states to fulfil the 
democratic promise of a ruling demos, they conclude that true democracy remains ‘to come’. [See Hardt and 
Negri, Multitude (New York: The Penguin Press, 2004.]  
Theories of radical democracy demonstrate that prophetic faith can take the form of both anticipation and 
nostalgia. Anticipation is linked to the elaboration of an unprecedented form of democracy, while nostalgia 
invokes the return of the original ‘purer’ direct democracy associated with early Athenian democracy. [See 
Wendy Brown, Undoing the Demos: Neoliberalism’s Stealth Revolution (New York: Zone Books), 2015.] 






Defined as what stands between a subject and its truth, faith expands far beyond its 
theological consideration to reach the field of egalitarian politics. The relationship between 
faith and equality is multi-layered. It begins with the intrinsically inclusive message of Pauline 
theology by which faith is addressed ‘to all’ regardless of origins, identities, or affiliations. 
Form his conversion onwards, Paul treats Christian faith as an egalitarian opening of god’s 
message to which all have access so long as they commit to its truth. This inclusive dimension 
is supplemented by the specific temporality of Paul’s messianism. Rather than patiently 
awaiting the return of the prophet, Paul begins from the event of Christ’s resurrection to 
ground faith in ‘the time of the now’. Paul’s inclusive consideration of faith as an active 
process grounded in ‘now-time’, coupled with Kierkegaard’s account of the subjective 
strength gained from leaping into faith has traversed the work of many contemporary political 
theorists such as Agamben, Critchley, and Badiou. Through the figures of both Paul and 
Kierkegaard, they explore the political potential of the faithful procedure in relation to love 
and inclusion and in contrast to identity and knowledge. Whereas rigid identities and 
knowledge are rendered irrelevant by faithful commitment, the act of loving others as oneself 
and including all within a defined belief system deeply resonates with egalitarian thought.  
 Both Agamben and Badiou provide a profoundly antinomian reading of Paul’s letters. 
In their view, Paul’s account of faith rests purely on subjective commitment, challenging the 
objective commandments of the law. In a different way, Kierkegaard also dismisses the 
possibility to associate faith with any form of objective imperative that might mediate its 
promise. In contrast to these antinomian readings, and in line with the political aspirations of 
this thesis, it may be claimed that axiomatic equality and the potential to materialise 
egalitarian politics through a collective subject-body together constitute the subject as much 
as the object of a secularised political faith. This argument allows for the possibility to step 
away from Badiou’s absolute consideration of truths. Following this shift, political truths are 
no longer simply realised and enforced subjectively, but also objectively measured against 
their conformity to the egalitarian axiom and their capacity to materialise through a palpable 
and inclusive collective. Following this argument, Badiou’s concept of political fidelity must 
be further secularised. Proceeding from the ‘death of the One’, fidelity becomes a procedure 





materiality. If truthful egalitarian politics is to effectively appear in the world, then fidelity 
must also be conditioned by this material possibility. The next chapter will focus specifically 
on the materialisation of egalitarian politics. If fidelity concerns theoretical subjects as well as 
existing bodies, it will be claimed that political truth is likely to materialise through a collective 







Forming the Political Collective:  




This chapter is an attempt to decisively address the research question underpinning 
this PhD project. Having stepped away from the impasse of liberal understandings of equality 
as a goal to be realised by autonomous individuals, endorsed Rancière and Badiou’s axiomatic 
considerations of equality, and established fidelity as the process through which equality may 
politically come to light, the following chapter aims to discuss egalitarian politics through the 
prism of materiality.     
Several gaps within strands of literature discussed earlier point to the necessity of 
deploying a materialist account of egalitarian politics. Chapter one showed that sophisticated 
liberal theorisations of equality tend to be let down by a generalised unwillingness to question 
the status of a ‘free’ market as the main field of political possibilities. Neoliberal approaches 
also display clear political shortcomings by denying the virtues of equality only to empower 
heteronomous individuals in a fully marketised environment. On the other hand, Rancière 
appears reluctant to further clarify the political implications of his ground-breaking account 
of equality. Unafraid to venture deep into the fields of axiomatic equality and truthful politics, 
Badiou then leans towards dogmatism when claiming that a subject-body faced with a 
political truth stands with its ‘back to the wall’, confronted to the false choice of either joining 
or abandoning an absolute truth.1 A clear pattern emerging from these discussions is a 
generalised unwillingness to consider egalitarian politics in its concrete material form within 
a framework that clearly exceeds the limits set by liberal markets. Even within Rancière and 
 
1 Badiou frames this image around his concept of the point as a test for politics: “A point is not that which a 
subject-body ‘freely’ decides with regard to multiplicities that appear in a world. A point is that which the 
transcendental of a world imposes on a subject-body, as the test on which depends the continuation in the 
world of the truth-process that transits through that body. A subject-body comes to face the point of the 
point, in the same sense that we could say it finds itself with its back to the wall.” [Alain Badiou, Being and 





Badiou’s radical propositions, equality is only elusively linked to its mode of appearance and 
remains fully detached from any type of economic materiality.2 This issue far exceeds the 
domain of political economy and concerns political materiality more generally understood as 
the concrete emergence of political forms. By avoiding conceptualising egalitarian politics far 
beyond its ideal presentation, these thinkers risk dissociating political thought from its 
grounded materialisation.3 Two main theoretical positions arguably arise from such 
dissociation. The first fails to effectively challenge the market’s inegalitarian tendencies in the 
name of equality.4 The other is a type of theoretical dogmatism according to which political 
truths and ideas take precedence above all else, including equality.5 In both cases, the role 
played by an empowered collective in materialising egalitarian politics remains largely 
unexamined. 
This chapter aims to provide an account of political materiality that takes shape within 
notions of collective body, space, economic exchange, and temporality. Interrogating 
egalitarian politics throughout these concrete categories under the banner of materialism 
remains rare in contemporary political theory. Even amongst those like Badiou who have 
reclaimed the term, materialism usually entails no physicality nor grounding.6 Yet, it is 
precisely from these intrinsically material grounds that politics is to be judged if it is to be 
grasped beyond its philosophical and theoretical forms. The previous chapter was a first step 
in this direction through the claim that politics rests on objective fidelity, and that existing 
subject-bodies must actively work towards materialising egalitarian politics of which they are 
both subject and object. Yet, to state that politics depends on a secular form of faith remains 
 
2 About Badiou’s economic position, Hallward writes, “true politics can begin only at a distance from the 
economy.” [Peter Hallward, Badiou a Subject to Truth (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota press 2003), 
237.]. 
3 The instigator of this type of materialist critique is undeniably Karl Marx who in his Theses on Feuerbach 
famously declares that “The philosophers have only interpreted the world in various ways; the point is to 
change it.” [Karl Marx, “Thesis on Feuerbach” in Marx and Engels Collected Works Volume 5 (London: Electric 
Book, 2010), 5.] 
4 This stance has been discussed in chapter one through the work of liberal egalitarians and chapter three on 
Rancière’s egalitarianism. 
5 This is Badiou’s position (see chapter four) 
6 Iain Hamilton Grant, “Does Nature Stay What-it-is?: Dynamics and the Antecendence Criterion” in The 
Speculative Turn: Continental Materialism and Realism, ed. Bryant, Levy, Srnicek, Nick, and Harman, Graham 
Melbourne: re.press, 2011), 69.  
On this issue also see Galen Strawson, Real Materialism and other Essays (Oxford: Oxford University press), 
2008.  
Badiou’s materialism is chiefly articulated around the notion of appearance put forth in Logics of Worlds. See 





largely constrained to the domain of thought. Whilst collective fidelity is a theoretical leap 
towards bridging the gap between the ideal and material facets of egalitarian politics, it tells 
little about the foundations of that bridge and what lays on the other end.7   
Building on the notion of objective fidelity in a collective, the first question relating to 
political materiality that should be addressed is: who is the ‘We’ of politics? Against the liberal 
emphasis on autonomous individuality, Badiou and Rancière respectively suggest that politics 
be ‘for All’ and the domain of ‘everyone and anyone’.8 This assessment, although valid 
regarding axiomatic equality, does not reveal the concrete set of processes by which 
‘everybody’ becomes engaged in a political sequence. In contrast to Badiou’s contempt for 
the objective category of body and liberalism’s individualistic leanings, the first section of this 
chapter will defend that the collective subject underpinning politics results from a set of 
complex interactions between bodies and their subjectivation. Rather than a given all-
inclusive category, the ‘for All’ of a political idea may be measured against its capacity to 
effectively include all bodies into a defined collective. This claim entails that the state of 
universal belonging contained within the notion of axiomatic equality is not a sufficient 
guarantee for the materialisation of politics. Conceived as active political agents, bodies must 
recognise themselves within a collective for politics to effectively unfold. Only through this 
process of continuous inclusion can the theoretical category of ‘everybody’ come to tangibly 
stand for everyone. The constitution of a political collective is material to the extent that it 
actively engages existing bodies on a given ground. Viewed in these terms, the ‘coming 
together’ of bodies into a collective constitutes an essential form of political materiality. 
Upholding the role of existing bodies in realising politics should be understood as a materialist 
rather than a realist position to the extent that bodies interact with ideality in addition to the 
world ‘as it is.’9   
 
7 For Ray Brassier, “It falls to conceptual rationality to forge the explanatory bridge from thought to being.” 
Ray Brassier in “Concepts and Objects”, in The Speculative Turn: Continental Materialism and Realism, 47. 
8 It is essential to remember that for both Rancière and Badiou axiomatic equality is all-encompassing in the 
sense that it concerns and applies to all. Axiomatic equality denotes a universal condition as much as a shared 
capacity for politics. Rancière considers that “equality is simply the equality of anyone at all with anyone else.” 
[Jacques Rancière, Disagreement: Politics and Philosophy, trans. Julie Rose (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1999), 15.]; For Badiou, “equality means that the political actor is represented under the sole 
sign of the uniquely human capacity”, capacity here referring to “the strictly egalitarian recognition of the 
capacity for truth.” [Badiou, Metapolitics (London: Verso 2005), 97-98.] 
9 About realism Pam Morris rightfully points out that “the term realism almost always involves both claims 






The second section of this chapter will focus on political materiality in terms of 
spatiality. Where does politics takes place? A good starting point to answering this 
immanently complex question are Edmund Husserl’s Foundational Investigations read 
through Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s interpretation.10 Husserl distinctively challenges the mode 
of thinking enabled by the ‘Copernican revolution’ in astronomy by which the earth comes to 
be understood as a decentred element that “contains only bodies” in the universe, rather 
than the universe’s central axis.11 Husserl's challenge is not scientific but philosophical. It is 
directed towards the ways in which one is able to think about one’s position on earth, and 
the position of that earth in the universe opened by the Copernican shift. Husserl proposes 
“a restitution of a sense of the earth as ground beyond Copernicus.”12 Rather than thinking 
the earthly ground (boden) as just another object, Husserl suggests that it be perceived as the 
pregiven ground of all experiences and possibilities (Erfahrungsboden).13 Husserl does not 
concern himself with questions relating to equality or politics. Nonetheless, he suggests the 
existence of an essential material base to which thought and materiality are irremediably tied. 
His phenomenological account of the earthly ground provides a useful starting point to 
conceptualising political spatiality. When stripped of its metaphysical ambitions, Husserl’s 
interpretation of the ground as a field of possibilities and experiences provides a tangible 
space from which the appearance of concrete political forms may be apprehended through 
the figure of the body. The givenness, spread, and horizontality of the ground materially 
 
10 See Husserl, “Foundational Investigations of the Phenomenological Origin of the Spatiality of Nature” in 
Husserl Shorter Works, ed. Peter McCormick and Frederick A. Elliston (Indiana: University of Notre Dame press, 
1981); and The Speculative Turn: Continental Materialism and Realism; and Quentin Meillassoux, Après la 
Finitude, Essai sur la necessite de la contingence (Paris : Editions du Seuil), 2006.  
11 Gabriel Catren in “Outland Empire: Prolegomena to Speculative Absolutism,” in The Speculative Turn: 
Continental Materialism and Realism, 335; Maurice Merleau-Ponty, “resume of the course,” in Husserl at the 
Limits of Phenomenology By Edmund Husserl, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, ed. Leonard Lawlor and Betina Bergo 
(Evanston: Northwestern University press, 2002), 9-10.  
Thomas S. Kuhn provides a concise summary of Nicholas Copernicus’s revolutionary astronomical proposal: “In 
1543, Nicholas Copernicus proposed to increase the accuracy and simplicity of astronomical theory by 
transferring to the sun many astronomical functions previously attributed to the earth. Before his proposal the 
earth had been the fixed center about which astronomers computed the motions of stars and planets. A 
century later the sun had, at least in astronomy, replaced the earth as the center of planetary motions, and the 
earth had lost its unique astronomical status, becoming one of a number of moving planets.” [Thomas S. Kuhn, 
The Copernican Revolution Planetary Astronomy in the Development of Western Thought (Cambridge: Harvard 
University press, 1995 [1957]), 1. 
12 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, “resume of the course,” 67. 
13 Ibid, 67, 69; Merleau-Ponty, "Husserl's Concept of Nature," in Text and Dialogues, trans. Drew Leder, (New 
Jersey: Atlantic Highlights, 1992), 166; and Dylan Trigg, “The role of the earth in Merleau-Ponty’s 
archaeological phenomenology,” Chiasmi International: Trilingual Studies Concerning the Thought of Merleau-





reverberates the ontological consideration of equality as an axiom of politics. Viewed in this 
way, the ground may be conceived as the elementary field on which political thought and 
materiality intersect often imperfectly and always transiently. It will be claimed that the 
ground sustains bodies as much as it provides them with a perspective on themselves as a 
collective and their environment. The spatiality of the ground, together with the figure of the 
body, allow for the possibility to conceive of egalitarian politics in material terms. They do so 
in a way that exceeds market-based considerations of equality, while grounding the 
emancipatory potential of politics considered as a truth procedure. 
Having established bodies and the ground as two essential material categories of 
politics, the third section will focus specifically on political economy as a mode of interactions 
amongst grounded bodies. Within the liberal democratic nexus economic relations tend to be 
reduced to market exchanges. On the other hand, economic questions remain largely absent 
from both Rancière and Badiou’s accounts of equality. Contra these two approaches, it will 
be claimed that economic interactions are crucial in consolidating egalitarian politics both by 
enabling bodies to relate to each other reciprocally, and by constituting key links between a 
collective and the material ground on which it stands. The discussion will be built on Karl 
Polanyi’s distinction between formal and substantive economics and the tradition of 
economic anthropology that followed.14 Following the substantive view from which economic 
exchanges are treated in their most elemental form, two types of material relations may be 
pinpointed as especially relevant to egalitarian politics: the mode of extraction of resources 
from the ground, and the equal distribution of these resources. Whilst economic extraction 
proceeds from ground to body (extracting from the ground) to guarantee the subsistence of 
all and sustain a collective, distribution concerns the collective organisation of bodies 
themselves. It will be argued that reciprocal economic exchange and equal distribution help 
sustain not only bodies in their bare forms but also political collectives. 
The last section of this chapter will focus on the contingent character of political 
materiality. Following Quentin Meillassoux, contingency will be interpreted as the process by 
 
14 In “The place of economies in societies”, Polanyi explains how substantive economics “derives from man’s 
dependence for his living upon nature and his fellows [referring] to the interchange with his natural and social 
environment, insofar as this results in supplying him with the means of material want satisfaction.” [Karl 
Polanyi, “The place of economies in societies” in Trade and Market in the Early Empires, ed. Polanyi, Conrad M 





which an event can equally “emerge, subsist, or perish”.15 The point will be made that the 
materialisation of politics is sustained by the uncertain objective fidelity of bodies standing 
on a ground with finite resources. Viewed contingently, it is not guaranteed nor 
fundamentally necessary that a political sequence will persist through time. Such timely 
persistence is contingent upon objective fidelity in a collective and the sustenance of the 
ground. Ultimately, egalitarian politics may be realised through a constantly expanding 
collective body, the horizontality of the ground, and reciprocal economic exchange. Yet, from 
a theorist’s standpoint it is essential to approach political materiality with some humility. This 
is necessary for reasons that have already been mentioned in previous chapters. On the one 
hand, one cannot assume that autonomous individuals are on a straight path to politically 
realising equality. On the other, there is a clear contradiction in the idea of ‘forcing’ a truth 
on unwilling bodies in the name of equality. By conceptualising existing bodies as active 
agents of their own subjectivation and maintaining that the materialisation of politics always 
remains contingent upon a fragile collective and the ground on which it stands, this chapter 
aims to present the sketch of a political vision in which equality is never compromised but 
whose materialisation is not guaranteed.  
 
Recognising the Collective Subject-Body 
The last chapter established that the political materialisation of equality rests on a 
process of fidelity. Conceived as a secular form of faith, political fidelity is directed towards 
pure multiplicity rather than the messianic promise of ‘the One’. Fidelity evidently denotes a 
strong subjective commitment so vividly depicted by thinkers such as Paul, Kierkegaard, 
Badiou, and Agamben through their portrayals of the leap of faith.16 In addition to this 
subjective facet, it was argued that political fidelity must also be attached to some form of 
objectivity. Whereas subjective fidelity simply refers to the relationship between a subject 
and a truth, its objective counterpart is arguably bound to the appearance of a political 
collective. This chapter will argue that the realisation of such collective cannot be grasped 
merely through concepts such as axiomatic equality, subjectivation, or fidelity. Although 
 
15 Meillassoux, Après la Finitude, 52. 





necessary, it is insufficient for an account of political materiality to simply declare that a 
political subject may exist in the world. Looking at egalitarian politics through the prism of 
materiality requires that the process by which bodies are subjectivised into a visible collective 
be discussed. Claiming that fidelity is objectively attached to the concrete realisation of a 
political collective opens the conceptual door to such discussion. Underpinning the latter is a 
fundamental question: who is the ‘We’ of politics?  
 The question of collectivity has been addressed in various ways by the literature 
studied in preceding chapters. For most liberal thinkers, a political collective may be equated 
to a sum of autonomous individuals collaborating towards a common goal. For neoliberals, 
the ‘We’ is replaced by an ‘I’ referring to individuals’ capacity to realise their potential in a 
fully marketised environment. For Rancière, political subjectivity is the domain of everyone 
and anyone indiscriminately. For Badiou, politics is addressed ‘to All’ but depends of the work 
of a faithful militant-subject of truth.17 It was established earlier that Badiou’s axiomatic 
approach to equality and his account of the processes of subjectivation and fidelity should be 
upfolded. In contrast to the liberal ideal of ‘reaching’ equality, axiomatic equality is already 
here waiting to be politically enabled through fidelity. This reading is essential but tells us very 
little about the moment when existing bodies come to form a collective. This sequence 
embodied by the act of ‘coming together’ is neither given nor evident.18 For most liberal and 
neoliberal thinkers, the question of collectivity is diluted into that of individual autonomy. In 
contrast, Rancière remains theoretically elusive by claiming that political subjectivation 
results in the enactment of a ‘third people’.19 Whereas Badiou offers a clearer account of 
subjectivation, he proposes an overly deterministic path that one must follow to realise the 
promise of a political event.20 Alternatively, it will be suggested that the process by which a 
political collective is formed denotes not only a ‘coming together’, but also confrontation of 
existing bodies to their ideal presentation as collective subject. In this chapter, the question 
of collectivity will be considered alongside concrete interactions between bodies and their 
subjectivation as a collective through the prism of objective fidelity.  
 
17 Badiou, Being and Event, 347. 
18 Roberto Esposito defines a community as “what belongs to more than one, to many or to everyone, and 
therefore is that which is ‘public’ in opposition to 'private’ or ‘general’ (though also ‘collective’) in contrast to 
‘individual’.” [Roberto Esposito, Communitas The Origin and Destiny of Community (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2009), 3.] 
19 Rancière, Disagreement, 88. 





The political relationship between bodies and their subjectivation excludes any form 
of individualism. As Fredric Jameson concisely puts it, “only the collective is truly political.”21 
Rebutting the political potential of individualism has been a clear trend thus far in this thesis. 
This has been done by questioning the capacity of individual autonomy to realise egalitarian 
politics. It was argued that erecting individuality as the main vehicle of political subjectivity, 
as is the case within the liberal democratic nexus, risks separating politics from the people it 
wishes to represent.22 Largely detached from collective political life, individuals evolving in a 
neoliberal context are less autonomously driven to realise equality than heteronomously 
pressed to realise their desires on the marketplace. As collective life becomes increasingly 
atomised into individual units, the market economy is transfigured into the sole horizon of 
human emancipation. This deceitful form of emancipation merely concerns individuals whose 
capacity to ‘realise themselves’ is continually tested on various types of markets.23 
Throughout the theoretical endeavour to ‘start with equality’, both Rancière and Badiou are 
able to re-centre their political thought on the collective capacity of ‘All’. A shared theoretical 
aversion for the category of identity pushes them to stretch their understanding of collectivity 
to generic categories encompassing ‘everybody’ and ‘All’. Whereas Rancière does so by 
recognising the anarchical character of the demos, Badiou treats truthful politics as 
universal.24 Although both maintain, albeit differently, that politics is the result of 
subjectivation, they fall short of concretely explaining how bodies come to form a 
subjectivised whole containing every-body. One way to fill that gap is to reconceptualise 
Badiou’s category of the appearing body as an active political agent. 
For Badiou, the appearance of a political truth in the world is “determined by a subject 
that has developed its fidelity to the trace of an event.”25 From his standpoint, subjects must 
force the veracity of a truth.26 Since political truths exist as an exception to what ‘there is’, 
subjective forcing is necessary to break the order of bodies and languages.27 The 
 
21 Fredric Jameson, The Ancient and the Postmoderns, (London: Verso books, 2015), 105. 
22 See Marcel Gauchet, La Révolution Moderne, L’avènement de la démocratie IV Le Nouveau Monde (Paris : 
Gallimard), 2017. 
23 See chapter two. 
24 Badiou, Logics of Worlds, 9. 
25 Meillassoux,” History and Event In Alain Badiou,” 5. 
26 Badiou, Being and Event, 407, 417. 
27 Badiou, Logics of Worlds, 4-8;  
In Badiou and Politics, Bruno Bosteels explains Badiou’s concept of forcing: “One of the keys in the radical 
critique of Badiou's thought is precisely the notion of forcing, in the sense that a procedure of truth would in 





confrontation between thought and what ‘there is’, or between subjects and existing bodies 
is violent in Badiou’s work. Badiousian subjectivation does not rest on a peaceful alliance 
between subjects of truth and existing bodies. Rather, a political sequence is activated by 
replacing impotent bodies with truthful subjects.28 More than collaborating entities, bodies 
and subjects correspond to two antagonistic states of human subjectivity in Badiou’s work. 
Inasmuch as subjects are endowed with the task of realising politics following an event, bodies 
are largely emptied of political meaning. Not only do existing bodies originally stand outside 
of a political sequence, they might even prove detrimental to it.  
Badiou’s contempt for the category of appearing body is best exemplified by his 
concepts of ‘full body’ and ‘faithful body’. A full body is seen as essentially obscure and useless 
based on its inability to recognise political truths as absolute and eternal.29 In other words, 
the appearing body has no political function or signification as such. If a body remains ‘full-
bodied’ and fails to move towards subjectivation, it will be pushed on the side-lines of a 
political sequence. The same dynamic is at work within the notion of faithful body. Whereas 
the latter is treated as a positive category, a body is only faithful under the condition that it is 
erased.30 Here, Badiou suggests that bodies must be repressed to make room for political 
subjectivation. Even notions of subject-body or ‘body-of-truth’ denote a body subjected to 
truth rather than an empowered subjectivised body.31 Chapter four showed that within the 
subject-body nexus, existing bodies were systematically blamed for political failures. By 
refusing to fully comply with the deployment of a political truth, objective bodies inevitably 
interrupt or corrupt a political sequence.32 Concurrently, the content of a political truth 
remains absolute and hence unquestionable. 33  
 
and not the truth as defined by Badiou.” [Bruno Bosteels, Badiou and Politics (Durham: Duke University Press, 
2011), 178. 
28 About Badiou’s conceptual relationship to the body, Bruno Besana writes that Depending on the 
inconsistency of an evanescent event, the subject for Badiou is shaped by a logic of subtraction, formaI 
construction and generic address, which functions independently of - when not against - the limits, finitude 
and contingencies of the body. Badiou's concept of the subject starts from a fierce opposition to the classic 
theme of embodiment. [Badiou dictionary, Bruno Besana ‘Body and identification’, 30.] 
29 Badiou, Logics of Worlds, 66-67, 490. 
30 Ibid, 67. 
31 For Badiou, “a subject-body comes to face the point of the point, in the same sense that we could say it finds 
itself with its back to the wall”, refusal to do so results in either disaster or betrayal. [Badiou, Logics of Worlds, 
400.] 
32 See Badiou’s account of the Cultural Revolution in The Communist Hypothesis. [Badiou, The Communist 
Hypothesis (London: Verso), 2010.] 





Although Badiou claims to break with dogma by removing his evental account of 
politics “from the ascendancy of the One”, the spectre of dogmatism still roams within his 
absolute consideration of political truths as well as his account of the supremacy of the 
faithful subject over meaningless bodies.34 The clear hierarchy established between subjects 
of truth and objective bodies in Badiou’s political thought has repercussions that far exceed 
this conceptual relationship. What emerges from the lack of reciprocity between subjects and 
bodies in his work is a deep suspicion towards entities and bodies that exist prior to the 
eruption of an event.35 This is an issue since it forbids the possibility to frame the realisation 
of politics in material terms beyond the figure of the truthful subject. In the same way that a 
faithful Christian is touched by grace, Badiou’s political subject follows a truthful trace with 
little or no regard for those bodies that stand in the way.36 Yet, if politics is indeed ‘for All’ 
and concerns every-body, existing bodies should be included in a political sequence beyond 
their instrumentalisation as mere recipients of truth.  
Inasmuch as the Badiousian definition of the body as a singular object making up the 
appearing of a subject must be reasserted, its political potential remains to be thoroughly 
explored.37 For Badiou, the political capacity of bodies merely results from their 
subjectivation. The post-evental body is “the foam, the wave, the wind, the salt and the rocks 
required by the metamorphosis of the sea, the storm-event, whose trace is the vital upsurge 
of the poet and the poem.”38 Like a rock or a wave in clear weather, the body indolently awaits 
the looming political storm. However, the body is not any object. Bodies, even in their pre-
evental form, move, exchange, collide, and converge with each other. Unlike a rock or sea 
salt, human bodies cannot be reduced to their chemical composition or physical properties. 
Endowed with language, motion, faith, and a unique perspective on the world that surrounds 
them, bodies are not essentially ‘inert’, ‘inactive’, nor ‘inconsequential’.39 Instead, they have 
a part to play at every stage of a political procedure. The body must be reaffirmed in its 
objective simplicity as moving and speaking physical object as much as through its political 
potential as a subject ‘in the making’. Neither a comprehensive political unit, nor an inanimate 
 
34 Badiou, Logics of Worlds, 387. 
35 This is also palpable in Badiou’s account of the state of a situation. See Badiou, Being and Event. 
36 Badiou, Logics of Worlds, 400, 416. 
37 Ibid, 453. 
38 Ibid, 467. 





object, the body nonetheless remains a vital component in the objective composition of a 
truthful collective.  
Breaking with Badiou’s dismissive account of bodies does not question the cruciality 
of his work for this thesis. Not only does he provide the most thorough account of axiomatic 
equality and political subjectivation in contemporary theory, he also lays the groundwork for 
the consideration of fidelity as political faith after the death of ‘the One’ developed in the 
previous chapter. The point is not to refute the Badiousian account of subjectivation 
altogether, but to claim that it may benefit from reasserting the active role of objective bodies 
in realising egalitarian politics. This chapter defends that bodies are, alongside space and 
economic exchange, essential to discussing equality in material terms.40 Thereby, it is crucial 
to assert that un-subjectivised bodies or ‘bare bodies’ are not politically impotent. Rather, 
they are equipped with a capacity for language and movement, as well as a unique 
perspective on the constitution of a collective subject-body to which they must be included 
for politics to effectively materialise. An interesting counterpoint to Badiou’s consideration of 
bodies may be found in Meillassoux’s After Finitude. Although Meillassoux does not refer his 
discussion of bodies to political possibilities, he acknowledges that the ‘taking place’ of the 
transcendental (represented here under the banner of politics) is conditioned by an 
interdependence between body and subject:  
Granted, the transcendental is the condition for knowledge of bodies, but it is 
necessary to add that the body is also the condition for the taking place of the 
transcendental. That the transcendental subject has this or that body is an empirical 
matter, but that it has a body is a nonempirical condition of its taking place - the body, 
one could say, is the 'retro-transcendental' condition for the subject of knowledge. 
We will invoke an established distinction here and say that a subject is instantiated 
rather than exemplified by a thinking body.41 
 
40 Whereas bodies contain the very possibility of materialising a political collective, the ground provides a 
concrete base from which political appearances may be thought objectively. On the other hand, re-founding 
economic relations away from market exchange opens the theoretical door to conceiving of material existence 
in reciprocal and egalitarian terms. 
41 Meillassoux, After Finitude an Essay on the Necessity of Contingency (London: Continuum, 2009), 45-46. 
Meillassoux adds that the possibility to consider bodies outside of the subjective frame of reference is one of 
the particularities of his ‘speculative idealism’: “what distinguishes transcendental idealism from speculative 
idealism is the fact that the former does not posit the existence of the transcendental subject apart from its 





Following Meillassoux, the objective world is no longer reduced to the sum of its 
interpretations by conscious subjects. More than a mere display of the knowledgeable 
subject, the body conditions and performs that subject in the now. In the current discussion 
this implies that subjectivation is not a sufficient condition for the taking place of egalitarian 
politics. Rather, the materialisation of equality depends on the successful encounter between 
a truthful subject and an objective body. If this connection is missed, the subject will not be 
instantiated, and politics will not take place. 
The previous chapter established fidelity as a procedure containing both subjective 
and objective elements. The subjective facet of fidelity straightforwardly refers to the 
transcendent relationship between a subject and a political truth. This Badiousian 
understanding of the subject must be maintained. The possibility of political truths relies on 
this subjective commitment. To say that fidelity is subjective refers an inward leap towards 
truth that cannot be rationalised. Although secularised, subjective fidelity retains the 
Kierkegaardian absurdity of religious faith.42 It is absurd to the extent that commitment is 
strong even when the collective subject only exists as a theoretical entity that is yet to 
appear.43 In many ways, this thesis and the arguments it supports constitutes a case of 
subjective fidelity. Inwardness, theory, and political ideality all stand on the side of subjective 
fidelity. On the other hand, objective fidelity rests on the active intervention of existing bodies 
in a political procedure set in motion within a particular time and space.44 Rather than an 
inward commitment attached to a theoretical subject, the objective iteration of fidelity refers 
to bodies’ outward commitment towards an appearing political collective on the ground. 
Bodies, the ground, and contingency are all constitutive categories of objective fidelity. 
If a subject-body is in the process of being constituted as a collective, then fidelity also 
becomes objective for it is no longer simply attached to a truthful promise but also to the 
palpable materialisation of that promise. If egalitarian politics has a chance of materialising, 
then fidelity will inevitably exceed its categorisation as a purely subjective commitment given 
that the constitution of the collective is already taking place (appearing) in front of every-
body. This taking place or taking shape of the collective is specifically the point when bodies 
 
subject. Thus, the subject is instantiated rather than exemplified by thinking bodies.” [Meillassoux, After 
Finitude, 45.] 
42 See Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling. 
43 On the Badiousian consideration of the subject as a theoretical entity see Badiou, Logics of Worlds, 47.  





become materially entangled in a political sequence. Such entanglement occurs regardless of 
whether bodies have been subjectivised so long as the constitution of a collective is taking 
place. It is vital to separate objective fidelity from notions of proof and miracles attached to 
theological discussions laid out in the previous chapter.45 Divorced from the ascendency of 
‘the One’, objective fidelity is a faith in ‘Us’, in our collective capacity to realise equality. Unlike 
religious faith, no divine sign is required to strengthen fidelity since its object (every-body that 
will come to constitute a collective subject-body) is already present here on the ground. The 
object of fidelity is not revealed through some divine apparition, but by the converging 
movements of bodies on the ground. Looking up for guidance is no longer required for the 
ideal subject and material object of political fidelity are equally contained within the collective 
subject-body.46 There is no urge to prove or demonstrate through miracles that we exist to 
the extent that all bodies already relate materially to each other in space and time regardless 
of whether egalitarian politics is present or not. The constitution of a collective is neither 
proof of equality nor a miracle, but simply a step in the materialisation of egalitarian politics. 
Earlier it was maintained alongside Badiou that egalitarian politics rests on the 
constitution of a collective subject-body.47 Yet, it was also argued against Badiou that political 
subjectivation cannot be forced, implying that bodies have an active role to play in the process 
of their own subjectivation. Conceived objectively, fidelity is a commitment taking place 
through movement and observation rather than vocation.48 Whereas subjective fidelity 
reflects an inward commitment to truth, its objective counterpart rests on the ability of 
existing bodies to look outward to recognise themselves within a collective subject-body.49 
 
45 On Badiou’s account of ‘proof’ see Peter Hallward, Badiou a Subject to Truth (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota press, 2003), 228. 
46 To conceive of the collective as a new subject draws resemblances to what Rancière refers to as a ‘third 
people’. However, in this case the new entity taking shape in a collective subject-body does not aim to tie “a 
particular dispute together on behalf of the uncounted”, but simply stands as the new collective subject-object 
of a political sequence. [Rancière, Disagreement, 88.] 
47 Steven Corcoran defines the subject-body as “an alternative mode of appearance, one determined by a 
subject that, endowed with a body, is incorporated into that world, duly reorganised around the production of 
a new present.” [Steve Corcoran, ‘Appearance-Existence’ in The Badiou Dictionary, 18.] Meillassoux explains 
the concept as “a mode of appearance in a world determined by a subject that has developed its fidelity to the 
trace of an event.” [Meillassoux, “History and Event in Alain Badiou,” 5.] 
48 For Husserl, moving bodies carry the actuality of their possibilities: “Bodies exist actually in open possibilities 
which are realised in their actuality, in their motion, change (nonchanged as a possible form of change). Bodies 
are in actual and possible motion and -there is- the possibility of always open possibility in actuality.” [Husserl, 
“Foundational Investigations” in Shorter Works, 223.] 
49 Badiou emphasises the importance of appearance and visibility for the subject-body when he writes that 






Rather than a subjective leap, objective fidelity is a step towards the constitution of a political 
collective enabled by the corporeal realisation that it is worth taking part in the political 
sequence unfolding. Neither forms of fidelity can be considered separately for there can be 
no recognition and therefore no movement without subjective truth, nor materialised politics 
without the collective movement of bodies. Conceived both as a subjective and objective 
process, fidelity is not blind faith for it also refers to the movement of bodies taking place on 
the ground.50  Whereas subjective fidelity rests on the statement that ‘this is truth’, objective 
fidelity starts with the realisation that ‘this is Us’. Existing bodies, subjectivised or not, always 
bear witness to the concrete deployment of a political collective. They are the faithful (fidèle) 
agents of objective fidelity. Enabled by what materialises in front of their eyes rather than a 
transcendent truth, bodies have an impact on the unfolding of a political sequence simply by 
being there and sensing of what is taking place. Far from representing obstacles to truthful 
politics, bodies may be conceptualised as active political agents benefitting from their 
grounded experience. Not settled on a predetermined course to either oppose or facilitate 
egalitarian politics, existing bodies will support their subjectivation into a collective if 
objective fidelity is sustained. Their original position, standing outside of a political procedure, 
is not necessarily a hindrance. Rather than an empty reflection of mere presence, such 
position offers a viewpoint from which the egalitarian potential of a political collective taking 
place can be evaluated.  
Having accepted transcendent truths as necessary yet insufficient conditions for the 
materialisation of egalitarian politics, how is bodies’ objective fidelity sustained? One way to 
answer this question is to recover two notions discussed in previous chapters: recognition 
and inclusion. Within the framework of objective fidelity, recognition does not refer to the 
state’s capacity to register particular identities, cultures, and claims. Unlike thinkers discussed 
in chapter one like Fraser, Taylor, or Benhabib, recognition here points to bodies’ capacity to 
recognise themselves within the ideality embodied within the collective subject being 
constituted.51 Recognition framed as a condition of objective fidelity could be considered as 
an inversion of its conventional interpretation. Here, there is no demand to be recognised by 
 
50 Meillassoux associates faith to an unfortunate form of fanatism whereby “The victorious critique of 
ideologies has been transformed into a renewed argument for blind faith.” [Meillassoux, Après la Finitude, 67.] 
51 See Charles Taylor, Multiculturalism and the Politics of Recognition (Princeton: Princeton University Press), 
1992; Nancy, and Axel Honneth, Redistribution or Recognition? (London: Verso), 2003; and Seyla Benhabib, 





the collective, let alone the state. Instead, recognition is a task assigned to bodies referring to 
their capacity to see themselves as part of a collective.52 Through objective fidelity, bare 
bodies are summoned to ask themselves ‘is this Us?’ when confronted to the formation of a 
collective rather than affirming that ‘this is me’ in the hope that such individual or group 
identities will be collectively recognised.53 Viewed in these terms, recognition is not directed 
towards distinctions and differences. Rather, it is attached to what is shared between bodies 
and subjects and amongst bodies themselves. Recognition politically empowers bodies by 
keeping them in charge of their inclusion within the collective unfolding in front of their eyes. 
Bodies may recognise themselves in this collective endeavour as much they might reject it. In 
both cases they remain sovereign in this decision. Through the prism of objective fidelity, 
there is no ground for forcing a political truth upon bodies insofar as they have the capacity 
to identify what is taking place and whether they wish to be part of it. If bodies fail to 
recognise themselves within a collective, objective fidelity is inevitably compromised. In that 
case, fidelity remains merely as a subjective procedure, hence limiting its political potential. 
The materialisation of a collective acts as a mirror for un-subjectivised bodies. This 
mirror does not only reflect bodies in their bare state, but also a projection of what they may 
come to constitute together as collective subject-body.54 By witnessing the deployment of a 
collective, bodies objectively gain access to the political potential of their subjectivation. This 
temporal shift is the reason why it is insufficient to refer to the constitution of a collective 
merely through the concrete encounter between subjects and bodies in a given space and 
time. The act of recognition demands that bodies project themselves onto the potential of a 
political collective, denoting the merging of present materiality with future ideality. The 
encounter between political materiality and ideality is embodied within the deployment of 
the collective subject-body itself. Upon recognising themselves into a collective, subjectivised 
 
52 Merleau-Ponty discusses bodies’ mutual identification in relation to the ground when writing that “through 
my corporeality […] I can put my experience into relation with theirs. (identify with other living beings).” 
[Merleau-Ponty, “Resume of the Course”, 71.] 
53 Following an intellectual tradition that stretches from Plato to Rousseau and Badiou, it is important to point 
out that the process through which bodies recognise themselves within a collective does not constitute a form 
of representation. Rather, bodies accept or refuse to be part of the presentation of a new collective which is 
judged on its capacity to include ‘every-body’. [Badiou, Being and Event, 347; Badiou, Logics of Worlds; and 
Rousseau, The Social Contract (London: Penguin Books), 1968.] 
54 Although projection is used here in positive terms, the psychoanalytical understanding of projection is 
usually pejorative. Dylan Evans defines projection in Lacanian terms as “a defence mechanism in which an 
internal desire/thought/feeling is displaced and located outside the subject, in another subject.” [Dylan Evans, 





bodies can make a concrete step towards the becoming of egalitarian politics by politically 
and economically enacting the political truth to which they are faithful. The ideality and 
potentiality contained within the subject-body is a reminder that considering bodies as active 
political agents is a materialist rather than a realist position. To the extent that bodies adhere 
to a collective, they do not merely move towards an entity that is objectively there. They also 
advance towards their subjectivation and a political procedure that is ‘in the making’ rather 
than finite. Upon recognising themselves within a collective, bodies do not only make a 
commitment to the world as it is. Their fidelity also concerns the potential materialisation of 
infinite egalitarian possibilities of which their collective movement is only a single step.   
It has been argued in this chapter that the materialisation of egalitarian politics 
depends on objective bodies’ capacity to recognise themselves within a collective subject. In 
addition to this argument, it is vital to provide an account of how a collective may objectively 
come to be equated to every-body. This is a question that evades most of the literature 
discussed previously. For liberal egalitarians, such collective is an abstract goal that may be 
achieved under the condition that autonomous individuals are provided by the state with 
certain means, capabilities, or levels of recognition.55 For Rancière, equality is already here. 
However, politics demand that a non-identitary ‘third’ people rises in opposition to the count 
of the police.56 For Badiou, the emergence of a political event aligned to axiomatic equality 
breaks with the categorisations of the state.57 As a result, universal belonging is a sufficient 
condition for political subjectivation so long as a community resists the trap of reducing itself 
to an identified part of the whole.58 For both Rancière and Badiou, political subjectivity rests 
on everybody’s capacity to be there as equal and reject any form of identification. Although 
this shared position is coherent with axiomatic considerations of equality, it does not account 
for the process through which a collective effectively comes to light. Establishing bodies as 
active and fidèles political agents is an attempt to provide a clearer account of this process. 
Another is to recognise that pure belonging and resistance to identification merely outline 
 
55 For more on redistribution and recognition refer to chapter one. 
56 Rancière, Disagreement 88, 100; and Rancière, Recognition or Disagreement a Critical Encounter on the 
Politics of Freedom, Equality, and Identity, 93. 
57 Badiou, Logics of Worlds, 6. 
58 Badiou, Being and Event, 110; and Peter Hallward, "Badiou's Politics: Equality and Justice" Culture Machine 





the contours of a collective. The picture becomes clearer by reclaiming the importance of 
inclusion in materialising a collective subject that objectively concerns every-body.  
Chapter four revealed Badiou’s tendency to antagonise notions of belonging and 
inclusion. In Being and Event he explains that ‘presentation’, ‘count-as-one’, and ‘belonging’ 
are on the side of a situation, while ‘representation’, ‘count of the count’, and ‘inclusion’ are 
aligned with the state of a situation.59 Building his political thought against the state and the 
representations it entails, Badiou often associates inclusion with the state’s superfluous count 
of what has already been counted. The state is concerned with identifying parts in subsets, in 
turn including them within its situation.60 Alternatively, belonging incarnates equality and 
constitutes a key facet of his ontology.61 Although Badiou does not reduce all of what takes 
place in a situation to the act of belonging, he still considers inclusion as a political impasse.62 
Opposing universal belonging to inclusion inevitably requires that some bodies be excluded 
when egalitarian politics effectively appears. Whereas Rancière dismisses sceptics of the all-
encompassing power of equality as elitist ‘haters’ of democracy, Badiou labels those bodies 
who refuse the legacy of an event as either ‘obscure’, or ‘reactive’.63 Implicitly for Rancière 
and explicitly for Badiou, the deployment of equality leaves those who do not recognise its 
elemental power on the margins of history, hence contradicting its fundamental promise. 
Building on the argument that bodies are active political agents endowed with the capacity 
to recognise themselves within a collective, it may be added that sustaining this collective 
rests in part on its capability to include every-body. Far from denying the importance of 
belonging for axiomatic equality, inclusion into a collective subject-body is necessary if bodies 
are considered as more than passive recipients of truth.  
 
59 Badiou, Being and Event, 103. 
60 Hallward, Badiou a Subject to Truth, 95; and Badiou, Being and Event, 103.  
About the gap between belonging and inclusion, Badiou explains that the coercion consists in not being held to 
be someone who belongs to society, but as someone who is included within society. The State is 
fundamentally indifferent to belonging, yet it is constantly concerned with inclusion. Any consistent subset is 
immediately counted and considered by the State, for better or worse, because it is matter for representation. 
[Badiou, Being and Event, 107.] 
61 Ibid, 415; and Bosteels, Badiou and Politics, 168. 
62 Bosteels, Badiou and Politics, 169-170. See Badiou, Logics of Worlds. 
63 See Rancière, Hatred of Democracy (London: Verso), 2006; 
For Badiou, a body’s subjectivation produces three results of which only one (faithful subject) is politically 
potent. On the other hand, a reactive subject is destined to deny a present while an obscure subject occults it. 





 Not unlike the point made earlier on recognition, it is essential to reject the definition 
of inclusion as the incorporation specific identities within a collective.64 Inclusion should be 
thought beyond its purely ideological consideration conveyed through multiculturalism or 
identity politics.65 Instead of a directive idea reducing egalitarian politics to the recognition 
and integration of distinct individual or group identities, inclusion may be considered in 
simpler terms as the concrete measure of a political collective. If egalitarian politics is indeed 
‘for All’, then the scale and therefore the strength of a collective should be measured 
according to its capacity to include every-body.66 In this context, inclusion refers less to 
labelling and identification than to the ultimate necessity of including every-body within a 
collective regardless of specific identities. Considering inclusion in quantitative terms as an 
‘infinite measure’ contrasts sharply with Badiou’s reduction of inclusion to a process of 
dividing and labelling parts by the state. Through this redefinition, the process of inclusion 
remains generic in the sense that it is oblivious to particularities and classifications.67 In its 
basic form, inclusion conveys identification only insofar as it registers the concrete presence 
of bodies ‘in’ or ‘out’ of a collective. Against the temptation to recognise outsider bodies (who 
do not recognise themselves within the collective) as either obscure or reactive, inclusion is a 
reminder that if egalitarian politics is ‘for All’, then it must objectively strive to include every-
body. Inasmuch as recognition reveals the subjective facet of objective fidelity through the 
figure of the body, inclusion provides an objective (quantitative) measure of the egalitarian 
potential of a collective, having a direct impact on bodies’ fidelity. 
Considered as the measure of a collective, inclusion evidently denotes a count. Yet, 
this count is infinite for its limit is the inclusion of every-body and there will always remain 
bodies to be included within the collective. This applies to the continuous appearance of new 
bodies (new-borns, international expansion of the collective…), as much as the constant 
presence of outsider bodies for whom recognising the political potential of the collective 
taking place is an impossibility. Upholding inclusion as a vital process for the materialisation 
 
64 See chapter 1. 
65 Ibid. 
66 This was surely best worded in the opening lines of Aristotle’s Politics: “Every state is a community of some 
kind, and every community is established with a view to some good; for mankind always act in order to obtain 
that which they think good. But, if all communities aim at some good, the state or political community, which 
is the highest of all, and which embraces all the rest, aims at good in a greater degree than any other, and at 
the highest good.” [Aristotle, Politics Book I part 1 (Kitchener: Batoche Books, 1999), 3. 






of equality significantly challenges the more exclusive accounts of equality provided by 
Rancière and Badiou. Rather than a monolithic sequence that one disregards at its own perils, 
egalitarian politics is objectively measured on its capacity to include every-body within a 
collective. Framed in these terms inclusion arguably remains consistent with axiomatic 
equality, acting as a step towards the materialisation of egalitarian politics rather than its end-
point. Actually, inclusion has no end-point if it is set as the infinite measure of bodies within 
a collective. Besides, there can be no subjectivation and therefore no inclusion within a 
collective subject-body without the existence of a political truth that is itself ordained to 
axiomatic equality. Not the starting point nor the ideological core or the objective of 
egalitarian politics, inclusion is the quantitative measure of a collective’s capacity to 
incorporate every-body. Inclusion persists as a politically potent concept if considered away 
from the recognition of specific identities or its reduction to a form of systematic 
representation. As a simple yet infinite measure of the reach of a collective, inclusion 
objectively reflects the egalitarian potential of a political sequence unfolding through bodies. 
Reaching far beyond identity, inclusion together with recognition stand as the objective test 
of the declaration that politics is ‘for All’. 
To say that political fidelity is objective as well as subjective requires the appearance 
of a concrete collective which empowered bodies may or may not choose to belong to. Only 
through concrete interactions between bodies and a collective being subjectivised can politics 
begin to materialise. Such interactions take shape through bodies’ capacity to recognise 
themselves and their potential in the collective subject-body being constituted in front of 
them, as well as the propensity of that collective to include every-body. Far for detrimental 
to egalitarian politics, objective bodies are the primary condition for its materialisation. The 
next section will be dedicated to framing the collective subject-body within a definite space. 










The Horizontal Ground as Political Space 
So far, this chapter has discussed political materiality through the relationship 
between objective bodies and the possibility of their inclusion within a collective subject-
body. To the extent that bodies and their subjectivation into a collective constitute both the 
subject and object of egalitarian politics, bodies were presented as an essential form of 
political materiality. Through their objective fidelity resting on recognition and inclusion 
within a collective, bodies engage the first step towards the materialisation of egalitarian 
politics. Yet, even in their collective subjectivised form, bodies are not a sufficient condition 
for the taking place of egalitarian politics. Although the collective embodiment of a political 
truth is crucial, bodies interact with other palpable objects that also have an impact on the 
unfolding of a political sequence. The notion of space offers a way to conceptualise such 
objects without undermining the cruciality of human bodies for politics.68 Building on the 
previous discussion it will be claimed that bodies do not merely interact with each other and 
their potential subjectivation into a collective, but also with the terrain on which they stand 
and move. In its most basic form, the material space that conditions the totality of bodily 
movements is the ground. Considered as an essential space, the ground must be discussed if 
equality is to be reflected into material political forms.  
 When Badiou declares “anyone who lives and works here belongs here”, 
where are we?69 What material space is extensive enough to contain all those who belong 
equally and sustain the constitution of a collective? This question may be answered alongside 
Husserl’s late discussion of the spatiality of nature found in his Foundational Investigations. 
Outlining the significance of this text, Merleau-Ponty explains that Husserl’s philosophical 
starting point is to reclaim the cruciality of the earthly ground against a Copernican 
understanding of earth as a body floating amongst others in the universe.70 Attempting to 
overcome the Copernican reduction of earth to just another planet, Husserl presents earth as 
 
68 This argument presented in this chapter treats the body as a human category and clearly rejects the 
contemporary trend of posthumanism. For more on Posthumanism see Rosi Braidotti, The Posthuman 
(Cambridge: Polity Press), 2013; and Rosi Braidotti, Posthuman Ecologies Complexity and Process after Deleuze 
(London: Rowman and Littlefield), 2018. 
69 Badiou, “What Is to Be Thought? What Is to Be Done?,” Whorecull 3 (2002): 15. 
70 About this particular point, Merleau-Ponty explains that “For the Copernican human, the world contains only 
‘bodies’ […] through meditation we must again learn of a mode of being the idea of which we have lost, the 
being of the ‘ground’, and that of the earth first of all- the earth where we live, that which is this side of rest 





an entity that is “pregiven to experience”, and whose surface forms the ground of all 
possibilities.71 For Husserl, who often uses the terms earth and ground interchangeably, “the 
earth does not move and does not rest; only in relation to it are motion and rest given as 
having their sense of motion and rest.”72 From a Husserlian standpoint, the earth is not any-
body.73 It is “the experiential basis for all bodies in the experiential genesis of our idea of the 
world.”74 In other words, it is the all-encompassing earthly body which grounds and enables 
all other bodies.75 For Dylan Trigg, Husserl’s earth displays two levels of foundation. Firstly, 
“the Earth is a foundation in that it renders movement and rest possible by establishing a 
relational axis between the body and the Earth as ground.” Secondly, “it constitutes the 
specificity of the body as having an origin” to the extent that human bodies remain tied to 
earth.76 Not only is the restful earthly ground a base for all bodies, it is also the plane on which 
any sort of bodily movement is enabled. This Husserlian account of the ground as essential 
materiality is directly relevant to conceptualising the spatial facet of egalitarian politics. 
Neither Husserl nor Merleau-Ponty connect their philosophical approach to any political 
endeavour. Notwithstanding, conceiving the ground through its basal and static materiality 
allows one to gain access to its simplicity and givenness. To the extent that the ground is there 
and remaining, bodily movement is possible.   
As Merleau-Ponty concisely points out, an earthly body’s destination is always tied to 
the ground.77 In his view, what must be recovered from Husserl and reasserted against post-
Copernican thought is an understanding of earth as being “on the side of rest and movement 
[…] something initial, a possibility of reality, the earth as a pure fact, the cradle, the basis and 
 
71 Trigg, “The Role of The Earth In Merleau-Ponty’s Archaeological Phenomenology,” 249. 
72 Husserl, “Foundational Investigations of the Phenomenological Origin of the Spatiality of Nature”, 223.  
The statement that ‘the earth does not move’ should not be understood as a scientific discreditation of 
modern astronomy. Instead, Husserl’s objective with this proposition is to philosophically set the earth as a 
basic ground of experience. The earth’s immobility reflects a paradox by which “if the Earth is not in 
movement, then this is only because it is the very ground for the possibility of movement, and thus for 
experienceIt is precisely from the earth’s restfulness that the earthly ground becomes a ground of 
experience.” [Trigg, 251.] 
73 Juha Himanka explains that the earth constitutes much more than a thing or even a body in Husserl’s 
phenomenology: “The phenomenological starting point of Husserl's argumentation is to see that the earth 
originally, in the first level of its constitution, is not a thing […] All of us, including Copernicus himself, do not 
originally see the earth as a body.” [Juha Himanka, “Husserl's Argumentation for the Pre-Copernican View of 
the Earth” The Review of Metaphysics 58 (2005): 633.  
74 Husserl, “Foundational Investigations of the Phenomenological Origin of the Spatiality of Nature”, 223. 
75 Ibid.  
76 Trigg, 253. 





the ground of all experience.”78 Framed in this way, the ground (Erfahrungsboden) becomes 
the exclusive material plane on which all human activity takes place. In the context of this 
chapter, the ground will be interpreted as a constitutive structuring of bodies’ experience of 
spatiality.79 Following this statement can easily lead to absolute considerations of the ground 
as a sort of ‘hyperobject’.80 However, it is vital to maintain a certain intellectual distance 
towards the ground. No political guidance can be expected from its content. This task is 
assigned to the subject-body roaming on its surface. The ground conditions bodies’ 
experience simply by virtue of its static and constant presence. Regardless of what unfolds on 
its surface the ground continues to support bodies, providing a platform for their movements. 
It should be read through this basic yet constant capacity to support bodies. The only political 
function of the ground is to serve as a foundational space for bodies. 
In addition to its overarching spatiality, the ground also displays a unique temporality. 
Being anterior to all life, there could be no-body without it.81 If the earthly ground is the 
original material ‘arche’, then it is also “the reserve from which all life, all future, all history 
can issue.”82 Not only is the ground everywhere supporting us according to Husserl, it is also 
everlasting.  As an object in and for itself, the ground subsists whether bodies are present or 
not. For Husserl, the ancestrality of earth (existing prior to any human experience) truly 
reveals the archetypal status of the ground.83 Not unlike Husserl and Merleau-Ponty, 
 
78 Merleau-Ponty, "Husserl's Concept of Nature," 46.  
Husserl’s treatment of the ground as pre-existing foundation deeply contrasts with the contemporary trend of 
post-foundationalism mentioned in previous chapters. Whereas post-foundationalism designates “a constant 
interrogation of metaphysical figures of foundation – such as totality, universality, essence, and ground”, 
Husserl takes a different route by establishing the ground not only as a ‘figure’ of foundation, but also as a 
material plane of experience. Building on Husserl’s work offers the possibility to reject the idea that politics is 
founded on an abyssal ground. Instead the point can be made that politics emanates from an existing and 
unconditioned ground. Whereas many contemporary thinkers tend to think of the ground as a theoretical 
construction, Husserl treats the ground as earthly materiality. Following Husserl and Merleau-Ponty, the 
ground is neither an idea nor a construction. It simply is here, immobile, and at the basis of all bodily 
movement and thought. [Oliver Marchart, Post-Foundational Political Thought: Political Difference in Nancy, 
Lefort, Badiou and Laclau (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University press), 2007, 2-3.] 
79 Husserl quoted in Trigg, 251. 
80 Hyperobjects are usually described as “entities of such vast temporal and spatial dimensions that they 
defeat traditional ideas about what a thing is in the first place.” [Timothy Morton, Hyperobjects Philosophy and 
Ecology after the End of the World (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota press, 2013). 
81 Trigg, 256. 
82 Merleau-Ponty, “Resume of the Course”, 74. 
83 About the significance of the earth’s pre-human temporality, Trigg explains that “the Earth beckons both a 
memorial and immemorial timescale, both a destructible and indestructible materiality, which at no point can 
be localised as a ‘correlate’ to human experience alone, but instead marks an irrecoverable depth anterior to 





Meillassoux also highlights the philosophical importance of recognising earth’s ancestral 
temporality in After Finitude. His approach to this question is chiefly illustrated by the notion 
of ‘arche-fossil’, which he defines as “materials indicating the existence of an ancestral reality 
or event; one that is anterior to terrestrial life.”84 For Meillassoux, the arche-fossil’s strange 
temporality represents a challenge to the philosophical impossibility of thinking of a world 
before human consciousness. Across its ancestral temporality, the arche-fossil embodies the 
possibility “to get out of ourselves, to grasp the in-itself, to know what is whether we are or 
not.”85 It challenges what he terms ‘correlationism’ by materially giving access to a world that 
subsists without being given.86 Meillassoux’s account of the arche-fossil may be linked to 
Husserl’s conceptualisation of the ground in several ways. First, both Husserl and Meillassoux 
seem willing to think human experience in relation to a material space that exceeds theory, a 
material kernel of objectivity that can never be fully appropriated or properly understood by 
thought alone.87 Another interesting connection lies in the embeddedness of the arche-fossil 
within the earthly ground itself. When discovered, the arche-fossil reveals not only its own 
ancestrally but also that of the ground. Located deep into the ground, the fossil bears witness 
to the elemental spatio-temporality of the ground. It was here long before humans walked 
the earth and remained grounded and static until its excavation. Ultimately, no other object 
embodies the Husserlian understanding of the earth as foundational ground more 
convincingly than the arche-fossil.  
For both Husserl and Meillassoux, thought and human bodies are grounded by an 
absolute materiality that simultaneously precedes and exceeds them. About the absoluteness 
of the Husserlian ground, Merleau-Ponty remarks that “the study of the Sinnesboden [ground 
of senses] is to be taken literally: natural boden (the earth) and cultural-historical boden which 
is built on the earth […] the figurative sense of boden is the literal one.”88 The ground is 
 
84 Meillassoux, After Finitude, 22. 
85 Ibid, 48. 
86 Meillassoux, Après la Finitude, 39, Own-translation.  
Meillassoux’s After Finitude is aimed more specifically at Kant’s Copernican revolution best captured by the 
assertion that “it is no longer the mind that conforms to objects, but rather objects that conform to the mind.” 
[Levi Bryant, Nick Srnircek, and Graham Harman in The Speculative Turn: Continental Materialism and Realism, 
4.] Meillassoux labels the mode of thought introduced by this revolution ‘correlationism’. The latter designates 
the idea according to which “we only ever have access to the correlation between thinking and being, and 
never to either term considered apart from the other.” [Meillassoux, After Finitude, 1.] 
87 Meillassoux refers to “the eternal in-itself, whose being is indifferent to whether or not it is thought. [Ibid, 
104.] 





simultaneously material and figurative for it conditions the totality of human possibilities in 
thought and action. On the other hand, Meillassoux directs his materialist speculations 
towards the absolute reality of an “entity without thought.”89 Even if unthinkable, such 
absolute reality can be glimpsed at through Meillassoux’s discussions of the ‘arche-fossil’. 
Within the Husserlian ground and Meillassoux’s ‘entity without thought’, the absolute returns 
as essential object rather than subjective truth. Faced with the return of ‘the One’ in the form 
of the ground, it is crucial to reiterate that the conceptual framework established thus far in 
this thesis rejects any form of absoluteness that does not concern ‘All’. The distinction 
established in the previous chapter between religious faith and political fidelity and the 
account of objective fidelity provided in the previous section would be theoretically 
compromised by fully endorsing Husserl’s absolute consideration of the ground. The point is 
not to recognise the ground as the material guiding light of egalitarian politics. Instead, the 
objective of this section is to recognise the basal position of a ground that ‘does not move’ 
for every-body and at every movement. As an immobile yet ever-present form of materiality, 
the ground does not dictate the content nor the direction of a collective subject-body. 
However, it sustains that subject-body simply by containing all bodies along its horizontal 
spatiality and by providing a grounded and objective point of view that is shared by All.  
Where does equality stand on the ground? If it is understood in Badiousian terms as a 
fundamental ontological category, then equality must be present everywhere there are 
bodies and sets. However, chapter two showed how this claim does not take root empirically 
in a neoliberal context that denies the political value of equality. Away from purely empirical 
considerations, egalitarian spatiality may be conceptualised in relation to an already existing 
ground to which all bodies are attached merely by ‘being there’. If the ground is there 
supporting all bodies in equal measures, then it is not merely immobile and ancestral, but also 
essentially equalising. The egalitarian facet of the ground is most clearly expressed through 
its horizontal prefiguration.90 As a horizontal plane, the ground supports all bodies equally. 
 
89 Meillassoux, After Finitude, 62.  
Meillassoux defines speculative materialism as follows: “Every materialism that would be speculative, and 
hence for which absolute reality is an entity without thought, must assert both that thought is not necessary 
(something can be independently of thought), and that thought can think what there must be when there is no 
thought. The materialism that chooses to follow the speculative path is thereby constrained to believe that it is 
possible to think a given reality by abstracting from the fact that we are thinking it. [Meillassoux, After 
Finitude, 36.] 
90 Merleau-Ponty refers to the ground as a horizontal entity that expresses both ontic and ontological 





Being static, it does not suggest any hierarchies but only rests there. The ground simply 
provides a material space that is common to all, remaining shared across its extensive 
spatiality and ancestral temporality. Although some of its parts may be appropriated, it 
remains open in its overarching totality. Regardless of the type of movement being deployed 
on the ground, all bodies remain attached to it simply by ‘standing there’. In that regard, the 
ground always persists as a common ground for bodies regardless of what is taking place on 
its surface. To say that all bodies present on the ground move on the same horizontal axis 
does not suggest that all thinking produced on the ground is egalitarian or equivalent. Far 
from being a guide, the ground should be understood as a perpetual material presence on 
which bodies must interact to generate movement. The ground remains a neutral space. The 
fact that it is always shared by every-body establishes the ground as a basic yet universally 
inclusive space.  
The ground’s equalising presence is significant at two basic levels when referring to 
the materialisation of egalitarian politics. First, it materially supports, sustains, and connects 
every-body along its horizontal spatiality. If every-body is on an equal footing by virtue of 
being grounded, what is being shared is not only a space but also a collective and basic 
experience of the world. Whereas sharing emanates from notions of belonging and inclusion, 
it also stems from a common ‘grounded perspective.’ Understanding the significance of such 
perspective requires returning to Husserl’s declaration that ‘the earth does not move’. Being 
static and ancestral, the ground provides a point of view that remains unchanged through 
time. Rather than as a pure scientific fact, the staticity of the ground is the be understood 
through its relationality with bodies. There is no denying on Husserl’s part that earth rotates 
 
actual within the ontic possibilities prefigured at any time; the world is prefigured and is subsequently 
conceptualised and expressed in judgements by ontology; the form of the world is taken into consideration 
along with its ontic possibilities. […] One would have to take up the concrete relation of these two orders by 
turning both of them not into a physical world relative to the idealistic, but into two correlative aspects of 
being. [Merleau-Ponty, “Resume of the course,” 75-76.]  
The question of ‘being there’ or Dasein and the ontic has been most extensively discussed by Heidegger in 
Being and Time. Dasein is “a pre-ontological understanding of being”. [Heidegger, Being and Time, 35.] This 
philosophical category is crucial to Heidegger’s fundamental ontology “from which alone all other ontologies 
can take their rise, must be sought in the existential analytic of Dasein. Dasein accordingly takes priority over 
all other entities in several ways. The first priority is an ontical one: Dasein is an entity whose Being has the 
determinate character of existence. The second priority is an ontological one: Dasein is in itself 'ontological', 
because existence is thus determinative for it.” [Martin Heidegger, Being and Time (Oxford: Blackwell, 2001), 
34.]; In light of Heidegger’s fundamental ontology, John Macquarrie & Edward Robinson explain the distinction 
between ontic and ontological as follows: “Ontological inquiry is concerned primarily with Being; ontical 
inquiry is concerned primarily with entities and the facts about them.” [John Macquarrie & Edward Robinson in 





around its own axis, hence generating movement. Rather than providing a scientific challenge 
to post-Copernican contributions to astronomy, Husserl constructs a phenomenological 
framework conceptualising the earthly ground specifically through the point of view of bodies 
that inhabit it. As Merleau-Ponty summarises, “To the degree that I adopt the Copernican 
constitution of the world, I leave my starting situation; I pretend to be an absolute 
observer.”91 From a Husserlian position, such scientific detachment is impossible for the 
earthly ground is not to be interpreted from infinite space but from the perspective of bodies 
themselves on the experiential ground (Erfahrungsboden). Trigg acknowledges this 
anthropocentric take on the ground writing that “if the Earth is not in movement, it is only 
because it is the very ground for the possibility of movement, and thus for experience.”92  
The assumed anthropocentricity or body-centricity of Husserl’s account of perspective 
is not anti-scientific but humble. Far from a weak spot in his conceptualisation of grounded 
bodies, humility is one of its main strength. Of the ground, we know only our point of view. 
Hence, we perceive the ground as static for it is all we can experience as bodies. The fact that 
earth rotates at approximately 1037 miles per hour is empirically inaccessible to bodies 
standing on its surface.93 Inasmuch as bodies cannot experience a political truth prior to their 
encounter with a subject, neither can they understand earth’s movement without embracing 
the absolute position of a detached external observer so crucial to the scientific method. 
Following a Husserlian account of the ground allows for a humble consideration of bodies 
detached from any form of absolute gaze. Neither is the body an absolute observer nor the 
ground an absolute object. Instead, the potential of bodies resides in their material 
experience of the ground as such and the perspective that ensues from this foundational 
bond. 
The static horizontality of the ground unknowingly provides bodies with some degree 
of objectivity on what is taking place on its surface. This basic shared perspective does not 
suggest that bodies are limited to a single viewpoint on themselves or their environment, nor 
that the ground provides the ‘One’ true perspective. Instead, it conveys the location from 
which bodies collectively bear witness to what is taking place around them and amongst 
 
91 Merleau-Ponty, “Resume of the course,” 9-10. 
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themselves. To the extent that the ground and the perspective it offers persist in time and 
space, it is also part of the process by which concrete political forms effectively appear. 
Conceived in these terms, grounded perspective helps clarifying the complex relationship 
between moving bodies and their subjectivation into a collective. Although fundamental, 
grounded perspective does not guarantee nor specifically directs the movement of bodies.94 
Because the ground is always static, objective fidelity exceeds grounded perspective by 
demanding that bodies move on the ground, potentially towards the constitution of a 
collective subject-body.  
The connexion between the ground and bodies standing on its surface generates a 
constant perspective from which the constitution of a collective may be apprehended. Far 
from taming the political potential of faithful (fidèles) bodies, the materiality of the ground 
can potentially contribute to it. Through the prism of objective fidelity, grounded perspective 
may help clarifying the process by which bodies objectively recognise themselves (or not) 
within a collective subject-body. Although Husserl never alludes to politicised bodies, he 
acknowledges the perspectival potential of the ground in his Foundational Investigations: 
The entire physical perceptual field as a constituted manifold of things that appear in 
perspectives is a harmonious unity of perspectivity; one perspectival style governs and 
continues to govern throughout the changing perceptual field. Its changes can occur 
by the entry of the perceptual appearance of things not already in the field, or by the 
withdrawal of those previously in the field.95 
For Husserl, perspective remains grounded regardless of whether things enter or exit 
the perceptual field. Perspective remains irremediably tied to the static ground. Objects enter 
and exit the field, but perspective is constant so long as bodies remain in contact with the 
ground. The ground’s horizontality assures a continuity of perspective amongst bodies that 
remains undisturbed by objects entering and exiting its temporal flow.96 Grasping appearing 
objects also denotes a sense of immobility on the part of bodies. Equipped with a certain 
perspective, a body is not just another moving object but also a restful witness able to sense 
 
94 For Husserl, the earthly ground conditions the conduct of any bodies whether they move or rest. [Himanka, 
636.] 
95 Husserl, “Foundational Investigations of the Phenomenological Origin of the Spatiality of Nature,” 239. 





what is taking place on the ground. Politically, what is taking place is the constitution of a 
collective subject-body.  
Several aspects of Husserl’s depiction of perspective are directly relevant to providing 
an account of recognition on the ground. One is the ‘harmonious unity of perspectivity’ 
obtained from the ground. Across its horizontality, the ground provides a shared perspective 
that is unique to equally grounded bodies. More interestingly, Husserl also speaks of both 
perspectivity and perceptuality when referring to the ground. Whereas perspectivity refers 
to the act of viewing something from a specific position, perceptuality denotes the act of 
recognising an object through senses more generally. Perceptuality offers the possibility to 
open grounded perspective to senses other than just vision. As Husserl points out, “bodies of 
any size whatever still could not and could never be inaccessibly far from our senses.”97 
Understood in this perceptual way, grounded perspective may be directed not only towards 
what is visible, but also less straightforward types of appearances such as affects or feelings.98 
This perceptual opening of perspective offers the possibility to corporeally relate to political 
materiality in a multi-sensory way that is not constituted merely by the act of seeing but that 
of sensing more generally.  
 This multi-faceted account of perspective provides an additional layer to the process 
of recognition described earlier. If grounded perspective is indeed perceptual, then bodies 
act not only on what they see but also what they feel in the broader sense. In the event of the 
materialisation of a collective, perceptuality signifies that the physical and ideological 
movement of a collective subject-body is sensed by bodies in a way that is not necessarily 
visible. In the same way, inclusion and rejection is felt as much as it is seen. One does not only 
become part of a collective by being formally included in it. Being grounded, bodies 
themselves have the capacity to sense whether they belong in that collective or not. This 
sensing emanating from a shared grounded perspective is crucial factor in determining 
objective fidelity. If bodies standing on the ground sense that they do not belong within a 
collective, then no recognition is possible, and fidelity loses its objective dimension. Such 
sensing is evidently hard to verbalise but consolidates existing bodies as the only agent 
capable of providing an objective point of view on a political sequence taking place through a 
collective. 
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 Having recognised the importance of the ground in supporting bodies and providing 
them with a static perspective, it is essential to maintain that bodies must be subjectivised 
for egalitarian politics to take place. Neither bodies nor the ground suffice for the 
materialisation of egalitarian politics. The latter still requires the formation of a collective 
subject. The figure of the subject resides outside of the frame of Husserl’s account of 
perspective. In his Foundational Investigations, Husserl largely conceptualises the subject 
through the notion of ‘absolute ego’. The latter “lives and precedes all actual and possible 
beings.”99 For Husserl, both the ego and the ground are transcendental.100 In fact, the ground 
acts as a fatherland of the ego and both persist in time and space regardless of whether life 
is present or not.101 For Trigg, Merleau-Ponty radicalises Husserl by bypassing the idealism of 
the ego and “returning  to  the  primal arche of the Earth itself.”102 One must follow Merleau-
Ponty in reaffirming the ground as primal materiality independently of any transcendental 
ego or subject. The point here is not to deny the possibility of such subjectivity, but to set the 
ground as the basic and humbling material basis of all bodily experience of which 
subjectivation is only a possibility.  
The risk with recognising the ground as ancestral object, independently of whether 
bodies or subjects roam its surface, is to elevate the ground and objects more generally as a 
new transcendental.103 Doubts that were cast on Badiou’s absolute consideration of truth and 
its subject are equally applicable to the treatment of objects as a transcendental category. An 
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example of this is provided by Meillassoux who argues for the possibility of an a-subjective 
point of view that remains unregulated by an ‘Idea of knowledge’: 
What do we mean by 'taking place'? We mean that the transcendental, insofar as it 
refuses all metaphysical dogmatism, remains indissociable from the notion of a point 
of view. Let us suppose a subject without any point of view on the world - such a 
subject would have access to the world as totality, without anything escaping from its 
instantaneous inspection of objective reality. But such a subject would thereby violate 
the essential finitude of the transcendental subject - the world for it would no longer 
be a regulatory Idea of knowledge, but rather the transparent object of an 
immediately achieved and effective knowledge.104 
 Although this chapter follows Meillassoux in reformulating the relationship between 
objects and subjects, it does not deny the cruciality of a process subjectivation for egalitarian 
politics.105 Grounded perspective arguably provides the conceptual tools to reassess the 
relationship between subject and object in regard to politics. Recognising the value of 
empowered bodies’ common grounded perspective demands that politics no longer be 
considered merely as subject-dependent.106 This position is not antithetical to the category 
of subject.107 Instead it suggests that human objects (bodies) standing on the ground are in a 
privileged position to assess the appearance of political subjectivity on that ground. The 
formation of a collective subject-body remains the objective facet of the process of 
subjectivation. It refers to the appearance of a political collective mediated by bodies’ basic 
yet crucial grounded perspective. 
 The concept of ground provides the material means to reassert equality whilst 
avoiding the dogmatic trappings of an all-powerful subject of truth. Egalitarian politics does 
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not take hold on the ground simply by breaking the order of bodies being there, imposing 
itself through the work of faithful subjects. It does not take root on a virgin field nor does it 
claim dominion over docile bodies awaiting enlightenment. Instead, the ground is a test 
conducted by perspectival bodies who must always retain agency over their own 
subjectivation against any absolutisation. Having presented bodies as active political agents, 
recognised the primordiality of the ground in providing a static perspective, and upfolded the 
compatibility of the objective ground with political subjectivity, it is imperative to provide an 
account of how these figures materially interact.  
 
For a Grounded Political Economy 
The previous section established that far from merely ‘being there’ the ground 
presents itself as a field on which objective bodies and political subjects interact. It was argued 
that a possible result of this confrontation is a process of political subjectivation enabled by 
bodies through the construction of a collective subject-body. Inasmuch as the current 
conceptual framework provides an account of the process whereby egalitarian politics may 
materialise on the ground, it does not yet paint a clear picture of what political materiality is. 
The appearance of a collective subject-body also rests on concrete material relations. 
Claiming that egalitarian politics necessitates a renewed engagement with materialism calls 
for an account of political materiality that exceeds abstract or speculative constructions. 
Failure to do so would reduce materialism to something existing outside of any matter, 
palpable materiality, or concrete relation.108 What then may be recognised as a concrete form 
of political materiality? Once again, one must look to the ground for answers. Insofar as the 
ground generates perspective, supports bodies in their movements, and provides a field on 
which bodies and truthful subjects intersect, it also generates and sustains any form of 
political materiality. Accepting that egalitarian politics is not only thought but materialises 
through a collective subject-body entails recognising that such collective must be sustained. 
Furthermore, if egalitarian politics belongs to all who stand there as equals then bodies must 
be equally sustained. This claim inevitably reframes the question of egalitarian politics in 
political-economic terms. The possibility of a grounded political economy may be extracted 
 





from Karl Polanyi’s ‘substantive’ understanding of economics and the work of economic 
anthropologists like Susana Norotzky and Maurice Godelier.  
  Chapter one demonstrated the extent to which liberal approaches to equality always 
derive their distributive models from a relatively ‘free’ and naturalised market economy. 
Equality is systematically set as a goal to be achieved to compensate for the inegalitarian 
outcomes of market exchange.109 In chapter two, neoliberalism was interpreted as a branch 
of political economy that treats the market as a political force, thriving in inequalities and fully 
denying the political potential of equality. It was concluded that neither liberal nor neoliberal 
understandings of the market offer a political economy that is fitting to an axiomatic 
conception of equality. On the other hand, neither Rancière nor Badiou theoretically venture 
into the realm of political economy, divorcing their egalitarianism from any economic 
ambitions.110 Polanyi’s critique of the classical understanding of the market potentially offers 
a response to this economic deadlock. For Polanyi the economic logic underpinning free 
market liberalism is ‘formal’. Formalised economic relations are all ultimately reduced to 
means-end relationships regimented by a situation of choice.111 Whether choice is indexed 
on natural laws or market laws, it always denotes a rational choice of means in relation to 
ends.112 Narotzky explains that formal conceptions of economic relations are only applicable 
“in a society where the market mechanism is the dominant means of allocating land, labour 
and goods.”113 Following Polanyi’s categorisation, none of the thinkers discussed thus far 
fundamentally challenge this formal understanding of the economy. As a political economist, 
one of Polanyi’s objective was to develop an understanding of economics that is not 
irremediably tied to the market. This endeavour clearly resonates with Marxism. Yet, unlike 
Marx, Polanyi’s ambition was not to demonstrate that relations of production underpin the 
structure and social consciousness of society as a whole.114 Instead, he aimed to show that 
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economic relations are embedded in other social institutions and cannot be analysed 
separately.115 
Through the notion of embeddedness, Polanyi arguably provides a challenge to the 
classical market-based understanding of the economy as well as its Marxist alternative. About 
the relation between Marxist and Polanyian political economy, Godelier writes that “Polanyi 
must take the credit for having shown that the economic does not always occupy the same 
sites and social relations throughout history and that it changes its forms according to 
whether or not it is 'embedded' in the operation of kin or politico-religious relations.”116 For 
Polanyi there is no separate economic sphere. Economic relations do not constitute society 
nor individual choice. Rather, economics is embedded in sets of complex social relations. 
Accordingly, there must be “an elaborate social organization to take care of such aspects of 
economic life as the division of labour, disposal of land, organization of work, inheritance and 
so on.”117 Building on the embeddedness of social and economic relations, Polanyi returns to 
a ‘substantive’ understanding of economic relations. The latter revolves around humans’ 
interaction with their natural environment and other humans “insofar as this results in 
supplying him with the means of material want satisfaction.”118 From this basic standpoint, 
economic relations simply denote interactions between bodies amongst themselves and their 
environment as a means to produce and reproduce material life.119 Unlike market-based 
understanding of economics, the substantive view entails no scarcity of resources, marginal 
utility motivation, or even trade.120 
Polanyi’s substantive view provides the tools to think of economic relations as 
fundamentally embedded within a larger political procedure. It sets the basic foundations for 
developing a political economy that is not merely focused on market competition nor the 
impact of relations of production, but the fundamental concordance of economic production 
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and distribution with a political sequence unfolding.121 Polanyi’s substantive economics 
together with his notion of embeddedness are compatible with the account of the ground 
and political materiality developed thus far in this chapter. To the extent that the substantive 
view strips economics down to its core objectives (subsistence, basic material needs), it 
renders the deployment of a grounded political economy possible. Rather than putting 
markets in motion and enabling individuals to fulfil their self-interests, a grounded 
substantive view suggests that economics takes place from the ground up and remains 
embedded within egalitarian politics. Far from a separate sphere of social life responding to 
its own rules and constituting specific economic subjects, economics depends on the ground 
for extracting material resources and on the collective subject-body to regulate economic life. 
Understood in these terms, economic relations are conditioned twice: first by the carrying 
capacity of the ground, and then by the egalitarian regulation of economic relations.122 
Narotzky lays out a substantive model that seems particularly fitted to the portrayal of 
grounded bodies presented earlier: 
Economic activities are those which are directed toward the satisfaction of material 
needs in human populations. This perspective presupposes the existence of a given 
'natural' context, an environment, where human groups dwell, which is there to be 
acted upon and from which they can extract what is needed for a living. […] humans 
are mainly treated as just one species interacting with other species in space and 
through time.123 
In the context of this chapter, the ‘environment where human groups dwell’ may be 
associated to the ground and the bodies it contains. The primordiality of the ground suggests 
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that no economic relation can avoid taking place on its surface. Moreover, it entails that 
economic resources can only emanate from its core. The notion of resource extraction is 
especially helpful when drawing the sketch of a grounded political economy. Extraction here 
does not refer to a specific industry such as resource-mining. Instead, it concerns the 
production of economic resources in its entirety for the latter is always directly or indirectly 
associated with the ground. Understood in this way, economic extraction refers to the totality 
of resources emanating from the ground that directly contributes to the subsistence of all and 
to the sustainability of a collective subject-body in accordance with the carrying capacity of 
that ground. Economic materiality is the result of extraction either directly through 
agriculture and mining, or indirectly through production in the form of industry, 
manufacturing, and services. In the latter case, value is not indexed on exchange but on the 
extent to which extraction directly contributes to the subsistence of all and the sustainability 
of a political collective.124  
A few elements of this definition of economic extraction must be unpacked to be 
legible in relation to the ground. The claim that economic resources result from extraction 
refers to the fact that all types of substantive economic materiality retain a foundational link 
to the ground. Crops directly emerge from the ground’s surface, feeding livestock and 
sustaining human bodies. Any item incorporating wood, metal, or fuel for its production 
emanates from the ground or grounded objects such as trees or minerals. The ubiquitous 
materiality of the ground perfectly illustrates the elementary character of the substantive 
view from which economic activity simply refers to the satisfaction of material needs. 
Fulfilling these needs does not entail that value be appropriated and exchanged on a market, 
but simply that material resources be extracted from and distributed to all on the ground. 
Polanyi was a strong critique of the commodification of both man and land at work in market 
economies. In The Great Transformation he wrote: “man under the name of labor, nature 
under the name of land, were made available for sale; the use of labor power could be 
universally bought and sold at a price called wages, and the use of land could be negotiated 
for a price called rent.”125 For Polanyi land is a ‘fictitious commodity’ that does not belong on 
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any marketplace.126 According to substantive economics, what is being extracted from the 
ground is not value but materiality. Hence, the ground cannot be fully appropriated for it is 
the source of all life and thereof all material production. 
Substantive political economy concerns essential economic relations. In doing so, it 
respects the integrity of the ground as foundation. However, political economy cannot simply 
be indexed on the horizontality of the ground. In addition, it must conform to axiomatic 
equality and respond to certain inter-body interactions if it is to play a part in the constitution 
and sustenance of a collective. In that regard, two specific types of economic behaviours 
stand out: reciprocity and distribution. For Polanyi, reciprocity, redistribution, and exchange 
are the three main economic patterns traversing societies through time.127 Exchange is 
associated to the formalism of market economies, reducing individuals to economic trading 
units autonomous from one another.128 Reciprocity is closer to a symmetrical relationship. It 
contrasts with market relations of interest for it requires no payment, but only that the 
‘favour’ be returned.129 Still referring to a form of exchange, it does so on the basis of 
“equality, complementarity, and voluntary interdependence.”130 True reciprocity is 
unconceivable in a society where others are not perceived as equals. If I am unable to give in 
the same way that I take, then ‘the other body’ cannot be my equal for I cannot reciprocate. 
Here, the discrepancy is not financial but of trust. The collective decision to be economically 
interdependent from each other is interrupted by one’s withdrawal from that pact. Not unlike 
politics, reciprocity depends on the assumption that equality is ‘already there’. Through 
reciprocal exchange, one assumes that disinterested giving has a shared value that will 
ultimately be returned.131 Perfectly fitting to an axiomatic understanding of equality, 
reciprocity is fully incompatible with a liberal conception of equality as a goal to be achieved. 
If equality is ‘not there yet’, there can be no trust and therefore no ground for reciprocal 
exchange. 
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For Polanyi, reciprocity and redistribution are often linked. Servet defines 
redistribution in Polanyian terms as “a principle founded on a logic by which political and 
collective goals condition both production and the movement of wealth.”132 Redistribution 
refers to the process by which one group divides and allocates goods according to “custom, 
law or ad hoc central decision.”133 Polanyi speaks of redistribution rather than distribution to 
the extent that allocating resources depends on a centre point to which resources converge 
before being distributed.134 This centre point is usually associated to a state or some level of 
government. Within the current discussion, it is necessary to talk of both distribution and 
redistribution to the extent that economic extraction begins before a political collective has 
been consolidated on the ground. In fact, resources must be extracted to operate this 
consolidation. Even without any clear form of political centricity, resource extraction must 
conform to the horizontality of the ground and be distributed equally to bodies. Although 
grounded extraction precedes the full materialisation of a collective subject-body, it must still 
operate according to the egalitarian axiom. In a pre-political world, economic extraction 
remains embedded within the horizontality of the ground to which all belong merely by ‘being 
there’.  
In reference to the point made earlier regarding the importance of not conflating 
presentation and representation when it comes to the constitution of a political collective, it 
is necessary to differentiate between distribution and redistribution in reference to political 
economy. The concept of redistribution establishes a clear hierarchy between the central 
institution (state or market) in charge of collecting resources and reinjecting them into society 
as goods and services. On the other hand, treating economic relations through the notion of 
distribution clears the conceptual path for a less formal understanding of economics. 
Distribution does not refer to any centralised system of allocation, but simply to the act of 
sharing resources. By once again returning to a more basic level of economic interaction, it is 
possible to reclaim bodies as active economic agents. Redistribution rests on a system of 
allocation that is largely separated from bodies beyond their intervention as producers, 
consumers, or collectors of welfare. In the same way that bodies cannot be mere recipient of 
truths, they do not have to be reduced to producers and consumers of resources. Drawing an 
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early sketch of an egalitarian political economy is better served by the idea of distribution for 
the absence of a given all-encompassing allocator of resources pushes one to treat bodies 
beyond the producer/consumer dichotomy. Within a substantive account of distribution, 
bodies may be treated as extractors, producers, benefiters, and distributors. In the same way 
that bodies have the capacity to recognise themselves within a collective, they can extract, 
produce, and distribute resources in the name of that collective. The collective subject-body, 
not the state nor the market, must retain control over the production and allocation of 
resources if a political economy is to be considered egalitarian.  
The question of economic materiality is irremediably linked to that of economic 
exchange. It was argued earlier that reciprocity is the mode of exchange that most closely 
corresponds to a political economy ordained by equality. Nonetheless, reciprocity denotes 
much more than mere economic exchange. Going back to the perceptuality associated with 
bodies’ grounded perspective, economic exchange also impacts the ways bodies relate to 
each other and the resources they extract from the ground, produce, and distribute.135 
Reciprocal economic exchange is also a way for bodies to materially relate to a collective 
subject-body. If economic extraction, production, and distribution does not incorporate ‘All’ 
based on reciprocal exchange, then it will forbid certain bodies from inclusion within the 
collective subject-body. If bodies are unable to materially relate to the collective in equal 
measures, they will be more likely to reject it. To the extent that economic reciprocity is 
undermined, so is inclusion. 
The substantive approach to economics allows for the possibility to conceive of a 
grounded political economy that is indexed to equality. Economic groundedness emanates 
from the notion of resource-extraction by which economic materiality is produced. Such 
political economy cannot accommodate markets. Instead it is underpinned by processes of 
reciprocity and distribution through which equality is upheld. The substantive notion that 
economic relations are always embedded with the socio-political context in which they take 
place is also crucial for the account of political materiality presented in this chapter. To the 
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extent that egalitarian politics must be realised by bodies on the ground, it depends from its 
inception on economic extraction. Far from implying that particular modes of economic 
extraction shapes political relations in their entirety, the basality of extraction implies that 
politics and economics are embedded and always implicate each other according to equality. 
Economic extraction sustains bodies to the same extent that it sustains a political collective. 
Conversely, a collective subject-body dictates the terms by which resources are to be 
extracted from the ground and distributed reciprocally on its surface.   
 
The Political Collective as Contingent 
What follows the construction of a collective subject-body on the ground? The 
question of the ‘day after’ will never cease to stimulate the imagination of those committed 
to political emancipation. Assuming that egalitarian politics is finally there, do we as subject-
body reach a utopian plateau? Or, should we reiterate and force an eternal political truth 
regardless of past failures?136 The uncertain temporality of a collective subject-body is best 
understood through Meillassoux’s conceptualisation of contingency. The latter may be briefly 
defined as “the possibility whereby something can either persist or perish, without either 
option contravening the physical invariants that govern the world.”137 One must be careful 
when incorporating Meillassoux’s notion of contingency within discussions egalitarian 
politics. Based on his rebuttal of correlationism, Meillassoux does not believe that political 
subjectivities may be thought. As Badiou rightfully points out, “Meillassoux’s demonstration 
establishes that only one thing is absolutely necessary: the contingency of natural laws”, 
thereof the thinking of contingency cannot be subject-dependent.138 Alongside Badiou, it was 
claimed earlier that politics requires the intervention of a faithful (fidèle) subject. There is a 
clear disagreement between Badiou’s account of egalitarian politics and Meillassoux’s 
philosophical deployment of contingency. This disagreement may arguably be mitigated by 
the perspectival understanding of the ground and the conceptualisation of bodies as active 
political agents developed throughout this chapter. Although the present account of political 
materialism articulated around bodies, the ground, and axiomatic equality remains somehow 
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attached to the correlationist tradition that Meillassoux aims to overcome, it may benefit 
from being read through the prism of contingency.   
In After Finitude Meillassoux declares, “we must think an absolute necessity without 
thinking anything that is absolutely necessary.” In other words, we must assert the necessity 
of an absolute without falling back into the dark waters of dogmatism.139 The paradoxical 
necessity for a non-absolute absolute takes root in the notion of ‘facticity’ by which thought 
is unable to uncover the reasons “why what is, is.”140 Facticity designates a form of essential 
ignorance.141 Whereas facticity may easily be dismissed as a type of intellectual resignation, 
it can also be read as a conveyor of humility when read through the prism of contingency. 
Meillassoux introduces contingency through this paradox: 
It is by exposing the weaknesses in our own arguments that we will uncover, by way 
of a meticulous, step by step examination of the inadequacies in our reasoning, the 
idea of a non-metaphysical and non-religious discourse on the absolute. For it is by 
progressively uncovering new problems, and adequate responses to them, that we 
will give life and existence to a logos of contingency, which is to say, a reason 
emancipated from the principle of reason.142 
The current presentation of the ground as an ancestral and un-subjectivised field 
already belongs to the factual domain of the ‘unknown known.’ To the extent that the ground 
simply is there, it has no ontological justification. Bodies, political truths, and subject-bodies 
interact and move on its surface, but the ground provides no thought besides its ancestral 
and foundational materiality. The force of unknowability and unpredictability resides 
precisely in the concept of contingency. The power of contingency is perhaps best read as a 
form of humility whereby ‘We’ as a collective have no way to know what might or might not 
happen. Overcoming the feeling of anxiety generated by this statement, Meillassoux frames 
contingency in positive terms: 
The term 'contingency' - designates a pure possibility; one which may never be 
realized. For we cannot claim to know for sure whether or not our world, although it 
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is contingent, will actually come to an end one day. We know, in accordance with the 
principle of unreason, that this is a real possibility, and that it could occur for no reason 
whatsoever; but we also know that there is nothing that necessitates it.143 
Through this definition, Meillassoux talks of contingency in eschatological terms as the 
impossibility to know when our world will end. This clearly echoes Agamben’s consideration 
of the Pauline ‘time that remains’ discussed in the previous chapter, when the inevitability 
‘end-time’ empowers the faithful to live ‘in the now.’144 It is crucial to point out that 
contingency is a wide category that does not necessarily rest on this eschatological dimension. 
Contingency concerns destruction as much as preservation or emergence.145 Etymologically, 
contingency comes from the Latin Comingere meaning ‘what is coming’ and clearly conveys 
the potentiality of emergence.146 Far from debilitating, contingency contains the promise that 
things might always be otherwise.147 Even at its most restrictive, contingency arguably 
constitutes a politically empowering force. In the same way that eschatological struggle has 
the potential to recentre the faithful in ‘now-time’, contingency may empower bodies by 
freeing them from the pressure of realising a definite and rigid political truth. To the extent 
that axiomatic equality is maintained as a primordial ontological category, contingency 
implies that political subject-bodies may not endure but also that it may re-emerge in a more 
inclusive form. This position is likely be dismissed as correlationist to the extent that it relies 
on an ontological argument as well as a subject.148 However, the ontological consideration of 
equality can be linked to contingency if considered alongside the givenness of the ground. If 
equality is suggested by the ungraspable capacity of the ground to support bodies 
(horizontality), then the materialisation of egalitarian politics is contingent on that ground 
and bodies that roam on its surface. Inasmuch as equality is always there so long as there is a 
ground and bodies, egalitarian politics contingently responds to these two entities. 
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Meillassoux chiefly conceptualises contingency as a temporal category. Through the 
prism of contingency, time acts as an indeterminate agent of destruction or hope. In a 
beautiful passage, Meillassoux illustrates the contingent character of time: 
If we look through the slit opened up onto the absolute, we will discover in it a 
somehow menacing power – something deafening capable of destroying things as 
much as worlds; capable of engendering illogical monsters; capable of never acting, 
yet also of realising every dream but also every nightmare; capable of disorderly 
frenetic change, or, conversely capable of producing a universe that remains 
motionless down to its ultimate recesses. […] [A] power without norms, blind, 
extracted from other divine perfections and becoming autonomous. A power without 
goodness nor wisdom, unable to provide thought with the veracity of its distinct ideas. 
It is indeed something like Time, but a Time that cannot be thought through the 
physical based on its capacity to destroy while being determined.149 
This powerful account of time is a reminder that attempting to materialise egalitarian 
politics should always be a humble process. Whatever politics is being deployed on the 
ground; it risks being swallowed by time at any moment. The collective subject-body is never 
eternal and will ultimately fail the test of time, remaining merely as ruins contained within 
the ancestral spatio-temporality of the ground and the collective imaginary. Although time 
has the potential to outlive all things, grounded perspective will persist so long as there is a 
ground and there are bodies. This statement does not imply a return to the Husserlian ego 
seen as an absolute gaze existing parallelly to the ground. Rather, it denotes that if bodies 
and the ground objectively persist in ‘being there’ over time, the potential for the emergence 
and persistence of a collective subject-body also remains. This implies that perspectival 
bodies are witness not only of their own subjectivation, but also of the contingent character 
of a collective subject-body and the process of materialising politics more generally. In that 
sense, the collective subject-body itself is a contingent (un contingent). Whereas subjects 
remain committed to a truth through their fidelity to an event, bodies need to perceive 
equality taking place on the ground to sustain their fidelity and allow for their subjectivation 
as collective subject-body. The subsequent decision to continue or abandon a political 
 





sequence is not rational but attached to sensing that what is happening on the ground is 
indeed equality in action. The perceptual perspective of grounded bodies may itself be 
considered as contingent for it destructs or uphold political subject-bodies for reasons that 
cannot be appropriated by thought alone. Bodies are simply moving and sensing from the 
horizontality of the ground. If the ground reflect contingency, so do bodies. 
Alongside time, spatiality may also be used to illustrate the power of contingency. 
Through the essential figure of the ground, space may or may not support a political collective 
or a certain mode of economic extraction. The ground entertains a contingent relationship 
with the mode of economic extraction taking place on its surface. It may itself deny certain 
forms of economic extractions exceeding its carrying capacity, or exhausting its limited 
resources. The contingency of time, space, and hence political subject-bodies reinforces the 
idea that egalitarian politics is rare. Its rarity does not only stem from the scarcity of political 
events, but also from the conditionality of bodies’ objective fidelity and the capacity of the 
ground. Thinking the political subject-body materially signals the impossibility to consider it 
in absolute terms. Relying on existing bodies and the ground as much as truthful subjects for 




Materialising egalitarian politics is an uncertain process involving not only axiomatic 
equality, political truths, and faithful subjects, but the objective forms of the ground, bodies, 
and political economy. Attempting to deduce the materialisation of egalitarian politics from 
the egalitarian axiom, one is pushed to reconsider Badiou’s account of existing bodies as 
passive enablers of absolute truths. Beyond its consideration as an apolitical entity 
constrained to either go with truth or live a meaningless life, the figure of body opens the 
door to conceptualising truthful egalitarian politics in materialist terms. Empowered as active 
political agents, bodies interact with their potential subjectivation through objective fidelity. 
It was argued that such fidelity depends on two processes, recognition and inclusion. 
Establishing these two concepts as conditions of objective fidelity, their liberal interpretations 
must be rejected. Rather than a demand made in the name of individual or group identities, 





unfolding collective subject-body. Either bodies decide that ‘this is Us’ and willingly accept to 
participate in the political sequence, or they fail to recognise themselves and remain outside 
the bounds of that collective. If it is to concern ‘All’ or ‘anyone’, the materialising subject-
body must also be measured on its capacity to include every-body. Rather than a case by case 
inclusion based on specific identities determined by race, gender, sexuality, resources, or 
capabilities, bodily inclusion refers to the quantitative inclusion of all bodies regardless of 
identity. Specific identities are irrelevant if inclusion is thought as an infinite count. There will 
always remain bodies to be counted, but the collective is measured in relation to its infinite 
capacity to include them all. Framed as such, recognition and inclusion form the basis of 
bodies’ objective fidelity in a collective.  
Discussing political materiality entails tying egalitarian politics to a specific spatiality. 
It was argued that only the ground constitutes a shared space extensive enough to contain 
the materialisation of politics ordained by axiomatic equality. Through Husserl and Merleau-
Ponty’s work, the ground was recognised as the material basis of all experience including 
politics. Maintained as an essential material plane rather than a transcendental entity, the 
ground embodies the space in which bodies interact with their subjectivation through fidelity. 
Providing a basal and constant perspective to all bodies on what is taking place on its surface, 
the ground is the central stage of egalitarian politics. Based on this account of bodies and the 
ground, it was claimed that a collective subject-body cannot be sustained without a political 
economy that is itself prescribed by axiomatic equality. Building on Polanyi’s critique of formal 
(market-based) economics and his endorsement of substantive economic relations, one can 
extract the theoretical skeleton of what an egalitarian grounded political economy may be. 
Still following Polanyi and to a lesser extent Marx, it was argued that a grounded political 
economy rests on a mode of resource extraction that respects the carrying capacity of the 
ground, establishes bodies as equal agents of production and distribution, and redefines 
economic exchange through reciprocity.  
To the extent that egalitarian politics may materialise, one must remain humble 
regarding the collective subject-body’s capacity to persist in time and space. Following 
Meillassoux, bodies, as well as the ground on which they stand, may be considered as 
contingent. No matter the political procedure unfolding, it will ultimately remain contingent 
on bodies, the ground, and subjectivation. Hence, considering the collective subject-body as 





contingent). Through the figure of the collective subject-body, egalitarian politics will break 
the endless horizon of pure possibility. However, the materialisation of such an event requires 
the inclusion and subjectivation of objective bodies within a collective that is ordained not 
only by equality and political truth, but also by the horizontality of the ground and reciprocal 

































Insomuch as equality consistently allures political thinkers, it often escapes or exceeds 
political thought. The question of equality requires introspection as well as the capacity to 
relate to others as oneself. It is precisely from this dual dimension, blurring demarcations 
between individual and collective life, that equality simultaneously fascinates and disturbs 
political thinkers as much as political actors. Equality fascinates by embodying the possibility 
to fundamentally rethink social relations through the erosion of differences and discrepancies 
amongst individuals. It disturbs for precisely the same reasons. These paradoxical feelings are 
attached to the theoretical and political potential of equality. Feelings of fascination and fear 
towards equality have traversed this thesis through a wide range of conceptual iterations, 
many of which cannot be reduced to either positive or negative considerations. Rather, 
equality is often invoked before being put at a distance. It is as if glancing at the political 
promise of equality, one must immediately look away to resist what either appears as sublime 
light or corrosive brightness. What remains from this encounter are fragments of equality 
relocated in distinct theoretical frameworks.  
Throughout the range of literature discussed in this work, equality has been defined 
as a goal to be achieved by autonomous citizens, a dangerous limit placed upon individual 
liberty and self-fulfilment, a fundamental declaration without which emancipation is 
unthinkable, and an axiom allowing for the formulation of political truths. Two main 
theoretical trends emerged from these readings. The first, revealed in chapter one and two, 
reduces equality to the task of undermining or upholding inequalities. It may be associated to 
the liberal and neoliberal traditions respectively. Within these approaches, equality is 
systematically invoked negatively through the lens of inequality and sometimes denied in the 
name of liberal autonomy, identity, market exchange, and individual self-interests. In 
contrast, Rancière and Badiou are dedicated to presenting equality as an unquestionable 
starting point of politics. Their political thoughts demand that equality be declared as such for 
only this declaration sets subjects on the path of emancipation. Within these two contrasting 
trends, a quasi-theological distance is maintained towards the realisation of egalitarian 
politics. For liberals and neoliberals, this distance is generated by the impossibility to consider 





autonomy. For Rancière and Badiou, equality is abstracted by a shared unwillingness to 
consider egalitarian politics in material terms.  
Liberal egalitarians are committed to the goal of politically undermining existing 
inequalities. Within liberal democracies where the egalitarian promise of a ruling demos 
tends to be formalised beyond recognition through parliamentary representation and human 
rights, they maintain that substantiating equality can still be achieved alongside liberal ideals. 
Their rich models aim to reconcile liberalism’s individualistic leanings with a collective 
incarnation of politics and justice whose central aim is to undermine inequalities. This is done 
by redistributing goods, resource, welfare, or capabilities, or by recognising marginalised 
identities that have historically not been considered as equals. Although their commitment 
to reducing inequalities is not in doubt, their models suffer from several shortcomings. First 
and foremost, they display a generalised unwillingness or indifference towards questioning 
markets’ efficiency in allocating resources. Not only do liberals remain relatively oblivious to 
markets’ inegalitarian outputs, they also tend to naturalise markets and inequalities in the 
process. This is especially palpable in the work of Rawls and Dworkin who attempt to curb 
market outcomes while never questioning their inegalitarian impact. Liberal egalitarians also 
limit their models to idealised situations in which inequalities are only challenged as a result 
of self-interested individual choices. This also applies to proponents of recognition for whom 
inclusion results from the state’s acknowledgement of claims made by or on the part of 
marginalised groups. An issue stemming from associating inclusion to individual choice is that 
exclusion may be designated as the preferred tool to promote justice. Ultimately, the 
prospect of substantiating liberal equality is compromised by the impossibility to question the 
virtues of individual autonomy, choice, and market exchange in the name of equality. 
Constructing their political vision in part on the shortcomings of liberalism, neoliberal 
thinkers fully deny the political potential of equality. Rather than a merely destructive 
ideology, neoliberalism is a branch of political economy that designates markets as vectors of 
individual emancipation. In a neoliberal context, every sphere of social life becomes a 
potential market on which individuals may wish to advance their self-interests. Marketisation 
elevates, not equality, but pure competition as a societal goal. To the extent that competition 
is fostered by a regime of inequalities by which individuals aim to acquire what they do not 
yet have by overcoming others, neoliberal thinkers like Friedman and Hayek treat inequalities 





exchange. Foucault and his intellectual followers remark that economic conducts associated 
with neoliberalism differ from classical considerations of homo economicus as a utility-
maximising subject. Instead, the neoliberal subject is an ‘entrepreneur of the self’ producing 
capital for and as itself. Production is no longer limited to commodities but also the individual 
as ‘project’. Endowed with the task of increasing its own capital value, homo neoliberalis is 
fixated on being ‘liked’ by others while competing to fulfil its own individual desires. This also 
applies to political behaviours where individual opinions are ‘shared’ without any need to 
interact with others. Ultimately, the current neoliberal hegemony signals the metamorphosis 
of the liberal ideal of autonomy into its heteronomous opposite. Existing neoliberal 
democracies do not correspond to the liberal ideal of autonomous individuals concurrently 
driven by private interests and the collective realisation of the common good. Rather, they 
reveal a sum of atomised individuals heteronomously driven by their desires and that of 
others in a marketised regime of inequalities. Most importantly, the neoliberal situation 
indicates that attempting to realise equality through liberal means is a political impasse. 
Decisively stepping away from liberal concerns, Rancière and Badiou radically open up 
the emancipatory potential of equality by treating it as the starting point of politics rather 
than its goal. Declaring the equal capacity of ‘everyone and anyone’, Rancière embraces the 
demos in its anarchical composition and its potential to dissent from the police order. Both 
Rancière and Badiou conceptualise equality against the limits of existing identities. From their 
standpoint, categorisations in place belong to the existing state of a situation or police order 
that must be overcome to make room for egalitarian politics. Although close at many levels, 
Rancière and Badiou’s egalitarianisms theoretically part ways on the question of 
subjectivation. Whereas for Rancière political subjects are constituted through the staging of 
a wrong, speaking on behalf of those ‘without parts’, Badiou introduces the subject through 
the concept of ‘event’. Following a succinct and unexpected political event, subjects must 
retrace truth through their fidelity to that event. More than Rancière, Badiou is prepared to 
thoroughly conceptualise the subjective process by which politics may appear in the world. 
Through his axiomatic consideration of equality and his understanding of politics as a truth 
procedure driven by fidelity, Badiou provides a framework from which thinking the 
materialisation of egalitarian politics becomes possible. Although Badiou guides his readers 
out of the impasse of liberal (in)equality, his egalitarianism too often retains properties of the 





Badiou forecloses the possibility to conceptualise equality in material terms. By systematically 
subordinating existing bodies to theoretical subjects, he produces a largely objectless account 
of politics that risks remaining blind to the dogmatic leanings of a political ‘One’.  
Building in part on Badiou’s concept of fidelity, faith was discussed for its potential as 
a political process. With St Paul, faith appears as a deeply inclusive process empowering 
subjects ‘in the now’ rather than in a distant prophetic future. Open to all so long as they are 
faithful, the egalitarian potential of Pauline faith continues to inspire political thinkers today. 
When Paul is read alongside Kierkegaard, faith is unveiled as the deepest form of subjective 
commitment between a truth and its subject. For Kierkegaard, faith is in many ways superior 
to knowledge. Immediacy and accessibility constitute another egalitarian characteristic of 
faith. Inasmuch as knowledge acquisition requires time, resources, and intellect, faith reveals 
its truth to all willing to make the leap. Against purely antinomian readings of Paul, it was 
argued that faithful commitment requires an objective component. For politics, the object of 
faith reformulated secularly as fidelity is attached to the egalitarian axiom and the 
materialisation of a collective subject-body. To the extent that ‘the One’ is evacuated, political 
faith summons the political collective ‘Us’ not only as its subject but also as its object.  
The last chapter of this thesis was dedicated to elucidating the material facet of 
egalitarian politics. Beginning with the collective to which objective fidelity is attached, it is 
essential to identify the ‘We’ of egalitarian politics. To the extent that a theoretical subject 
does not necessarily correspond to politics ‘in action’, the figure of the body must be 
recovered. Insofar as bodies are present on the ground, they must participate to their own 
subjectivation into a collective. Not only is asserting or enforcing a political truth on bodies 
self-defeating, it also contradicts the egalitarian axiom from which politics emanates. Two 
processes characterise the role of existing bodies in materialising egalitarian politics, each of 
which conditions their objective fidelity: recognition and inclusion. Whilst recognition refers 
to bodies’ ability to recognise themselves within a subjectivised collective, inclusion measures 
the collective’s capacity to include every-body. Besides the figure of the body, political 
materiality also refers to the spatiality of the ground. Only the basal ground provides a space 
shared by all able to sustain the materialisation of a collective subject-body. From the ground 
up, bodies get a perspective on a political sequence unfolding, either recognising themselves 
within the political collective or refusing its truth. Egalitarian materiality is also conveyed 





bodies relate as equals through reciprocal exchange, equal distribution, and shared 
production.  
Equality can be materialised by politics. Rising above the mist of liberal inequalities, 
we must be willing to restart as equals stripped of identarian concerns. Committed to equality 
and the political truths it may generate, we must also direct our fidelity towards the objective 
realisation of these truths, for egalitarian politics demands a leap of faith as much as a step 
forward. Taking this step on the ancestral ground, we advance towards a novel collective 
subject. It is there, faced with the groundwork of a contingent subject-body that we may 
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